Establishing the Two-Step “Particularly Serious Crime” Test and CAT Deferral Standards: Jimenez v. Bondi

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Jimenez v. Bondi (2025) addresses the standards for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) when an applicant has an aggravated felony conviction and for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez, a Brazilian national convicted in Connecticut of second-degree strangulation, challenged multiple Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decisions denying his continuance requests, asylum applications, withholding of removal and CAT relief, reconsideration and reopening. The government, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice, urged dismissal. The Court consolidated three of Jimenez’s petitions, denied them, and dismissed the fourth.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held that Jimenez’s conviction for second-degree strangulation is a “particularly serious crime” even though he received a suspended three-year sentence (less than the five-year safe harbor). Under the two-step analysis, the crime’s elements and surrounding facts supported the finding.
Because of that determination, Jimenez is ineligible for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii). The Court did not need to resolve whether jurisdictional bars on factual review extend to withholding claims.
The Court also affirmed the denial of CAT deferral, finding that Jimenez failed to show he would more likely than not be tortured by or with acquiescence of Brazilian officials.
His challenges to the denial of continuance, remand, reconsideration, and reopening under the applicable abuse-of-discretion standards likewise failed.
All petitions were denied or dismissed, pending motions were denied, and stays were vacated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv): establishes a five-year sentencing safe harbor for per se “particularly serious crimes.”
In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007): outlines the two-step “particularly serious crime” test (elements plus fact-specific inquiry).
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008): factors relevant to seriousness include nature of conviction, underlying facts, sentence imposed, and danger to community.
Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005) and Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): framework for reviewing IJ decisions as modified by the BIA.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020): jurisdictional limits on review of withholding and CAT claims.
Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021): standard for substantial-evidence review of CAT deferral.
Ming Dai, Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): adverse-credibility principle where testimony conflicts with objective evidence.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): abrogated Chevron deference but preserved precedential holdings.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a two-step inquiry under INA § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii):

Does the crime’s statutory elements place it in the category of potentially “particularly serious crimes”? Here, Connecticut’s strangulation statute targets violent, person-on-person harm, satisfying that threshold.
If so, do the conviction record, sentencing, and underlying facts support a finding of seriousness? Although Jimenez’s three-year sentence was suspended, the BIA explicitly considered suspension irrelevant under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) and emphasized the violent nature of strangulation.

On CAT deferral, the Court held that Jimenez’s omissions in his written application and the delay since past police assaults undermined his claim that future torture was more likely than not. The BIA’s reliance on country-conditions evidence and lack of proof of government acquiescence with gang violence met the substantial-evidence standard.

Impact

This decision:

Reaffirms the two-step framework for “particularly serious crime” determinations and clarifies that suspended sentences count as “terms of imprisonment.”
Confirms that fact-specific evidence of danger to the community is subsumed in the seriousness analysis and no separate overall dangerousness finding is required.
Illustrates the high bar for CAT deferral, particularly the consequences of omissions in asylum applications and the need for concrete proof of government acquiescence.
Demonstrates the rigorous standards for continuance, remand, reconsideration, and reopening motions in removal proceedings and the strict procedural rules governing ineffective-assistance claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggravated Felony: A crime defined by statute that carries severe immigration consequences, including limits on relief from removal.
Particularly Serious Crime: A non-statutory category for withholding of removal; crimes are per se serious if sentenced to five years or more, otherwise agencies apply the two-step test.
Chevron Deference: A doctrine giving courts deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes; its status post-Loper Bright is unsettled, but prior holdings remain intact.
CAT Deferral: Protection from removal when torture is likely, even if the applicant is barred from withholding due to criminal history.

Conclusion

Jimenez v. Bondi is a key articulation of how aggravated felony convictions interact with withholding and CAT deferral in removal proceedings. It confirms that violent offenses—regardless of suspended sentences—can be “particularly serious,” barring withholding relief, and underscores the applicant’s burden to present credible, consistent evidence of future torture. Practitioners should note the strict procedural thresholds for challenging removability, seeking continuances, and raising ineffective-assistance claims before the BIA and the courts.