Enhanced Sentencing for Stolen Firearms: Possession “In Connection With” a Related Felony Under USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

Introduction

United States v. Marvin Green (11th Cir. Dec. 11, 2024) clarifies the application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to defendants who possess firearms stolen during another felony. Marvin Green, a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), pled guilty to possession of a firearm after stealing a handgun and ammunition in a burglary. The district court applied a four-level enhancement on the ground that Green “possessed any firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense.” Green challenged that enhancement and the district court’s “Keene statement” on harmless error. The Eleventh Circuit affirms both the enhancement and the sentencing procedures, establishing that: (1) a firearm taken in the course of a completed felony remains “in connection with” that felony for enhancement purposes, and (2) a district court must reserve its harmless‐error (Keene) statement until after hearing allocution and §3553(a) arguments.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Marvin Green was arrested with a stolen .45-caliber handgun and ammunition from a truck burglary committed two days earlier. He pled guilty to one count of possession by a felon under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
2. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) applied a four-level enhancement under USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (“in connection with another felony offense”) because the firearm had been stolen in the burglary.
3. Green objected, arguing the burglary was complete at his arrest and the firearm did not facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the burglary post-completion.
4. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the four-level enhancement, and later announced it would impose the same sentence even if the enhancement were erroneous—before hearing allocution and §3553(a) arguments.
5. After allocution and argument, the court sentenced Green to 100 months’ imprisonment (above the 70–87-month guideline range) and three years’ supervised release.
6. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held (a) the enhancement properly applies whenever the firearm stolen in a felony is possessed “in connection with” that felony, regardless of when discovered; (b) the enhancement is supported by precedent and the text; and (c) although the district court’s Keene statement was premature, the enhancement was correct—so no harmless-error analysis was required.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) – mandates a four-level increase for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.”
• United States v. Young (11th Cir. 1997) – affirmed enhancement when a burglar stole a gun during a burglary and was later arrested—even though the gun was never used.
• United States v. Brooks (11th Cir. 2024) – held “in connection with” means a firearm “facilitates, or has the potential of facilitating” the other offense, and that stolen firearms may qualify as “fruit of the crime” yet still meet this standard.
• United States v. Keene (11th Cir. 2006) – provides that guideline errors are harmless if the district court states it would impose the same sentence and that sentence is substantively reasonable.
• Other cases (e.g., Carillo-Ayala, Jackson, Rhind) – reinforce that mere possession of a firearm during a felony can deter opposition or facilitate flight, supporting the “potential to facilitate” test.

Legal Reasoning

The court begins with the plain text of §2K2.1(b)(6)(B), noting it applies to defendants who “used or possessed” a firearm “in connection with another felony.” The use of past tense indicates coverage of any prior possession linked to a felony, not just contemporaneous possession at the moment of commission. Under Brooks, “in connection with” is properly read to require facilitation or potential facilitation of the felony. The Eleventh Circuit held that a firearm stolen during a burglary inherently “has the potential” to facilitate that burglary—by emboldening a burglar, guarding stolen goods, or enabling escape—even if the burglary is complete by the time of arrest. The court declined to carve out a temporal exception for a completed offense, distinguishing Green’s status from neither Young nor broader doctrine.

On the “Keene statement,” the court explains that a district court must reserve any harmless-error declaration until after hearing allocution and §3553(a) arguments, because only then is the court’s sentencing decision truly formed. Here, the trial court’s announcement that it “would nonetheless impose the same sentence” came prematurely—before allocution and argument—effectively nullifying allocution rights. Although the district court’s timing violated procedure, no harmless-error inquiry was necessary because the sentencing enhancement itself was correct.

Impact

United States v. Green cements several important principles for future sentencing:

1. No temporal gap limitation: A firearm stolen during a felony remains “in connection with” that felony for purposes of §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) even if police discover it later.
2. Facilitation standard: Mere possession of a stolen firearm qualifies as having the potential to facilitate the underlying felony, triggering the four-level enhancement.
3. Keene timing: District courts must hear allocution and §3553(a) arguments before stating whether a guideline error would alter the sentence, preserving defendants’ rights and appellate review integrity.

Sentencers and practitioners should note that any firearm obtained during a burglary or similar felony may expose defendants to this specific enhancement—even when the firearm is not used in a subsequent crime.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“In Connection With” (USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B))

Means that a firearm either helps commit the felony or has the potential to do so—even if the vehicle of facilitation is only the defendant’s awareness of having the weapon.

“Keene Statement”

A declaration by a sentencing court that its final sentence would be unchanged even if it applied a different guideline calculation. To be valid, it must come after hearing both the government’s and defendant’s arguments and after allocution.

“Preponderance of the Evidence”

The standard under which the government must prove facts supporting sentencing enhancements—more likely than not.

“Allocution”

The defendant’s right to speak before sentencing, explaining personal circumstances or expressing remorse. Denial of a meaningful allocution can require remand for resentencing.

Conclusion

United States v. Marvin Green reinforces that firearms stolen in the course of any felony qualify for the four-level enhancement under USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) so long as they facilitate—or have the potential to facilitate—that felony. The decision dispels any notion that the enhancement applies only to weapons possessed at the moment of commission. It also reminds district courts to defer harmless-error statements until sentencing arguments and allocution conclude. Taken together, Green strengthens prosecutors’ ability to secure enhanced sentences for stolen firearms and clarifies procedural safeguards to ensure that defendants’ allocution rights and appellate review remain intact.