Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements and the Standard for Unconscionability in Vermont

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Vermont decided in Danielle Lacroix v. Peter Rysz, 2025 VT 16, whether a broadly drafted prenuptial agreement should be set aside as unconscionable. Wife, Danielle Lacroix, sought to nullify her agreement with husband Peter Rysz on grounds that its terms were substantively unfair and that husband’s misconduct had constructively forced her to file for divorce. The Family Division granted wife’s motion, applied a novel “vitiation of marriage” unconscionability standard borrowed from Massachusetts law, and redistributed the couple’s assets under 15 V.S.A. § 751. Husband appealed, arguing that Vermont precedent requires a different approach to conscionability and that the trial court erred in ancillary rulings on subpoenas and length-of-marriage findings. The Supreme Court reversed the unconscionability ruling and remanded for further fact-finding on wife’s alternate breach and coercion arguments.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Vermont held:

The Family Division misapplied Vermont’s unconscionability standard (as set forth in Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353 (1991)) by invalidating the prenuptial agreement on the ground that it “vitiate[d] the very status of marriage.”
Vermont law measures unconscionability based on circumstances at the time of execution, not on the ultimate financial outcome at divorce. Prenuptial agreements that leave spouses in the same financial position they enjoyed before marriage are not per se unconscionable.
The Court reversed the Family Division’s determination that the entire agreement was unenforceable and remanded for consideration of wife’s alternative arguments—that husband failed to fulfill obligations under the agreement and that his misconduct constructively forced her to seek a divorce.
The Court did not reach issues regarding subpoenas of non-parties or the length-of-marriage calculation because those questions will depend on the outcome of further proceedings.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353 (1991): Established four criteria for enforcing prenuptial agreements in Vermont—fair disclosure, voluntary execution, substantive fairness, and lack of unconscionability.
Rock v. Rock, 2023 VT 42: Reaffirmed Bassler’s requirements for disclosure, voluntariness, and fairness in marital agreements.
Gamache v. Smurro, 2006 VT 67: Confirmed that prenuptial agreements are contracts to be interpreted under general contract-law principles.
Padova v. Padova, 123 Vt. 125 (1962): Emphasized that unconscionability must be shown “at the time of execution.”
Maglin v. Tschannerl, 174 Vt. 39 (2002): Reviewed unconscionability based on formation circumstances.
Austin v. Austin, 839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005): Massachusetts case holding a prenup unconscionable because it left parties materially unchanged by marriage—relied on by the Family Division but deemed inapplicable to Vermont’s test.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s opinion centers on proper application of the unconscionability prong in Bassler. Under Vermont law:

Unconscionability is assessed at the time the agreement is signed, not at divorce.
Agreements that preserve separate property or income streams—even if they leave spouses in the exact financial position as before marriage—do not automatically offend public policy.
The Family Division’s reliance on an out-of-state “vitiation of marriage” standard exceeded Vermont precedent and undermined freedom of contract principles recognized in family law contexts (Theberge v. Theberge, 2020 VT 13).

The Court observed that requiring a prenup to guarantee a significant property settlement or maintenance regardless of parties’ agreement would nullify one of the principal purposes of such contracts: protecting assets from being subject to marital distribution. Having determined that the agreement was procedurally sound (full financial disclosure, independent counsel, no duress) and substantively within the parties’ bargaining range, the Court reversed the blanket unconscionability finding.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies and fortifies Vermont’s prenuptial agreement jurisprudence:

Reaffirms that unconscionability must focus on execution circumstances, not marital outcome.
Preserves parties’ freedom to contractually define property rights and support obligations, even to the extent of limiting spousal maintenance.
Signals that Vermont courts will not import broader or more demanding fairness tests used in other jurisdictions.
Emphasizes importance of fact-finding on alternative challenges—especially claims of breach and constructive coercion—before invalidating entire agreements.

Future litigants and practitioners should ensure prenuptial agreements are negotiated with full disclosure, time to consider terms, and clarity about post-divorce rights. This case also highlights that courts will examine whether a spouse’s post-execution misconduct triggers contract defenses such as breach or constructive requisition of divorce.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unconscionability: A contract defense applied when terms are so one-sided or the bargaining process so unfair that enforcing the contract would shock the conscience. In Vermont, courts look at conditions when signing, not the end result upon divorce.
Procedural Fairness: Ensures both parties had adequate disclosure, independent advice, and freedom from duress at signing.
Substantive Fairness: Assesses whether the agreed-upon property division or support terms are within the range of what a court could impose under statutory guidelines.
Constructive Coercion: Arises when one spouse’s post-agreement misconduct—such as abuse or economic manipulation—effectively forces the other to sue for divorce, potentially activating special contract provisions or defenses.
Public Charge Doctrine: A prenup that leaves a spouse dependent on public assistance may be unenforceable; courts avoid agreements that shift economic burden to taxpayers.

Conclusion

Danielle Lacroix v. Peter Rysz underscores Vermont’s commitment to established contract and family-law principles in evaluating prenuptial agreements. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that unconscionability must be shown at execution, preserving parties’ autonomy to structure their financial relationship. By reversing the Family Division’s expansion of the unconscionability test and remanding for consideration of breach and coercion claims, the Court balanced freedom of contract with protection against misuse of prenups. This decision will guide practitioners in drafting durable agreements and shape how Vermont courts address post-execution challenges.