Introduction

In James Taylor v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation, No. 24-12771 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) suit arising from a Georgia nonjudicial foreclosure initiated after the death of the original mortgagor. The plaintiff, James Taylor, became a successor in interest to his late mother’s refinanced mortgage and sued the loan servicer (Freedom Mortgage Corporation) and its foreclosure counsel (McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC), alleging violations of FDCPA §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f(6).

The appeal presented two threshold FDCPA issues and one procedural issue:

• Whether a loan servicer that began servicing before default qualifies as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA’s primary definition (§ 1692a(6)) for purposes of §§ 1692d and 1692e.
• Whether a law firm that undertakes only nonjudicial foreclosure and issues state-law required foreclosure notices falls within the FDCPA’s primary “debt collector” definition.
• Whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged a § 1692f(6) claim by asserting that the defendants lacked the lawful right to enforce the security interest, and whether amendment should have been allowed.

The court held that neither defendant was a “debt collector” under the Act’s primary definition, that the § 1692f(6) claim failed because the servicer possessed a present right to possession through an enforceable security interest, and that amendment would have been futile.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim:

• Counts 1–3 (§§ 1692d, 1692e): Dismissed because neither Freedom Mortgage nor McCalla qualified as “debt collectors” under the FDCPA’s primary definition. Freedom Mortgage was a loan servicer that began servicing before default and is excluded by § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). McCalla’s role was limited to nonjudicial foreclosure and sending notices mandated by Georgia law, which does not suffice under Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP.
• Count 4 (§ 1692f(6)): Dismissed because the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege any of the three statutory triggers, particularly § 1692f(6)(A). Plaintiff’s own exhibits established that Freedom Mortgage had a present right to possession via an enforceable security interest and retained McCalla to foreclose after default.
• Leave to amend: Affirmed as futile. The plaintiff forfeited appellate challenge to the futility determination and, in any event, the pleadings and exhibits showed amendment could not cure the defects, particularly given similar prior suits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466 (2019): The Supreme Court held that entities engaged solely in nonjudicial foreclosure are generally not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA’s primary definition (§ 1692a(6)), though they are subject to § 1692f(6) as “security interest enforcers.” The Eleventh Circuit relied on Obduskey to conclude McCalla’s foreclosure-only activity and statutorily required notices did not bring it within §§ 1692d or 1692e.
• Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015): Davidson interprets § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) to exclude from the primary definition loan servicers and others who obtain debts before default. The court applied this exclusion to Freedom Mortgage because it began servicing at origination/refinance and before any default.
• Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012): Reese recognizes that liability under § 1692e requires the defendant to be a “debt collector” and clarifies that self-identification as a debt collector in a letter does not control; the statutory definition governs. The court used Reese to reject reliance on McCalla’s boilerplate “may be deemed a debt collector” language.
• Twombly and Iqbal: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) provide the plausibility standard guiding the § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)/Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.
• Gill v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504 (11th Cir. 2019), and Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2016): Attachments to the complaint become part of the pleading and can be considered on a motion to dismiss. The court leaned heavily on plaintiff’s exhibits (loan documents, validation responses, and notices) to assess the plausibility of the claims.
• Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014): Pro se complaints are liberally construed, but courts cannot rewrite deficient pleadings. The opinion acknowledges pro se leniency yet enforces substantive pleading standards.
• Woldeab v. DeKalb County Board of Education, 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018), Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2023), and Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019): These decisions frame when leave to amend should be granted and when amendment is futile. The court emphasized futility where the record shows the plaintiff cannot plausibly cure defects and where similar prior suits have already failed.
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014), and Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Issues not plainly and prominently raised on appeal are forfeited. The court applied forfeiture to the leave-to-amend challenge.
• Georgia nonjudicial foreclosure statute: Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑14‑162.2 requires written notice of the initiation of power-of-sale foreclosure and contact information for the party with authority to negotiate, amend, and modify loan terms. The statute supported characterizing McCalla’s letters as state-mandated, incidental to foreclosure—not independent debt collection.

Legal Reasoning

1. FDCPA “debt collector” status under the primary definition (§ 1692a(6)):
   • Freedom Mortgage: The complaint and attached loan documents showed the servicer’s role began at refinance (July 1, 2020) and before any default. Under § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) and Davidson, a servicer who acquires servicing rights pre‑default is excluded from the primary definition. Consequently, claims under §§ 1692d and 1692e cannot proceed against Freedom Mortgage.
   • McCalla (foreclosure counsel): The pleadings established the firm’s role was limited to initiating a Georgia nonjudicial foreclosure and sending the notices that Georgia law requires. Under Obduskey, this does not make the firm a “debt collector” under the primary definition. Incidental statements about payment or contacting the servicer, when mandated by state law and not accompanied by abusive collection conduct, do not transform foreclosure enforcement into “debt collection” for §§ 1692d/1692e purposes.
   • Self-identification is not dispositive: That McCalla’s correspondence included “may be deemed a debt collector” or similar FDCPA disclaimers does not compel the legal conclusion that it is a “debt collector.” Reese holds that the statute’s definition controls.
2. Section 1692f(6) (security interest enforcement):

   The FDCPA contains a broader, section-specific definition of “debt collector” for § 1692f(6) that includes security interest enforcers. But even assuming defendants fit that definition, a plaintiff must allege one of three triggers:

   • (A) no present right to possession through an enforceable security interest,
   • (B) no present intention to take possession, or
   • (C) the property is exempt by law from dispossession.

   Taylor rested on (A), arguing defendants lacked a legitimate interest because, among other reasons, they were not holders in due course. The court rejected this for two reasons:

   • The exhibits confirmed a present right to possession: The loan documents and notices attached to the complaint demonstrated that Freedom Mortgage, as servicer, had authority to enforce the security deed after default, including nonjudicial foreclosure, and McCalla acted as its agent for that purpose.
   • Holder-in-due-course theory is misplaced: Section 1692f(6)(A) asks whether there is a present right to possession “through an enforceable security interest,” not whether the enforcer is the original noteholder or a holder in due course. The servicer’s enforcement authority sufficed, particularly where the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) owned the loan and the servicer had contractual enforcement rights.

   Because plaintiff did not allege (B) or (C), and the exhibits contradicted (A), the § 1692f(6) claim failed.

3. Pleading standards and use of exhibits:

   Applying Twombly/Iqbal, the court looked to the factual allegations and incorporated exhibits (per Rule 10(c) and Gill/Hoefling). Those materials showed pre‑default servicing, state-law mandated foreclosure notices, and an enforceable security interest—facts that defeated plausibility for all counts.

4. Leave to amend and futility:

   Although pro se litigants typically receive at least one chance to amend, leave is not automatic. The court found Taylor forfeited the issue on appeal and, independently, that amendment would be futile: the core facts (timing of servicing, nature of counsel’s foreclosure role, and the servicer’s enforcement rights) could not be pleaded around, and similar prior suits had already failed.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Reaffirmed limits on FDCPA coverage in nonjudicial foreclosures: Borrowers in nonjudicial foreclosure states (like Georgia) face a narrow path to FDCPA relief under §§ 1692d and 1692e against servicers and foreclosure firms when servicing started pre‑default and counsel confines itself to foreclosure steps and state-mandated notices. Obduskey remains a strong shield for foreclosure counsel; Davidson’s pre‑default servicer exclusion remains dispositive for servicers.
• Pathways that could still trigger FDCPA liability:
  • Servicer acquired after default: If a servicer first acquires the account after it is in default, the § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exclusion does not apply, potentially exposing the servicer to §§ 1692d/1692e.
  • Conduct beyond foreclosure enforcement: If foreclosure counsel demands payment separate from enforcing the security interest, or engages in harassing or deceptive practices, it may step outside Obduskey’s foreclosure-only safe harbor for the primary definition.
  • Valid § 1692f(6) claims: Plaintiffs may plead § 1692f(6) where facts plausibly show no present right to possession (e.g., void or improperly assigned security interest), no present intent to repossess, or statutory exemption from dispossession.
• Use of complaint exhibits can be outcome-determinative: Attaching loan documents, validation letters, and foreclosure notices can either bolster or sink claims at the pleading stage. Parties should anticipate that courts will treat attachments as part of the allegations.
• For servicers and foreclosure firms:
  • Ensure foreclosure notices strictly track state statutory requirements (e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑14‑162.2: written notice; contact details for the authorized negotiator; timing; and method of service) and avoid extraneous language that could be construed as independent debt collection.
  • Maintain clear documentation showing pre‑default servicing and authority to enforce the security interest; these records can defeat FDCPA claims at the pleading stage.
  • Be cautious with dual-track communications. Combining foreclosure steps with aggressive collection demands can risk FDCPA exposure outside Obduskey’s safe harbor.
• For borrowers and heirs (successors in interest):
  • To state an FDCPA claim under §§ 1692d/1692e, identify conduct beyond foreclosure enforcement or facts showing the servicer acquired the loan after default.
  • For § 1692f(6), plead specific facts undermining the present right to possession (e.g., defects in assignment of the security deed, expiration or invalidity of the power of sale, statutory exemptions), or allege lack of present intent to foreclose.
  • Consider alternative claims and forums: state wrongful foreclosure, unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), or federal servicing statutes/regulations (e.g., RESPA’s Regulation X loss mitigation procedures) where applicable.
• Nonprecedential but persuasive: Although designated “Not for Publication,” the opinion offers a practical, persuasive application of Obduskey and Davidson that district courts within the Eleventh Circuit are likely to follow, especially at the screening or 12(b)(6) stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Debt collector” under the FDCPA (primary definition): A “debt collector” is generally someone whose business is mainly collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another. But the statute excludes servicers that obtained the loan before default. If the loan wasn’t in default when the servicer began servicing, the servicer typically is not a “debt collector” for §§ 1692d and 1692e.
• Security interest enforcers and § 1692f(6): The FDCPA has a special, broader coverage for § 1692f(6) that reaches those who enforce security interests (like conducting a foreclosure). Even then, liability exists only if one of three conditions is met—most commonly, there is no present right to possess the collateral through an enforceable security interest.
• Obduskey’s foreclosure-only safe harbor: If a law firm or trustee simply carries out a nonjudicial foreclosure and sends the notices required by state law, that activity alone usually does not make the firm a “debt collector” for the FDCPA’s primary provisions. Additional collection behavior can change that analysis.
• “Present right to possession” vs. “holder in due course”: “Holder in due course” is a negotiable instruments concept. Section 1692f(6) focuses instead on whether the enforcer currently has a legally enforceable security interest allowing repossession/foreclosure. A servicer can have that right even if it is not the original noteholder, such as where an investor (like Ginnie Mae) owns the loan and the servicer is authorized to enforce.
• Effect of exhibits on pleadings: Documents attached to a complaint are treated as part of the pleading. Courts can rely on them at the motion-to-dismiss stage; if they contradict the complaint’s conclusions, the documents control.
• Pro se leniency vs. plausibility: Courts read pro se complaints liberally but still require factual allegations that, taken as true, plausibly show entitlement to relief. Courts cannot rewrite the complaint to add missing elements.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores three core principles in FDCPA litigation arising out of nonjudicial foreclosure:

• Pre‑default servicer exclusion: A servicer who began servicing before default is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA’s primary definition, foreclosing §§ 1692d and 1692e claims against it on that basis.
• Foreclosure counsel under Obduskey: A law firm engaged solely in nonjudicial foreclosure—and sending state-law required notices—does not become a “debt collector” under the FDCPA’s primary definition simply by providing those notices, even if the letters include standard FDCPA disclaimers.
• § 1692f(6) triggers are specific and fact-dependent: A plaintiff must plausibly allege the absence of a present right to possession (or the other triggers). Exhibits showing a valid, enforceable security interest and authorized foreclosure will defeat such claims.

Procedurally, the case also illustrates the power of complaint exhibits at the pleading stage and that leave to amend, while generally favored, will be denied where amendment cannot cure fundamental legal defects. While unpublished, the opinion provides clear, practical guidance: in the Eleventh Circuit, FDCPA claims tied to Georgia nonjudicial foreclosure will rarely proceed past the pleadings unless plaintiffs can allege facts showing post-default acquisition by the servicer, collection conduct beyond foreclosure, or a concrete defect that negates the present right to enforce the security interest.

Key Citations

• Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466 (2019)
• Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015)
• Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012)
• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
• Gill v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504 (11th Cir. 2019)
• Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2016)
• Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014)
• Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018)
• Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2023)
• Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019)
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)
• Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008)
• Ga. Code Ann. § 44‑14‑162.2