Delegating the Temporal Reach of Arbitration Agreements:
Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC (Tex. 2025)

Introduction

In Abigail Dalila Cerna, as Next Friend of R.W. v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC, the Supreme Court of Texas confronts a recurring and practically important question in modern arbitration law: when parties dispute whether an arbitration agreement extends to later events or transactions, is that question one of the agreement’s existence (for courts) or its scope (potentially for the arbitrator)?

The case arises from a parent’s execution of a broad release and arbitration agreement upon entering a trampoline park with her minor child. Months later, during a second visit for which no new agreement was signed, the child allegedly suffered a serious injury. The mother sued in court. The park moved to compel arbitration based on the first agreement. The central dispute: does the original agreement—silent as to its duration—govern claims from a later visit?

The opinion clarifies and extends Texas law at the intersection of:

• The two-step judicial inquiry into arbitration (existence vs. scope);
• The enforceability of delegation clauses that assign “gateway” issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator; and
• How disputes about the temporal reach or duration of an arbitration agreement are characterized.

The Texas Supreme Court holds that, once a valid arbitration agreement is established, a dispute over its duration—here, whether it covers a second visit to the premises— is a scope question. And because the parties had clearly and unmistakably delegated issues of “scope, arbitrability, or validity” to the arbitrator, the court must compel arbitration and allow the arbitrator to decide whether the November injury claim is covered.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The August Visit and Agreement

On August 30, 2020, Abigail Cerna and her minor child visited Urban Air Trampoline and Adventure Park in Pearland, Texas. As a precondition to entry, Cerna signed a document titled:

“Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement”

(“the August Agreement”). The agreement:

• Released “all claims” against Urban Air and related entities;
• Covered entry to the Pearland location “or any other premises owned or operated by Urban Air wherever located”; and
• Contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that:
  • Any “dispute or claim arising out of or relating to” the agreement, “the Premises,” “Activities,” or personal injury be arbitrated; and
  • Disputes concerning “the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement” be “settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator” under AAA Commercial Rules.

The agreement did not contain any express provision addressing its duration (how long it would last, whether it applied to future visits, or whether it expired at the end of the initial visit).

B. The November Visit and Injury

On November 21, 2020—approximately three months later—Cerna and her child returned to the same Urban Air location. This time, they did not sign a new release or waiver. While jumping on a trampoline, the child allegedly suffered a serious injury by cutting his foot.

Cerna, acting as next friend of her minor child, filed suit in court, alleging negligence and related claims arising from the November incident.

C. Motion to Compel Arbitration and Lower Court Rulings

Urban Air’s position:

• The August Agreement is a valid and binding contract.
• The November injury occurred on Urban Air’s premises and therefore falls within the agreement’s broad arbitration clause.
• The agreement clearly and unmistakably delegates questions of “scope, arbitrability, or validity” to the arbitrator, which includes whether it covers the November visit.

Cerna’s position (as relevant to this appeal):

• There is no arbitration agreement governing the November visit because:
  • The August Agreement does not say it applies to future visits; and
  • No new agreement was signed in November.
• Therefore, Urban Air failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement covering the November incident, and the motion to compel should be denied.

The trial court denied Urban Air’s motion to compel arbitration.

On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District (Houston):

1. Held that the August Agreement is a valid and binding contract covering Cerna and her child;
2. Characterized Cerna’s argument (that the agreement did not cover the November visit) as a scope challenge, not an existence challenge; and
3. Concluded that because the agreement expressly delegated scope questions to the arbitrator, the trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration.

The Texas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeals.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Bland, holds:

1. Courts must conduct a two-step inquiry in arbitration cases:
   • (1) Determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; and
   • (2) Determine whether the dispute falls within the agreement’s scope, unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated that question to the arbitrator.
2. Here, the existence and validity of the August Agreement is undisputed.
3. The question whether the August Agreement extends to claims arising from a later visit—i.e., its duration or temporal reach—is a question of the agreement’s scope, not its existence.
4. The August Agreement contains a clear and unmistakable delegation clause, expressly assigning disputes about its “scope, arbitrability, or validity” to the arbitrator.
5. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to decide whether the agreement covered the November visit. That threshold arbitrability issue must be decided by the arbitrator.
6. The Court expressly declines to decide whether, as a matter of contract interpretation, the August Agreement actually applies to the November visit. That merits/arbitrability decision is reserved for the arbitrator.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to compel arbitration.

III. Analytical Framework: Existence, Scope, and Delegation

A. The Two-Step Inquiry: Existence vs. Scope

Texas follows the now-familiar “two-step” framework, reflected in both state and federal arbitration law:

1. Step One – Existence / Formation: The court decides whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
   • This inquiry uses ordinary contract law principles: offer, acceptance, consideration, capacity, defenses to formation, etc.
   • Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 171.021(b) and 9 U.S.C. § 4 (FAA) both require the court to be “satisfied” that an arbitration agreement exists before compelling arbitration.
2. Step Two – Scope / Arbitrability: If a valid agreement exists, the next question is whether the particular dispute falls within its scope. By default, the court decides this question, but parties may agree to delegate it to the arbitrator.

The Court cites In re Rubiola for the basic two-part test: the party seeking arbitration must show “(1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope.”

B. Delegation Clauses and the “Clear and Unmistakable” Standard

Because arbitration agreements are contracts, parties can adjust the default allocation of who decides certain threshold issues. Specifically, they can adopt a delegation provision that sends “gateway” questions of arbitrability (e.g., scope, enforceability) to the arbitrator.

However, courts will enforce such delegations only if they are:

• “Clear and unmistakable”—language that clearly communicates that the parties intended the arbitrator, not the court, to decide arbitrability questions that courts would otherwise decide.

The Court relies heavily on its own recent decisions—RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, Robinson v. Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc., and TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC— as well as U.S. Supreme Court authority (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.) to reinforce the principle that:

• If a valid arbitration agreement exists, and
• It clearly and unmistakably delegates arbitrability questions,

then the court must compel arbitration even if it believes the arbitrability claim is weak or “wholly groundless.”

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. In re Rubiola (2011)

In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2011), supplies the basic test for compelling arbitration in Texas: validity and scope. The Court cites Rubiola to restate that the movant bears the burden to prove:

1. The existence of a valid arbitration agreement; and
2. That the dispute falls within its scope.

Rubiola’s framework underpins the Court’s insistence on separating “existence” and “scope” as distinct inquiries, a separation that becomes central when parties attempt to recharacterize scope disputes as existence disputes to avoid delegation clauses.

B. TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC (Tex. 2023)

TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023), is the doctrinal backbone of the opinion. There, the Court confronted a party who tried to frame its argument as one that “no arbitration agreement exists as to the claims asserted in this suit.” The Court rejected that framing as an impermissible collapse of the two inquiries—existence and scope—into one.

Key teachings from TotalEnergies that are explicitly extended here:

• If the parties concede that an arbitration agreement exists and is valid, then arguments that the agreement does not cover particular claims are scope challenges, not existence challenges.
• Scope disputes—such as whether claims “arise out of” a contract containing the arbitration clause— are arbitrability issues that can be delegated to an arbitrator.
• Courts must respect a clear delegation clause by compelling arbitration and allowing the arbitrator to decide which claims fall within the agreement.

Cerna invoked language from TotalEnergies suggesting that existence questions include whether an agreement “exists as to” particular claims. The Court explains that this language cannot be used to erase the distinction between existence and scope. Otherwise, any scope dispute could be rebranded as an existence dispute, effectively nullifying delegation provisions.

In Cerna, the Court applies this reasoning directly: the argument that the August Agreement does not “exist as to” the November claim is a scope argument because the formation and current existence of the August Agreement are not in dispute.

C. Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc. (Tex. 2022) and Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski (U.S. 2024)

Transcor Astra, 650 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2022), involved parties who had entered into an initial contract with an arbitration clause and a later settlement agreement that arguably superseded or displaced the prior contract. The question was whether the original arbitration agreement “still exists at all” after the later contract.

The Court held in Transcor that:

• When parties enter into a subsequent agreement that may supersede or extinguish an earlier arbitration agreement, the issue is one of the continued existence of the first agreement.
• That is a formation/existence question that courts must decide, even in the presence of a delegation clause in the earlier agreement.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024), adopted essentially the same approach, holding that where:

• One contract sends arbitrability disputes to arbitration; and
• A later contract sends arbitrability disputes to the courts (expressly or by implication);

the question which contract governs is a gateway formation/existence issue for the court.

In Cerna, the Court distinguishes that scenario. There is no subsequent agreement governing the November visit that might displace or conflict with the August Agreement. Thus, unlike Transcor Astra and Coinbase, there is no genuine dispute that the August Agreement “still exists” as a contract. The only dispute is whether its coverage extends to the later injury—squarely a scope issue.

D. RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome (Tex. 2018)

In RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. 2018), the Court enforced a clear delegation clause where the respondent conceded the existence of an arbitration agreement but argued it did not apply to certain disputes. The Court held that such arguments must be resolved by the arbitrator when there is a clear delegation of arbitrability.

In Cerna, the Court quotes RSL Funding to reaffirm that a party who “concedes the existence of the agreement” cannot avoid a delegation clause by recasting scope arguments as existence arguments.

E. Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero (Tex. 2022) and Robinson v. Home Owners Management (2019)

In Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, 642 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2022), the Court held that language stating “[a]rbitration shall be the sole forum to determine the validity, scope and breadth of this Agreement” constituted a clear and unmistakable delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

Similarly, Robinson v. Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2019), adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework from Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., distinguishing “questions of arbitrability” (for courts absent delegation) from procedural or subsidiary questions (for arbitrators).

Cerna relies on these precedents to conclude that language delegating disputes about the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement is sufficiently clear and unmistakable to require judicial deference.

F. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. and Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.

The Court cites Henry Schein, 586 U.S. 63 (2019), for the important principle that courts may not create a “wholly groundless” exception to delegation clauses. If parties clearly and unmistakably agree that the arbitrator decides arbitrability, courts cannot refuse to compel arbitration just because they think the arbitration claim is frivolous or obviously inapplicable.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022), is cited more generally for the principle that arbitration agreements must be treated like any other contract—neither disfavored nor given special solicitous treatment.

In Cerna, these authorities support the Court’s insistence that once:

• A valid agreement with a delegation clause is established, and
• No later contract calls its continued existence into question,

the court must compel arbitration and cannot carve out an ad hoc exception because the dispute involves a later visit, or because the argument for coverage appears weak.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Cerna

A. Characterizing Cerna’s Argument: Existence or Scope?

Cerna’s core argument in the Supreme Court was framed as an existence challenge: she contended there was no arbitration agreement “for the November visit,” because:

• The August Agreement did not specify that it applied to future visits; and
• No agreement was signed on the date of the accident.

The Court rejects this framing. It observes that Cerna:

• Does not dispute the formation or validity of the August Agreement;
• Does not argue that she or her child are nonsignatories; and
• Does not point to any subsequent agreement that supersedes or terminates the August Agreement.

Given those concessions, the August Agreement clearly exists as a valid contract. Cerna’s argument is instead about:

“the extent of the agreement’s applicability—that is, whether it ‘exists as to the claims [she] has asserted in this suit.’”

The Court labels this a scope dispute: a question of whether the claims “arise out of” or “relate to” the agreement and the covered premises/activities, including over what time period.

If the Court accepted Cerna’s characterization, virtually any scope dispute could be recast as an “existence as to these claims” argument, collapsing the two-step framework and undermining delegation clauses. The Court, echoing TotalEnergies, emphatically refuses to allow that maneuver.

B. Duration as a Scope Question

An important doctrinal contribution of this opinion is the express holding that, once a valid agreement exists:

“The question of the agreement’s duration is one asking whether the claims asserted fall within the agreement’s scope.”

In other words, whether an arbitration clause extends to injuries occurring months later (and in different visits) is not—absent a later superseding contract—a formation/existence question. It is a matter of contract interpretation that falls within the scope inquiry.

The Court does not decide how a neutral arbitrator should interpret the duration of the August Agreement. It simply classifies the interpretive task (deciding what the parties meant by the agreement’s coverage of “the Premises” and “Activities,” and whether that covers future visits) as:

• Part of the scope inquiry; and
• Therefore delegable to the arbitrator when a clear delegation clause exists.

C. Effect of the Delegation Clause

The arbitration clause in the August Agreement not only commits substantive disputes to arbitration; it also provides that disputes concerning the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement itself must be decided by arbitration.

Relying on Baby Dolls and Robinson, the Court:

• Recognizes this language as a clear and unmistakable delegation of arbitrability; and
• Holds that it must be enforced according to its terms.

Thus, once the Court concludes:

1. A valid arbitration agreement exists (step one); and
2. The parties clearly delegated questions of scope and arbitrability to the arbitrator,

the judicial role is complete. The court may not:

• Decide whether the November visit is covered; or
• Consider whether Urban Air’s invocation of the clause is “frivolous” or “wholly groundless.”

Those issues go to the merits of arbitrability, which the parties validly assigned to the arbitrator.

D. Addressing Policy Concerns About “Perpetual” Delegation

Cerna warned that under the court of appeals’ and Urban Air’s view, a single signature with a delegation clause could “delegate disputes to arbitration in perpetuity,” even decades later, regardless of context.

The Court acknowledges this concern but identifies three important safeguards that prevent judicial abdication:

1. The “clear and unmistakable” standard Courts will not lightly infer delegation. The language must be explicit and unambiguous. This prevents parties from being dragged into arbitrators’ hands on gateway issues they never agreed to submit.
2. Superseding contracts and continued existence As illustrated by Transcor Astra and Coinbase, when parties enter new contracts that may:
   • Supersede or extinguish prior arbitration agreements, or
   • Assign arbitrability disputes to courts rather than arbitrators,
   courts retain authority—and indeed must exercise it—to decide which contract governs and whether the earlier arbitration agreement “still exists at all.” A delegation clause in the earlier agreement cannot override a later conflicting contract or oust courts from their contract-formation role.
3. Arbitrators can reject frivolous arbitrability claims Following Henry Schein, courts cannot apply a “wholly groundless” filter. But arbitrators retain the power to decide arbitrability and dismiss clearly inapplicable or frivolous arbitration demands. The question is not whether the dispute will be arbitrated, but who decides that question in the first instance.

Collectively, these safeguards preserve the two-step process:

• Courts decide: formation/existence and whether a delegation clause itself exists and is valid.
• Arbitrators (if delegated) decide: scope, enforceability in context, and arbitrability of specific disputes.

E. The Unresolved Issue: Does the August Agreement Actually Cover the November Visit?

The Court is explicit: it expresses no opinion on whether the August Agreement, properly construed, covers the November incident. That is now a question for the arbitrator to answer, aided by:

• The contract’s text (e.g., references to “the Premises,” “Activities,” and the absence of duration language);
• Parol evidence, if admissible and considered appropriate; and
• Applicable contract-law principles on duration and continuing obligations.

For practitioners, this underscores that winning the delegation battle (as Urban Air did here) is distinct from winning the coverage/arbitrability battle before the arbitrator.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Drafting and Transactional Practice

The decision has immediate implications for businesses that routinely use waivers and arbitration agreements for customer activities—such as trampoline parks, gyms, recreational facilities, and entertainment venues.

1. Include explicit duration / multi-visit coverage if that is intended If operators intend a waiver and arbitration agreement to cover:
   • Future visits; or
   • A defined period (e.g., one year);
   they should say so expressly. While Cerna allows such interpretive questions to go to an arbitrator if delegated, explicit duration language:
   • Reduces uncertainty;
   • Decreases the likelihood of litigation over arbitrability; and
   • Makes it more likely that the drafter’s intended scope will be enforced.
2. Use clear delegation language if you want the arbitrator to decide gateway issues Language delegating disputes over the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration clause has now been repeatedly endorsed as “clear and unmistakable” in Texas (Baby Dolls, TotalEnergies, Cerna). Drafters who want arbitrators, not courts, to decide coverage disputes should:
   • Include such language explicitly; and
   • Consider incorporating AAA or similar rules, which often contain their own competence-competence provisions.
3. Be mindful of later contracts and updates After Transcor Astra and Coinbase, introducing new customer agreements, updated terms of service, or settlement agreements can inadvertently create formation/existence questions that courts—not arbitrators—must decide. Businesses should:
   • Clearly state whether new forms supplement or replace prior agreements;
   • Ensure that arbitration provisions and delegation clauses are consistent across documents; and
   • Avoid conflicting forum-selection or dispute-resolution clauses in later contracts that could undermine earlier arbitration agreements.

B. For Litigators Challenging Arbitration

Cerna continues a trend in Texas law that narrows the path for litigants who concede a valid arbitration agreement but seek to avoid arbitration of particular disputes.

• Pure scope arguments (without a formation challenge) will usually go to the arbitrator when a delegation clause exists. Claims that “this agreement does not cover these facts” or “does not extend to this later event” are classic scope questions.
• To keep the issue in court, you must genuinely challenge formation/existence, for example:
  • No signature or manifestation of assent;
  • Lack of capacity or authority (e.g., minor, duress, fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause specifically);
  • A subsequent contract that supersedes the prior arbitration agreement; or
  • Non-signatory issues where no recognized theory of binding the non-signatory applies.
• Reframing a scope dispute as an existence dispute is unlikely to succeed. Courts will look behind labels and ask: is the party really contesting formation or the ongoing existence of the agreement, or merely its coverage?

C. For Courts Applying Texas Arbitration Law

The opinion offers a clear doctrinal decision tree for courts:

1. Step 1: Does a valid arbitration agreement exist?
   • If no: deny the motion to compel.
   • If yes: proceed to Step 2.
2. Step 2: Does the agreement contain a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability?
   • If no: the court decides scope and arbitrability.
   • If yes: proceed to Step 3.
3. Step 3: Is there a genuine formation/existence issue despite the delegation clause?
   • Examples: allegations of fraud in the making of the arbitration clause, or a later contract that may extinguish or displace the earlier arbitration agreement.
   • If such an issue exists: the court must decide it (Transcor Astra, Coinbase).
   • If not: the court must compel arbitration and let the arbitrator decide scope and arbitrability.

Cerna is a strong reaffirmation that once a valid agreement and a valid delegation clause are established, courts must resist the temptation to resolve close or interesting scope disputes themselves.

D. For Personal Injury and Minor-Child Claims

Although the core of the opinion is about arbitration doctrine, the facts—an injured child at a trampoline park—highlight a common context where such clauses arise. Two points of note:

• Binding minors through parents/guardians The opinion accepts, without revisiting, the court of appeals’ conclusion that the August Agreement bound both Cerna and her child. Texas law has generally enforced arbitration clauses signed by a parent or next friend in connection with a child’s participation in recreational activities, but this can be fact- and doctrine-specific.
• Public policy concerns are channeled to arbitrability merits, not judicial gatekeeping Any arguments about whether such a waiver should be interpreted to extend to future visits, or whether continuing releases for minors violate public policy, will now be addressed—at least in this case—by an arbitrator rather than the courts at the front end.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Arbitration Agreement vs. Delegation Clause

• Arbitration agreement: The contract term in which parties agree that certain disputes will be resolved by a private arbitrator instead of a public court.
• Delegation clause A specific provision within (or separate from) the arbitration agreement in which the parties agree that the arbitrator, not the court, will decide certain “gateway” questions—such as whether the agreement covers a particular dispute or is valid.

2. Existence (Formation) vs. Scope

• Existence / formation:
  • Did the parties actually make an arbitration agreement?
  • Was there assent, consideration, capacity, and absence of formation defects?
  • Has the agreement been extinguished or superseded by a later contract?
• Scope:
  • Assuming a valid agreement exists, what kinds of disputes does it cover?
  • Do the present claims “arise out of” or “relate to” the contract or activities described?
  • Does it extend to later events, different locations, third-party claims, etc.?

Courts always decide existence. Scope can be delegated if the parties clearly say so.

3. “Clear and Unmistakable” Delegation

Because courts are the default deciders of arbitrability, a delegation clause must clearly state that the parties intend the arbitrator to decide issues like:

• “Scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement; or
• Whether particular disputes fall under the arbitration clause.

Vague or ambiguous references are not enough. But language like that used in Cerna is sufficient under Texas law.

4. Superseding Contracts and Continued Existence

If parties sign multiple contracts over time, they may:

• Expressly state that a later contract “supersedes and replaces” prior agreements; or
• Create contradictions (e.g., a later contract that selects courts as the exclusive forum, while an earlier one mandates arbitration).

In such cases, courts must decide which contract governs any dispute about arbitrability. This is a formation/existence issue that a delegation clause cannot “bootstrap” into the arbitrator’s hands.

5. The “Wholly Groundless” Concept

Before Henry Schein, some courts refused to compel arbitration under a delegation clause if the argument that the dispute was arbitrable was “wholly groundless.” The U.S. Supreme Court eliminated this exception:

• If a valid delegation clause exists, courts must compel arbitration even if they believe the arbitrability argument is frivolous.
• The arbitrator—not the court—decides whether the case actually proceeds in arbitration.

Cerna faithfully applies that principle.

6. “Next Friend”

A “next friend” is an adult who brings a lawsuit on behalf of a minor or legally incapacitated person who cannot sue in their own name. Here, Cerna sued “as next friend” of her child, which is the procedural mechanism for asserting the minor’s claims.

VIII. Conclusion

Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC continues and sharpens the Texas Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence by:

• Reaffirming the critical distinction between existence and scope of arbitration agreements;
• Holding that, where formation and current existence of an agreement are conceded and no later agreement is alleged, disputes about the agreement’s duration or temporal reach are scope questions;
• Enforcing a clear and unmistakable delegation clause that assigns such scope questions to the arbitrator; and
• Integrating Texas law with recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Henry Schein, Coinbase) in a coherent two-step framework for courts confronting arbitration motions.

The decision underscores that once parties agree both to arbitrate and to delegate arbitrability, courts must generally:

1. Confirm the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and delegation clause; and
2. Compel arbitration, leaving to the arbitrator whether particular claims—including those arising at a later time—fall within that agreement’s scope.

For drafters, Cerna counsels clarity about duration and explicit delegation language. For litigators, it cautions that scope disputes will likely be resolved in arbitration when a delegation clause exists, and that only genuine formation/existence challenges can keep arbitrability in court. In the broader legal landscape, the opinion consolidates Texas’s role as a jurisdiction that strongly respects both the parties’ choice to arbitrate and their choice about who will decide the reach of that commitment.