Defining “Marital Status” under the NYCHRL: General Condition vs. Specific Spousal Relationship

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s decision in Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC addresses a pivotal question under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”): whether “marital status” covers discrimination based on an employee’s marital status relative to a particular individual, or only covers the general condition of being married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed. Plaintiff‐Appellee Kelvin Hunter, Executive Producer of The Wendy Williams Show, alleges he was terminated solely because Wendy Williams filed for divorce. The district court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, relying on an intermediate state appellate decision. On interlocutory review, the Second Circuit vacated that order, applying the New York Court of Appeals’ recent holding in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. and clarifying that “marital status” refers only to one’s general status, not to the identity or circumstances of a specific spouse.

Summary of the Judgment

On April 8, 2025, a three‐judge panel of the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss Hunter’s NYCHRL marital‐status discrimination claim. The panel held that:

“Marital status” under the NYCHRL means the legal condition of being single, married, separated, divorced, or widowed.
It does not extend to adverse actions taken because of whom an individual has or has not married.
The New York Court of Appeals’ decision in McCabe binds federal courts in New York and supersedes the contrary intermediate appellate decision in Morse v. Fidessa Corp..

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this narrow statutory interpretation.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. NY State Human Rights Appeal Board (1980): Held that “marital status” under the NYSHRL covers one’s status as married or not, not whom one marries.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (1983): Applied the same interpretation of “marital status” to housing discrimination under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL.
Levin v. Yeshiva University (2001): Reaffirmed the distinction between a person’s marital status and the nature of their spousal relationship.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp. (2018, N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.): Held that 2005 and 2016 amendments to the NYCHRL broadened “marital status” to reach discrimination based on relationship to a specific person.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (2024, N.Y. Ct. App.): Clarified that “marital status” refers to the legal condition of being married, single, etc., and disclaims any broader application to specific spousal relationships.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in these steps:

Statutory Text and Legislative History: The court reviewed the plain language of the NYCHRL and noted that “marital status” appears among other clearly defined categories (e.g., race, gender), suggesting a discrete meaning.
Binding Authority: The panel relied on the New York Court of Appeals’ McCabe decision, which post-dates Morse and resolves the very interpretive question at issue.
Consistency Across Contexts: The court rejected any distinction between employment and housing contexts for “marital status,” emphasizing that the same statutory language should bear the same meaning throughout the NYCHRL.
Rejection of Broader Interpretation: The Second Circuit found unpersuasive the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion in Morse that legislative amendments expanded the category to cover spousal‐specific discrimination. It held instead that nothing in the amendments explicitly altered the traditional interpretation.

3. Impact

This decision has significant implications:

Employment Litigation: Employers defending NYCHRL marital‐status claims can invoke McCabe and Hunter to argue that the statute does not reach adverse actions based on the identity or circumstances of an employee’s spouse.
Clarity for Litigants: The ruling resolves a split between lower courts and provides uniform guidance on what constitutes “marital status” discrimination under city law.
Limitation of Remedies: Individuals seeking relief for alleged discrimination tied to a specific spousal relationship must look to other legal theories (e.g., sex discrimination, retaliation) if their claim does not allege discrimination based on their general marital condition.
Future Amendments: The decision may prompt legislative action if the City Council wishes to expand protections to cover spousal‐specific discrimination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Marital Status vs. Spousal Relationship: The term “marital status” means one’s broad legal condition—such as “married” or “divorced”—and does not hinge on which person one is or is not married to. For example, firing someone because they recently divorced is actionable; firing them because they divorced a particular individual is not covered under the NYCHRL’s marital‐status provision.

Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): The district court certified its denial of the motion to dismiss for immediate appeal, and the Second Circuit granted permission. This procedure allows appellate review of non‐final orders when controlling questions of law could materially advance the litigation.

Binding Precedent: Federal courts in New York must follow decisions of the New York Court of Appeals on matters of state law. When that court speaks definitively—as it did in McCabe—lower federal and state courts must follow its interpretation.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC reaffirms the longstanding rule that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers solely to the legal condition of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed. By following the New York Court of Appeals’ ruling in McCabe, the Court resolves the split created by Morse and narrows the scope of marital‐status discrimination claims. This clarification provides employers and employees with clear guidance and underscores the importance of precise statutory interpretation under New York City’s uniquely broad anti‐discrimination law.