Credibility and Substantial Evidence Standards in LHWCA Disability Determinations

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Global Terminal & Container Services, Inc. v. Mohamed Elghobashy, which clarified how administrative law judges (ALJs) under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) should assess expert testimony, weigh conflicting medical opinions, and apply the substantial‐evidence standard in awarding disability benefits. The petitioners (Global and its insurer) challenged the Benefits Review Board’s affirmance of an ALJ’s award of permanent total disability benefits to a longshoreman, Claimant Mohamed Elghobashy, on grounds that the ALJ improperly discredited their experts and misapplied the standards for determining total disability. The Third Circuit denied review, reaffirming the deference owed to ALJ credibility determinations and the burden‐shifting framework for total disability claims under the LHWCA.

Summary of the Judgment

On January 29, 2014, Claimant suffered neck and back injuries when a spreader bar struck his hustler vehicle during container operations. After an administrative hearing, the ALJ credited Claimant’s testimony, discredited Global’s expert recreation report (Dr. Tsoumanis) and its medical expert (Dr. Dennis), and accepted Claimant’s treating surgeon (Dr. Rosa) as well as other medical records in finding Claimant permanently and totally disabled. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, and the Third Circuit, applying plenary review to legal questions and substantial‐evidence review to factual findings, denied Global’s petition. Key points include:

The ALJ’s decision to discredit an engineering reconstruction was supported by substantial evidence because it relied on factual premises inconsistent with Claimant’s credible account.
The ALJ properly weighed conflicting medical opinions, crediting the well‐reasoned opinion of Dr. Rosa over the unpersuasive report of Dr. Dennis, which depended on the discredited reconstruction.
The ALJ correctly applied the LHWCA’s burden‐shifting framework: once Claimant showed he could not return to his prior work, Global bore the burden to identify suitable alternative employment—and failed to do so.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court relied on a well‐established body of administrative and appellate precedents:

Wilson v. Director, OWCP (984 F.3d 265): Defined the scope of appellate review—plenary for legal issues; substantial evidence for factual findings.
C & C Marine Maintenance Co. v. Bellows (538 F.3d 293) and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Board (629 F.3d 322): Clarified the “substantial evidence” standard under the LHWCA.
Balsavage v. Director, OWCP (295 F.3d 390): Confirmed that credibility determinations rest within the ALJ’s discretion unless inherently incredible.
Marathon Ashland Petroleum v. Williams (733 F.3d 182) and Morehead Marine Servs., Inc. v. Washnock (135 F.3d 366): Articulated the burden‐shifting analysis for total disability—claimant first shows inability to return to former work; employer then must show availability of suitable alternatives.
Roger’s Terminal & Shipping Corp. v. Director, OWCP (784 F.2d 687): Held that lack of evidence of suitable alternative employment supports a finding of total disability.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s decision underscores three core components of ALJ fact‐finding under the LHWCA:

Credibility and Factual Consistency: An ALJ may discredit expert testimony that rests on assumptions at odds with a claimant’s credible, uncontradicted testimony. Here, the ALJ found Dr. Tsoumanis’s reconstruction incorrect in its basic factual premise (the mechanics of the spreader‐bar incident) and therefore refused to give his conclusions probative weight.
Substantial Evidence: Even if an employer’s evidence is quantitatively significant, it is not controlling if a reasonable mind would not accept it when weighed against other evidence. The court held that the ALJ’s evaluation of the competing medical experts—favoring Dr. Rosa’s detailed examinations and report over Dr. Dennis’s reliance on the flawed reconstruction—met the substantial‐evidence threshold.
Burden‐Shifting for Total Disability: Once Claimant established he could not perform his hustler‐driving job, the burden shifted to Global to identify any available, suitable jobs he could secure. Global presented no such evidence, so the ALJ permissibly concluded total disability.

3. Impact

This decision reinforces several important principles for future LHWCA and administrative‐law litigation:

ALJs enjoy broad discretion in weighing expert opinions. Where an expert’s methodology or factual foundation is shown to be flawed or inconsistent, an ALJ may justifiably reject that opinion.
The “substantial evidence” standard demands more than a mere scintilla but does not require a preponderance. Appellate courts will not substitute their judgment where the ALJ’s findings rest on reasonable inferences.
Employers defending against total‐disability claims must present concrete evidence of suitable alternative employment; otherwise, claimants satisfy their burden once they show inability to return to their former work.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Evidence: Evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It lies between a “mere scintilla” and a “preponderance.”
Burden‐Shifting Framework: Under the LHWCA, a claimant first proves inability to return to former employment; then the employer must show availability of other suitable jobs.
Credibility Determination: ALJs decide which witnesses to believe. These findings are given great deference on appeal unless inherently unreasonable.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A hearing officer who resolves disputed claims under federal compensation statutes and whose factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s ruling in Global Terminal & Container Services, Inc. v. Elghobashy clarifies the interplay between expert testimony, credibility determinations, and the substantial‐evidence standard in LHWCA disability claims. By affirming the ALJ’s decision to discount a flawed reconstruction and endorse well‐founded medical opinions, the court reaffirms the principle that appellate review of an ALJ’s factual findings is deferential. Furthermore, the decision underscores the employer’s burden to identify suitable alternative employment once a claimant establishes inability to return to his pre‐injury job. As a result, this case will guide future adjudications under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ensuring that ALJs’ credibility judgments and evidentiary assessments remain the linchpin of fair and consistent outcomes.