Constitutional Limits on Legislative Compensation Affirmed in S.H. Terrell v. A.H. King (1929)

Constitutional Limits on Legislative Compensation Affirmed in S. H. Terrell v. A. H. King (1929)

Introduction

The landmark case of S. H. Terrell, Comptroller, v. A. H. King (118 Tex. 237), decided by the Supreme Court of Texas on March 7, 1929, addresses critical issues concerning the constitutional boundaries of legislative compensation. This case emerged from a dispute over Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, enacted by the Fortieth Legislature of Texas, which established the Tax Survey Committee. The resolution allotted compensations and expenses to committee members, both legislative and private citizens, raising substantial constitutional questions.

The primary parties involved were S. H. Terrell, the Comptroller of Texas (Appellant), and A. H. King, a citizen and taxpayer residing in Throckmorton County (Appellee). The contention revolved around whether the resolution's provisions for compensating committee members infringed upon the Texas Constitution's stipulations regarding legislative compensation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Texas ultimately upheld portions of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5 while striking down others as unconstitutional. The court determined that the resolution did not violate constitutional provisions when it provided compensation and expenses to the eight private citizens serving on the Tax Survey Committee. However, it found that the resolution's provision to compensate legislative members ($10 per day) exceeded the limits prescribed by the Texas Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 24.

Consequently, the court ruled in favor of the Comptroller by invalidating the compensation clauses for legislative members while affirming the legality of compensating private citizen members. This decision underscored the constitutional restrictions on legislative compensation and reinforced the separation of official capacities in Texas governance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced a multitude of precedents to establish the constitutional boundaries of legislative compensation. Notable among these were cases such as McGRAIN v. DAUGHERTY, Brown v. Galveston, and opinions from the Attorney General of Texas, which collectively underscored the long-standing principles limiting legislative pay.

The court also examined precedents from other states, including Brazos v. Worth from North Carolina and Ex Parte Caldwell from West Virginia, to draw parallels and reinforce the notion that legislative bodies cannot exceed compensation thresholds set by their constitutions.

Additionally, the court evaluated federal interpretations, notably referencing McGRAIN v. DAUGHERTY from the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed Congress's authority to compel testimony for legislative purposes, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of legislative committees but within constitutional confines.

Legal Reasoning

The court's reasoning hinged on a meticulous interpretation of the Texas Constitution, particularly Article III, Sections 18, 24, 30, and 44, as well as Article XVI, Sections 6, 17, 33, and 40. The crux of the legal argument revolved around whether the compensation provided to committee members, especially those who were also legislative members, exceeded constitutional limitations.

The court affirmed that while the Legislature possesses inherent authority to form committees for legislative purposes, as supported by historical precedents and constitutional provisions, this authority does not extend to overstepping compensation laws. Specifically, Article III, Section 24 clearly delineates the maximum per diem allowances for legislative members, which the resolution breached by offering $10 per day.

However, the provision allowing compensation for private citizens serving on the committee was deemed lawful, as it did not conflict with the constitutional limits imposed on legislative members. The differentiation between compensating legislative members and private citizens was crucial in the court's decision.

Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of authorized expenses for legislative functions, such as travel and accommodation, asserting that these do not constitute additional compensation but are necessary for the effective execution of legislative duties.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for the balance of power within Texas's legislative framework. By affirming constitutional limits on legislative compensation, the court reinforced the necessity for adherence to established financial boundaries, thereby promoting fiscal responsibility and preventing potential abuses of power.

Future legislative actions involving compensation and expenses must meticulously comply with constitutional provisions, ensuring that any forms of remuneration or reimbursement are within the legally prescribed limits. This ruling acts as a guiding precedent for similar disputes, emphasizing the judiciary's role in upholding constitutional integrity against legislative overreach.

Additionally, the decision delineates a clear boundary between compensation for legislative members and payments to private citizens, thereby fostering transparency and accountability in legislative financial dealings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Senate Concurrent Resolution

A Senate Concurrent Resolution is a legislative measure that requires approval by both the Senate and the House of Representatives but does not carry the force of law. In this case, it was used to establish the Tax Survey Committee.

Demurrer

A demurrer is a legal response wherein a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint without addressing its factual assertions. Here, the General Demurrer by the defendant was overruled by the court.

Contingent Expense Fund

This fund is a budget allocated for unforeseen or emergency expenses related to legislative operations. The resolution attempted to draw from this fund to pay committee members, which the court scrutinized for constitutional compliance.

Injunction

An injunction is a court order that requires a party to do or refrain from doing specific acts. The trial court granted an injunction against the Comptroller to prevent further payments to legislative members beyond constitutional limits.

Per Diem

Per diem refers to a daily allowance for expenses or compensation. The constitutional limit set specific per diem rates for legislators, which the resolution exceeded.

Conclusion

The S. H. Terrell v. A. H. King case serves as a pivotal affirmation of the Texas Constitution's provisions regarding legislative compensation. By delineating the boundaries within which legislative bodies must operate, the Supreme Court of Texas reinforced the principles of fiscal responsibility and constitutional adherence.

This judgment underscores the judiciary's vital role in maintaining the constitutional integrity of legislative actions. It ensures that while the Legislature retains the authority to form committees and seek necessary information for effective governance, such powers are exercised within the strictures of the constitutionally mandated compensation frameworks.

Ultimately, the case emphasizes the importance of separation of roles and responsibilities, particularly in avoiding conflicts of interest that may arise from dual compensations. It strengthens the checks and balances vital to Texas's legal and governmental systems, ensuring that legislative actions remain transparent, accountable, and constitutionally sound.

Case Details

Year: 1929
Court: Supreme Court of Texas.

Judge(s)

MR. JUSTICE GREENWOOD delivered the opinion of the court.

Attorney(S)

Claude Pollard, Attorney-General, and H. Grady Chandler and Allen Clark, Assistants, for appellant. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, passed by the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature of Texas, which created the Tax Survey Committee to be composed of three members of the Senate appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and eight private citizens appointed by the Governor, each to receive $10 per day and expenses, violates no provision of the Constitution. The court, therefore, erred in overruling defendant's general demurrer, and in granting an injunction restraining the Comptroller from issuing warrants to pay the members of the Legislature serving on said committee for their services and expenses. Constitution, Article 3, Sections 18, 24, 30, 44; Constitution, Article 16, Sections 6, 17, 33, 40; Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1; Connelly v. Daughters of Republic, 164 S.W. 26; Opinion of Attorney General of Texas, March 15, 1909; Opinion of Attorney General of Texas, May 10, 1915; Opinion of Attorney General of Texas, June 9, 1915; Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Bank v. Worth, 117 N.C. 146; Ex Parte Caldwell, 55 S.E. 910 (W.Va.); In Re Davis, 49 P. 160 (Kan.); Sherman v. George, 29 P. 356 (Ore.); United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 3, Subdiv. 2; Sergeant's Constitutional Law, p. 304; Doyle v. Raleigh, 89 N.C. 133, 45 Am. Reports, 677; Groves v. Barden, 169 N.C. 8, 84 S.E. 1042. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5, passed by the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature of Texas, which created the Tax Survey Committee to be composed of three members of the Senate appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and eight private citizens appointed by the Governor, each to receive $10 per day and expenses, violates no provision of the Constitution. The court, therefore, did not err in refusing to grant an injunction prohibiting the Comptroller of Public Accounts from issuing warrants to pay the eight private citizen members of the Tax Survey Committee a per diem and expenses for serving on said committee. Same authorities. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 5 of the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature authorizes the Comptroller to issue warrants for expenditures made by the Tax Survey Committee, including a per diem and expense of members of the committee. T. R. Odell and George Mendell, Jr., for appellee. The Court did not commit error in overruling defendant's general demurrer to plaintiff's amended petition, as plaintiff's amended petition stated a cause of action. Golden v. Odiorne, 249 S.W. 824, 56 Fed. Rep., 892; Weatherford Ry. v. Granger, 85 Tex. 575; Robinson v. Davenport, 40 Tex. 341; Novencamp v. Union Stock Yards, 107 Tex. 425. The Court did not commit error in granting the injunction restraining the defendant from issuing any warrant upon the Treasurer of the State of Texas in payment for the services and expenses of Senators A. E. Wood, Edgar E. Witt and A. J. Wirtz and Representatives Claude D. Teer, J. W. Stevenson, Adrian Pool and C. E. Nicholson as members of the Tax Survey Committee. Article III, Sections 3, 4, 18, 24, 30, 31, 32, 51, Constitution of Texas; Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367; Article XVI, Sections 6, 17, 30, Constitution of Texas; Lillard v. Freestone County, 57 S.W. 338; Ruling Case Law, Vol. 6, Secs. 34 and 42; Ex Parte Meyer, 207 S.W. 104; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed., 77, 227-229. The public funds of the taxpayers cannot be appropriated by the Legislature by means of a resolution, to pay claims of private citizens, appointed on the Tax Survey Committee by the Governor of Texas. To pay such claims would violate Sections 44 and 51 of Article III of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 6, Constitution of Texas; Article III, Sections 30, 31 and 32, Constitution of Texas; Dunwoody v. United States, 22 Ct. of Claims, 269-80; Opinion Attorney General, Vol. for 1916-1918, p. 120. The contingent expense fund is a lump sum set apart by the Legislature to pay necessary expenses in the operation of the Legislature; the Tax Survey Committee is no part of the Legislature and is not necessary in its operation, and the payment of the public funds to the members thereof for any purpose out of the contingent expense fund, or any other fund, in the absence of an appropriation made in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III, is illegal and void.

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