Concrete Downstream Consequences Required for Informational Injury Standing Under NVRA

Introduction

The Third Circuit’s decision in Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (No. 23-1590, 23-1591, 23-3045, decided April 25, 2025) marks a significant clarification of Article III standing doctrine in the context of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”). The plaintiff, the Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”), is an out-of-state public‐interest organization dedicated to promoting election integrity. PILF sought access to records under the NVRA’s public‐inspection provision after a PennDOT computer “glitch” allegedly registered noncitizens to vote. The Commonwealth refused, and PILF sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The district court found that PILF had suffered an “informational injury” sufficient for standing and granted in part and denied in part cross‐motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed: mere denial of NVRA records, without concrete “downstream consequences” tied to the statute’s purpose, falls short of Article III injury in fact.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit held:

PILF lacked Article III standing because it failed to demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury arising from the denial of records. Under TransUnion v. Ramirez and subsequent Third Circuit decisions, a plaintiff in an “informational injury” case must show not only that it was deprived of information but also that this deprivation caused adverse effects or other downstream harms closely connected to the interests Congress sought to protect.
The NVRA’s central purpose is to expand voter registration and ensure accurate federal voter rolls – not simply to provide public access to agency records. PILF’s asserted harms—its inability to analyze data for general election‐integrity research, to publish educational materials, and the costs of litigation—have no nexus to the NVRA’s objectives.
Because PILF never alleged or proved that denial of the requested information impaired its own or any Pennsylvania voter’s ability to participate in federal elections, it did not suffer a concrete injury traceable to the NVRA violation. Its suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice (1989) – Recognized “informational injury” standing under the Federal Advisory Committee Act by analogy to FOIA, where denial of records needed for effective participation in government processes conferred standing.
FEC v. Akins (1998) – Held that denial of disclosure under the Federal Election Campaign Act gave voters standing because the information at stake was directly related to their voting rights.
TransUnion v. Ramirez (2021) – Clarified that an “informational injury” must also produce tangible adverse consequences akin to traditional harms (e.g., reputational, economic) or “downstream effects” closely related to the statute’s purpose.
Kelly v. RealPage (2022) – In the Third Circuit, reaffirmed that plaintiffs alleging informational injuries must show both deprivation of information and concrete downstream consequences tied to the protected interest.
Scott v. Commonwealth of Texas (5th Cir. 2022) – Applied the TransUnion framework to NVRA claims, requiring civic‐engagement organizations to demonstrate how denial of voter‐roll data concretely hindered their or voters’ participation in elections.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

Article III Injury in Fact Requires Concreteness and Particularization: Under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Spokeo v. Robins, an injury must be concrete (real, not abstract) and particularized (affecting the plaintiff in a personal and individual way).
Informational Injury Doctrine Post-TransUnion: While statutes like FOIA or FACA center on transparency, the NVRA’s “public‐inspection” clause serves a broader purpose – ensuring accurate and current voter rolls to expand and protect voter participation. Following TransUnion and Kelly, a plaintiff asserting an informational injury must show:
- That it was denied information to which it was statutorily entitled, and
- That this denial caused adverse effects or downstream consequences tightly linked to the statute’s goals.
Application to PILF: PILF alleged three harms: inability to study/analyze Pennsylvania’s voter‐roll maintenance; frustration of its educational mission; and litigation expenses. The court found none bore a sufficient nexus to the NVRA’s goals of expanding voter registration or preserving roll accuracy. PILF did not represent Pennsylvania voters or show that withholding the records hampered any voter’s ability to register or vote.

3. Impact

This decision has several important consequences:

Limits on Private NVRA Enforcement: Third-party organizations without direct ties to a state’s voters cannot sue under the NVRA merely to audit or research electoral data. They must show concrete harm affecting voter participation or roll accuracy.
Post-TransUnion Clarity: Courts will rigorously apply the dual requirement of informational deprivation plus a downstream effect in suits under statutes that include a public‐disclosure component but are primarily aimed at other regulatory goals.
Encourages Targeted Litigation: Potential plaintiffs must develop and plead concrete plans showing how obtaining or losing specific records will advance or impair the statutory purpose (e.g., registering disenfranchised voters or challenging erroneous roll purges).
Preserves Article III Limits: Reinforces that federal courts are not forums for general oversight by distant organizations; they require a genuine case or controversy with personal stakes at issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: Federal court jurisdiction requires a real, personal stake—an injury that is concrete (not hypothetical) and particularized (affecting the party uniquely).
Informational Injury: Occurs when a party is lawfully entitled to certain data or records but is denied access. Post-TransUnion, it also must cause some tangible adverse effect.
Downstream Consequences: Practical harms or barriers flowing from being denied information—such as inability to register voters, correct errors, or participate in a process essential to the statute’s goals.
NVRA’s Public‐Inspection Clause (52 U.S.C. § 20507): Requires states to make certain voter‐roll maintenance records available to the public for two years—but only as part of a broader scheme to facilitate voter registration and accurate rolls.
Zone of Interests: A statutory standing test asking whether a plaintiff’s interests fall within those the statute was designed to protect.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s ruling in Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania underscores that informational‐injury standing under the NVRA demands more than an abstract right to inspect records. Following TransUnion and Kelly, a plaintiff must show it was denied statutorily required information and that this denial caused concrete adverse effects tied to the NVRA’s central goals: expanding voter participation and preserving accurate federal voter rolls. Out‐of‐state advocacy groups without personal ties to affected voters cannot bootstrap general oversight interests into a federal controversy. This decision reaffirms Article III’s case‐or‐controversy requirement and provides clear guidance to lower courts and future litigants on the limits of private enforcement under the NVRA.