Community-Protection Inferences from Repeated Drug Use Permissibly Support Revocation Sentences: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Within-Guidelines Term After Esteras

Introduction

In United States v. Edward Jerome Rolle, No. 25-12792 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a nine-month term of imprisonment and a four-year term of supervised release imposed after revocation. The case arises out of a rapid succession of supervised-release violations—seven positive cocaine tests over roughly three months—following Rolle’s early release for substantial assistance in a murder prosecution.

Rolle challenged his revocation sentence as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argued that the district court effectively punished him for declining an early treatment recommendation from his probation officer and improperly relied on speculation about future crimes (particularly driving under the influence). He also contended that incarceration did not advance the rehabilitative aims of supervised release.

The panel rejected these arguments. Grounding its analysis in Gall v. United States and Eleventh Circuit reasonableness jurisprudence, and noting the revocation-specific framework recognized in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, the court held the sentence reasonable on both procedural and substantive axes.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a within-Guidelines sentence of nine months’ imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release. The court held:

• Procedural reasonableness: The district court properly treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e), and adequately explained the sentence. The court’s rationale focused on Rolle’s repeated, intentional violations and the need to deter future violations and protect the public—not on punishing him for declining treatment.
• Substantive reasonableness: The sentence, which fell within the recommended policy-statement range (8–14 months), appropriately weighed the nature and circumstances of the violations, Rolle’s history and characteristics, deterrence, and community protection. The court emphasized Rolle’s “serial conduct,” multiple warnings, and “flagrant violations,” finding no error in the district court’s judgment even though the sentence did not prioritize rehabilitation.

The panel also rejected the claim that the district court relied on speculative future crimes. Given seven recent cocaine positives and Rolle’s recent acquisition of a driver’s license, the district court’s discussion of community risk—both generally and in one instance by reference to driving—was a permissible inference, not conjecture.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007): Establishes two-tier reasonableness review (procedural and substantive). Procedural error includes treating Guidelines as mandatory, relying on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to consider relevant factors and explain the sentence.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Articulates the substantive reasonableness framework: reversal is warranted if the court (1) fails to consider significant factors, (2) gives weight to irrelevant or improper factors, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in balancing the factors.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2008): Confirms reasonableness review and notes the Eleventh Circuit “ordinarily” expects within-Guidelines sentences to be reasonable.
• United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2007): Requires the district court to consider the applicable Guidelines range.
• United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 998 (11th Cir. 2017): District court need not explicitly state it considered each § 3553(a) factor; consideration may be implicit in the record.
• United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018): Reinforces deference to the district court’s weighing of sentencing factors under abuse-of-discretion review.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e): Governs revocation; incorporates most—but not all—§ 3553(a) factors when revoking supervised release (specifically, § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7)).
• Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2045 (2025): Clarifies that not all § 3553(a) factors apply at revocation; in particular, courts may not rely on retribution (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) when revoking supervised release.

Statutory and Guidelines Framework

• Revocation authority: Under § 3583(e)(3), a court may revoke if it finds a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and may impose imprisonment up to a class-based cap (here, five years, consistent with the underlying offense’s classification).
• Applicable sentencing considerations: § 3583(e) instructs courts to consider most § 3553(a) factors, notably:
  • § 3553(a)(1): Nature and circumstances of the violations; history and characteristics of the defendant;
  • § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D): Deterrence, protection of the public, and providing needed treatment;
  • § 3553(a)(4)–(7): Advisory ranges/policy statements, policy considerations, avoiding disparities, and restitution.
  The court may not premise a revocation sentence on “just punishment” (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)), per § 3583(e) and Esteras.
• Guidelines and policy statements: Chapter 7 policy statements (e.g., USSG § 7B1.1 and § 7B1.4) are advisory. Positive drug tests generally constitute Grade C violations. The policy-statement range identified here (8–14 months) framed the district court’s discretion.
• Additional supervised release after revocation: § 3583(h) permits reimposition of supervised release after a revocation prison term, up to the maximum authorized for the original offense, minus any imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The four-year term here is consistent with that cap.
• Mandatory revocation note: Although not relied upon in the opinion, repeated positive drug tests can trigger mandatory revocation under § 3583(g)(4) (more than three positives in one year). Rolle admitted seven positives in roughly three months, which would satisfy that criterion; the panel nonetheless decided the appeal on reasonableness grounds.

Legal Reasoning and Application

Procedural Reasonableness

The panel found no “significant procedural error” under Gall. The district court:

• Recognized the advisory status of the Guidelines (“not binding on the [c]ourt”), satisfying Campbell and Gall.
• Considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors expressly incorporated by § 3583(e), including the nature of the violations, Rolle’s characteristics, deterrence, and protection of the public, consistent with Johnson and Esteras.
• Explained its rationale: Rolle’s “serial conduct,” repeated opportunities and warnings, “flagrant violations,” and the risk to community safety posed by ongoing cocaine use. This was a sufficiently individualized explanation for the chosen term of imprisonment and additional supervision.

Addressing Rolle’s specific procedural complaints:

• Punishment for declining treatment: The record did not show the court sanctioning Rolle for disrespecting the probation officer or for refusing treatment. Instead, the sentence turned on repeated and admitted violations and on public-safety and deterrence considerations—the proper § 3583(e) factors. This avoids any Tapia-type problem (using imprisonment to promote rehabilitation) and aligns with Esteras (no retributive focus).
• Speculation about future crimes: The district court’s community-protection analysis permissibly drew an inference from seven cocaine positives in three months and Rolle’s recent driver’s license that his continued drug use could endanger the public. The court referenced driving risk once, but more broadly considered community risk without anchoring the sentence in an uncharged DUI offense. Under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), deterrence and public protection are proper considerations. The inference was grounded in record facts, not conjecture.

Substantive Reasonableness

Applying the Irey framework, the panel concluded the nine-month term was well within the district court’s discretion:

• The sentence was within the Chapter 7 policy-statement range (8–14 months), and the Eleventh Circuit “ordinarily” expects within-range sentences to be reasonable (Gonzalez).
• The record highlighted repeated and intentional violations over a compressed period, despite multiple warnings and opportunities. The district court reasonably emphasized deterrence, community protection, and the nature of the violations over rehabilitation.
• Rolle’s argument that incarceration does not advance rehabilitation does not render the sentence unreasonable. Revocation sentencing is not solely about rehabilitation; § 3583(e) incorporates broader aims, and Esteras confirms courts need not (and in certain respects cannot) use revocation imprisonment to further retributive goals. The district court’s weighing showed no clear error of judgment.

Why the Panel’s Approach Fits the Revocation Paradigm

Revocation proceedings address breach of the supervised release conditions, focusing on public safety, deterrence, and the defendant’s demonstrated ability to comply. Here:

• One admitted violation is sufficient to revoke supervised release. Rolle admitted seven positive tests; the court held another alleged violation in abeyance because one suffices.
• The district court identified a pattern of intentional noncompliance and concluded that a custodial term was necessary to promote general and specific deterrence and protect the public—core § 3583(e) objectives.
• The resulting four-year follow-on term of supervised release fits § 3583(h)’s structure and is tailored to ongoing risk management and compliance monitoring.

Impact and Practical Implications

For District Courts

• This case reinforces that courts may emphasize deterrence and community protection when fashioning revocation sentences, particularly where violations are repeated and intentional.
• Courts should continue to treat Chapter 7 ranges as advisory benchmarks and articulate reasons tethered to the § 3583(e) factors. Explicitly avoiding retributive rationales is prudent after Esteras.
• Courts may draw reasonable, record-based inferences about public-safety risks from the nature and frequency of violations without converting revocation into punishment for uncharged crimes.

For Defense Counsel

• When facing repeated drug-use violations, assembling a concrete, immediate treatment plan (with verified acceptance and timelines) can be critical. Mere assurances about future testing or rehabilitation, without engagement, will carry little weight against deterrence and public-protection concerns.
• Challenge speculative risk by developing a record that meaningfully addresses community safety (e.g., verified abstinence periods, monitoring technology, third-party supervision, transportation limits), while acknowledging relapse dynamics.
• Stress the revocation-specific limits on § 3553(a)(2)(A) (Esteras) and Tapia’s prohibition on using imprisonment to promote rehabilitation—but be prepared that deterrence and public protection may dominate the balance where violations are strategic and repeated.

For Probation and the Government

• Documenting progressive responses and opportunities given (warnings, referrals, intermediate sanctions) strengthens the justification for custody where noncompliance persists.
• When recommending treatment alternatives, develop evidentiary support for participant suitability and community-safety measures; if declined, the record will still show that noncustodial options were considered.
• If applicable, note the § 3583(g)(4) mandatory revocation trigger for multiple positive tests, while still addressing § 3583(e) considerations for the choice and length of any custodial term.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural asks “Did the judge follow the right steps and explain the sentence?”
  • Substantive asks “Given those steps and the facts, is the sentence a reasonable choice?”
• Advisory Guidelines in revocation: Chapter 7 ranges are nonbinding policy statements. Courts must consider them but may vary based on § 3583(e) factors.
• § 3583(e)’s tailored factor set: At revocation, courts consider most, but not all, § 3553(a) factors. They do not rely on “just punishment” (retribution) under § 3553(a)(2)(A), consistent with Esteras.
• Inference vs. speculation: A court may infer risk from concrete facts (e.g., frequent drug positives) but cannot sentence based on unfounded assumptions about uncharged crimes.
• Additional supervised release after revocation: After serving a revocation prison term, a defendant may receive another term of supervised release, subject to statutory caps and crediting prior revocation imprisonment.
• One violation suffices: Revocation can be based on a single proven violation by a preponderance of the evidence; multiple admitted positives make revocation straightforward.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, this decision cogently illustrates the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to revocation sentencing after Esteras. The panel reaffirms that district courts:

• Must treat the Guidelines as advisory and consider the tailored set of § 3553(a) factors under § 3583(e);
• May prioritize deterrence and community protection—especially where violations are repeated and intentional—without relying on retributive considerations; and
• Can draw sensible, record-based inferences about public risk from serial drug-use violations without veering into improper speculation.

The affirmance of a within-Guidelines, nine-month term plus four additional years of supervision underscores the deference appellate courts afford to well-explained revocation sentences, the centrality of community-safety and deterrence in the revocation context, and the limits of arguments grounded solely in rehabilitation where a defendant’s conduct reflects a sustained breach of the court’s trust.