Comity and Identical Sanctions in Reciprocal Attorney Discipline — A Commentary on In Re Daryl Andre Gray (La. 2025)

Comity and Identical Sanctions in Reciprocal Attorney Discipline — A Commentary on In Re Daryl Andre Gray (La. 2025)

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s per curiam decision in In Re Daryl Andre Gray, No. 2025-B-0408 (17 June 2025), addresses reciprocal attorney-discipline when misconduct has already been adjudicated in another jurisdiction—in this instance, the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Mr. Gray, licensed in both Louisiana and Tennessee, was suspended in Tennessee for mishandling client and third-party funds and for neglecting a client matter culminating in the lapse of a statute of limitations. Louisiana’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) sought identical discipline in Louisiana under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, triggering the state’s reciprocal-discipline mechanism.

Key issues before the Louisiana court included:

  • Whether due-process or proof infirmities in the Tennessee proceeding rendered identical discipline inappropriate;
  • Whether identical sanction would cause grave injustice, offend Louisiana public policy, or warrant substantially different discipline; and
  • The extent to which the doctrine of comity should guide Louisiana’s response to another state’s disciplinary judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying Rule XIX, § 21(D), the court imposed identical discipline: a six-month suspension of which two months are to be served actively and the remaining four months on probation, with the same monitoring and CLE conditions mandated by Tennessee. Mr. Gray did not respond to Louisiana’s Rule XIX notice, and the court found no apparent procedural defects or evidence-based infirmities in the Tennessee record. Citing In re Aulston and In re Zdravkovich, the court reiterated that only “extraordinary circumstances” justify a sanction materially different from that imposed by the originating jurisdiction. Finding none, it deferred to Tennessee’s judgment and entered reciprocal discipline.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

a. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21 (D)
This provision codifies Louisiana’s approach to reciprocal discipline. It establishes a rebuttable presumption that the foreign sanction will be mirrored unless the respondent or ODC proves one of four enumerated exceptions (due-process flaw, evidentiary infirmity, grave injustice/public-policy offense, or a sanction that would be “substantially different” in Louisiana).

b. In re Aulston, 05-1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So. 2d 461
Aulston underscored deference to foreign disciplinary outcomes, noting identical discipline should be denied only under “extraordinary circumstances.” By quoting Aulston, the court harmonised today’s decision with its own precedent that promotes interstate comity and conserves judicial resources.

c. In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964 (D.C. 2003)
Although a District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, Zdravkovich is widely cited for articulating the policy rationale of deferring to sister-state determinations: consistency, respect for other jurisdictions’ disciplinary regimes, and avoidance of duplicate litigation. Louisiana invoked that rationale to bolster its conclusion.

d. Tennessee Supreme Court Decision: Gray v. Board of Prof’l Responsibility, 2025 WL 749621
The Louisiana court relied entirely on Tennessee’s factual findings and sanction analysis, treating them as presumptively correct absent proof to the contrary.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Louisiana Court

  1. Presumption of Identical Discipline. Rule XIX, § 21(D) is written in mandatory language (“shall impose the identical discipline”) unless one of the four exceptions applies. The burden to rebut lies with the party seeking a different result—here, the respondent, who filed no opposition.
  2. Due-Process Scrutiny. The court independently reviewed the Tennessee order for notice and hearing adequacy and found no constitutional deficiency. Mr. Gray had participated throughout the Tennessee proceedings and had appellate avenues there.
  3. Evidentiary Sufficiency. Louisiana accepted Tennessee’s finding that Mr. Gray violated multiple Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Nothing in the Louisiana record suggested “infirmity of proof.”
  4. Public-Policy Compatibility. Louisiana ethics rules mirror Tennessee’s (Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 4.1, 8.4). Imposing identical sanctions therefore advances Louisiana public policy rather than offends it.
  5. No Substantially Different Discipline Warranted. Louisiana sanctions for comparable misconduct (conversion of third-party funds and neglect) typically range from six-month suspensions to disbarment depending on aggravating factors. Thus, the Tennessee penalty fell within Louisiana norms; no variance was required.
  6. Application of Comity. By citing Aulston and Zdravkovich, the court reaffirmed that comity reduces duplication and reinforces nationwide ethical standards. Identical discipline fosters uniformity, deters forum-shopping, and protects the public in every jurisdiction where the lawyer practices.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

a. For Louisiana Practitioners. The decision signals the court’s willingness to impose swift, identical sanctions when another jurisdiction has already vetted the misconduct. Attorneys with multistate licenses cannot assume leniency or procedural relitigation in Louisiana.

b. For Louisiana Disciplinary Counsel. ODC can rely on foreign fact-finding, reducing investigative duplication. The decision serves as a roadmap for invoking Rule XIX efficiently.

c. For National Professional Responsibility Law. Gray contributes to a growing body of cases recognising that professional misconduct transcends state boundaries. The more homogenous the sanction, the less incentive attorneys have to “shop” for lax jurisdictions.

d. Substantive Practice Areas Affected. The underlying misconduct involved (1) mishandling medical liens and settlement funds and (2) failure to withdraw properly in a personal-injury suit. Personal-injury lawyers and those dealing with third-party liens should be especially mindful that conversion or misdirection of funds—even temporarily—may yield severe discipline.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reciprocal Discipline: A mechanism by which State B disciplines an attorney based on disciplinary action imposed by State A, ensuring uniform regulation across jurisdictions.
  • Comity: A principle whereby courts in one jurisdiction voluntarily defer to the decisions of another, fostering interjurisdictional respect and consistency.
  • Doctor’s Lien: A contractual or statutory claim by a medical provider on settlement proceeds to ensure payment of outstanding treatment bills.
  • Interpleader: A court action allowing a party holding funds contested by multiple claimants to deposit those funds with the court and require claimants to litigate entitlement amongst themselves.
  • Administrator ad litem: A temporary personal representative appointed solely for litigation purposes when an estate has not been formally opened.
  • Safekeeping Property (Rule 1.15): The ethical duty to keep client or third-party funds separate, promptly notify rightful owners, and deliver funds upon demand.
  • Neglect (Rule 1.3): Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

Conclusion

In Re Daryl Andre Gray fortifies Louisiana’s commitment to reciprocal discipline rooted in comity, due-process review, and public-protection principles. The court confirmed that absent extraordinary circumstances, it will mirror sanctions imposed by sister states, thereby deterring multistate practitioners from ethical breaches and preserving the integrity of the profession across borders. Practitioners should heed the message: misconduct anywhere can—and likely will—follow an attorney everywhere.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

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