Clarifying “Favorable Termination” After a Guilty Plea: The Second Circuit’s Charge-by-Charge Rule in Carruthers v. Colton

Introduction

On 20 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delivered a significant opinion in Carruthers v. Colton, No. 22-3234-cv. The case arose from a 2017 traffic stop in Oneida County, New York that led to multiple driving-while-intoxicated (“DWI”) charges, a contested suppression hearing, and ultimately a plea agreement in which the driver, Raymond A. Carruthers, admitted guilt only to an unsafe-lane-change traffic infraction. After his criminal case ended, Carruthers sued three New York State Troopers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and failure to intervene.

The district court dismissed all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Second Circuit (1) affirmed dismissal of the false-arrest claim, (2) largely affirmed dismissal of the malicious-prosecution claim except as to one felony charge that had been amended downward before the plea, and (3) revived the fabrication-of-evidence claim. Most importantly, the Court announced a new, clarifying rule for the “favorable termination” element of Fourth-Amendment malicious-prosecution claims when a case ends in a plea bargain:

• Dismissal of a charge as part of a negotiated plea agreement is not a favorable termination.
• Dismissal or amendment of a charge independent of any plea bargain can qualify as a favorable termination.
• Courts must apply this analysis charge by charge.

Summary of the Judgment

False Arrest: Carruthers’s plea to the traffic infraction supplied conclusive probable cause, barring his false-arrest claim.
Malicious Prosecution:
- No claim lies for the misdemeanor and infraction DWI counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea bargain.
- A claim does lie for the original felony count (VTL § 511(3)(a)) because that charge was effectively dismissed (amended to a misdemeanor) before any negotiated plea.
Fabrication of Evidence: Carruthers pleaded sufficient, particularised facts—accepted as true at the Rule 12 stage—to suggest that Trooper Colton intentionally falsified (i) field-sobriety-test results and (ii) the existence of a prior DWI conviction necessary for the felony charge.
Disposition: Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022) – Held that a plaintiff need only show the criminal case ended “without a conviction” to satisfy favorable termination; provided historical backdrop.
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024) – Announced that malicious-prosecution claims must be evaluated charge by charge for probable cause; Second Circuit extends the same logic to favorable termination.
Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989) – Earlier Second Circuit authority recognising charge-specific favorable termination when a defendant is acquitted on a more serious offense but convicted on a lesser, unrelated one.
Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc); Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997) – Stand for the traditional common-law principle that compromise dismissals (e.g., plea deals) are not favorable terminations.
False-arrest authorities: Cameron v. Fogarty, Weyant v. Okst, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, among others.

Legal Reasoning

False Arrest
The Court reaffirmed that any conviction—even via guilty plea— constitutes “conclusive evidence of probable cause” for the arrest. Because the traffic infraction was an arrestable offense under New York CPL § 140.20(1)(d) and VTL § 155, Carruthers’s plea foreclosed his false-arrest theory regardless of the DWI charges.
Malicious Prosecution – Charge-by-Charge Framework
Drawing on Chiaverini and historic common-law sources, the panel extended the charge-specific analysis to the “favorable termination” element. It harmonised earlier, seemingly conflicting Second-Circuit cases by distinguishing:
- Dismissals tied to a plea compromise (not favorable).
- Dismissals or amendments that occur independently of any plea (potentially favorable).
Applying that rule:
- The misdemeanor and lesser counts were dismissed because of the plea; so they cannot support a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.
- The felony count was dropped before plea negotiations and for reasons the pleadings did not explain. The Court inferred the dismissal was independent and therefore “favorable.”
Fabrication of Evidence
The district court erred by weighing conflicting inferences from Trooper Colton’s suppression-hearing testimony. At the pleading stage the court must accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts— which included specific allegations of (i) misstated field-sobriety results, (ii) a non-existent prior DWI conviction, and (iii) motivation to detain Carruthers long enough to thwart an independent blood test.

Impact

Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Prosecutors can now negotiate plea bargains with reduced fear that counts dismissed as consideration for a plea will later spawn § 1983 suits.
Defense Strategy: Civil-rights practitioners must probe why a charge was dismissed. If the dismissal preceded or was unrelated to the plea, a malicious-prosecution claim may survive.
District-Court Practice: Judges must apply Janetka-Chiaverini charge-by-charge analysis to both probable cause and favorable termination, resisting the urge to aggregate outcomes.
Law-Enforcement Training: Officers face renewed exposure for knowingly overstating probable cause or “bumping up” charges to felonies—fabrications may now lead to civil liability even when some lesser conviction follows.
Clarification of Pleading Standards: The opinion underscores that “intent” to fabricate can be plausibly inferred from circumstantial allegations; courts should not dismiss merely because a defendant offers an alternative innocent explanation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause – A commonsense belief, based on reasonably trustworthy facts, that a person committed a crime. For false-arrest claims, any one offense with probable cause defeats liability.
Malicious Prosecution – A civil claim requiring (i) initiation of criminal process, (ii) termination in plaintiff’s favor, (iii) lack of probable cause, (iv) malice, and (since Swartz v. Insogna) (v) a post-arraignment liberty deprivation.
Favorable Termination – The criminal proceeding ended such that it cannot be revived. Under Carruthers:
- Dismissal because of a plea bargain ≠ favorable.
- Dismissal independent of the plea bargain = potentially favorable.
Fabrication of Evidence – When an officer knowingly supplies false information likely to influence a jury and forwards it to prosecutors, causing a liberty deprivation.
Charge-by-Charge Rule – Courts examine each criminal count separately for probable cause and termination, instead of declaring the whole prosecution valid merely because one count was sound.

Conclusion

Carruthers v. Colton cements the Second Circuit’s position at the forefront of malicious-prosecution jurisprudence post-Thompson and Chiaverini. By requiring a charge-specific inquiry into favorable termination and carving out an explicit “plea-bargain exception,” the Court guards against two extremes: (i) allowing prosecutors to shield misconduct by tacking on minor charges, and (ii) turning every dismissed count in a plea deal into automatic civil liability.

The decision also reiterates that credibility disputes belong at trial, not on Rule 12 motions, thereby revitalising fabrication-of-evidence claims that rest on detailed, plausible allegations.

Going forward, defendants contemplating § 1983 suits must scrutinise the chronology and substance of every dismissal in their criminal case. Prosecutors and law-enforcement officers, in turn, are on notice that independent dismissals and pre-plea charge reductions remain fertile ground for civil rights exposure. The precedent provides a clearer, balanced roadmap for courts within the Second Circuit and persuasive guidance nationally.