Child Refusal, Third-Party Abuse, and Therapeutic Visitation: The High Bar for Suspending Parental Access in Matter of Richard CC. v. Lacey DD.

Child Refusal, Third-Party Abuse, and Therapeutic Visitation:
The High Bar for Suspending Parental Access in Matter of Richard CC. v. Lacey DD.

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Richard CC. v. Lacey DD., 2025 NY Slip Op 06577 (3d Dept Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant contribution to New York custody and visitation jurisprudence. It clarifies:

  • the stringent standard for suspending a noncustodial parent’s visitation based on a child’s refusal and mental health struggles, and
  • the nondelegable nature of the court’s duty to structure visitation, particularly therapeutic visitation, rather than leaving it to the discretion of a therapist or other third party.

The case arises from a high-conflict co-parenting situation involving serious allegations of sexual abuse by the mother’s boyfriend against one of the parties’ daughters, the daughters’ marked refusal to see their father, and a flurry of petitions filed by both parents and the Attorney for the Children (AFC).

The Third Department reverses Family Court’s order that effectively terminated the father’s visitation except for contact that might occur in counseling sessions, at the therapist’s discretion. The appellate court holds that:

  • the record does not contain compelling reasons and substantial evidence that visitation is detrimental to the children, and
  • Family Court improperly delegated to the therapist the power to decide if and when the father would see his children.

At the same time, the court recognizes the children’s mental health concerns and the seriousness of the underlying abuse allegations. It therefore remits the matter for updated and deeper fact-finding, including consideration of:

  • a new Lincoln hearing,
  • psychological evaluations under Family Court Act § 251, and
  • an investigation into the sexual abuse allegations under Family Court Act § 1034(1).

This commentary explores the decision’s factual context, doctrinal underpinnings, and implications for future custody and visitation disputes in New York.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Family Structure and Prior Orders

The parties are unmarried parents of two daughters, born in 2009 and 2010. Under an August 2019 consent order:

  • they shared physical custody, with the father exercising significant parenting time and telephone contact, and
  • the mother was awarded sole legal custody.

In October 2022, after the father sought sole legal custody, Family Court dismissed his modification petition but:

  • granted his violation petition and
  • admonished the mother for noncompliance with the prior order.

That 2022 decision was affirmed by the Third Department in 2024 (see fn 1).

B. Escalation: Petitions and Allegations

The situation escalated after 2022:

  • The father filed multiple:
    • enforcement petitions,
    • modification petitions, and
    • violation petitions
    targeting the mother’s alleged noncompliance with his parenting time.
  • The Attorney for the Children (AFC) filed:
    • an order to show cause and
    • a modification petition
    seeking to suspend the father’s parenting time and communication with the children.
  • The mother, through her own order to show cause and modification petition, likewise sought temporary suspension of the father’s parenting time.

Against this procedural backdrop, a critical factual development occurred: a neglect and abuse proceeding and a criminal proceeding were commenced concerning an alleged sexual assault in September 2023 by the mother’s boyfriend against the older child (fn 2).

C. Interim Temporary Order and Children’s Refusal

Following the AFC’s filings, the parties agreed to a temporary order that superseded the 2019 consent order. Under this interim arrangement, the father was limited to:

  • two hours of parenting time each Saturday,
  • at a designated public location.

Meanwhile, the children began refusing contact with the father. The record reflects:

  • abrupt cessation of visitation around July 2023,
  • the children’s stated desire to stop seeing or communicating with him, and
  • the mother’s testimony that she was honoring their autonomy and emotional safety.

D. The July 2024 Fact-Finding Hearing

A consolidated fact-finding hearing was held in July 2024 on all pending petitions (fn 3). Notably:

  • shortly before the hearing, the father filed an order to show cause seeking sole custody; the return date coincided with the fact-finding date, yet Family Court did not appear to address this request in the order on appeal,
  • Family Court also did not address the father’s earlier modification petition (fn 4).

At the hearing:

  • The father testified that:
    • he had consistently exercised parenting time under the 2019 order and maintained a close relationship with his daughters until mid-2023;
    • he had positive interactions during hospital visits in fall 2023;
    • he continued to appear for court-ordered visits even after the children stopped attending;
    • he denied wrongdoing and wished to reunify with his daughters via family counseling;
    • he believed the mother had created a “toxic environment” and interfered with his relationship with the girls;
    • he referenced alleged sexual abuse by the mother’s boyfriend, which had led to neglect and criminal proceedings.
  • The mother testified that:
    • she supported the children’s autonomy and emotional safety;
    • both daughters strongly wished to cease contact with the father;
    • the younger child felt uncomfortable at a visit when the father allegedly discussed sensitive topics over her objection;
    • the older daughter refused all contact;
    • she denied coaching the children or violating visitation orders and claimed she prioritized their mental health.

E. Family Court’s Ruling

Family Court:

  • Dismissed the father’s violation petitions, finding:
    • the mother had not willfully violated court orders; rather,
    • the children independently refused visits due to the father’s actions toward them.
  • Granted the AFC’s modification petition, concluding:
    • there was a change in circumstances, and
    • it was in the children’s best interests to limit the father’s contact to participation in counseling sessions,
    • at the discretion of the children’s therapist.

The effect of this ruling was to terminate the father’s regular visitation and to make any future contact wholly dependent on a therapist’s decision to permit (or not permit) therapeutic parenting time.

The father appealed.

III. Summary of the Appellate Division’s Opinion

The Third Department modifies Family Court’s order and remits the matter for further proceedings. Its core holdings are:

  1. Change of circumstances is conceded; the issue is best interests.
    The father does not dispute that circumstances changed since the 2019 order. The only live question is whether suspending his visitation (except at a therapist’s discretion) serves the children’s best interests.
  2. Presumption favoring visitation not overcome.
    Visitation with a noncustodial parent is presumed to be in the child’s best interests. That presumption may be rebutted only by compelling reasons and substantial evidence that visitation is detrimental. The Third Department finds that this high standard was not met on this record.
  3. Children’s wishes and mental health concerns are important but not dispositive.
    The court acknowledges the children’s mental health struggles and their difficulties with the father’s parenting style, which contributed to their desire to cease contact. However, this alone does not demonstrate that visitation is harmful or inimical to their welfare.
  4. Insufficient exploration of alleged sexual abuse and its effects.
    The Third Department identifies as “troubling” the lack of testimony about:
    • the boyfriend’s sexual abuse of the older child and
    • its effect on both children.
    Given the pending neglect and criminal cases, the appellate court signals that this context must be fully explored to understand why the children refuse contact with the father.
  5. Improper delegation of visitation decisions to a therapist.
    The court holds that Family Court impermissibly delegated to a therapist its authority to determine if or when therapeutic parenting time would occur. This delegation can effectively deny a parent visitation indefinitely without the required finding of detriment.
  6. Reversal and remittal before a different judge.
    The appellate court reverses the suspension of parenting time and remits the matter to Family Court for:
    • updated fact-finding (given the passage of time),
    • before a different judge,
    • and consideration of whether to:
      • hold an updated Lincoln hearing,
      • order psychological evaluations (Family Ct Act § 251), and
      • order an investigation into the sexual abuse allegations (Family Ct Act § 1034[1]).
    Importantly, the Third Department directs that if therapeutic visitation is deemed necessary, Family Court must set a definite schedule, not leave visitation solely to a therapist’s discretion.
  7. Pending remittal, the restrictive order remains in effect temporarily.
    While reversing the legal basis for suspending visitation, the court orders that the terms of the Family Court order remain in effect temporarily pending new proceedings. This balances the need for caution with the need to restore properly structured access.
  8. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim rejected.
    The father’s complaint about his trial counsel’s performance is rejected. The Third Department finds that counsel:
    • vigorously cross-examined the mother,
    • thoroughly examined the father,
    • highlighted the alleged harm from the boyfriend’s actions and the mother’s inaction, and
    • provided “meaningful representation,” even if not perfect.
    Speculation in hindsight about different strategies is insufficient to show ineffective assistance.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: Modification of Custody and Visitation

In New York, a request to modify an existing custody or visitation order under Family Court Act article 6 involves a two-step inquiry:

  1. Change in circumstances since the prior order; and
  2. Best interests of the child under the new circumstances.

This case focuses entirely on step (2), because the father accepted that circumstances had indeed changed. Within the best-interests analysis, several well-established principles shape the court’s review:

  • Presumption in favor of continued contact.
    Visitation with a noncustodial parent is presumed to be in a child’s best interests, absent evidence that it would be detrimental or harmful.
  • High threshold for suspension of visitation.
    To rebut the presumption, the party opposing visitation must present “compelling reasons” and “substantial evidence” that visitation would harm the child.
  • Children’s wishes as one factor.
    The wishes of the children are considered but are not determinative. Their preferences are weighed in light of age, maturity, and the surrounding circumstances.
  • Nondelegation principle in visitation.
    A court cannot delegate to third parties—such as therapists, guardians, or even children themselves—the ultimate authority to determine whether a parent will have visitation. The court must structure a schedule that preserves parental access unless visitation is truly inimical to the child’s welfare.

The Third Department’s opinion applies and refines these principles in the specific context of:

  • children with mental health struggles,
  • alleged sexual abuse by a third party (the mother’s boyfriend), and
  • a prolonged breakdown in father-child contact.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Presumption of Visitation and Detriment Standard

The decision relies heavily on a line of Third Department cases reaffirming the presumption favoring visitation and the high bar for suspending it:

  • Matter of Robert D. v Sarah E., 238 AD3d 1222 (3d Dept 2025)
    Cited for the core proposition that:
    “Visitation with a noncustodial parent is presumed to be in the best interests of the [children], but that presumption may be overcome where the party opposing visitation sets forth compelling reasons and substantial evidence that such visitation would be detrimental or harmful to the [children’s] welfare.”
    The Third Department uses this to frame its central inquiry in Richard CC.: did the AFC and mother show that the father’s visitation would be harmful?
  • Matter of Melissa H. v Jordan G., 238 AD3d 1296 (3d Dept 2025)
    Cited in tandem with Robert D., reinforcing the same presumption and detriment standard, and later cited for the proposition that the record did not support a finding that visitation was detrimental (the appellate court analogizes to that case in reversing here).
  • Matter of Cecelia BB. v Frank CC., 200 AD3d 1411 (3d Dept 2021)
    Cited both for:
    • the requirement that the court provide frequent and regular access to the noncustodial parent unless visitation is inimical to the children’s welfare, and
    • the prohibition on delegating visitation decisions to third parties.
  • Matter of Ellen TT. v Parvaz UU., 178 AD3d 1294 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 35 NY3d 905 (2020)
    Quoted for the principle that:
    “Unless visitation is inimical to the children’s welfare, the court is required to structure a schedule which results in frequent and regular access by the noncustodial parent.”
    This case supports the view that suspension of visitation is reserved for extreme situations; mere difficulties in the relationship or child resistance are not enough.
  • Matter of Laware v Baldwin, 42 AD3d 696 (3d Dept 2007)
    Invoked in the same sentence as Melissa H. and Cecelia BB. to underscore that the suspension of visitation requires evidence that contact would be harmful. The Third Department analogizes this earlier line of cases to find that standard unmet here.

2. Nondelegation of Visitation Decisions

The nondelegation principle is central. The Third Department underscores that:

“The court cannot delegate to anyone . . . its authority to [structure a visitation schedule], as such delegation can have the practical effect of denying a parent his or her right to visitation with his or her [children] indefinitely without the requisite showing that visitation would be detrimental to the [children’s] welfare.”

This principle is developed through several precedents:

  • Matter of Cecelia BB. v Frank CC., 200 AD3d 1411 (3d Dept 2021)
    The court relies on Cecelia BB. not only for the presumption of visitation but also to condemn delegating control of visitation to a therapist or similar professional. The concern is that such delegation can end up as a de facto termination of contact without the procedural safeguards or evidentiary showing required by law.
  • Matter of Theressa M. v Gaddiel M., 228 AD3d 1040 (3d Dept 2024)
    Cited alongside Cecelia BB. to reaffirm the principle that visitation decisions cannot be delegated to non-judicial actors. It shows continuity in Third Department jurisprudence leading into Richard CC..
  • Matter of Rice v Wightman, 167 AD3d 1529 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 33 NY3d 903 (2019)
    A Fourth Department case illustrating statewide consensus that courts must not leave visitation entirely to therapists or other third parties. Its citation here reinforces that this is not merely a local Third Department rule.
  • Matter of Kimberly C. v Christopher C., 155 AD3d 1329 (3d Dept 2017)
    Similarly used to condemn open-ended delegation of visitation supervision or initiation to third parties.
  • Matter of Christina KK. v Kathleen LL., 119 AD3d 1000 (3d Dept 2014); Matter of Lora PP. v Alphonso PP., 221 AD3d 1321 (3d Dept 2023)
    Cited for the requirement that:
    • if visitation is to be therapeutic or supervised, the court must set a definitive schedule and clear structure, rather than leaving its occurrence to the discretion of a therapist or other entity.
    In Richard CC., these precedents support the directive that any therapeutic visitation order on remand include a specific schedule.

3. Children’s Wishes and the Best Interests Analysis

The court cites:

  • Matter of Gabrielle Q. v James R., 233 AD3d 1407 (3d Dept 2024)
    for the proposition that the children’s wishes are:
    “not determinative but are entitled to consideration as part of the best interests analysis.”
    This frames how the Third Department views the daughters’ refusal to see their father: as relevant but not controlling, especially when the reasons for their refusal may be complex and intertwined with alleged third-party abuse and parental conflict.

4. Appellate Fact-Finding and Remittal

When reversing the Family Court’s modification of visitation, the Third Department notes:

  • Matter of Shirreece AA. v Matthew BB., 166 AD3d 1419 (3d Dept 2018)
    for the principle that the Appellate Division’s fact-finding authority is “as broad as that of Family Court”; however, the appellate court may still decide that remittal is appropriate due to changed circumstances or the need for updated evidence over time.

Shirreece AA. supports the approach taken here: although the appellate court could theoretically fashion its own visitation order based on the existing record, it chooses instead to:

  • reverse the improper delegation and suspension,
  • identify gaps in the record (especially regarding sexual abuse and mental health), and
  • remit for a fresh, more thorough inquiry before a different judge.

5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

On the claim of ineffective assistance, the court cites a trio of recent cases:

  • Matter of Kyle I. v Kandice K., 232 AD3d 1074 (3d Dept 2024)
    Quoted for the standard that representation need not be perfect and that appellate courts will not “second-guess counsel’s trial strategy or tactics” based on hindsight speculation.
  • Matter of Dianne SS. v Jamie TT., 235 AD3d 1138 (3d Dept 2025)
    Reinforces the same standard that mere dissatisfaction with strategy is not enough to establish ineffective assistance.
  • Matter of Laura E. v Matthew E., 226 AD3d 1117 (3d Dept 2024); Matter of Jacklyn PP. v Jonathan QQ., 221 AD3d 1293 (3d Dept 2023)
    Cited to support the finding that the father, in fact, received “meaningful representation.”

Collectively, these precedents show the Third Department’s consistent application of a “meaningful representation” standard, rather than a perfection standard, in custody/visitation contexts.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Presumption in Favor of Visitation and Lack of Detriment Evidence

Having accepted that there was a change in circumstances, the Third Department examines whether the record justifies the near-suspension of the father’s visitation. Its key conclusions:

  • The children are experiencing mental health struggles and difficulties with the father’s parenting style.
  • These difficulties have affected their relationship with the father and contributed to their desire to avoid him.
  • However, such difficulties, standing alone, do not establish that visitation is detrimental or inimical to their welfare.

The court emphasizes that the legal threshold is not simply:

  • “The children are distressed,” or
  • “The children don’t want to visit.”

Instead, it requires:

  • “compelling reasons” and
  • “substantial evidence”

that ongoing visitation would harm the children. The Third Department finds this standard unmet. There is a significant difference between recognizing that visitation is challenging and concluding that it is so damaging that it must be effectively terminated.

2. The Role and Limits of the Children’s Wishes

The children’s refusal to see or even communicate with their father is at the heart of the Family Court’s ruling. However, guided by Gabrielle Q., the Third Department treats their preference as one important factor but not the controlling one.

The opinion suggests several reasons for caution:

  • The children’s refusal may be influenced by:
    • their mental health struggles,
    • trauma from the sexual abuse by the mother’s boyfriend,
    • family dynamics, including possible parental interference or “toxic” messaging (as alleged by the father).
  • Without a deeper exploration (e.g., psychological evaluations, a Lincoln hearing, and investigation of the abuse), the court cannot safely attribute the children’s refusal solely, or even primarily, to the father’s conduct.
  • If courts were to take a child’s refusal at face value, without probing its causes, it could:
    • enable subtle forms of alienation or
    • trigger unjustified estrangement of a parent.

By remitting for further fact-finding and suggesting specific investigative tools, the Third Department insists that courts must understand the root causes of a child’s refusal before making drastic decisions about parental access.

3. The Undeveloped Record on Sexual Abuse and its Significance

A striking element of the opinion is the court’s explicit concern over the “lack of testimony regarding the boyfriend’s sexual abuse of the older child and its effect on the children.”

This concern operates on several levels:

  • Causation of the children’s refusal.
    The abuse could be a significant factor in the children’s emotional state and their reluctance to see their father, whether:
    • because they associate him with the environment in which the abuse occurred,
    • because of how each parent responded to the abuse, or
    • due to trauma responses that are not straightforwardly attributable to either parent.
  • Assessment of each parent’s protective capacity.
    The father alleges that the mother failed to protect the child from the boyfriend’s abuse and that her environment is “toxic.” If true, this might bear on:
    • the appropriateness of the mother’s gatekeeping of contact, and
    • the relative safety of spending time with each parent.
  • Appropriate therapeutic interventions.
    Without a clear understanding of how the abuse has impacted the children, it is difficult to design effective therapeutic visitation or determine the pace and structure of reunification efforts.

The Third Department’s directive to consider:

  • psychological evaluations under Family Ct Act § 251 and
  • an investigation under Family Ct Act § 1034(1)

signals that courts must not treat such serious allegations as background noise. Instead, they can—and should—trigger intensive fact-finding and expert input before modifying visitation in a way that might permanently damage the parent-child bond.

4. The Nondelegation Principle Applied: Therapist-Controlled Visitation

Perhaps the most doctrinally important part of the opinion is its insistence that Family Court:

  • improperly delegated to a therapist the decision as to whether and when the father would have contact with his children.

The order limited the father’s parenting time to counseling sessions:

  • “at the discretion of the therapist”.

The Third Department views this as equivalent, in practical terms, to:

  • a potentially indefinite suspension of visitation.

The legal reasons this is impermissible include:

  • Visitation decisions are judicial functions.
    Only the court has the authority to determine whether visitation should occur, how frequently, and under what conditions. This is inherent in the court’s parens patriae role and in the statutory structure of Family Court Act article 6.
  • Therapists have different roles and incentives.
    While therapists can and should advise the court, they:
    • do not have the same legal mandate to balance statutory best-interest factors or
    • to weigh parental rights with child welfare.
    Giving them the final say risks skewing decisions toward mere avoidance of conflict or short-term symptom reduction, rather than long-term familial health and rights.
  • Delegation undermines procedural protections.
    A therapist’s private decisions about visitation are not subject to the same:
    • evidentiary standards,
    • adversarial testing, or
    • appellate review
    as a court order. This can effectively terminate a parent’s rights without due process.

Thus, while therapeutic or supervised visitation is often appropriate in high-conflict or trauma-affected families, the court must:

  • set a definite schedule,
  • specify the conditions clearly, and
  • retain ultimate control over whether and how visitation evolves.

The Third Department’s reliance on Cecelia BB., Rice, Kimberly C., Christina KK., and Lora PP. makes clear that this is not a new rule, but Richard CC. brings it into sharp focus in the context of alleged sexual abuse and severe child refusal.

5. Remittal Before a Different Judge and Suggested Tools

Recognizing both:

  • the deficiencies of the current record and
  • the passage of time since the July 2024 hearing,

the Third Department remits the case for further proceedings:

  • before a different Family Court judge, and
  • with explicit guidance on possible steps:
    • an updated Lincoln hearing,
    • psychological evaluations, and
    • a formal investigation into the alleged sexual abuse.

The instruction to assign a different judge is notable. It signals that:

  • the appellate court has concerns about the prior handling of the matter, particularly:
    • the failure to address certain petitions (e.g., the father’s custody order to show cause, earlier modification petition), and
    • the depth of inquiry into the abuse allegations.

By leaving the temporary restrictions in place pending remittal, the court balances:

  • the urgency of correcting the legal error (improper delegation and insufficient basis for suspension) against
  • the need to avoid abrupt changes in the children’s routines while their mental health and safety are still being assessed.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The father argued that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Third Department rejects this, applying the “meaningful representation” standard:

  • Representation need not be flawless; strategic decisions that might be debatable in hindsight are not grounds for reversal.
  • The record showed vigorous cross-examination of the mother and a thorough presentation of the father’s narrative, including his concerns about the boyfriend’s abuse and the mother’s alleged inaction.
  • The father’s criticisms amounted to speculation that different tactics might have yielded a better outcome, which is insufficient under Kyle I. and its progeny.

By upholding the adequacy of counsel while still reversing on the merits, the court separates:

  • errors attributable to the trial court’s legal analysis and management of the case from
  • the defense counsel’s performance.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Family Courts

The decision sends several clear messages to trial judges:

  • Do not rely solely on child refusal.
    Even strong, consistently expressed wishes by mature children are not, by themselves, enough to suspend a parent’s access, especially when:
    • there are unresolved allegations of third-party abuse and
    • the reasons for the children’s refusal are complex or poorly explored.
  • Dig deeply into the causes of resistance.
    Courts should consider:
    • Lincoln hearings,
    • psychological evaluations,
    • child protective investigations, and
    • expert testimony
    to understand whether a child’s refusal stems from:
    • legitimate fear or trauma associated with the parent,
    • trauma from unrelated sources (e.g., third-party abuse), or
    • subtle or overt interference by the other parent.
  • Retain judicial control over visitation.
    While therapeutic and supervised visitation are valuable tools:
    • the court must specify when, where, how often, and under what conditions visits will occur, and
    • cannot cede this authority to therapists, agencies, or parents themselves.
  • Address all pending petitions clearly.
    The opinion highlights that Family Court did not address some of the father’s modification and custody applications. On remittal, the court will need to ensure that all pending issues are explicitly decided, creating a clear and reviewable record.

B. For Attorneys for the Children (AFCs)

For AFCs seeking to curtail or suspend parental visitation, Richard CC. underscores the need for:

  • Robust evidentiary support.
    Assertions that a child is distressed or refusing contact are insufficient without:
    • expert testimony,
    • documented psychological impact, and
    • clear linkage between contact and harm.
  • Nuanced positions on therapeutic visitation.
    AFCs must be careful not to propose visitation arrangements that:
    • leave all discretion to therapists, or
    • function as disguised, indefinite suspensions of access.
  • Balanced child-voice advocacy.
    Representing the child’s wishes must be coupled with encouraging the court to understand the context of those wishes, especially where trauma or possible parental influence is in play.

C. For Parents and Their Counsel

From a practice standpoint, the decision offers key lessons:

  • For noncustodial parents:
    • Persistent efforts to exercise visitation, even when the other side is noncooperative, help preserve credibility and show commitment.
    • Documenting positive interactions and promptly raising concerns about third-party abuse can be critical.
  • For custodial parents:
    • Supporting the child’s autonomy does not permit unilateral suspension of court-ordered visitation.
    • Courts will scrutinize whether refusal is genuinely child-driven or influenced by the custodial parent’s attitudes.
  • For counsel on both sides:
    • Be prepared to present or challenge psychological and forensic evidence.
    • Anticipate that courts will seek to preserve some form of structured access unless compelling detriment is proved.

D. Doctrinal Consolidation: Nondelegation and Therapeutic Visitation

Matter of Richard CC. consolidates and modernizes a line of cases on:

  • nondelegation of visitation decisions, and
  • the structuring of therapeutic visitation.

It affirms that:

  • Therapeutic visitation is an adjunct, not a substitute, for judicial decision-making.
  • Court-ordered therapy may support or shape visitation, but may not replace the court’s role in deciding whether a parent will see their child.

Given the growing use of therapy-based reunification models in high-conflict custody disputes, this clarification will likely shape how courts across New York structure such interventions.

VI. Complex Concepts and Terminology Explained

Family Court Act Article 6
The part of New York’s Family Court Act governing custody and visitation proceedings, including original petitions and requests to modify existing orders.
Modification Petition
A request to change an existing custody or visitation order, requiring proof of a change in circumstances and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests.
Violation Petition
A petition alleging that a party has willfully failed to comply with an existing court order (e.g., denying scheduled visitation).
Enforcement Petition
A petition seeking specific enforcement of an existing order, which may overlap with or accompany a violation petition.
Attorney for the Children (AFC)
A lawyer appointed to represent the children’s interests and, in most cases, to advocate for their expressed wishes, subject to ethical rules (22 NYCRR Part 7).
Best Interests of the Child
The legally controlling standard in custody and visitation cases; it encompasses the child’s safety, emotional and developmental needs, relationships with each parent, stability, wishes (in light of age and maturity), and other relevant factors.
Presumption Favoring Visitation
The legal presumption that ongoing contact with a noncustodial parent is generally beneficial for a child, and thus that visitation should occur unless shown to be harmful.
Detrimental or Inimical to Welfare
Legal terms indicating that visitation would be affirmatively harmful to the child’s physical, emotional, or psychological well-being. Mere discomfort or conflict is not enough; there must be compelling evidence of actual or likely harm.
Lincoln Hearing
An in-camera (in chambers), on-the-record interview between the judge and the child, without the parents present, used to understand the child’s wishes and experiences while reducing pressure and potential coercion. Named after Lincoln v Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 (1969).
Family Court Act § 251 (Psychological Evaluations)
A provision allowing the court to order physical, mental, or psychiatric examinations of a party or child, and to assign mental health professionals, to aid in custody or visitation determinations.
Family Court Act § 1034(1) (Investigation of Abuse/Neglect)
A provision authorizing the court to order an investigation by child protective services (CPS) into allegations of abuse or neglect, often in connection with Article 10 proceedings.
Therapeutic Visitation
Visitation occurring in a therapeutic setting, often with a mental health professional present, designed both to maintain parental contact and to address relational or psychological issues.
Nondelegation Principle (in Visitation Context)
The rule that courts may not delegate to third parties (e.g., therapists, agencies, or even children themselves) the ultimate authority to decide whether, and under what conditions, a parent will have visitation. The court must set the schedule and retain oversight.
Meaningful Representation
The standard for effective assistance of counsel in civil family law proceedings in New York. Counsel’s performance must be adequate and reasonably competent, though not perfect. Strategic choices are generally not grounds for reversal unless they render representation fundamentally unfair.

VII. Conclusion

Matter of Richard CC. v. Lacey DD. is a consequential reminder that:

  • parental visitation is a deeply protected aspect of the parent-child relationship,
  • courts must require compelling, well-developed evidence before effectively terminating contact, and
  • judges cannot outsource their core responsibilities to therapists or other nonjudicial actors.

The Third Department insists on a nuanced, evidence-based approach when children refuse contact and when allegations of third-party sexual abuse and mental health trauma are in play. It calls on Family Court to:

  • fully investigate the roots of the children’s refusal,
  • utilize psychological and investigative tools as needed,
  • consider the children’s voices in a structured, developmentally appropriate way, and
  • if therapeutic visitation is warranted, design a clear, definite, judicially controlled visitation schedule.

By reversing an order that both lacked sufficient evidentiary support and improperly delegated visitation decisions to a therapist, the Third Department strengthens important procedural and substantive safeguards in New York family law. The decision will likely serve as a touchstone in future cases involving:

  • children’s resistance to contact,
  • therapeutic or supervised visitation arrangements, and
  • the intersection of allegations of abuse with ongoing parental access.

In doing so, Richard CC. reaffirms the judiciary’s central role in balancing child protection, parental rights, and the long-term integrity of the parent-child relationship.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York

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