Chen v. Rubio: Second Circuit Limits “Mandel” Review to Cases Burdening a U.S. Citizen’s Constitutional Rights and Extends Muñoz Beyond Spouses to Parents and Siblings

Introduction

In Chen v. Rubio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed and sharpened the doctrine of consular nonreviewability in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Department of State v. Muñoz. The case concerns three U.S. citizens—Xiao P. Chen, Shiming Chen, and Yamin Yan—each of whom had a family member’s immigrant visa application denied by the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China. The grounds given for the refusals were fraud or willful misrepresentation under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

After the Eastern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit—one on venue and two on consular nonreviewability—the Second Circuit affirmed. Most significantly, the Court held that:

The “facially legitimate and bona fide” inquiry from Kleindienst v. Mandel applies only when a visa denial allegedly burdens a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights.
Following Muñoz, U.S. citizens have no fundamental liberty interest in the admission of a noncitizen spouse—and a fortiori none in the admission of a parent or sibling.
Absent a burden on a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights, courts will not look behind a consular visa denial simply because the applicant or sponsoring relative alleges error, bad faith, or demands rational basis review.

Defendants were sued in their official capacities: the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to China, and the U.S. Consul General in Guangzhou. Judge Gerard E. Lynch authored the opinion for a panel including Judges Raggi, Lynch, and Park.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court in full:

Venue (Yan): The dismissal of plaintiff Yamin Yan’s claims for improper venue was affirmed and not challenged on appeal, mooting any merits argument regarding his claim.
Consular nonreviewability (Xiao P. Chen and Shiming Chen): The court held that absent a burden on a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights, consular visa denials are “final and conclusive” and not subject to judicial review. Plaintiffs conceded they had no constitutional right to reunification with a parent or sibling; thus, review was barred.
Scope of Mandel review: The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that courts must always test visa denials for a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason, clarifying that this limited inquiry is available only when a citizen’s constitutional rights are allegedly burdened.
Bad faith and timeliness: Because the prerequisite constitutional burden was absent, the court found no need to reach a bad-faith inquiry and agreed that plaintiffs’ “untimeliness” claim merely repackaged a merits disagreement with the stated ground of inadmissibility.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972): Mandel established that where the Executive gives a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for excluding a noncitizen, courts will not “look behind” that reason or balance it against asserted rights. In Chen, the Second Circuit emphasized Mandel’s context: the Court engaged in narrow review only because U.S. citizen plaintiffs claimed a First Amendment burden. Chen underscores that Mandel does not create a freestanding, universal standard of review for all visa denials.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950): The bedrock rule that decisions to admit or exclude noncitizens—made pursuant to congressional delegation—are “final and conclusive.” Chen relies on Knauff (as Muñoz did) to anchor the presumption against judicial review of consular decisions.
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967): Cited for Congress’s plenary power over the admission of noncitizens, a power that undergirds consular nonreviewability.
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018): Reaffirmed that even when U.S. citizens allege constitutional burdens, judicial inquiry remains “circumscribed” to whether the Executive stated a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason. Chen adopts this framing to confine review to the narrow “assumed” exception.
Department of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024): The pivot. Muñoz held that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in a noncitizen spouse’s admission. Chen applies Muñoz and extends its logic: if there is no fundamental right regarding spouses, there is certainly none for parents or siblings. Muñoz also synthesized prior cases, confirming that the “assumed” exception to consular nonreviewability arises only when a citizen’s constitutional rights are allegedly burdened, at which point the Mandel standard applies.
Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015): Justice Kennedy’s concurrence assumed a constitutional burden and then found the government’s stated reason sufficient under Mandel. Chen distinguishes Din: it does not support applying Mandel absent a constitutional burden.
Burrafato v. U.S. Department of State, 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975): Longstanding Second Circuit authority refusing review of visa denials where no constitutional rights of American citizens are implicated. Chen reprises Burrafato’s approach.
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), and Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47 (2017): Inapposite here; those cases concerned congressional criteria for recognizing qualifying family relationships (classification), not the review of a consular officer’s denial of a specific visa.
Kane v. U.S. Attorney General, 2024 WL 3650239 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024): Cited as in line with Muñoz in rejecting review of denials involving a spouse and her children. Chen notes that plaintiffs offered no reason to treat parents or siblings differently from spouses after Muñoz.

Legal Reasoning

Start from plenary power and consular finality: Congress has plenary authority to set admission rules for noncitizens. When Congress delegates decisions to the Executive, the Executive’s admission/exclusion decisions are “final and conclusive.” This is the doctrinal backbone of consular nonreviewability (Knauff; Boutilier).
Recognize only an assumed, narrow exception: The Supreme Court has “assumed” a narrow exception to nonreviewability when a visa denial allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen. Even then, the judicial inquiry is strictly limited to whether the Executive has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason (Mandel; Trump v. Hawaii; Muñoz).
Apply Muñoz to the plaintiffs’ relationships: Muñoz held there is no fundamental liberty interest in the admission of a noncitizen spouse. Chen extends that logic: if no fundamental right exists for spouses, none exists for parents or siblings. Plaintiffs “wisely” conceded they lack such a constitutional right. Because the prerequisite constitutional burden is absent, there is no occasion for Mandel review.
Reject a free-floating “Mandel review” for all denials: Plaintiffs argued that courts should assess whether the denial is “facially legitimate and bona fide” regardless of whether constitutional rights are implicated. The Second Circuit squarely rejected this position as “find[ing] no basis in the case law.” As Chen explains, the Supreme Court’s limited, circumscribed inquiry has only ever been undertaken when a citizen’s constitutional rights were allegedly burdened.
Alleged bad faith does not open the courthouse door absent a constitutional burden: The district court found plaintiffs’ bad-faith allegations insufficiently plausible. The Second Circuit observed that, because no constitutional right is implicated, it need not reach whether bad faith was plausibly alleged. Without the threshold constitutional burden, even allegations of bad faith do not trigger judicial review of the consular decision.
“Timeliness” challenge fails because it repackages a merits dispute: INA § 212(b)(1) requires timely written notice of inadmissibility grounds. Here, the Guangzhou consulate promptly issued written refusals citing § 212(a)(6)(C). Plaintiffs’ “timeliness” argument was not genuinely about timing; it contested the underlying ground as illegitimate. The court thus affirmed dismissal of the “untimeliness” claim.

Impact and Implications

Near-absolute bar to reviewing family-based visa denials in the Second Circuit absent a constitutional burden: After Chen, U.S. citizens sponsoring parents or siblings cannot obtain judicial review of consular visa denials merely by alleging error, unfairness, or even “bad faith,” unless they can first show that the denial burdens their constitutional rights—something Muñoz makes effectively impossible for family-unity claims, even as to spouses.
“Mandel review” is not a general-purpose rationality check: The Second Circuit clarifies that the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard is not a universal yardstick for reviewing consular actions. It is a narrow, assumed exception triggered only by alleged burdens on a citizen’s constitutional rights.
Strategy shift for litigants:
- Challenges may focus on upstream classification decisions by USCIS (e.g., I-130 approvals/denials), where APA review may be available, rather than on consular refusals.
- Consular refusals under INA § 212(a)(6)(C) (fraud/misrepresentation) are particularly final. While a § 212(i) waiver can forgive misrepresentation, it requires a qualifying U.S. citizen or LPR spouse or parent—not a sibling or child—suffering extreme hardship. In many parent/sibling cases, waiver pathways will be limited or unavailable.
- Procedural claims must be genuinely procedural and independent of the merits. As Chen shows, courts will reject “timeliness” or similar process claims that simply restate a disagreement with the substantive ground of inadmissibility stated on the refusal notice.
Consistency with national trend post-Muñoz: Chen aligns the Second Circuit with Muñoz and decisions like Kane in the Eleventh Circuit, limiting litigation over consular refusals where no citizen’s constitutional rights are plausibly implicated.
Reduced likelihood of discovery or record development: Because the threshold for review is not met, plaintiffs should expect courts to dispose of cases at the pleadings stage without ordering production of consular files or permitting discovery to probe alleged “bad faith.”
Limited role of equal protection cases on classification rules: Fiallo and Morales-Santana remain relevant to challenges against congressional classifications, but they do not open a door to reviewing the merits of a specific consular visa refusal for an otherwise qualifying relative.
Venue still matters, but won’t cure the nonreviewability problem: One plaintiff’s claim was dismissed for improper venue, and the Second Circuit did not address the merits. Practitioners should still carefully select venue, but Chen demonstrates that even a proper venue cannot overcome the nonreviewability bar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Consular nonreviewability: A longstanding doctrine that federal courts generally do not second-guess a consular officer’s decision to grant or deny a visa. The decision is treated as final because Congress has broad power over immigration and has delegated consular authority to the Executive.
“Facially legitimate and bona fide” reason: From Mandel. If a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights are allegedly burdened by a visa denial, courts ask only whether the Government offered a legitimate reason stated on its face, in good faith. If so, courts do not probe further. Chen clarifies that this inquiry is not available unless a citizen’s constitutional right is at stake.
Plenary power: The idea that Congress has near-complete authority to set the rules for who may enter the United States. This power supports judicial deference to consular decisions.
INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) (fraud or willful misrepresentation): A ground of inadmissibility applied when an applicant seeks to obtain a visa or immigration benefit by knowingly making a material false statement. It results in a permanent bar absent a waiver (typically available only if the applicant has certain qualifying relatives, not including siblings).
Constitutional burden: A threshold requirement for any possible judicial review in this context. The plaintiff must show that a visa denial burdened the U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights. Muñoz makes clear there is no fundamental liberty interest in a spouse’s admission; Chen extends that logic to parents and siblings.
Bad faith: Allegations that the government acted with improper motive or dishonesty. Under Chen, courts will not reach bad-faith arguments unless the plaintiff first shows a constitutional burden that would permit any review at all.
Timely written notice (INA § 212(b)(1)): The statute requires prompt written notice of the ground(s) of inadmissibility. In Chen, refusals were promptly issued and identified § 212(a)(6)(C); plaintiffs’ “timeliness” claim was rejected as a veiled attack on the merits of the refusal.

Conclusion

Chen v. Rubio cements, within the Second Circuit, a post-Muñoz landscape in which consular visa denials are effectively unreviewable unless—and only unless—the denial allegedly burdens a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights. The court expressly rejects the notion that the Mandel “facially legitimate and bona fide” test operates as a universal rationality review for visa denials. Instead, Mandel’s narrow inquiry is available solely in the exceptional circumstance where a citizen’s constitutional rights are implicated—a circumstance Muñoz now forecloses for spousal admissions and, by extension, for parents and siblings.

Practically speaking, this decision will redirect litigation away from consular refusals and toward upstream classification decisions or legislative reform efforts. For family-based immigration, Chen underscores the steep challenges of contesting consular fraud or misrepresentation refusals and the very limited space for judicial review. The key takeaway is clear: absent a cognizable constitutional burden on a U.S. citizen, consular decisions remain “final and conclusive,” and courts will not “look behind” the stated statutory ground of inadmissibility.