Carter v. Southwest Airlines: The Fifth Circuit Draws a Bright Line Between Belief- and Practice-Based Title VII Claims, Clarifies Union Liability for “Attempting to Cause” Discrimination, Narrows Post-Certification RLA Suits, and Polices Overbroad Injunctions and Punitive Civil Contempt

Introduction

In a closely watched dispute at the intersection of religious accommodation, labor law, and judicial remedies, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Edith Brown Clement, joined by Judges Engelhardt and Wilson) issued a substituted panel opinion in Charlene Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company and Local 556, Transport Workers Union of America.

Charlene Carter, a long-time Southwest flight attendant, sent graphic anti-abortion messages and posts criticizing union leadership after Local 556’s Working Women’s Committee participated in the 2017 Women’s March. Southwest terminated her under its Social Media, Workplace Bullying and Hazing, and Harassment policies; an arbitrator upheld “just cause” for termination. Carter then sued Southwest and the Union alleging Title VII religious discrimination and accommodation violations, Railway Labor Act (RLA) retaliation and interference, and a fair-representation breach by the Union.

A jury found for Carter, and the district court entered sweeping injunctive relief and later held Southwest in contempt for its post-judgment communications, ordering the airline’s in-house counsel to attend religious-liberty training. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit granted panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued this comprehensive decision addressing:

• A doctrinal clarification distinguishing belief-based from practice-based Title VII religion claims and the availability of the “undue hardship” defense.
• How Groff v. DeJoy’s “substantial increased costs” standard affects already-tried cases.
• Union liability under Title VII for “attempting to cause” an employer’s adverse action and the pleading of a union’s undue hardship defense.
• The narrow availability of RLA private actions in post-certification settings absent anti-union animus or breakdowns in RLA processes.
• Rule 65(d) limits on vague and overbroad injunctions and the remedial (not punitive) nature of civil contempt sanctions.

Summary of the Opinion

• Title VII – Southwest:
  • Belief-based claim: Reversed. Carter failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Southwest terminated her because of her religious beliefs (as distinct from her conduct). Judgment as a matter of law ordered for Southwest.
  • Practice-based claims (intentional discrimination and failure to accommodate): Affirmed. Southwest did not obtain a new trial despite Groff’s intervening clarification raising the undue hardship bar; the jury’s verdict stood under the pre-Groff instruction and would not be disturbed.
• Title VII – Union:
  • Liability affirmed on all Title VII theories, including “causing or attempting to cause” discrimination. The Union forfeited sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges by failing to file a Rule 50(b) motion, and the “attempt to cause” instruction correctly tracked 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3).
  • The Union’s late attempt to add an undue-hardship defense was properly denied; undue delay and prejudice justified refusal to amend mid-trial.
• RLA – Southwest:
  • Interference claim: Affirmed dismissal. Carter did not plead anti-union animus or a fundamental attack on the collective-bargaining process; administrative mechanisms were available.
  • Retaliation claim: Reversed. No standalone private right of action for post-certification retaliation absent anti-union animus or collapse of RLA mechanisms.
• RLA – Union:
  • Duty of fair representation: Affirmed. The Union breached its duty via arbitrary conduct when its president reported Carter to Southwest; the Union’s challenge premised on whether Carter’s conduct was “protected” was immaterial to the DFR standard.
• Injunctive relief: Vacated and remanded. The district court’s permanent injunction was void for vagueness and overbroad under Rule 65(d) and governing precedent.
• Contempt: Contempt finding affirmed, but the sanction vacated and remanded. Southwest’s notice (“does not discriminate”) failed to comply with the court’s order (“may not discriminate”), but ordering counsel to attend religious-liberty training was punitive, not remedial.
• Appellate attorneys’ fees: Remanded to the district court to determine and award Carter’s Title VII appellate fees.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion knits together a series of landmark Title VII and RLA cases with remedial law on injunctions and contempt. Key precedents include:

Title VII Religious Accommodation and Causation

• EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768: Title VII demands favored treatment for religious practices and allows liability where the motive is to avoid accommodation. The court uses Abercrombie for the “motivating factor” causation standard and to emphasize that neutral policies yield when accommodation is possible.
• Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447: Clarified “undue hardship” means “substantial increased costs” in relation to the business; impacts on coworkers count only insofar as they impose substantial business costs. The Fifth Circuit acknowledges Groff but declines a new trial because the employer lost under the lower (pre-Groff) de minimis standard.
• Hebrew v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 80 F.4th 717 (5th Cir. 2023): Applied Groff and emphasized employers’ heavy burden; used here to underscore the modern standard and the convergence of practice-based intentional discrimination and accommodation analyses.
• Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324: An example highlighting the need to preserve the undue hardship defense for practice-based claims—and why collapsing belief and practice would nullify that defense.
• Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141; Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172; Weber v. Roadway Express, 199 F.3d 270: Pre-Groff Fifth Circuit cases defining “undue hardship” as more-than-de minimis, including coworker morale and shift disruption. The panel contrasts these with Groff’s heightened standard, noting the change favors plaintiffs.

Union Liability Under Title VII

• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3): The textual basis for union liability where a union “causes or attempts to cause” an employer to discriminate. The court relies on the plain language to approve a jury instruction allowing liability for “attempting to cause.”
• Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641: Supports joint/several backpay where a union’s role under a CBA contributes to Title VII violations.
• Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729: Preservation rule—sufficiency challenges must be raised in a Rule 50(b) motion. The Union’s failure to file 50(b) foreclosed its sufficiency arguments on appeal.

Railway Labor Act – Jurisdiction and Private Rights

• Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. IFFA (TWA), 489 U.S. 426: The RLA chiefly protects pre-certification rights; post-certification judicial intervention is tightly constrained.
• Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Union Pac. R.R., 31 F.4th 337; Ass’n of Prof. Flight Attendants v. American Airlines, 843 F.2d 209: Post-certification jurisdiction exists only for anti-union animus or fundamental attacks on the union process.
• Roscello v. Southwest Airlines, 726 F.2d 217: A pre-certification context where the court assumed (without deciding) a private right of action and where facts suggested employer interference with organizing; contrasted here to reject post-certification retaliation claims absent anti-union animus.
• Mitchell v. Continental Airlines, 481 F.3d 225: Employees are generally confined to contractual grievance/arbitration mechanisms; courts preserve DFR claims against unions.
• Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171; O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65: Duty of fair representation (DFR) doctrine—unions breach the duty when acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith.

Injunctions and Contempt

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473; Louisiana v. Biden, 45 F.4th 841; Payne v. Travenol Labs., 565 F.2d 895; E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760; Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48: The specificity requirement and tailoring mandate; “obey-the-law” injunctions are improper; relief must redress the plaintiff’s injury and not extend unnecessarily to nonparties.
• Bagwell, Gompers, Turner, Norman Bridge, Stewart, Willy: Civil contempt must be remedial—aimed at compliance or compensation—not punitive; sanctions like mandatory training unrelated to remedy or coercion are improper in civil contempt.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Title VII Belief–Practice Divide

The opinion adopts a structural reading of Title VII’s definition of “religion” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) to require separate analysis for claims based on:

• Belief-based intentional discrimination: No undue hardship defense applies. The question is whether the belief itself motivated the adverse action.
• Practice-based intentional discrimination, and
• Practice-based failure-to-accommodate: Both are subject to the undue hardship defense.

Carter’s evidentiary showing connected Southwest’s action to her conduct (graphic, targeted messaging) rather than animus against her beliefs as such. Without direct evidence of belief animus—or valid comparators under the McDonnell Douglas framework—the belief-based claim failed as a matter of law. By contrast, her practice-based claims succeeded because Southwest did not carry its burden on undue hardship even under the then-applicable de minimis standard, and the Fifth Circuit refused to grant Southwest a new trial after Groff raised that burden.

2) Groff’s Higher Standard and Why No New Trial

Groff requires employers to prove that accommodating a religious practice would impose “substantial increased costs” in relation to the business, not just more-than-de minimis burdens or diffuse morale concerns. Southwest sought a retrial to develop evidence tying morale and coworker impacts to business costs, but the panel emphasized:

• Southwest already tried and lost under a more favorable standard (de minimis).
• Fairness does not compel a new trial when the change in law makes the losing party’s burden harder, not easier.
• The airline identified no concrete, withheld evidence such that an ordinarily prudent counsel would not have presented it already.

3) Union Liability for “Attempting to Cause” Discrimination and Undue Hardship

The court confirmed that § 2000e-2(c)(3) reaches a union’s “attempt” to cause an employer to discriminate—liability does not hinge on consummated adverse action. The Union’s sufficiency challenges were barred by its failure to file a Rule 50(b) motion. On defenses, the court traced authority recognizing that unions, like employers, can invoke undue hardship in accommodation disputes, but the Union forfeited that affirmative defense by failing to plead it for years and trying to add it mid-trial. Denial of leave to amend was within the district court’s discretion due to undue delay and prejudice.

4) RLA – Narrow Post-Certification Pathways

The RLA channels most disputes to arbitration and limits federal court roles. While pre-certification cases can proceed to enforce employees’ organizing rights (e.g., Roscello), post-certification judicial relief is available only where:

• Carrier conduct is motivated by anti-union animus or attempts to undermine union functioning; or
• RLA processes are ineffective or unavailable.

Carter’s post-certification retaliation/interference theories against Southwest did not meet these thresholds: no anti-union animus finding, no union-undermining, and no collapse of dispute-resolution processes. By contrast, the DFR claim against the Union fit comfortably within the traditional implied right of action: the Union’s president’s reporting of Carter to Southwest was found arbitrary/bad faith by the jury, and whether Carter’s conduct was “protected” was beside the point under DFR doctrine.

5) Judicial Remedies – Precision in Injunctions and Restraint in Civil Contempt

The permanent injunction was vacated for two independent reasons:

• Vagueness: It failed Rule 65(d) specificity by effectively ordering the parties to “obey the law,” leaving the Union (especially) unclear about what conduct was prohibited.
• Overbreadth: It extended beyond redressing Carter’s injury to cover all Southwest flight attendants, an unnecessary reach to non-parties not required to afford Carter complete relief.

On contempt, the court drew a sharp remedial/punitive line. It affirmed the contempt finding because Southwest’s internal notice (“does not discriminate”) did not comply with the required wording (“may not discriminate”), misrepresenting the judgment in a way that frustrated the order’s purpose. However, ordering in-house lawyers to attend religious-liberty training was punitive and overbroad:

• It neither coerced compliance nor compensated loss.
• It reached non-decisionmakers and swept beyond Title VII to unrelated topics.
• Less restrictive, targeted remedial measures were available.

The sanction was vacated and remanded for a narrowly tailored, remedial remedy.

Impact

For Employers

• Doctrinal clarity: Courts in the Fifth Circuit will separately analyze belief-based and practice-based religion claims. The undue hardship defense is categorically unavailable for belief-based claims, but central to practice-based claims.
• Groff’s standard applies prospectively with rigor: Morale or coworker objections are insufficient unless tied to substantial business costs; bias-based coworker discomfort cannot count at all.
• No automatic “Groff retrial”: Losing under a lower, employer-friendly standard does not entitle the employer to a second trial to meet a now higher standard.
• Compliance communications matter: When ordered to issue a notice, follow the court’s language precisely; paraphrasing can support a contempt finding.

For Unions

• “Attempting to cause” liability is real: Unions can face Title VII liability even if the employer’s adverse act is not consummated.
• Plead defenses early: If a union will rely on undue hardship, it must plead it; late attempts to amend risk denial.
• DFR exposure: Internal actions—such as reporting members/nonmembers to management—are subject to DFR constraints; arbitrariness or bad faith can trigger liability regardless of whether the member’s conduct is “RLA-protected.”

For RLA Litigation

• Post-certification suits remain narrow: Absent anti-union animus or breakdowns in RLA mechanisms, federal courts will not entertain retaliation/interference claims against carriers; contractual arbitration remains the avenue.
• Preserve arguments: The Fifth Circuit flagged that issue preclusion from arbitration could have disposed of claims—but those arguments were forfeited on appeal. Parties should preserve preclusion from the outset through appeal.

For District Courts (Remedial Crafting)

• Injunctions must be specific and tailored: Avoid “obey the law” decrees and class-wide relief untethered to the plaintiff’s injury.
• Civil contempt must be remedial: Coercive or compensatory sanctions only; training orders that look punitive and do not coerce compliance will not stand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Belief-based vs. practice-based Title VII claims:
  • Belief-based: Employer allegedly acts because of what you believe. No undue hardship defense applies. The key is motive toward the belief itself.
  • Practice-based: Employer acts because of how you act on your belief (e.g., grooming, scheduling, religious speech/conduct). Employer can avoid liability if accommodating would impose substantial increased costs on its business (Groff).
• Undue hardship (post-Groff): The employer must show that accommodating the religious practice would impose substantial increased costs in relation to its business; coworker objections count only if they significantly burden the business, and bias-based discomfort is irrelevant.
• “Attempt to cause” (Title VII union liability): A union can be liable if it tries to get an employer to discriminate—even if the employer doesn’t follow through.
• Duty of fair representation (DFR): A union must act non-arbitrarily and in good faith toward all represented employees (members and nonmembers). Arbitrary or retaliatory union actions against an employee can breach this duty.
• RLA post-certification limits: After a union is certified, federal courts generally step out unless the carrier acts with anti-union animus or undermines the union process—or RLA remedies are unavailable.
• Rule 65(d) injunction specificity: Court orders must clearly state what is required or prohibited; vague “follow the law” directives are unenforceable.
• Civil vs. criminal contempt: Civil contempt seeks to coerce compliance or compensate harm; criminal contempt punishes. Civil sanctions must be remedial; punitive training or unrelated burdens exceed civil contempt authority.

Conclusion

Carter clarifies and sharpens several important legal doctrines. First, Title VII religious claims in the Fifth Circuit must be parsed into belief-based and practice-based categories, with the undue hardship defense confined to practice-based claims. Second, post-Groff, employers face a demanding burden to prove undue hardship—and cannot expect retrials simply because the law has shifted to favor employees. Third, unions face statutory exposure not only for causing but even for attempting to cause employer discrimination, and they must timely plead affirmative defenses like undue hardship. Fourth, post-certification RLA claims against carriers remain tightly circumscribed; absent anti-union animus or a breakdown in RLA processes, federal courts will not entertain retaliation/interference claims, though DFR claims against unions remain viable.

Finally, the opinion reinforces foundational remedial principles: injunctions must be specific and tailored to the plaintiff’s injury, and civil contempt sanctions must be remedial—not punitive. Along the way, the court flags preservation pitfalls (Rule 50(b), issue preclusion) that can be outcome-determinative on appeal.

Net result: Carter prevails on her Title VII practice-based claims against Southwest and on all Title VII claims against the Union; her belief-based and RLA retaliation claims against Southwest fail; the global injunction is vacated and must be reworked; the contempt finding stands but the sanction must be remedial. For employers, unions, and courts alike, the decision provides a detailed roadmap for litigating and remedying religion-in-the-workplace disputes post-Groff within the Fifth Circuit.