Attempted Armed Bank Robbery Under 18 U.S.C. §2113(d) as a Predicate Crime of Violence

Introduction

In United States v. Ronald Vines, 3rd Cir. No. 23-2843 (Apr. 21, 2025), the Third Circuit addressed whether an attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), predicated on the robbery clause of § 2113(a), qualifies as a “crime of violence” for the purposes of the firearms‐in‐furtherance‐of‐a‐crime statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ronald Vines and two of his adult sons planned and executed a gunpoint bank robbery that ended in an aborted attempt and a subsequent guilty plea to (1) attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) and (2) brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under § 924(c). On collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Vines challenged the § 924(c) conviction, contending that attempted armed bank robbery is not categorically a crime of violence. The district court denied relief, and this appeal followed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that:

The categorical approach applies: one looks only to the statutory elements, not to the facts of the crime.
Section 2113(a)’s first paragraph is divisible into (i) the robbery clause (“by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes or attempts to take”) and (ii) the extortion clause.
Under the robbery clause of § 2113(a), both successful and attempted takings must be carried out “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” The grammatical structure—an introductory adverbial phrase modifying two parallel verbs—compels that reading.
Armed bank robbery under § 2113(d), which punishes the commission or attempt to commit a § 2113(a) robbery while “assault[ing] any person, or put[ting] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon,” plainly incorporates the force element of the robbery clause.
Therefore, attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) (predicated on § 2113(a)’s robbery clause) is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), which defines such crimes to include those that “have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
Because any objection to the § 924(c) charge would have failed, Vines’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d) – The statutory framework for bank robbery and armed bank robbery, including both completed and attempted offenses.
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Established the categorical approach and the concept of divisible statutes.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) – Confirmed focusing on the least‐egregious conduct criminalized by the statute.
United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2018) – Held that completed bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence.
United States v. Jordan, 96 F.4th 584 (3d Cir. 2024) – Clarified that § 2113(d) incorporates § 2113(a)’s elements and reaffirmed the categorical approach for completed offenses.
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022) – Held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is not a crime of violence because its attempt provision lacks any force element.

Legal Reasoning

1. Categorical approach: The court employed the two‐step test—(i) identify the elements of the statute of conviction, and (ii) decide whether the least culpable conduct requires force against another. Under this approach, actual conduct in the case is irrelevant.

2. Divisibility of § 2113(a): The first paragraph contains two distinct clauses—a “robbery” clause and an “extortion” clause. Because Vines pleaded guilty to robbery, the analysis focuses on the “by force and violence, or by intimidation” clause.

3. Grammatical interpretation: The adverbial phrase “by force and violence, or by intimidation” precedes two parallel verbs (“takes” and “attempts to take”) and therefore modifies both. Attempts to construe force as applying only to successful robberies would lead to a grammatically disjointed sentence.

4. Relevance of Taylor: The court distinguished its analysis from Taylor, noting that § 2113(a) expressly requires force or intimidation to complete or attempt the robbery, whereas the Hobbs Act’s analogous attempt provision does not.

5. Armed robbery under § 2113(d): Because § 2113(d) incorporates § 2113(a)’s robbery elements and adds the presence of a dangerous weapon, it likewise involves the threatened or attempted use of force against another, satisfying § 924(c)(3)(A).

6. Ineffective assistance claim: Counsel’s failure to object to a meritless argument does not prejudice the defendant. Had Vines’s lawyer objected, the objection would have been rejected.

Potential Impact

Future § 924(c) cases will treat attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d)(predicate on the robbery clause of § 2113(a)) as a categorical crime of violence.
This decision reinforces a strict, text‐based approach to divisibility and modifier placement in criminal statutes.
Defendants charged under § 924(c) for armed bank robbery will face higher hurdles in challenging predicate offenses.
Other circuits may revisit their analyses of § 2113(a) and § 2113(d) to resolve minor intra‐circuit splits, especially where statutes contain parallel structures.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: Courts look at the statutory definition alone and imagine the “least serious” case it criminalizes. If that hypothetical case requires force, the offense is a crime of violence.
Divisible Statute: A law that lists multiple, alternative elements (e.g., robbery or extortion). Courts “break out” only the relevant alternative to test against the crime‐of‐violence definition.
Modifier Placement: When a descriptive phrase comes before two parallel verbs, it modifies both (not just the first one). Here, “by force and violence, or by intimidation” qualifies both “takes” and “attempts to take.”
Crime of Violence under § 924(c): A “predicate offense” that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against another person or property.

Conclusion

United States v. Vines establishes that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), when grounded in the robbery clause of § 2113(a), is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The decision underscores strict application of the categorical approach, careful parsing of statutory grammar to determine divisibility, and the necessity of a force element even in attempt offenses. By reinforcing that both completed and attempted armed bank robberies involve the use or threatened use of force, this ruling will guide lower courts and practitioners in evaluating predicate offenses for sentencing enhancements under the federal gun statutes.