Arzamendi v. Hegseth: Rescission of Federal Vaccine Mandate Does Not Moot Damages Claims; Religious Accommodation Pleadings Must Specifically Tie Beliefs to Testing/Masking Protocols

Introduction

In Arzamendi v. Hegseth, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed two recurring questions arising from COVID-19-era federal workplace policies: whether the rescission of a vaccination mandate moots employees’ damages claims, and what a plaintiff must plead to plausibly allege a Title VII religious-accommodation conflict with testing/masking/distancing requirements imposed on unvaccinated employees. The court reversed a mootness dismissal as to damages claims challenging the now-rescinded federal employee vaccination requirement and affirmed dismissal of Title VII claims attacking related COVID-19 testing/masking/distancing protocols for failure to plausibly plead a religious conflict with those protocols. The panel remanded the vaccine-mandate damages claims for the district court to consider all remaining arguments in the first instance.

The case involves three Department of Defense civilian employees—Amy Arzamendi, Michael Orloff, and Brooke Stadler—who sought religious exemptions from the 2021 federal COVID-19 vaccination requirement and from DOD’s related testing, masking, and distancing protocols (“COVID-19 Guidelines”). They sued the Department and senior officials, asserting Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, RFRA, and (originally) Bivens claims; they ultimately withdrew Bivens claims and requests for prospective relief. The district court dismissed, holding that the rescinded vaccine requirement mooted the vaccine claims and that the COVID-19 Guidelines claims were insufficiently pleaded. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Summary of the Opinion

• Mootness: The court held that the rescission of the federal employee vaccination requirement did not moot plaintiffs’ claims insofar as they sought damages. Because plaintiffs pleaded damages (including nominal damages), the controversy over alleged past injuries remained live. The court reversed the mootness dismissal of the vaccine-mandate claims and remanded for the district court to address the merits and other defenses in the first instance.
• Title VII (COVID-19 Guidelines): The court affirmed dismissal of Title VII claims challenging testing/masking/distancing protocols for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege the essential element that their religious beliefs conflicted with these specific protocols. The court treated other theories (disparate treatment, hostile work environment, disparate impact, RFRA, and Rehabilitation Act as to the Guidelines) as abandoned or not meaningfully briefed on appeal, limiting review to a failure-to-accommodate theory under Title VII.
• Concurrence/Dissent: Judge Willett concurred that mootness did not bar vaccine-mandate damages claims and agreed Orloff’s Guidelines claim was insufficiently pleaded. He dissented as to Stadler’s and Arzamendi’s testing/masking claims, emphasizing Rule 12(b)(6)’s “low bar” and reasoning that their allegations plausibly alleged a religious conflict when read as a whole and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

Factual and Procedural Background

• September 2021: Executive Order 14043 required federal employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to legally required exemptions.
• October 2021: DOD implemented the mandate; issued enforcement guidance and established exemption processes via DD Forms 3175 (attestation), 3176 (medical exemption), and 3177 (religious exemption). Unvaccinated employees had to comply with COVID-19 Guidelines (testing, masking, distancing, travel limits).
• November 2021: Plaintiffs submitted religious exemption requests from vaccination (and, for some, from testing/masking/distancing).
• January 21, 2022: A nationwide preliminary injunction halted implementation of EO 14043; later developments culminated in the EO’s rescission in May 2023 after the DOD had discontinued the Guidelines.
• July 2023: Plaintiffs sued DOD and officials. The government moved to dismiss on multiple grounds (jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, failure to state a claim, improper venue, qualified immunity). Plaintiffs withdrew Bivens claims and prospective relief; they later sought class certification.
• District court: Dismissed vaccine claims as moot and Guidelines claims as insufficiently pleaded. Plaintiffs appealed.

Key Issues

• Whether rescission of a federal employee vaccination requirement moots claims for damages arising from alleged past violations.
• What constitutes a sufficient pleading of a religious “conflict” with employment requirements under Title VII’s failure-to-accommodate framework, specifically for testing/masking/distancing protocols imposed on unvaccinated employees.
• Which claims and theories were preserved for appellate review, and which were abandoned.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Mootness and Damages
  • Morgan v. Plano Independent School District, 589 F.3d 740, 748 n.32 (5th Cir. 2009): The court relied on Morgan’s settled principle that mootness bars only equitable claims; claims for damages, including nominal damages, remain live despite policy rescission.
  • Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America Production Co., 704 F.3d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 2013): Standard of review for mootness is de novo.
• Pleading Standards
  • Twombly and Iqbal (cited through Fifth Circuit cases): A complaint must plead enough facts to make relief plausible, not merely conceivable.
  • Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016): At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts on the ultimate elements to make the claim plausible.
  • Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022): The court may consider documents attached to the complaint or to the motion to dismiss if central to and referenced by the complaint.
• Title VII Religious Accommodation
  • EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773–74 (2015): An employer may not make an employee’s religious practice a factor in employment decisions; a request for accommodation may evidence motive but does not itself establish the underlying need for accommodation.
  • Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2013): Elements of Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim; courts assume sincerity but must ensure an actual conflict between belief and policy.
  • Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485–87 (5th Cir. 2014): Reinforces elements; courts should handle sincerity inquiries with “judicial shyness,” but the belief must actually conflict with a workplace requirement.
  • Sibley v. Touro LCMC Health, No. 24-30189, 2024 WL 5118489 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024): At the pleading stage, detailed explanations in religious-accommodation requests can suffice to plausibly allege a conflict with a vaccine requirement; cited as context for whether requests themselves suffice.
  • Comparative Circuit Guidance cited by the panel or dissent:
    • DeVore v. University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, 118 F.4th 839, 846 (6th Cir. 2024): Pleading a religious conflict requires showing the belief actually conflicts with the policy; courts’ task is narrow but real.
    • Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2024): Adequate pleadings explain the connection between belief and policy, here vaccine mandates.
    • Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2024): At the early stage, plaintiffs who alleged “temple of the body” and opposition to unnecessary medical interventions plausibly alleged a religious conflict with testing.
• Preservation and Abandonment on Appeal
  • Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993): Issues not meaningfully briefed are abandoned.

Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness: Damages Claims Survive Rescission of the Policy

The district court dismissed the claims targeting the vaccination requirement as moot because the mandate was enjoined and ultimately rescinded before being enforced against plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The presence of damages demands was dispositive: under Fifth Circuit law, mootness does not bar damages claims based on alleged past harm. The panel emphasized that plaintiffs pleaded damages (including nominal damages), so even though injunctive relief had been withdrawn and the policy rescinded, the case remained live as to retrospective relief. The court therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to consider, in the first instance, all remaining defenses and merits issues that had not been reached due to the mootness ruling.

Practical significance: For federal agencies and employees alike, rescinding or pausing a policy does not extinguish liability exposure for alleged past violations when plaintiffs seek damages. Agencies cannot rely on rescission as a universal exit ramp; courts will still adjudicate claims for retrospective relief.

2) Title VII Failure-to-Accommodate and the COVID-19 Guidelines: The “Conflict” Element Requires Specific, Policy-Tethered Allegations

The amended complaint advanced several Title VII theories (disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, disparate impact) and RFRA claims related to both the vaccine and the COVID-19 Guidelines. On appeal, however, plaintiffs meaningfully briefed only one Guidelines issue: whether they plausibly alleged a conflict between their religious beliefs and DOD’s testing/masking/distancing requirements sufficient to state a Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim. The court deemed the other theories abandoned for purposes of the appeal.

Under Fifth Circuit law, a plaintiff must plausibly plead four elements to state a Title VII religious-accommodation claim: (1) bona fide religious belief, (2) conflict with an employment requirement, (3) employer notice, and (4) adverse action for noncompliance. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, plaintiffs need not prove the case but must allege facts that make each “ultimate element” plausible.

The panel accepted sincerity but found plaintiffs’ pleadings fell short on the second element—an actual religious conflict with the testing/masking/distancing protocols:

• Orloff: Allegations referenced vaccination objections and asserted that other employees without his beliefs were not subject to the Guidelines, but they did not articulate how his religious beliefs conflicted with testing or masking. Dismissal affirmed.
• Stadler: She alleged she believes God created her immune system to fight illnesses and that she does not take “vaccinations, medications, or treatments.” The court held these allegations were insufficient to show a conflict with testing/masking/distancing, which are not themselves “vaccinations, medications, or treatments.” Her allegation that testing violated her beliefs was deemed conclusory without factual development tying her religion to those specific protocols. Dismissal affirmed.
• Arzamendi: She invoked “temple of the body” beliefs and opposed fetal-cell involvement in vaccines; she also requested an exemption from “invasive testing protocols.” The panel held that a bare request for a religious exemption, without facts linking her beliefs to the specific Guidelines, does not plausibly establish a religious conflict. While EEOC v. Abercrombie recognizes that a request may help show motive, it does not automatically show the employee “actually requires an accommodation” for a religious practice. The panel contrasted Sibley, where the plaintiff’s exemption requests contained robust, belief-specific explanations that directly connected the beliefs to the policy.

The court underscored that it generally takes claimants at their word on sincerity but must still ensure that the asserted belief “actually conflicts with a workplace policy.” Without factual allegations that tie a plaintiff’s religious beliefs to the specific employment requirement (here, testing/masking/distancing), the “conflict” element is not plausibly pleaded.

3) Concurring/Dissenting Opinion: A Pleading-Standard Counterpoint

Judge Willett agreed that damages claims survive mootness and agreed Orloff’s Guidelines claim failed. He dissented as to Stadler and Arzamendi. Emphasizing Rule 8’s “short and plain” statement and the “deferential Rule 12(b)(6) standard,” he argued that the majority parsed the complaint too finely and demanded more detail than plausibility requires. He would hold that Stadler’s and Arzamendi’s allegations—read as a whole and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs—adequately pleaded a religious conflict with the testing/masking protocols, relying on Cicalese (warning against heightening pleading standards), Sibley (recognizing detailed accommodation requests as sufficient), and the Eighth Circuit’s Ringhofer (accepting “temple of the body” and opposition to non-necessary medical interventions as plausibly conflicting with testing).

Impact and Implications

A) Immediate Effects on the Parties and the Case

• Vaccine-mandate damages claims proceed: On remand, the district court must address unresolved defenses and merits issues, including subject-matter jurisdiction for RFRA damages against the sovereign, personal jurisdiction over individual-capacity defendants, venue issues for non-Texas plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, exclusivity of Title VII for federal employment discrimination, and any qualified-immunity defenses to RFRA individual-capacity claims (if preserved).
• COVID-19 Guidelines claims remain dismissed: As to testing/masking/distancing, dismissal stands because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege the “conflict” element for a Title VII accommodation claim. Other Guidelines-related theories were abandoned on appeal and remain dismissed.
• Class certification: The district court had stayed class briefing. Any renewed efforts will confront commonality and typicality challenges given individualized exemption processes, differing component policies, and individualized damages.

B) Guidance for Future Litigation

• Mootness strategy: Policy rescission will not extinguish damages exposure. Where plaintiffs plead retrospective harms, claims will proceed notwithstanding policy withdrawal.
• Pleading religious conflicts with testing/masking/distancing:
  • Be policy-specific: Conclusory statements that an employee has “religious objections” or a bare exemption request are not enough. Plead how particular beliefs conflict with each specific requirement (e.g., nasopharyngeal testing as a bodily intrusion violating the “body as a temple,” masking as compelled expressive conduct with religious implications, or other faith-based grounds).
  • Use first-person religious statements: As in Sibley and Ringhofer, explanatory statements that articulate the religious rationale for rejecting specific medical procedures or bodily intrusions can propel a claim past Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Do not rely on vaccination objections to carry testing/masking claims: Courts will not assume that objections to vaccines automatically extend to non-vaccine protocols absent factual allegations tying beliefs to those protocols.
• Appellate preservation: The Fifth Circuit strictly enforces abandonment rules. Litigants should fully brief all theories they wish to preserve (e.g., RFRA and Rehabilitation Act as to Guidelines, and all Title VII theories beyond failure-to-accommodate).
• Undue hardship after Groff: Although not reached here (because the pleadings failed at the “conflict” element), on the merits employers will face the heightened “substantial increased costs” standard. Employers should contemporaneously document the burdens of possible accommodations.

C) Doctrinal Positioning within and across Circuits

• Within the Fifth Circuit: Arzamendi aligns with Morgan’s treatment of damages and mootness. On pleading, it sits alongside Sibley: explaining that an exemption request may support motive but that, to show the necessity of an accommodation, plaintiffs should articulate how their beliefs conflict with the policy. This opinion is unpublished, so it is non-precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, but it provides practical guidance.
• Across circuits: The opinion cites Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions requiring a concrete connection between belief and policy (DeVore, Passarella) while the dissent favorably references the Eighth Circuit’s more forgiving approach at the pleadings stage (Ringhofer). The cross-circuit dialogue shows emerging contours for pleading religious conflicts with COVID-era protocols.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mootness: Courts decide live disputes. If a policy is rescinded, requests for forward-looking relief (like injunctions) may be moot. But claims for money damages over past injuries can proceed because they seek compensation for alleged harms already suffered.
• Title VII religious accommodation:
  • What plaintiffs must show: A sincere religious belief; a conflict between that belief and a work rule; the employer knew; and the employee suffered an adverse action for not following the rule.
  • Pleading tip: Do not just say “I object for religious reasons.” Explain how your specific religious beliefs conflict with each specific work rule.
• RFRA and sovereign immunity: RFRA permits suits against the federal government and its officials for substantial burdens on religious exercise. Damages against individual federal officials may be available in certain circumstances, but sovereign immunity issues can bar damages against the United States or officials in their official capacities. Those questions are for the district court on remand.
• Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not meaningfully brief an issue, the Fifth Circuit treats it as abandoned and will not review it.
• Rule 12(b)(6) “plausibility”: A complaint must include enough facts to make the claim reasonably believable, not just possible. Courts accept well-pleaded facts as true but disregard bare conclusions.

Unresolved Questions on Remand

• Whether RFRA damages are available against the sovereign or whether sovereign immunity bars those claims; whether RFRA claims are precluded by Title VII’s comprehensive remedial scheme for federal employment discrimination.
• Personal jurisdiction over individual-capacity defendants and qualified immunity defenses.
• Venue objections for non-Texas plaintiffs’ Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims.
• The merits of Title VII and RFRA damages claims regarding the vaccine mandate, including whether plaintiffs can prove an actual religious conflict and, if so, whether DOD can show undue hardship or other defenses.

Practice Pointers

• For employees:
  • In complaints, spell out how each specific policy (e.g., weekly testing, masking, distancing) conflicts with your religious beliefs. Consider including the religious language you used in exemption requests.
  • Preserve all claims and theories on appeal with clear, developed briefing.
• For employers:
  • Do not assume rescission moots damages exposure. Evaluate settlement and litigation strategies accordingly.
  • When evaluating accommodation requests, document individualized assessments and potential hardships; on the merits, the undue-hardship standard is demanding.
  • Ensure exemption forms and communications do not conflate proof of sincerity with explanations that might help or harm plaintiffs at the pleading stage.

Conclusion

Arzamendi v. Hegseth delivers two principal takeaways. First, the rescission of the federal employee vaccination mandate does not moot damages claims based on alleged past injuries; plaintiffs’ vaccine-mandate damages claims must be addressed on the merits. Second, Title VII religious-accommodation claims attacking testing/masking/distancing protocols will be dismissed at the pleading stage unless plaintiffs specifically tie their religious beliefs to those protocols and articulate how those beliefs actually conflict with the employer’s requirements. A bare exemption request or a generalized objection to “vaccinations, medications, or treatments” will not, by itself, plausibly allege a conflict with non-vaccine protocols like testing or masking.

The dissent underscores an appellate-level debate about how deferential Rule 12(b)(6) should be in this context, citing decisions that have allowed “temple of the body” beliefs to plausibly conflict with testing requirements. Although unpublished and thus non-precedential, Arzamendi offers practical, immediate guidance in the Fifth Circuit for pleading religious-accommodation challenges to COVID-era workplace rules and confirms that damages claims remain live notwithstanding policy rescissions. On remand, the case is poised to address significant, unresolved questions about RFRA damages, sovereign immunity, Title VII exclusivity, and the merits of alleged religious conflicts with vaccine mandates.