Affirmation of Felon-In-Possession Prohibition Under the Second Amendment Post-Rahimi

1. Introduction

United States v. Lorenzo Garod Pierre arises from Pierre’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. After an initial Eleventh Circuit panel decision rejecting Pierre’s as-applied challenge in light of Bruen and its own precedent, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated that judgment, and remanded for reconsideration post-Rahimi. At issue is whether § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Second Amendment’s text-and-history framework articulated in District of Columbia v. Heller, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi. The Eleventh Circuit again affirms Pierre’s conviction, holding that its precedents upholding § 922(g)(1) survive both Bruen and Rahimi.

2. Summary of the Judgment

On remand, the Eleventh Circuit:

Reiterated that its decision in United States v. Rozier (2010) — that felon-in-possession bans are “presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment — remains binding.
Held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi clearly overruled or abrogated Rozier or related Eleventh Circuit panels.
Applied the “prior‐panel precedent rule,” concluding no “demolition” of Rozier by subsequent Supreme Court rulings.
Affirmed Pierre’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) and the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession prohibition in all applications.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Recognized an individual right to bear arms for self-defense but noted that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are outside its scope.
United States v. Rozier (11th Cir. 2010): Held § 922(g)(1) constitutional in all circumstances, relying on Heller’s safe-harbor language regarding felon disarmament.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022): Recast Second Amendment analysis into a single “text‐and‐history” test and invalidated New York’s “proper-cause” carry requirement. Did not mention § 922(g)(1) or felon bans.
United States v. Dubois (11th Cir. 2024): Applied Bruen to reject as-applied and facial challenges to § 922(g)(1), reaffirming that Rozier remains good law.
United States v. Rahimi (2024): Upheld § 922(g)(8)’s domestic-violence‐restraining‐order prohibition under the text-and-history test and reiterated that “presumptively lawful” categories (including felons) survive Second Amendment scrutiny.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

Binding Precedent: Under the “prior-panel precedent rule,” only the en banc court or the Supreme Court can overrule a prior panel. Rozier remains binding unless clearly abrogated.
No Clear Abrogation: Neither Bruen nor Rahimi expressly mentions or cancels Rozier. On the contrary, both decisions reaffirm that laws disarming certain classes—felons or those under restraining orders—are compatible with the Second Amendment’s historical tradition.
Text-and-History Consistency: Just as in Rozier the court relied on Heller’s statement exempting felon bans, in Rahimi the Supreme Court used analogous historical analogues (e.g., surety and going-armed laws) to justify temporary disarmament of dangerous individuals. This parallelism confirms that longstanding felon-in-possession statutes survive Bruen’s test.

3.3 Impact

This decision cements the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Bruen and post-Rahimi framework for assessing § 922(g)(1):

Future as-applied challenges by felons will face a high barrier: absent a direct Supreme Court abrogation of Rozier, § 922(g)(1) stands.
Courts will continue to employ the single text-and-history test for all Second Amendment claims, distinguishing facial from as-applied challenges but preserving presumptively lawful categories.
Within the Eleventh Circuit, the precedent coheres: Heller’s safe-harbor language, Bruen’s fidelity to Heller, and Rahimi’s historical-analogue methodology all support felon disarmament statutes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Text‐and‐History” Test: A two‐part inquiry: (1) Does the Second Amendment’s text cover the regulated conduct? (2) If so, is the regulation consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation?
“Prior-Panel Precedent Rule”: A later three-judge panel of the same circuit must follow an earlier panel’s binding decision unless the Supreme Court or the full court sitting en banc overrules it.
“Presumptively Lawful” Categories: Classes of persons (e.g., felons, the mentally ill) or types of regulation (e.g., prohibitions on carrying firearms in sensitive places) that Heller identified as outside the Second Amendment’s protection.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Pierre underscores the durability of felon-in-possession prohibitions. By reaffirming Rozier and adhering to Heller’s safe-harbor language, the Eleventh Circuit confirms that § 922(g)(1) remains “presumptively lawful.” Neither Bruen nor Rahimi qualifies as a clear abrogation. As a result, felons challenging § 922(g)(1) face a formidable precedent barrier, and courts within the Eleventh Circuit will continue to uphold the ban in all applications unless overruled by a higher authority.