A Two‑Track Roadmap When a Plaintiff Goes Silent: Rule 56 Record Review or Poulis‑Based Rule 41(b) Dismissal—Not “Default” Summary Judgment

Case: Michael Goodson, Sr. v. City of Philadelphia and Chief Inspector Christopher Flacco

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Not Precedential)

Opinion by: Judge McKee, joined by Judges Shwartz and Matey

Date: August 25, 2025

Introduction

This appeal arises from a workplace-discrimination suit brought by Michael Goodson, Sr. against the City of Philadelphia and a senior police official, Chief Inspector Christopher Flacco, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑2(a)(1)–(2)), among other claims. After the City moved for summary judgment, Goodson sought to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice. The District Court denied that request, warned of possible dismissal for failure to prosecute if Goodson did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and—when he did not respond—granted the City’s summary judgment motion on the basis of nonresponse and lack of discovery activity.

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of voluntary dismissal but vacated the grant of summary judgment. The panel clarified that Rule 56 does not authorize “default” summary judgment when a nonmovant fails to respond; rather, the trial court must independently review the motion and supporting materials to ensure the movant has met its burden. The court also provided a procedural roadmap: when a plaintiff fails to prosecute or respond, a district court may dismiss under Rule 41(b) after applying the Poulis factors, or grant summary judgment only after a proper merits analysis under Celotex and Rule 56.

Summary of the Judgment

• Voluntary Dismissal (Rule 41(a)(2)): Affirmed. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goodson’s motion to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice filed after discovery closed and after the City moved for summary judgment. The City had already expended substantial effort; Goodson had not engaged in discovery and even failed to appear for his own deposition.
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56): Vacated. The District Court erred by effectively granting summary judgment by default due to Goodson’s nonresponse. Rule 56 requires an independent merits review of the record to determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Remand Instructions: On remand, the District Court may (a) dismiss the case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) after considering the Poulis factors, or (b) conduct a proper Rule 56/Celotex analysis to determine whether the City has shown the absence of a genuine dispute and Goodson’s inability to produce evidence on essential elements of his claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Estate of Ware v. Hospital of Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017) and Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1974):
  These cases guide the exercise of discretion under Rule 41(a)(2). They emphasize evaluating prejudice to the defendant, including litigation stage, effort/expense, and whether a summary judgment motion is pending. Here, discovery had closed, the City had moved for summary judgment, and Goodson had failed to participate meaningfully. That context supported the denial of voluntary dismissal.
• Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc):
  Reaffirms the abuse-of-discretion standard: a district court abuses its discretion by applying incorrect standards, ignoring relevant factors, or reaching an unreasonable result. The panel found no abuse in denying voluntary dismissal.
• Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1999):
  Articulates the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment rulings, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. The Third Circuit applied that standard to conclude the District Court had not conducted the required Rule 56 analysis.
• Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Board of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1990):
  “It is well-settled” that a nonmovant’s failure to respond does not automatically entitle the movant to summary judgment. The panel’s central holding tracks Anchorage: Rule 56 does not authorize “default” grants of summary judgment; courts must examine the record and the movant’s proofs.
• Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) and Hamer v. LivaNova Deutschland GmbH, 994 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2021):
  These cases require district courts to consider the six Poulis factors before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). The panel directed the District Court to follow this route if it chooses to address Goodson’s nonparticipation by dismissal.
• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) and Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622 (3d Cir. 2024):
  Provide the modern summary-judgment framework: the movant may carry its burden by showing the absence of evidence on an essential element the nonmovant must prove at trial. The panel suggested this as an alternative, proper route to summary judgment on remand if the record supports it.
• Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam):
  Clarifies that a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute renders pending motions (like summary judgment) moot. The panel flagged this consequence for remand.

Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice (Rule 41(a)(2))

The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s refusal to allow Goodson to walk away without prejudice after the City had borne the expense of discovery and motion practice. Courts balance prejudice to defendants, the stage of proceedings, and resource investment when evaluating Rule 41(a)(2) motions. Here:

• Discovery had closed; the City had moved for summary judgment.
• Goodson conducted no affirmative discovery and failed to appear for his own deposition.
• Goodson attributed inactivity to a preferred counsel’s illness and inability to enter an appearance, but his counsel of record remained in place for the entire year and did not prosecute the case.

Against that backdrop, the District Court reasonably concluded a without-prejudice dismissal would unfairly prejudice the City. The denial rested on familiar factors and thus fell well within the court’s discretion.

2) Error in Granting Summary Judgment for Nonresponse (Rule 56)

The District Court granted summary judgment because Goodson did not respond to the City’s motion and had not engaged in discovery, concluding he “has not and cannot meet his summary judgment burden.” The Third Circuit vacated, explaining that Rule 56 does not permit summary judgment by default. Even when a nonmovant fails to respond, the court must:

• Review the motion’s legal sufficiency and the supporting materials;
• Determine whether, on that record, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
• Ensure there is no genuine dispute of material fact.

The order below did not reflect any such independent analysis; it relied on nonresponse and inactivity. That short-circuited the Rule 56 inquiry and required vacatur.

3) The Roadmap on Remand

The panel emphasized that a district court has tools to address a party’s silence or dilatory conduct—but must use the right ones:

• Rule 41(b) Failure-to-Prosecute Dismissal after considering the Poulis factors (e.g., personal responsibility, prejudice to the adversary, history of dilatoriness, willfulness/bad faith, effectiveness of alternative sanctions, meritoriousness of claims). The District Court had already warned Goodson of this consequence.
• Rule 56/Celotex Merits Disposition if the City’s submissions demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue and show Goodson cannot produce admissible evidence on essential elements (Rule 56(c)(1)(B)).

Either path is permissible; what is impermissible is granting “default” summary judgment without engaging the Rule 56 merits standard.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although not precedential under the Third Circuit’s I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion offers clear, persuasive guidance that will influence district court practice within the Circuit.

• For District Courts:
  • Nonresponse to summary judgment does not relieve the court of its Rule 56 duties. Orders must reflect an independent review of the motion and record.
  • Where a party fails to prosecute, use Rule 41(b)—and document consideration of the Poulis factors—to ensure an appellate-proof sanction.
  • Alternatively, conduct a Celotex analysis to grant summary judgment on the merits if the record supports it.
• For Plaintiffs:
  • Silence carries risk—courts may dismiss for failure to prosecute. If counsel issues arise, promptly seek extensions, substitution, or other relief, and respond to dispositive motions.
  • Voluntary dismissal after discovery closes and after a summary judgment motion is filed is unlikely to be granted without prejudice absent strong equitable considerations.
• For Defendants:
  • Do not assume nonresponse will yield automatic victory. Bolster summary judgment with materials satisfying Rule 56 and Celotex to withstand appellate scrutiny.
  • When facing a disengaged plaintiff, consider moving for Rule 41(b) dismissal and address the Poulis factors proactively.
• Substantive Law (Title VII):
  • The panel did not reach the merits of Goodson’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Future litigation will turn on whether the City can establish the absence of triable issues under Rule 56 or whether the case is dismissed under Rule 41(b).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal: A plaintiff needs court permission to dismiss a case without prejudice after the defendant has answered or moved for summary judgment. Courts weigh prejudice to the defendant, including litigation stage and costs already incurred.
• Rule 41(b) Failure-to-Prosecute Dismissal: A court may dismiss when a plaintiff does not move the case forward. Before doing so, it must consider the six Poulis factors: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) prejudice to the adversary; (3) history of dilatoriness; (4) willful or bad-faith conduct; (5) effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim.
• Rule 56 Summary Judgment—No “Default”: Even if the nonmovant stays silent, the court must decide whether the movant’s evidence shows no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the initial burden.
• Celotex Framework: A movant can prevail by showing an absence of evidence on an essential element the opponent must prove at trial. If that showing is made, the nonmovant must point to evidence creating a genuine dispute. If the nonmovant has no evidence, summary judgment may be proper.
• Standards of Review:
  • Abuse of discretion for denial of voluntary dismissal—deferential review focused on whether the district court applied the right factors reasonably.
  • De novo for summary judgment—no deference; the appellate court re-examines the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
• Not Precedential Decisions: Under the Third Circuit’s I.O.P. 5.7, such opinions are not binding precedent but can be persuasive, especially when they synthesize and apply established rules like Anchorage, Poulis, and Celotex.

A Practical Roadmap for Trial Courts and Litigants

When the Nonmovant Ignores a Summary Judgment Motion

1. Confirm the movant’s Rule 56 evidentiary submissions are properly supported (affidavits, depositions, documents).
2. Apply Celotex: Has the movant shown the absence of a genuine dispute or the nonmovant’s inability to produce admissible evidence on essential elements?
3. If yes, grant summary judgment with reasoned analysis; if no, deny—even absent a response.
4. If the issue is broader nonparticipation, consider Rule 41(b). Before dismissal, analyze each Poulis factor and explain why lesser sanctions would not suffice.

Checklist for Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal Motions (Post‑Discovery)

• Stage of litigation (discovery complete? dispositive motions filed?).
• Defendant’s effort/expense and potential duplication if refiled.
• Plaintiff’s diligence or dilatoriness (missed deadlines, deposition no‑shows).
• Any legitimate explanations (e.g., health) balanced against responsibility to prosecute.
• Appropriate terms/conditions (costs, fees, with or without prejudice) if dismissal is to be granted.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Goodson v. City of Philadelphia delivers two important procedural clarifications. First, voluntary dismissal without prejudice is disfavored after discovery closes and a summary judgment motion is filed, particularly where the plaintiff has not diligently prosecuted the case; denying such a motion is well within a district court’s discretion. Second, and crucially, a plaintiff’s silence in the face of a summary judgment motion does not authorize “default” summary judgment. District courts must either:

• Conduct a merits-based Rule 56 analysis consistent with Celotex, or
• Dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) after careful application of the Poulis factors.

By vacating the summary judgment and mapping out these two permissible paths on remand, the opinion reinforces due process safeguards inherent in Rule 56 while preserving district courts’ authority to manage dockets and sanction noncompliance appropriately. Even as a nonprecedential disposition, the case provides a clear, practice-oriented roadmap for judges and litigants navigating the intersection of summary judgment practice and failure-to-prosecute scenarios.

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Note: This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.