Statutory Presumption of Tenancy by the Entireties for Spousal Bank Accounts in Florida: Commentary on Linda Loumpos v. Bank One

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Linda Loumpos v. Bank One, No. SC2024‑1256 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2025), authored by Justice Canady. The case resolves a certified conflict between Florida’s Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal over a narrow but practically significant question: whether a bank account originally opened by one spouse, and later converted into a joint account with an express “tenancy by the entireties” designation, can be treated as a tenancy by the entireties (TBE) even though the traditional common-law “unities” of time and title are not present.

The answer matters because property held as TBE is generally immune from execution by the creditor of only one spouse; only joint creditors of both spouses may reach such assets. The decision therefore has substantial implications for creditor–debtor relations, asset protection planning for married couples, and the drafting and administration of bank account agreements in Florida.

The Court held that:

Its earlier decision in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates, 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001), did not eliminate the common-law requirements of the unities of time and title for TBE accounts and is not controlling on the conflict question presented; and
The Legislature’s 2008 amendment to section 655.79(1), Florida Statutes, does establish a statutory presumption that a deposit or account made in the names of spouses is a tenancy by the entireties, a presumption not defeated by the absence of the unities of time and title.

On that basis, the Court quashed the Second District’s decision in Loumpos v. Bank One, 392 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), and approved, in relevant part, the Fourth District’s decision in Versace v. Uruven, LLC, 348 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The case arises from a default judgment entered in 2003 against Linda Maragoudakis (formerly Linda Loumpos). After Linda later married Peter Maragoudakis, Peter opened a bank account in 2017 in his name alone. Several months later, Peter and Linda executed new signature cards converting that account into a joint account, checking the box “Joint Tenants by Entirety” and listing the account as “Peter Maragoudakis & Linda Maragoudakis, Ten by Enty.” Only Peter’s wages were deposited.

The judgment against Linda was eventually assigned to Dove Investment Corp., which sought to garnish the joint account for Linda’s individual debt. Linda claimed the account was held as a tenancy by the entireties, making it exempt from garnishment by a creditor of only one spouse. The trial court and the Second District Court of Appeal rejected her claim, reasoning that because the account was originally opened by Peter alone, the unities of time and title were lacking and the account could not be a TBE account.

The Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District’s decision in Versace, where under similar facts (one spouse’s individual account later converted to a joint account expressly designated as TBE), the court held the account was indeed a TBE account and therefore immune from garnishment for the individual debt of one spouse.

The Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict by:

Holding that Beal Bank does not control the narrow issue because Beal Bank assumed that all unities already existed and expressly declined to address accounts opened by only one spouse or to abolish the unity of time.
Interpreting section 655.79(1), as amended in 2008, to create a presumption that any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife “shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing,” and concluding that this presumption applies even where the account began as an individual account of one spouse and was later converted into a joint spousal account.

The Court thus held that section 655.79(1) authorizes a joint spousal bank account to be held as a tenancy by the entireties even if the account was originally established by one spouse. The common-law unities of time and title do not defeat the statutory presumption in the banking context governed by this provision.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Legal Background

1. Tenancy by the Entireties and the Six Unities

Under Florida common law, a tenancy by the entireties is a special form of joint ownership available only to married couples. It is defined by six traditionally required “unities”:

Unity of possession – joint ownership and control;
Unity of interest – identical interests in the property;
Unity of title – interests arising from the same instrument;
Unity of time – interests commencing at the same time;
Survivorship – right of the surviving spouse to own the whole on the other’s death;
Unity of marriage – the parties must be married when the property is titled jointly.

As the Court reiterated (quoting Beal Bank), the consequence of these unities is that: only creditors of both spouses jointly may attach property held as TBE; unilateral creditors of one spouse cannot reach it.

The Court noted the longstanding acceptance in Florida that TBE may exist in both real and personal property, citing Bailey v. Smith, 103 So. 833 (Fla. 1925), and its successors, including First Nat’l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1971); Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); In re Estate of Lyons, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1955); and Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).

Historically, however, Florida courts treated real property and personal property differently in terms of the proof required to establish TBE:

Real property titled in both spouses’ names carried a presumption of TBE if the unities were otherwise present.
For personal property (including bank accounts), courts required not only that the formal unities exist but also proof of the spouses’ intent to create a TBE estate.

2. Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates (2001)

In Beal Bank, the Florida Supreme Court confronted inconsistent standards for determining whether bank accounts held by spouses were TBE. The case involved joint accounts opened and maintained by both spouses. The Court rephrased certified questions from the Fifth District so that each explicitly assumed that “the unities required to establish ownership as a tenancy by the entireties exist.” The questions focused on whether and how a presumption of TBE should operate, and how signature-card language (including disclaimers) affects that presumption.

The Court held, in substance:

When a bank account is titled in the names of both spouses, and is established in accordance with the unities of possession, interest, title, and time (and survivorship), a presumption arises that the account is held as TBE, so long as the signature card does not expressly disclaim TBE.
When the signature card expressly designates the account as held as TBE, that designation “ends the inquiry” as to the form of ownership (i.e., no further inquiry into intent is necessary).
When the signature card expressly disclaims TBE, a debtor may still resort to extrinsic evidence in certain limited circumstances (e.g., where the financial institution did not offer TBE as an ownership option).

Importantly for the present case, Beal Bank:

Did not address accounts opened by a single spouse and later converted into joint accounts; indeed, the Court explicitly “chose not to address” such an account in footnote 2.
Expressly declined in footnote 6 to discuss whether “unity of time should be omitted from the list of tenancy by the entireties requirements.”

Beal Bank was therefore targeted at resolving how to determine the spouses’ intent and what presumptions apply when the unities are already assumed present in joint accounts opened by both spouses. It did not purport to change the definition of TBE or to eliminate the unities of time and title.

3. Section 655.79, Florida Statutes, and the 2008 Amendment

Section 655.79 governs “Deposits and accounts in two or more names; presumption as to vesting on death.” Before 2008, subsection (1) already established a presumption that where a deposit account is held in the names of two or more persons, and absent a contrary contractual specification, the survivors take the account on the death of one co-owner (i.e., a presumption of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship).

As quoted in the opinion, the key statutory language after the 2008 amendment reads (emphasis added):

Unless otherwise expressly provided in a contract, agreement, or signature card executed in connection with the opening or maintenance of an account, including a certificate of deposit, a deposit account in the names of two or more persons shall be presumed to have been intended by such persons to provide that, upon the death of any one of them, all rights, title, interest, and claim in, to, and in respect of such deposit account, less all proper setoffs and charges in favor of the institution, vest in the surviving person or persons. Any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing.

Subsection (2) then provides that the presumption “may be overcome only by proof of fraud or undue influence or clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent.”

The 2008 amendment added the second sentence, establishing an explicit presumption of TBE for spousal deposits or accounts, unless that is “otherwise specified in writing.”

4. Conflicting Decisions Below: Loumpos vs. Versace

a. The Second District in Loumpos

In the decision under review, the Second District held that “neither Beal Bank nor section 655.79(1) eliminated the common law requirement” that a TBE account satisfy all six unities, including time and title. The court:

Emphasized that Beal Bank repeatedly assumed the existence of the unities and explicitly refused to discuss discarding the unity of time.
Interpreted the statement in Beal Bank that an express TBE designation on the signature card “ends the inquiry” as referring only to the inquiry into the spouses’ intent, not as abolishing any unity requirements.
Viewed section 655.79(1) as merely codifying Beal Bank and extending its presumptions, but not as altering the common-law definition of TBE or eliminating the unities of time and title.
Invoked the canon that statutes are not presumed to change the common law unless such change is clearly expressed, citing Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 173 So. 820 (Fla. 1937).

Consequently, the Second District upheld the garnishment, reasoning that because the account was originally opened by Peter alone and later amended to add Linda, the unity of time and the unity of title were absent, making a TBE estate impossible as a matter of common law.

b. The Fourth District in Versace

In Versace, by contrast, the Fourth District faced similar facts: an account originally held by one spouse was later converted to a joint account with an express TBE designation. The court concluded:

Beal Bank “controls” and its statement that an express TBE designation on the signature card “ends the inquiry” is not qualified by any discussion of the unities.
Section 655.79(1) “reinforced” Beal Bank and should be read to mean that all spousal accounts are considered TBE unless otherwise specified in writing.

The Fourth District therefore held that the account was a TBE account and exempt from garnishment by a creditor of only one spouse.

B. The Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Beal Bank Is Inapplicable to the Narrow Conflict Question

The Supreme Court first clarified what Beal Bank did—and did not—decide.

The certified questions in Beal Bank all expressly assumed that “the unities required to establish ownership as a tenancy by the entireties exist.”
The accounts at issue were joint accounts opened by both spouses; the Court deliberately chose not to address an account originally opened by one spouse and later amended to include the other’s name.
The Court explicitly noted that it was not discussing whether the unity of time should be omitted from the TBE requirements.

Against this background, the Court held that Beal Bank dealt only with:

Presumptions and burdens of proof concerning the intent of the spouses to create TBE accounts; and
The legal effect of various signature-card designations or disclaimers, assuming the traditional unities are satisfied.

Therefore, Beal Bank “does not answer the question presented here” and does not support the Fourth District’s assertion that it “controls” the issue of whether a TBE can arise when an account is initially opened by one spouse alone. The statement that an express TBE designation “ends the inquiry” in Beal Bank must be understood as ending the inquiry into intent, not abolishing the unities.

On this point, the Supreme Court agreed with the Second District’s reading of Beal Bank, and concluded that the conflict could only be resolved by examining the statute, not by stretching Beal Bank beyond its context.

2. The 2008 Amendment to Section 655.79(1) Changes the Common Law in the Banking Context

The core of the Court’s analysis is its interpretation of the statutory text added in 2008:

Any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing.

The Court emphasized several points:

a. Plain Text and the Disjunctive “Deposit or Account Made”

The phrase “any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife” is written in the disjunctive (“deposit or account made”). The Court reasoned that this wording:

“Unmistakably looks beyond account inception,” because it is equally apt to describe deposits made after the account is opened and changes in ownership during the life of the account.
Must be read alongside the first sentence of subsection (1), which already contemplates both “opening or maintenance of an account” and not just its initial creation.

The Court rejected the respondent’s narrow reading that “account made” refers only to the moment an account is initially opened. That reading, the Court observed, “wholly ignores ‘[a]ny deposit . . . made’,” which necessarily contemplates more than just account inception.

Once an individual account is converted into a joint spousal account with both spouses as account holders, it is entirely natural—and textually sound—to say that the “account [is] made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife.” On that understanding, the statutory presumption of TBE applies.

b. Statutes May Change the Common Law When the Text So Indicates

The Second District had relied on the principle that statutes are not presumed to change the common law absent clear expression. The Supreme Court responded by:

Acknowledging this principle, but emphasizing that it should not be used to “reject a fair reading [of a statute] that changes the common law.”
Reasserting the “cardinal canon” that courts presume the Legislature “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says,” citing Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 308 So. 3d 953 (Fla. 2020), and Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
Warning against ignoring or rewriting statutory language in order to impose a narrower interpretation that preserves the common law, citing State v. Gabriel, 314 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2021).

In short, while the presumption against common-law change is a relevant interpretive tool, it cannot justify disregarding clear or fairly read statutory text. Here, a fair reading of the amended section 655.79(1) confirms that the Legislature has modified the common-law application of the unities in the banking context.

c. Consistency Within the Statutory Scheme

The Court further grounded its interpretation in the structure of section 655.79:

The first sentence of subsection (1) creates a presumption that a “deposit account in the names of two or more persons” is intended to vest in the survivors, unless a contrary contractual or signature-card provision exists.
That first sentence already contemplates “opening or maintenance” of the account, showing that the statute deals not only with account inception but with its continuing status.
Subsection (2) sets forth the exclusive grounds to rebut the statutory presumption: fraud, undue influence, or clear and convincing proof of contrary intent—none of which refer to the unities of time or title.

The Court noted that:

Lower courts had effectively concluded that, in the context of survivorship rights, the statute rendered the unities of time and title irrelevant for joint tenancies (e.g., In re Estate of Herring, 670 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Larkins v. Mendez, 363 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)).
A tenancy by the entireties is, conceptually, a joint tenancy plus the unity of marriage; the two forms share the same unities of possession, interest, title, time, and survivorship.

It would therefore be incoherent to:

Treat unities of time and title as irrelevant under section 655.79(1) for joint tenancies (first sentence), but still insist on those same unities to defeat the TBE presumption (second sentence) that the statute provides for married co-owners.

The natural reading is that, when spouses are co-holders of an account or deposit, the statute’s second sentence layers on a presumption of TBE—subject to rebuttal only under subsection (2)—and not to an additional unity-of-time/title analysis.

3. Application to the Facts of the Case

Applying the statute as interpreted, the Court concluded:

When Peter and Linda executed new signature cards making the account jointly owned and expressly designating it as “Joint Tenants by Entirety” / “Ten by Enty,” the account became an “account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife.”
Under section 655.79(1), that account “shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing.” There was no contrary written specification; rather, the writing expressly selected TBE.
Under section 655.79(2), this statutory presumption could only be overcome by evidence of fraud, undue influence, or clear and convincing proof of contrary intent—none of which were present.

Consequently, the account was properly classified as a TBE account, and as such it could not be garnished for Linda’s individual debt. The garnishing creditor, as a creditor of only one spouse, had no right to reach the TBE property.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Doctrinal Significance

The decision establishes a clear and important doctrinal rule:

Under section 655.79(1), Florida Statutes, a bank account or deposit held in the names of a husband and wife is presumed to be a tenancy by the entireties, and this presumption is not defeated merely because the account was originally opened by one spouse alone. The traditional unities of time and title do not bar the formation of a TBE in such accounts.

The opinion confirms that:

For bank deposits and accounts governed by section 655.79(1), the Legislature has modified the common-law unity requirements in favor of statutory presumptions.
Beal Bank remains relevant to questions of intent, presumptions, and the effect of signature-card designations, but it cannot be invoked to limit the statutory presumption created in 2008.
The statutory presumption for spousal accounts is robust and may be displaced only by a writing expressly specifying another form of ownership or by the limited grounds in subsection (2).

2. Effects on Creditors and Debtors

For judgment creditors, this ruling significantly strengthens the protection afforded to spousal bank accounts:

Even if an account began as an individual account of the debtor spouse, once that account is converted into a joint spousal account with both spouses on the title, it will be presumed to be a TBE account, absent contrary written specification.
Individual creditors of one spouse generally cannot garnish or execute upon TBE accounts; only joint creditors of both spouses can do so.
Creditors will need to more carefully investigate account titling and any written disclaimers or alternative ownership designations in bank documents.

For married couples and asset-protection planners:

The decision confirms that converting an individual account into a joint TBE account (by adding the spouse and using appropriate signature-card language) can protect funds from creditors of only one spouse, subject to fraudulent transfer laws.
However, transfers into TBE accounts may be attacked under fraudulent transfer or fraudulent conveyance principles where made in order to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

3. Effects on Banks and Financial Institutions

The opinion also has operational implications for banks:

Banks must recognize that, by default, spousal accounts are deemed TBE unless “otherwise specified in writing.” The choice of ownership form on the signature card is crucial.
Institutions wishing to avoid unintended TBE classifications may need to:
- Provide clear, distinct options for ownership forms (TBE, joint tenancy with survivorship, tenancy in common); and
- Ensure that their documentation accurately reflects the parties’ chosen form and explains the consequences.
Failure to offer a TBE option or to draft clear “otherwise specified” provisions may cause courts to apply the statutory TBE presumption, sometimes contrary to a bank’s internal policies or expectations.

4. Broader Legal System Implications

More broadly, the decision:

Clarifies the relationship between statute and common law in Florida’s property and banking law, affirming a strong form of textualism: courts should give effect to the statute’s actual words, even when doing so modifies traditional common-law doctrines.
Provides clear guidance to trial and appellate courts for resolving future disputes about spousal bank accounts and the significance of the unities of time and title.
Will likely influence related areas such as probate (rights of surviving spouses and heirs), divorce (classification and division of TBE assets), and bankruptcy (scope of exemptions for TBE property under federal and state law).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Tenancy by the Entireties (TBE)

A tenancy by the entireties is a way for married couples to own property together. Think of it as the couple owning the property as a single legal “unit,” rather than each owning a separate share.

Key features:

Only married couples can have a TBE.
Each spouse is considered to own the whole property; neither can unilaterally sell or encumber it without the other’s consent.
When one spouse dies, the other automatically owns the property alone (right of survivorship).
Asset protection: a creditor of only one spouse generally cannot seize TBE property. Only a creditor of both spouses (on a joint debt) can.

2. The “Unities”

The six “unities” historically required for TBE are:

Possession – both spouses must have joint ownership and control.
Interest – their interests must be identical.
Title – they must obtain their interests through the same legal document or event.
Time – their interests must arise at the same time.
Survivorship – the surviving spouse receives full ownership when the other dies.
Marriage – they must be married at the time the property is titled in their joint names.

In this case, the account originally opened solely by Peter and later converted to a joint account with Linda did not satisfy unity of time or title under the traditional common-law rules. The statute, however, effectively overrides those particular unity requirements for bank accounts held by spouses by creating a presumption of TBE for such accounts.

3. Joint Tenancy vs. Tenancy in Common vs. TBE

Joint tenancy with right of survivorship: both owners have equal shares and survivorship rights, but each can typically sell or encumber their share separately. A creditor of one joint tenant can often reach that tenant’s interest.
Tenancy in common: each owner has a separate, possibly unequal share, with no survivorship. On death, a tenant’s interest passes to heirs or devisees, not automatically to the co-owner.
Tenancy by the entireties: a form of joint tenancy limited to married couples, with survivorship and strong protection against individual creditors of one spouse.

4. Garnishment

Garnishment is a legal process by which a creditor seizes assets held by a third party (like a bank) that belong to the debtor, to satisfy a judgment. In this case, the creditor sought to garnish the funds in the bank account to satisfy Linda’s individual judgment debt.

If the account is TBE, garnishment by a creditor of only one spouse is generally not permitted.

5. Certified Conflict and De Novo Review

A certified conflict arises when a Florida district court of appeal identifies a decision that conflicts with another district’s decision on the same question of law and certifies that conflict to the Florida Supreme Court for resolution.
De novo review is a standard of review under which the appellate court gives no deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions, instead deciding the issue anew as a pure question of law. This applied here because the issues were questions of statutory and case-law interpretation.

V. Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Linda Loumpos v. Bank One firmly establishes that, under section 655.79(1), Florida Statutes, a bank account or deposit held in the names of spouses is presumed to be a tenancy by the entireties, even if the account began as the individual account of one spouse.

By clarifying that Beal Bank did not abolish the unities of time and title and by interpreting the 2008 amendment to section 655.79(1) as a legislative change to the common-law rules for bank accounts, the Court:

Resolves a direct conflict between the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal;
Strengthens the statutory protection of spousal bank accounts from the creditors of only one spouse; and
Reinforces a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, giving primacy to the statute’s actual language and context over assumptions grounded in prior common-law doctrine.

For practitioners, the decision underlines the importance of:

Careful drafting and review of bank account signature cards and ownership designations;
Understanding that spousal accounts are now presumptively TBE unless clearly stated otherwise in writing; and
Recognizing that converting an individual account into a joint spousal account can have powerful, and sometimes contested, asset-protection consequences.

In the broader legal landscape, this opinion will serve as a leading precedent on the interaction between legislative enactments and the common-law rules of property in Florida, and it will likely shape creditor–debtor strategies and marital property planning for years to come.