Mandatory Communicable Disease Reporting Does Not Create a Criminal-Case Exception to Physician–Patient Privilege:
An In-Depth Commentary on People v. Gomez, 2025 NY Slip Op 06929 (3d Dept)

I. Introduction

In People v. Gomez, 2025 NY Slip Op 06929 (3d Dept Dec. 11, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed a conviction for predatory sexual assault against a child, first-degree sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child, while modifying the sentence in the interest of justice. The decision is especially noteworthy for its treatment of the physician–patient privilege in the context of mandatory reporting of communicable diseases, and for its careful application of juror impartiality standards and harmless-error analysis.

The case sits at the intersection of several important areas of New York law:

• child sexual abuse prosecutions and the weight-of-the-evidence standard,
• juror disqualification and the “grossly unqualified” standard under CPL 270.35,
• the scope of the physician–patient privilege under CPLR 4504(a) when a sexually transmitted infection is reportable under Public Health Law § 2101(1),
• ineffective assistance of counsel claims best suited to collateral review, and
• appellate sentence review and “trial penalty” arguments under the “interest of justice” standard.

Among these, the most significant doctrinal development is the court’s holding that the mandatory disease-reporting requirement under Public Health Law § 2101(1) does not create an exception to the physician–patient privilege in criminal prosecutions. The court recognized that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s treating physician to testify about the defendant’s chlamydia diagnosis, but deemed that error harmless in light of the overall proof.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The defendant, Jose Omar Aguilar Gomez, was accused of repeated sexual contact with a child born in 2011. The charged period ran from January 2019 through January 2022. At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that:

• the defendant, an adult over 18, engaged in multiple acts of sexual conduct with the child over an extended period (at least three months), including penetration or attempted penetration; and
• these acts culminated in a reported incident on January 1, 2022, leading to law enforcement involvement and a medical examination.

The child disclosed to her mother, then to State Police, and to a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) that the defendant had made genital contact with her that day, and that such contact had occurred many times before when her mother was away. The SANE observed genital redness and tenderness, took physical swabs, and a urine test revealed chlamydia. The mother and defendant both also tested positive for chlamydia in close temporal proximity, and the mother testified about her sexual relationship with the defendant during that period.

The defense attacked:

• the credibility of the child’s account,
• the probative value and source of the DNA evidence (which could not distinguish the defendant from male relatives, including his infant son), and
• the significance and source of the child’s bleeding and discharge (with alternative explanations such as early menstruation).

B. Procedural History

A Warren County jury convicted the defendant of:

• predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law former § 130.96),
• sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65[3]), and
• endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10[1]).

He was sentenced to 25 years to life on the predatory sexual assault count, with lesser concurrent terms on the remaining counts.

On appeal, he raised multiple claims, including:

• insufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence challenges,
• error in failing to discharge a sworn juror who mid-trial disclosed she knew the child victim,
• error in admitting privileged testimony from his physician about his chlamydia diagnosis,
• ineffective assistance of counsel, and
• an excessive sentence allegedly reflecting a “trial penalty” relative to a more lenient plea offer.

C. Holding

The Third Department:

• held the legal sufficiency claim unpreserved but conducted a full weight-of-the-evidence review and found the verdict supported by the weight of the evidence;
• found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to discharge the juror who knew the victim, concluding she was not “grossly unqualified” under CPL 270.35(1);
• held that the defendant’s physician’s testimony regarding his chlamydia diagnosis violated the physician–patient privilege under CPLR 4504(a), and that Public Health Law § 2101(1)’s reporting requirement does not abrogate that privilege in a criminal prosecution;
• deemed that evidentiary error nonconstitutional and harmless under People v. Crimmins;
• declined to resolve the ineffective-assistance claim on the merits, noting it depended on matters outside the record better suited to a CPL 440 motion; and
• reduced the minimum term of the predatory sexual assault count from 25 years to 20 years to life, in the interest of justice, while otherwise affirming the judgment.

III. Key Legal Issues

1. Evidence Review: How does the court apply the “weight of the evidence” standard in a child sexual abuse case relying heavily on the victim’s testimony, limited physical findings, DNA that does not uniquely identify the defendant, and sexually transmitted infection (STI) evidence?
2. Juror Impartiality: When a sworn juror reveals mid-trial that she knows the child victim socially, under what circumstances is the juror “grossly unqualified” and subject to discharge?
3. Physician–Patient Privilege & Disease Reporting: Does mandatory reporting of communicable diseases under Public Health Law § 2101(1) create an exception to the physician–patient privilege in criminal cases under CPLR 4504(a)?
4. Harmless Error: Once the court finds a privilege violation, how does it evaluate whether the error requires reversal?
5. Ineffective Assistance & Procedural Posture: Which aspects of ineffective-assistance claims can be reviewed on direct appeal versus in a CPL article 440 motion?
6. Sentencing & Trial Penalty: How does the court address a significant disparity between a pretrial plea offer and the post‑trial sentence, and in what way can it modify sentence “in the interest of justice”?

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Evidence Review and Jury Credibility

• People v. Santana, 179 AD3d 1299 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 973 (2020) – cited for two propositions:
  • a legal sufficiency claim is unpreserved if a defendant’s trial dismissal motion does not raise the specific grounds later urged on appeal; and
  • a weight-of-the-evidence review necessarily includes consideration of the sufficiency of proof as to each element.
• People v. Madsen, 168 AD3d 1134 (3d Dept 2019) – similarly cited regarding preservation requirements for sufficiency claims.
• People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007) – the leading case on the standard for “weight of the evidence” review, emphasizing the appellate court’s role as a “thirteenth juror” viewing evidence in a neutral light and weighing credibility.
• People v. Sweet, 200 AD3d 1315 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 38 NY3d 930 (2022) – cited for deference to the jury’s credibility determinations where testimony is not “inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of law.”
• People v. Karnes, 223 AD3d 1119 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 928 (2024) and People v. Mayette, 233 AD3d 1097 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 945 (2025) – reinforce the neutral-light standard and deference to jurors on credibility.
• People v. Fournier, 137 AD3d 1318 (3d Dept 2016), lv denied 28 NY3d 929 (2016) – cited on weight-of-evidence methodology in sex offense cases.

B. Juror Discharge and Impartiality

• CPL 270.35(1) – the statutory basis for discharging a sworn juror who becomes “grossly unqualified” during trial, based on facts unknown at selection.
• People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290 (1987) – landmark decision defining “grossly unqualified” as a juror possessing a state of mind preventing an impartial verdict, and urging a “tactful and probing” inquiry by the trial court.
• People v. Spencer, 29 NY3d 302 (2017) – clarifies that expressions of sympathy or emotion, without more, do not render a juror grossly unqualified; reinforces that impartiality is the core concern.
• People v. Kuzdzal, 31 NY3d 478 (2018) – cited in support of the principle that the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury must be protected, but that trial courts are owed deference in assessing juror impartiality.
• People v. Crider, 176 AD3d 1499 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 1157 (2020) and People v. Rogers, 157 AD3d 1001 (3d Dept 2018), lv denied 30 NY3d 1119 (2018) – examples where jurors had some prior exposure or connection yet were deemed capable of impartiality after inquiry.
• People v. Williams, 234 AD3d 1180 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 966 (2025) and People v. Hicks, 6 NY3d 737 (2005) – emphasize that failure to object to the court’s juror inquiry procedure can render related appellate claims unpreserved.
• People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1 (1979) and People v. Wilson, 163 AD3d 1049 (3d Dept 2018) – address the standard for granting a mistrial (“manifest necessity”) and the trial court’s discretion in deciding whether a mistrial is required.

C. Physician–Patient Privilege and Public Health Reporting

• CPLR 4504(a) – New York’s physician–patient privilege, prohibiting physicians from disclosing information acquired in a professional capacity and necessary to treat the patient, absent waiver or statutory exception.
• Public Health Law § 2101(1) – requires physicians to promptly report cases of communicable diseases to the local health officer when such diseases are on the Department of Health’s reportable list.
• 10 NYCRR 2.1(a) – the regulation listing reportable communicable diseases, including chlamydia.
• Public Health Law § 2306 – provides for confidentiality of health department records relating to reportable sexually transmitted diseases, with tightly limited circumstances for disclosure.
• People v. Sinski, 88 NY2d 487 (1996) – underscores that:
  • the physician–patient privilege is to be given a broad and liberal construction to effectuate its policy, while
  • statutes limiting the privilege are strictly and narrowly construed.
• People v. Rivera, 25 NY3d 256 (2015) – discusses how specific statutes can operate as exceptions to the privilege (there, in the context of blood-alcohol testing and reporting requirements), and is cited here chiefly to contrast a situation where the Court of Appeals found an implied limitation on the privilege based on detailed statutory scheme.
• Thomas v. Morris, 286 NY 266 (1941) – referenced in a “compare” signal, as a case considering whether statutory duties affecting physicians can implicitly limit the privilege. The Third Department implies that Thomas is distinguishable and does not control under Public Health Law § 2101(1).
• People v. Isidore, 170 AD3d 1637 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 933 (2019) – mentioned in a “but see” parenthetical; there, medical records obtained by court order were admitted, suggesting a potentially more permissive approach by the Fourth Department to the use of STI-related medical information in criminal trials.

D. Harmless Error

• People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 (1975) – foundational case establishing New York’s harmless-error standard:
  • for nonconstitutional errors, reversal is not required if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and no significant probability that the error contributed to the verdict;
  • for constitutional errors, a stricter standard applies (not central here because the court classifies the error as nonconstitutional).
• People v. Moghaddam, 56 AD3d 801 (2d Dept 2008), lv denied 16 NY3d 897 (2011) – applied Crimmins to find erroneous admission of evidence harmless where proof of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable probability of a different result.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

• People v. Cummings, 16 NY3d 784 (2011), cert denied 565 US 862 (2011) – emphasizes that the effectiveness of counsel is judged on the totality of representation, not isolated errors.
• People v. Taylor, 156 AD3d 86 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1120 (2018) – applied that “totality” standard and observed that claims involving both record and non-record matters may be more appropriately raised in CPL 440 proceedings.
• People v. Cole, 217 AD3d 1185 (3d Dept 2023) and People v. Capers, 129 AD3d 1313 (3d Dept 2015), lv denied 27 NY3d 994 (2016) – reinforce that appellate courts will not deem counsel ineffective where a legitimate strategic explanation for the challenged omission cannot be excluded on the record.

F. Sentencing and Trial Penalty Concerns

• People v. Burdo, 210 AD3d 1306 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 1077 (2023) – cited for the rule that an argument that sentencing penalized the defendant for going to trial is unpreserved if no objection is raised at sentencing to the disparity between the plea offer and ultimate sentence.
• CPL 470.15(6)(b) – authorizes the Appellate Division, “as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice,” to modify a sentence, even if the sentence is otherwise lawful.

V. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Weight of the Evidence in a Child Sexual Abuse Case

1. Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence

The defendant attempted to attack the legal sufficiency of the evidence on appeal by focusing on the reliability of DNA evidence and the credibility of the child’s uncorroborated testimony. However, his trial motion to dismiss was not tailored to these specific deficiencies. Under Santana and Madsen, a generalized dismissal motion does not preserve particularized sufficiency arguments. The court therefore treated the sufficiency claim as unpreserved.

Nonetheless, in New York, a weight-of-the-evidence review:

• has no preservation requirement, and
• must still encompass whether each element of the offense was, in fact, proven beyond a reasonable doubt (Santana).

Thus, in practical terms, even when a legal sufficiency argument is unpreserved, a defendant still gets a de facto sufficiency review via the broader weight-of-the-evidence analysis.

2. Elements and proof for the charged offenses

The relevant statutes, as applied, required the People to prove:

• Predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law former § 130.96):
  • defendant was at least 18 years old,
  • he committed a “course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree,” and
  • the victim was under 13.
• Course of sexual conduct against a child, first degree (Penal Law § 130.75[1][former (b)]):
  • two or more acts of “sexual conduct” over at least three months,
  • at least one act being sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, or aggravated sexual contact,
  • defendant at least 18, and
  • child under 13.
• Sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65[3]):
  • defendant subjected the victim to “sexual contact,” and
  • the victim was under 11.
• Endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10[1]):
  • defendant knowingly acted in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child under 17.

The victim testified to more than 10 separate incidents in which the defendant touched her anus and vagina with his penis or fingers, often when her mother was at work and a babysitter was distracted. She could not precisely date the beginning of the abuse but located it before the birth of defendant’s son in August 2021—well within the indictment period and satisfying the “course of conduct” and age requirements.

3. Corroborating and conflicting evidence

The court candidly acknowledged that a contrary verdict “would not have been unreasonable” (Danielson) because:

• no eyewitness other than the child observed any abuse;
• the DNA evidence could not distinguish between the defendant and his male relatives, including his infant son;
• one defense theory was that male DNA on the victim’s body and underwear could have been secondarily transferred from the infant, whom the victim often cared for; and
• the child’s bleeding and discharge might have been related to an early menstrual period, which the school nurse had reported months earlier.

Nonetheless, several factors significantly strengthened the People’s case:

• The SANE’s objective findings of genital redness and tenderness, and the victim’s consistent statements that the defendant “keeps touching [her] when [her] mother leaves for work” and had “put his private spot into [hers]” “many times.”
• The positive chlamydia tests for:
  • the child,
  • the mother (tested in January 2022), and
  • the defendant (tested in March 2022).
• The mother’s testimony that:
  • she had been in a sexual relationship with defendant for three years until January 2021,
  • resumed intimate relations with him in November and December 2021, and
  • saw blood and discharge in the child’s underwear before the disclosure.

The DNA evidence, while not uniquely identifying the defendant, still had probative value: given the child’s age, the locations where male DNA was found (genitals, anus, underwear), and the frequency and circumstances of her contact with the infant, the jury could rationally infer that the DNA was more likely attributable to the defendant than to incidental contact with his son.

4. Deference to the jury’s credibility findings

Central to the affirmance is the principle from Sweet and similar cases: unless testimony is inherently unbelievable, appellate courts will defer to the jury’s assessment of credibility. The child’s account, while not independently corroborated by eyewitnesses, was:

• consistent over time (to mother, police, SANE, and in court),
• supported by physical findings, and
• reinforced by the chlamydia evidence and the circumstantial DNA evidence.

The defense attempted to undermine credibility by pointing to:

• the mother’s anger at the defendant just before the disclosure,
• alternative explanations for the child’s bleeding, and
• the lack of direct eyewitness corroboration.

The court explicitly recognized these counterpoints but concluded that:

“[I]nsofar as the witnesses’ testimony was not inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of law and was fully explored during cross-examination, we accord due deference to the jury’s credibility determinations” (quoting Sweet).

The jury weighed the competing inferences, and the Third Department, acting as a “thirteenth juror” (per Danielson), agreed that the evidence, in a neutral light, supported the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

5. Impact on sexual abuse prosecutions

This aspect of Gomez reinforces several trends in New York sexual offense jurisprudence:

• The testimony of a child victim, even without eyewitness corroboration, can be sufficient to sustain convictions where the account is consistent and not inherently implausible.
• Partial physical corroboration (e.g., redness, tenderness, sexually transmitted infection) significantly bolsters such testimony.
• Ambiguous forensic evidence (e.g., DNA not uniquely identifying the defendant) can still support conviction when integrated with the broader factual context.

Practically, this underscores the importance of thorough cross-examination of child witnesses and careful forensic analysis, while also reminding appellate counsel that weight-of-evidence challenges are difficult to win when trial testimony is plausible and supported by even modest physical corroboration.

B. Juror’s Prior Acquaintance with the Child Victim

1. The “grossly unqualified” standard

Under CPL 270.35(1), a sworn juror must be discharged if, during trial, it appears from previously unknown facts that the juror is “grossly unqualified” to serve. Buford and Spencer construe “grossly unqualified” to mean:

a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

The standard is deliberately stringent: not every doubt, sympathy, or prior connection warrants removal. The decisive question is whether the juror’s impartiality is compromised.

2. Facts concerning the juror in Gomez

Midway through trial, a sworn juror disclosed that:

• her child and the victim shared classes at school,
• the victim had once lived in the same apartment complex as the juror,
• the victim sometimes came over to play with the juror’s child, and
• the victim would greet the juror if they met at school.

Upon inquiry by the court:

• the juror unequivocally affirmed that she could remain fair and impartial;
• she acknowledged feeling some sympathy for the victim, but explicitly stated she understood that the defendant remained innocent until proven guilty.

The trial court declined to discharge her, and the Third Department upheld that ruling.

3. Emotional response vs. legal impartiality

The court underscored a key point from Spencer:

“A declaration regarding emotions alone does not render a juror grossly unqualified.”

Particularly in emotionally charged cases (e.g., child sexual abuse, violent crimes), it is unsurprising that jurors will experience sympathy or concern. Those emotional reactions, standing alone, do not disqualify a juror. The focus is whether:

• the juror can set aside emotional reactions,
• follow the law and instructions, and
• decide solely on the evidence presented.

Here, the juror’s limited, preexisting acquaintance with the child (neighborhood and school contact) did not involve any prior knowledge of the allegations, and her answers convinced the court that she could remain impartial. Under Crider and Rogers, such circumstances are within the acceptable range of juror experiences.

4. Preservation and mistrial issues (Footnote 1)

In a footnote, the court addressed two additional issues:

• The defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficiently “tactful and probing” inquiry (as required by Buford) was unpreserved because he did not object to the manner of inquiry (Williams; Hicks).
• The defendant did not move for a mistrial; his suggestion on appeal that the court should have declared one sua sponte implicates the “manifest necessity” standard (Michael, Wilson). The appellate court deferred to the trial court’s on‑the‑scene assessment and found no abuse in allowing the trial to continue.

This highlights two practice points:

• Defense counsel must object contemporaneously not only to the court’s decision but also to the adequacy of the inquiry if they intend to challenge it on appeal.
• Requests for mistrial should ordinarily be made explicitly, rather than expecting the court to act sua sponte.

C. Physician–Patient Privilege and Mandatory Communicable Disease Reporting

1. The scope of CPLR 4504(a)

CPLR 4504(a) provides, in substance, that:

a person authorized to practice medicine
shall not be allowed to disclose any information acquired while attending a patient in a professional capacity, and necessary to enable the physician to act in that capacity,
unless the patient waives the privilege or a statutory exception applies.

New York’s Court of Appeals has repeatedly treated this privilege as:

• central to fostering open communication between patients and physicians, and
• entitled to broad and liberal construction, while any limitation or exception is strictly and narrowly construed (Sinski; Rivera).

The parties in Gomez agreed that, in the ordinary course, the defendant’s chlamydia diagnosis would be privileged medical information: it was obtained in the course of treatment and was necessary to that treatment.

2. The People’s reliance on Public Health Law § 2101(1)

Public Health Law § 2101(1) mandates that physicians:

“immediately give notice of every case of communicable disease required by the [Department of Health] to be reported to it, to the health officer of the local health district where such disease occurs.”

Because chlamydia is listed as a reportable communicable disease (10 NYCRR 2.1[a]), the People argued that this reporting duty created an implied exception to the physician–patient privilege, at least as to that diagnosis.

The Third Department rejected this argument, holding that:

“the limited reporting obligation imposed upon physicians by Public Health Law § 2101(1) does not abrogate the privilege in a criminal proceeding against the patient.”

In other words, the statutory obligation to notify public health authorities does not in itself authorize a physician to testify in a criminal trial about the patient’s diagnosis, nor does it permit prosecutors to bypass CPLR 4504(a) on that basis.

3. Contrast with Rivera and Thomas v. Morris

The court signaled that its analysis follows the logic of Rivera and Sinski in requiring clear statutory language or compelling implication before recognizing an exception to the privilege. Rivera dealt with a specific statutory scheme related to blood tests (and reporting) in motor vehicle contexts; there, the Court of Appeals found that the legislative design implied limits on the privilege.

By using “cf.” before Rivera, the Third Department suggests that:

• in Rivera, the statutory scheme was comprehensive and explicit enough to justify limiting the privilege, whereas
• Public Health Law § 2101(1) simply imposes a reporting duty to health authorities and says nothing about admissibility in criminal cases or physician testimony.

The reference to Thomas v. Morris is in a “compare” signal, indicating that while Thomas might be read to support broader inroads into privilege where statutory duties exist, the Third Department finds Gomez distinguishable and refuses to read § 2101(1) as an implied privilege waiver in the criminal context.

4. Isidore and potential inter-departmental tension

The citation to People v. Isidore—“but see People v. Isidore”—signals that the Fourth Department permitted the admission of medical records (including possibly STI information) obtained by court order in a criminal case. The Third Department does not directly overrule or distinguish Isidore in detail, but the “but see” signals skepticism or a potentially different approach.

This suggests:

• a possible developing split among Departments regarding how far privilege yields to court orders or to public health reporting schemes in criminal prosecutions; and
• a likelihood that the Court of Appeals may eventually need to reconcile differing interpretations, especially where communicable-disease reporting intersects with criminal liability (e.g., sex crimes, HIV exposure, etc.).

5. Public Health Law § 2306

The People also invoked Public Health Law § 2306, which concerns:

confidentiality of public health records of a patient’s reportable sexually transmitted disease diagnoses.

But the Third Department found § 2306 inapplicable because the physician’s testimony in Gomez was not a “report or information secured by a board of health or health officer.” Thus, § 2306—governing how health department records may be disclosed—provided no path around CPLR 4504(a) in this setting.

6. The core holding on privilege

The key doctrinal rule that emerges from Gomez is:

Mandatory communicable disease reporting under Public Health Law § 2101(1) does not create an exception to the physician–patient privilege of CPLR 4504(a) in criminal proceedings against the patient.

Consequently:

• Absent waiver or another explicit statutory exception, a treating physician may not testify about a defendant’s communicable disease diagnosis in a criminal case.
• The trial court should have sustained the defense objection to the physician’s testimony about the defendant’s chlamydia status.

7. Practical implications

For prosecutors:

• They must avoid eliciting privileged medical testimony from a defendant’s treating physicians, even if the condition is reportable to health authorities.
• They may instead rely on:
  • testimony or records relating to the victim’s and other non-defendant witnesses’ STI diagnoses (which are not protected by the defendant’s privilege);
  • circumstantial evidence (e.g., timing of diagnoses, sexual relationships) from which the jury can logically infer the defendant’s infection status.
• Any attempt to obtain DOH records or physician reports must be scrutinized in light of CPLR 4504(a) and PHL 2306; Gomez suggests a cautious, narrow reading of exceptions.

For defense counsel:

• Gomez provides a strong basis for pretrial motions in limine to preclude:
  • treating physicians’ testimony about STI diagnoses of the defendant, or
  • admission of medical records revealing such diagnoses, absent an applicable exception.
• Where such testimony has already been admitted, Gomez supports an argument of error; whether such error is reversible will turn on harmless-error analysis (discussed below).

For medical providers:

• The decision reinforces that:
  • the duty to report STIs to public health authorities does not authorize free disclosure in court of patients’ diagnoses; and
  • physicians remain bound by CPLR 4504(a), except where the patient waives or a clear statutory exception applies.

D. Harmless Error Analysis

1. Classification as nonconstitutional error

The court treated the erroneous admission of the physician’s testimony as a nonconstitutional error, even though it implicated a statutory privilege. As such, the Crimmins standard applied:

• Is there overwhelming evidence of guilt without the tainted proof?
• Is there any reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict?

2. Why the error was deemed harmless

Even without the defendant’s doctor’s testimony, the remaining chlamydia-related evidence was:

• the child’s positive test for chlamydia,
• the mother’s positive test in January 2022, and
• undisputed evidence of a sexual relationship between the mother and defendant in November–December 2021.

From these facts, the jury could logically infer:

• that the defendant had transmitted chlamydia to the mother (or vice versa), and
• that the same infection was then present in the child, consistent with the child’s report of sexual contact.

The child’s detailed testimony, corroborated by:

• physical findings of redness and tenderness,
• her consistent outcry statements to multiple adults, and
• the circumstantial DNA evidence,

provided substantial proof of guilt independent of the physician’s statement that the defendant himself tested positive in March 2022.

Accordingly, borrowing language from Moghaddam, the court found:

“the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the physician’s challenged testimony, was overwhelming, and there is no reasonable probability that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction.”

3. Limits and caution

It is important to note the narrowness of this harmless-error holding:

• In a case where the STI evidence is more central or less circumstantial—for example, where the only proof linking defendant to the victim is the defendant’s diagnosis—such an error might not be harmless.
• Gomez does not license routine violation of the physician–patient privilege; it merely holds that in this particular evidentiary context, with multiple independent strands of evidence, the admission of the privileged testimony did not affect the verdict.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Unified claim and totality standard

The defendant raised several grievances about trial counsel, including:

• failure to move for a mistrial after the juror’s disclosure,
• failure to call witnesses for the defense,
• denial of the defendant’s alleged desire to testify in his own defense, and
• failure to seek a pretrial hearing or other remedies to block disclosure of his chlamydia diagnosis.

The court treated these as a single unified claim of ineffective assistance under Cummings and Taylor, consistent with New York’s “meaningful representation” standard, which examines the totality of counsel’s performance rather than isolated missteps.

2. Record vs. non-record issues and CPL 440

Some of the claimed deficiencies (e.g., why counsel did not move for a mistrial, or whether the defendant expressly asked to testify) involve strategic or communicative issues typically not fully revealed by the trial record. As such, the court found them:

“better suited for review in the context of a CPL article 440 motion.”

This is a standard pathway in New York practice:

• Direct appeals address errors evident on the face of the record.
• CPL 440 motions address claims that depend on facts outside or contradicting the record (e.g., private attorney–client communications, off‑the‑record strategy decisions).

With respect to the juror issue, the court specifically noted that the failure to move for a mistrial is not on its face such an egregious and prejudicial error as to constitute ineffective assistance, especially where a plausible strategic explanation (e.g., belief that the juror might be favorable) cannot be ruled out (Cole, Capers).

F. Sentencing, Plea Offers, and the “Trial Penalty”

1. Disparity between plea offer and sentence

The defendant noted that:

• the prosecution had twice offered a plea of 15 years’ imprisonment plus 20 years of postrelease supervision in exchange for a plea to first-degree course of sexual conduct against a child, but
• after trial, the court imposed the statutory maximum of 25 years to life on the predatory sexual assault count.

He argued that this discrepancy showed that he was punished for exercising his right to a jury trial (a “trial penalty” claim).

Relying on Burdo, the court held that this argument was unpreserved because the defendant did not object at sentencing to the disparity between the plea offer and sentence.

2. Appellate reduction “in the interest of justice”

Despite the lack of preservation, the Third Department exercised its discretionary authority under CPL 470.15(6)(b) to reduce the sentence on the top count from a minimum of 25 years to life to a minimum of 20 years to life, stating:

“we exercise our discretion, in the interest of justice, to reduce the prison sentence on the top count … to 20 years to life.”

The court did not explicitly tie the reduction to the plea offer, to the evidentiary error, or to any particular factor. However, the context suggests that concerns of fairness and proportionality—particularly in light of the maximum statutory sentence and the strong but not unassailable nature of the evidence—motivated the modification.

This demonstrates that:

• Even when a “trial penalty” argument is technically unpreserved, the Appellate Division can still adjust a sentence if it deems the original term unduly harsh or severe.
• Defense counsel should nevertheless object at sentencing to preserve any argument that the sentence is retaliatory or disproportionate in relation to pretrial offers.

VI. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence

• Legal sufficiency: asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could have found every element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s a minimum threshold; if it fails, the case should not go to the jury at all.
• Weight of the evidence: asks whether, after weighing the credibility of witnesses and conflicting inferences, the appellate court is convinced that the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence or that a different outcome would not be more reasonable. The appellate court acts somewhat like a “thirteenth juror,” though still giving respect to the trial jury’s vantage point.

2. “Grossly unqualified” juror and impartiality

• Not every negative or emotional reaction disqualifies a juror. The standard is whether the juror’s state of mind would prevent an impartial verdict.
• Knowing a victim slightly, having seen publicity, or feeling sympathy is not enough, if the juror can:
  • follow the law,
  • put aside personal feelings, and
  • base the verdict solely on the trial evidence.

3. Physician–patient privilege and mandatory reporting

• The privilege (CPLR 4504[a]) protects what a patient tells a doctor and what the doctor learns in treating the patient.
• Mandatory reporting laws (like PHL 2101[1]) require doctors to tell health authorities about certain diseases but do not automatically allow the doctor to reveal that information in court.
• An exception to the privilege must be clearly stated in a statute or be a reasonably necessary implication of a detailed statutory scheme; it is not lightly inferred.

4. Harmless error

• When a trial error occurs, the appellate court asks whether the defendant likely would have been convicted anyway.
• For nonconstitutional errors (like violating a statutory privilege), the conviction stands if:
  • the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and
  • there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the verdict.

5. Ineffective assistance of counsel

• New York asks whether, viewed in totality, the attorney provided “meaningful representation.” One tactical mistake usually does not suffice.
• Claims that depend on what the attorney and defendant said privately (e.g., discussions about testifying, plea advice) usually must be raised in a CPL 440 motion, not just on direct appeal.

6. “Interest of justice” sentence reduction

• The Appellate Division can reduce a lawful sentence if it finds it unduly harsh or severe, even if no legal error occurred.
• This power allows the court to promote fairness and proportionality across cases.

VII. Broader Impact and Future Litigation

A. Strengthening of Physician–Patient Privilege in Criminal Cases

Gomez is a strong reaffirmation that:

• the physician–patient privilege is robust,
• mandatory reporting to health authorities does not automatically pierce it in court, and
• any exception must be clearly grounded in statutory text or compelling legislative intent.

This will likely:

• encourage defense counsel to challenge prosecutorial efforts to introduce medical testimony about defendants’ diagnoses, especially STIs;
• require prosecutors to build STI-related arguments to sexual misconduct using non-privileged circumstantial evidence; and
• prompt more careful trial-court gatekeeping around subpoenas for medical records and physician testimony in criminal cases.

B. Standard-setting on Juror Familiarity and Child Victims

The decision clarifies that mere social acquaintance between a juror and a child victim—especially when superficial and unrelated to the case—does not automatically require juror discharge. It emphasizes:

• the central role of a tailored voir dire or mid-trial inquiry into impartiality, and
• the need for counsel to preserve objections to the adequacy of such inquiries.

In communities where social networks are tight and children share schools or neighborhoods, this realistic and nuanced view of juror neutrality is practically important.

C. Use of STI and DNA Evidence in Sex Crimes

Gomez illustrates both:

• the probative force of STI evidence in linking sexual partners and victims; and
• the evidentiary and privilege boundaries that constrain its use in court.

The case also:

• shows that even non-definitive DNA evidence (e.g., mixture profiles not uniquely identifying the defendant) can carry weight when combined with context; and
• highlights the appellate courts’ willingness to uphold convictions based on child testimony supported by modest physical corroboration.

D. Sentencing Fairness and Potential “Trial Penalties”

Although the court found the explicit “trial penalty” claim unpreserved, its decision to lower the sentence from 25 to 20 years to life signals sensitivity to:

• the disparity between plea offers and post-trial sentences; and
• the need for appellate oversight to ensure that maximum sentences are reserved for the most aggravated cases.

Future litigants may rely on Gomez when encouraging appellate courts to use their “interest of justice” power to moderate sentences that, while lawful, may appear disproportionate relative to other cases or offers.

VIII. Conclusion

People v. Gomez is a significant Third Department decision that accomplishes several things at once:

• It upholds a serious child sexual abuse conviction after a careful, neutral review of the evidence, reaffirming the deference owed to juries in evaluating credibility, especially of child victims, when corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence.
• It clarifies that a sworn juror’s limited social familiarity with a child victim does not automatically render the juror “grossly unqualified,” so long as the juror credibly pledges impartiality and any emotional reactions do not dominate decision-making.
• Most importantly, it establishes a new, clear rule that mandatory communicable disease reporting under Public Health Law § 2101(1) does not create a criminal-case exception to the physician–patient privilege. Treating physicians remain bound by CPLR 4504(a), and their testimony about a defendant’s STI diagnosis is inadmissible absent waiver or a specific statutory exception.
• It demonstrates the operation of harmless-error doctrine when privileged evidence is erroneously admitted but the remaining proof of guilt is overwhelming.
• It underscores that many ineffective-assistance claims depend on matters outside the trial record and are best pursued in CPL 440 proceedings.
• Finally, it shows the Appellate Division’s willingness to exercise its sentencing-modification power to temper maximum sentences in the interest of justice, even where the legal challenge to the sentence is unpreserved.

Going forward, Gomez will serve as an important precedent in New York’s evidentiary and criminal jurisprudence, especially at the juncture of patient confidentiality, public health reporting, and criminal prosecution. It reinforces that statutory privileges are not lightly overridden, even in difficult and emotionally charged cases, and that fairness—both in trial procedure and sentencing—remains a central concern of appellate review.