Uniform 4‑Point Annual Roster & Loss of “Birthmark” in Higher Judicial Service Seniority: Commentary on All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1328

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I. Introduction

The judgment in All India Judges Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 1328, delivered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India (5 Judges) on 19 November 2025, marks a significant development in service jurisprudence governing the Higher Judicial Service (HJS) across all States and Union Territories.

The decision arises from an Interlocutory Application (I.A. No. 230675/2025) filed in the long‑standing writ petition W.P. (C) No. 1022 of 1989, the celebrated All India Judges Association (AIJA) litigation that has, for over three decades, functioned as an ongoing mandamus to structurally reform the subordinate judiciary.

The core issue before the Constitution Bench was succinctly framed (para 6):

“What should be the criteria for determining seniority in the cadre of Higher Judicial Services?”

The controversy centres on the inter se seniority among District Judges appointed from three distinct sources, which together constitute the HJS:

• Regular Promotees (RP) – promoted from Civil Judge (Senior Division);
• Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) appointees – promoted on merit via a competitive exam; and
• Direct Recruits (DR) – usually from the Bar, directly appointed as District Judges.

The judgment confronts a long‑standing sense of “heartburn” among promotee officers who begin as Civil Judges (Junior and Senior Divisions), claiming disadvantage vis‑à‑vis younger Direct Recruits who enter the HJS laterally as District Judges. The Amicus Curiae proposed extensive structural changes (including weightage for lower‑cadre service and quotas in higher scales) to alleviate this perceived inequity.

The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the complexity and human dimension of these grievances, ultimately rejects all proposals that seek to alter seniority or career progression in HJS based on prior service in the lower judiciary. Instead, it:

• Affirms the principle that once officers from different sources enter a common cadre, they lose their “birthmark” (i.e., the source of recruitment cannot be used to classify or favour them within that cadre);
• Establishes a uniform, mandatory 4‑point annual roster for HJS seniority (2 RPs : 1 LDCE : 1 DR); and
• Sets out a nuanced regime dealing with delayed recruitments, unfilled vacancies, and diversion of posts, while leaving modalities to be codified by each State in its service rules in consultation with the High Court.

This commentary analyses the judgment’s reasoning, its engagement with prior precedents, the legal concepts it deploys, and its far‑reaching implications for the structure and governance of the Indian judiciary.

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II. Background and Procedural Context

1. The AIJA Litigation as Continuing Mandamus

The parent writ petition, All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, was filed in 1989 and has yielded a series of landmark decisions—often referred to as the First to Sixth AIJA judgments. This litigation functions as a continuing mandamus to reinforce the independence and efficiency of the judiciary, recognised as part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

The Court recalls (paras 20–29) how successive AIJA decisions have:

• Rationalised pay scales, service conditions, retirement age, housing, transport, and training (First AIJA, (1992) 1 SCC 119);
• Prescribed and later removed the requirement of minimum Bar practice for entry into the lowest judicial posts (Second AIJA, (1993) 4 SCC 288; Fourth AIJA, (2002) 4 SCC 247);
• Created and refined the three‑stream model for recruitment to the cadre of District Judge—RPs, LDCE, and DRs—and initially fixed the ratio at 50:25:25 with a 40‑point roster (Fourth AIJA);
• Modified that ratio to 65:10:25 (Fifth AIJA, (2010) 15 SCC 170) due to chronic non‑filling of LDCE vacancies; and
• Most recently in Sixth AIJA, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184, restored the 50:25:25 ratio and introduced an expanded framework for accelerated promotions from Junior Division to Senior Division and into the HJS.

In parallel, the Shetty Commission (First National Judicial Pay Commission) had also highlighted slow progression for lower‑rung judicial officers and recommended mechanisms to fast‑track deserving officers.

2. The Present Interlocutory Application and the Referral

The Amicus Curiae, Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate, moved I.A. No. 230675/2025, drawing the Court’s attention to what was termed an “anomalous situation” (paras 5, 7–10):

• In many States, judicial officers who join as Civil Judges rarely reach the level of Principal District Judge (PDJ) or become eligible for High Court elevation; this is alleged to dissuade bright young candidates from joining at the Civil Judge level; and
• Direct Recruits, entering as District Judges at a younger age, allegedly enjoy a structural advantage for Selection Grade, Super Time Scale, administrative postings, and ultimately elevation to the High Court.

Recognising that resolving this issue would require reconsidering prior three‑Judge Bench decisions and that a “long‑lasting solution” was necessary, a two‑Judge Bench referred the matter to a five‑Judge Constitution Bench, which formulated the central question regarding criteria for determining seniority within the HJS (para 6).

3. Competing Proposals and Responses

The Amicus suggested four broad reforms (para 10):

1. 1:1 quota between DRs and promotees (RPs + LDCEs) in Selection Grade and Super Time Scale;
2. Equal zone of consideration (50:50) for upgradation, regardless of exact selection outcomes;
3. Weightage for lower‑cadre service: one year of seniority in HJS for every five years of prior judicial service (up to a maximum of three years), echoing Shetty Commission thinking; or
4. Three separate seniority lists within HJS based on source of recruitment, adhering to the 50:25:25 composition ratio (an idea traced to the Andhra Pradesh High Court).

Responses came from:

• Regular Promotees (RPs), who emphasised:
  • The age advantage of DRs at the time of entry into HJS;
  • The qualitative superiority (or at least equality) of judicial experience over Bar experience, citing Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196; and
  • “Heartburn” due to younger DRs quickly occupying higher posts and administrative responsibilities.
• LDCE officers, who largely supported RPs but added:
  • Their prior judicial service must be reckoned similarly to RPs;
  • Vacancies unfilled in an LDCE cycle should be carried forward, not diverted to RPs; and
  • Their roster position should be preserved despite year‑to‑year variations in vacancies.
• Direct Recruits (DRs), who contended:
  • There is no consistent, pan‑India pattern of DR dominance; the picture varies by State;
  • High Courts are constitutionally empowered under Articles 233–235 to regulate judicial services and are best placed to manage seniority rules; and
  • Once officers enter HJS in accordance with the roster, their source of recruitment becomes irrelevant for further advancement; seniority at entry should not be revisited.

Various High Courts provided statistical data and described their existing roster and seniority rules. While their exact positions differed, many urged the Supreme Court not to re‑engineer seniority within HJS beyond the entry‑level roster already in place.

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III. Summary of the Judgment

The Constitution Bench delivers a nuanced but firm answer. Key outcomes can be distilled as follows:

1. Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction and Role

• The Court reaffirms its constitutional authority under Articles 32, 141, and 142 to lay down uniform guidelines for the structure and functioning of the judicial services nationwide (paras 36–37).
• While Articles 233–235 confer control over district judiciary on the High Courts and Article 309 empowers the legislature/Governor to frame service rules, those powers are subject to the Constitution and must not impair High Court control (B.S. Yadav; Bal Mukund Sah). The Court’s guidelines set a uniform framework within which State rules must operate.

2. Rejection of “Heartburn” as a Legal Basis for Classification

• Perceived “heartburn” among promotees, without a concrete legal injustice, cannot justify creating preferential treatment within HJS (para 100(i)).
• The Court finds the statistical data amorphous, disparate, and unreliable for crafting nationwide rules (paras 87–92, 100(ii)-(iv)).
• No uniform “malady” of over‑representation of DRs at the cost of RPs is established; in many States, RPs hold a majority of crucial posts.

3. Birthmark Doctrine: Once in a Common Cadre, Source Becomes Irrelevant

• Once RPs, LDCEs, and DRs enter the HJS and their seniority is fixed at entry as per the roster, they “lose their birthmark” (para 60, 100(v)).
• Selection Grade, Super Time Scale, and administrative postings must be decided solely by merit‑cum‑seniority within HJS, not by length or quality of service in the lower cadres (paras 47, 49–50, 55–60, 100(vi)-(vii)).
• The Court rejects proposals that seek to use past service as Civil Judge (Junior/Senior Division) as an intelligible differentia for further classification within HJS.

4. The New Uniform 4‑Point Annual Roster

The Court introduces a mandatory, uniform 4‑point roster system for determining inter se seniority at the time of induction into HJS (paras 66–71, 100(x)):

• The roster cycle is: RP, RP, LDCE, DR (i.e., 2 RPs : 1 LDCE : 1 DR), repeating annually.
• This reflects the restored 50:25:25 ratio (Sixth AIJA) in an easily operable form and replaces the earlier non‑uniform 40‑point rosters adopted by different States.
• All officers appointed in a particular recruitment year are slotted into that year’s roster as per source, irrespective of their actual date of appointment within that year.

5. Treatment of Delayed Recruitment and Non‑Initiation of Recruitment

To address inevitable delays and ensure fairness, the Court devises a carefully calibrated rule (paras 71–83, 100(xi)-(xii)):

• If recruitment from a source (e.g., DRs) is initiated in Year A but concluded only in Year A+1, those appointees:
  • Will still be placed on the roster for Year A, provided that no recruitment process for Year A+1 from any source has resulted in appointments before they are appointed.
• If recruitment for a given source is not initiated at all in a year when vacancies arose, then officers later appointed against those vacancies are granted seniority only in the year when recruitment is actually concluded and appointment made.

6. Diversion of Unfilled LDCE/DR Vacancies to RPs

In continuation of the Sixth AIJA approach, the Court:

• Affirms that if DR or LDCE vacancies in a recruitment year remain unfilled due to non‑availability of suitable candidates, after the respective recruitment processes are concluded, such vacancies shall be filled by RPs in that same recruitment year (paras 84–86, 100(xiii)).
• However, these RPs do not take the LDCE or DR roster positions; they occupy subsequent RP slots in the roster.
• In subsequent years, the ratio of 50:25:25 is applied to the entire cadre to compute fresh vacancies, thereby ensuring long‑term structural balance.

7. Prospective Operation and Stability of Existing Seniorities

• The guidelines are prospective: they do not reopen or unsettle seniority already determined (paras 97–99).
• The Court recognises that post‑Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA, the composition and dynamics of HJS may change significantly; the present directions may need reconsideration in the future (para 99).
• State Governments/UTs are directed to amend their statutory HJS rules within three months, in consultation with their respective High Courts, to align with this judgment (para 101, 100(xiv)).

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Jurisdiction: Supreme Court vs High Courts and the State Under Articles 233–235 & 309

One of the threshold objections raised was that the Supreme Court should defer to the High Courts and State Governments in matters of service rules and seniority, given Articles 233–235 (appointments, posting, promotion, and control over district judiciary) and Article 309 (recruitment and conditions of service).

The Court answers this concern in a two‑step reasoning (paras 31–37):

1. Constitution Bench Precedents:
   • B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1980) Supp SCC 524: Held that while the State Legislature/Governor may frame rules under Article 309, those rules must not conflict with Article 235, which vests “control” over courts below the High Court in the High Court itself.
   • State Of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640: Affirmed that recruitment and service conditions in the State judiciary are subject to Articles 233–235; High Court’s role is primary.
2. Supreme Court’s Constitutional Role:
   • The Court emphasises that it faces no constitutional impediment in issuing overarching directions under Articles 32, 141, and 142 to ensure a uniform and robust judicial service framework (para 36).
   • These guidelines are not a micro‑management of State services, but an articulation of common minimum standards essential for judicial independence and Rule of Law.

Thus, the Court harmonises the High Courts’ operational autonomy with its own role as the final constitutional sentinel for judicial independence. High Courts and State Governments must frame detailed rules within the skeleton laid down by the Supreme Court.

B. The “Heartburn” Argument and Equality Jurisprudence

A striking feature of the judgment is its engagement with what it repeatedly calls the “heartburn” of promotee officers (paras 38–52, 87–95, 100(i)-(iv)). This is not dismissed as trivial; the Court recognises it as a genuine human reaction to perceived unfairness. However, it emphatically holds that:

“Perceived discontentment and heartburn without something more in the form of a legal claim, illegal denial, or at least a legitimate expectation cannot result in creating an artificial classification of members within a cadre.” (para 100(i))

Key aspects of this reasoning include:

• No qualitative supremacism of judicial experience over Bar experience:
  • Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa allowed judicial officers to compete for DR posts in HJS, counting their prior service, but only on the footing that judicial experience is not inferior to Bar experience, not that it is superior (paras 40–41).
• Contextual disadvantage of DRs for High Court elevation:
  • R. Poornima v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 519, requires 10 years’ service as a judicial officer for consideration for High Court elevation. For DRs, only service after their direct appointment counts, whereas for RPs/LDCEs, prior lower‑cadre service also counts (para 43).
  • The Court notes that this effectively places DRs at a disadvantage for elevation, partly counter‑balancing any earlier perceived advantages.
• Multiple avenues of advancement already exist for promotees:
  • Sixth AIJA provides accelerated promotion timelines from Junior to Senior Division and from there to HJS.
  • Rejanish K.V. allows judicial officers to compete in DR exams for HJS, counting their experience.
• Ambition vs. constitutional objectives:
  • The Court delivers a telling line: “Ambition is a ladder, the last rung of which is always elusive…” (para 95). Individual career aspirations—even if understandable—cannot dictate structural rules designed to serve the larger objective of an independent and efficient judiciary (para 100(viii)).

On this basis, the Court rejects:

• Fixed quotas for RPs/LDCEs in Selection Grade and Super Time Scale;
• Weightage of 1 year seniority for every 5 years of lower‑cadre service (up to 3 years); and
• Separate seniority lists for each source within HJS (paras 91–93, 100(vi)-(vii)).

All these proposals would, in the Court’s view, undermine equality under Articles 14 and 16, sacrifice merit, and create new injustices—especially to meritorious DRs and LDCE candidates who entered HJS on the clear understanding that once in a common cadre, source would not matter.

C. The “Birthmark” Doctrine and Common Cadre Seniority

The “birthmark” metaphor is central. It refers to the indelible mark of a person’s original source of recruitment (DR/LDCE/RP). The question is whether that “birthmark” can be used after officers merge into the common HJS cadre to justify different treatment.

The Court draws heavily from classical service law precedents (paras 53–63):

1. Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of Customs, (1966) 3 SCR 600:
   • Held that where all officers in a higher grade are drawn from a single common source, seniority is based on date of promotion/continuous officiation in that grade.
   • This underpins the Court’s view that once in HJS, further progression (Selection Grade, Super Time Scale) is governed by HJS seniority and performance, not pre‑HJS service.
2. Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185:
   • Famously stated that once direct recruits and promotees are fused into a single cadre, they shed their birthmarks and cannot be discriminated against on the basis of source alone.
3. State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19:
   • Upheld a classification within a common cadre based on educational qualifications, as a permitted and rational classification furthering administrative efficiency.
   • Distinguished Roshan Lal by clarifying that its ratio only bars source‑based discrimination, not any and every classification.
4. Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715:
   • Reaffirmed that officers appointed substantively and regularly get seniority from the date of initial appointment; but ad hoc or irregular appointees cannot claim parity.

The Court’s application of these precedents is precise:

• It fully endorses the Roshan Lal–Triloki Nath framework: once officers from different sources are absorbed into a common cadre with their seniority fixed, they cannot be further classified on the basis of source or past cadre experience (paras 59–62, 100(v)).
• The attempt to justify weightage or quotas for RPs/LDCEs on the basis of longer service as Civil Judges does not create a constitutionally valid intelligible differentia; it fails the twin tests of rational nexus and non‑arbitrariness (paras 64–65, 100(vii)).
• Educational qualification (as in Triloki Nath) is something an officer brings with them into the cadre and supports administrative efficiency; by contrast, length of lower‑cadre service is a historical fact that has already been rewarded by promotion and cannot be used again to disturb equality in the common cadre.

This is perhaps the clearest and strongest reaffirmation, in the judicial context, of the principle that “birthmarks” are shed upon entry into a unified cadre.

D. The New 4‑Point Annual Roster: Structure, Rationale, and Operation

The earlier AIJA regime endorsed a 40‑point roster to implement the 50:25:25 ratio. However, States adopted variant versions; some privileged LDCE over DR, others the reverse, resulting in non‑uniform seniority structures across the country (paras 68–69).

To restore uniformity and simplicity, the Court mandates (paras 70–71, 100(x)):

• A 4‑point roster repeating every four appointments:

1st roster point – RP
2nd roster point – RP
3rd roster point – LDCE
4th roster point – DR
…then repeat (RP, RP, LDCE, DR, …)

Over a span of four posts, this yields:

• 2 RPs (50%),
• 1 LDCE (25%),
• 1 DR (25%),

perfectly mirroring the 50:25:25 quota for the HJS cadre as a whole.

Crucially, the Court clarifies:

• The roster is tied to the recruitment year (annual roster), not to the exact date of joining (para 71).
• Once recruitment for a year is initiated (ideally in accordance with the Malik Mazhar Sultan timetable), all appointees recruited against that batch of vacancies—regardless of whether they are appointed in the same calendar year—are, in principle, contenders for that year’s roster (subject to the exception for delayed appointments, discussed below).

This moves away from a mechanical “date of appointment” approach and emphasises the cohort of recruitment as the decisive unit.

E. Delayed Recruitment & the Seniority Exception

Delays are inevitable, especially in DR and LDCE recruitments which are merit‑based, involve competitive examinations, and are prone to litigation. The Court balances two competing considerations (paras 72–83):

1. Fairness to those delayed by administrative or procedural bottlenecks: they should not lose seniority because authorities delayed the process.
2. Seniority as continuous service: those who have actually been in service should not be arbitrarily pushed down or up to accommodate later entrants.

The Court notes earlier case law on this issue:

• Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, which had allowed DRs to claim seniority from the year in which recruitment was initiated, even if appointments were delayed, was later overruled in K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro, (2020) 5 SCC 689.
• Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Singh Rao, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1717, in turn, doubted Meghachandra and referred the matter to a larger Bench, particularly where vacancies are carried forward.

Given this unsettled terrain, the Court crafts a specific rule for HJS only (para 78–82), which can be summarised as:

• Rule 1 – Primary Principle: Seniority in HJS is to be governed by continuous length of service, subject to the annual roster.
• Rule 2 – Exception for Delayed Completion:
  • If recruitment from any source is initiated in Year A but appointments take place in Year A+1, and no appointments for the Year A+1 recruitment have been made from any source, then such appointees are:
    • Slotted into the Year A roster at their respective roster points.
• Rule 3 – Non‑Initiation of Recruitment:
  • If recruitment for vacancies of a given year is not initiated at all in that year, officers later appointed against those vacancies:
    • Get seniority only in the year in which their recruitment is concluded and appointment made (para 100(xii)).

This provides a tailored, context‑sensitive solution for the judiciary while leaving the broader N.R. Parmar/Meghachandra controversy to be resolved in the pending reference.

F. Diversion of Unfilled LDCE/DR Vacancies and Protecting the Roster Logic

Unfilled vacancies—especially in LDCE and DR—were a recurring issue in past AIJA orders. Sixth AIJA authorised diversion of unfilled LDCE posts to RPs. This judgment extends that logic (paras 84–86, 100(xiii)):

• Where DR and/or LDCE recruitment for a particular year is completed but suitable candidates are fewer than notified vacancies, remaining vacancies:
  • Shall be filled by RPs in that same recruitment year.
• Such “diverted RPs” are placed in the roster at subsequent RP points only; they do not occupy roster points earmarked for LDCE or DR.
  • This ensures that non‑availability of candidates from a source does not artificially inflate that source’s historical footprint in the roster.
• For future recruitment years, vacancies are computed by applying the 50:25:25 ratio to the entire sanctioned strength of the HJS, thereby gradually realigning the cadre composition.

This preserves:

• The immediate imperative to fill judicial posts swiftly (to avoid case backlogs), and
• The long‑term structural balance among the three sources.

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V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. The AIJA Line of Cases

• First AIJA – (1992) 1 SCC 119:
  • Laid the foundation for uniform service conditions, pay scales, retirement age (60), and infrastructural support for the judiciary.
• Second AIJA – (1993) 4 SCC 288:
  • Mandated 3 years’ Bar experience as a minimum for entry into lowest judicial posts; directed weeding‑out of “dead wood” before 60.
• Third AIJA – (1994) SCC 314:
  • Clarified that States like Kerala could prescribe higher Bar experience (5 years); struck down “by‑transfer” recruitment from ministerial staff for not meeting bar‑practice requirement.
• Fourth AIJA – (2002) 4 SCC 247:
  • Dispensed with minimum Bar experience for entry to lowest posts (given one‑year training);
  • Introduced LDCE and structured 50:25:25 quota for RPs, LDCEs, DRs;
  • Approved the 40‑point roster in line with R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745.
• Fifth AIJA – (2010) 15 SCC 170:
  • Reduced LDCE quota from 25% to 10% (65:10:25) due to chronic under‑utilisation.
• Sixth AIJA – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184:
  • Restored 50:25:25 ratio for HJS recruitment;
  • Expanded fast‑track promotion mechanisms at lower levels.

The present judgment builds on this lineage, particularly Fourth and Sixth AIJA, but also recognises that the reintroduction of three‑year practice at Bar and new acceleration schemes make the current moment fluid (paras 44–46, 88–94, 99). Hence, its directions are cautious and expressly open to future reconsideration.

2. Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196

This Constitution Bench judgment allowed judicial officers to participate, along with advocates, in the direct recruitment channel for HJS, with their prior judicial service counting towards eligibility. In the present judgment, the Court:

• Emphasises that Rejanish only equated the value of judicial experience and Bar experience; it did not elevate one over the other (paras 40–42);
• Highlights Rejanish as part of the broader answer to promotees’ grievances, by giving them an additional merit‑based route into HJS (paras 42, 94, 100(ix)).

3. Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703

This judgment prescribed a timetable for judicial recruitment to ensure regular, predictable filling of vacancies. Here, the Court treats that timetable as the backdrop for the annual roster system (para 71). Ideally, if Malik Mazhar is complied with, recruitment from all three sources for a given year would be completed roughly together, making the roster system smoother.

4. Other Service Law Precedents

• Mervyn Coutindo & Roshan Lal Tandon – foundational for the loss of birthmark doctrine and seniority based on continuous service in a common cadre (paras 54–56, 60–61).
• Triloki Nath Khosa – clarified permissible classifications within a cadre (educational qualifications) and their limits; used here to reject lower‑cadre length as a valid basis for preferential treatment (paras 57–59, 64–65, 100(vii)).
• Direct Recruit Engineering Officers, Aghore Nath Dey, and Ram Janam Singh – reaffirmation that regular/substantive appointments attract seniority from date of appointment, while ad hoc or irregular appointments do not (paras 62–63).
• N.R. Parmar and K. Meghachandra Singh – represent two conflicting approaches on back‑dated seniority for delayed appointments (paras 74–75); the Court carves out an HJS‑specific solution rather than rely wholly on either.

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VI. Impact and Future Implications

1. On High Courts and State Judicial Service Rules

Within three months, all States/UTs must amend their Higher Judicial Service Rules to:

• Incorporate the 4‑point annual roster (RP, RP, LDCE, DR);
• Implement the delayed‑recruitment exception and the rule on non‑initiation of recruitment (paras 79–83, 100(xi)-(xii));
• Provide for diversion of unfilled DR/LDCE vacancies to RPs as described (para 100(xiii));
• Ensure that Selection Grade and Super Time Scale promotions are based solely on merit‑cum‑seniority within HJS, with no extraneous quotas or weightage derived from lower‑cadre service.

This will likely require:

• Redrafting of seniority provisions in judicial service rules;
• Revising recruitment calendar provisions to align with the annual roster logic; and
• Clarifying transitional provisions for officers recruited under old rosters (though seniority already settled is protected).

2. For Regular Promotees and LDCE Officers

Promotees gain:

• Recognition that their ratio in the cadre is three‑fourths (including LDCEs) and that this is reflected in the 2:1:1 roster and 50:25:25 structure;
• Multiple accelerated promotion routes (LDCE, DR participation) to enter HJS earlier (as per Sixth AIJA and Rejanish);
• Security that DRs cannot claim back‑dated seniority that pushes them unduly ahead, except in the limited, structured exception carved out.

They do not receive:

• Any automatic seniority weightage for years spent as Civil Judge;
• Separate or preferential quotas in Selection Grade or Super Time Scale;
• Ability to use heartburn or “longer toil” as an enforceable legal claim to alter the structure of seniority within the common cadre.

3. For Direct Recruits

DRs benefit from:

• A clear reaffirmation that once in HJS, their source of recruitment cannot be used to disadvantage them in seniority or higher scales;
• Protection from seniority erosion through weightage schemes based on lower‑cadre service;
• Clarity that merit‑cum‑seniority in HJS is the path to higher grades and PDJ postings.

However, DRs remain:

• Subject to Poornima’s 10‑year rule for High Court elevation (which comparatively favours RPs/LDCEs);
• Exposed to the practical impact of unfilled DR vacancies being diverted to RPs (though roster logic mitigates structural distortion over time).

4. For Service Jurisprudence More Broadly

This judgment:

• Reinforces the “loss of birthmark” doctrine post‑fusion into a common cadre;
• Demonstrates how quota‑rota systems can be reconciled with the principle of seniority based on continuous service, by using annual rosters and carefully drawn exceptions for delayed recruitments;
• May influence other sectors where employees are drawn from multiple sources into a single cadre (e.g., engineering, administrative services), although the Court’s directions here are expressly tailored to judicial services.

5. Scope for Future Reconsideration

The Court itself acknowledges (para 99) that:

• The combined effect of Sixth AIJA (restored 50:25:25, accelerated promotions) and Rejanish K.V. (judicial officers as DR candidates) will substantially change the balance among RPs, LDCEs, and DRs over time.
• Depending on how the landscape evolves, the present directions might require review, modification, or recall.

Therefore, this is a living framework, albeit a robust one, responsive to real‑world consequences rather than fixed in stone.

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VII. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

• Higher Judicial Service (HJS): The cadre of District Judges (including Additional District Judges, Principal District Judges, etc.) in each State. It is “higher” relative to the lower judicial services (Civil Judges, Magistrates).
• Regular Promotees (RPs): Officers promoted from the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) to HJS based on seniority‑cum‑fitness, not via competitive examination.
• Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE): A merit‑based, internal competitive exam open to Civil Judges, providing a fast‑track promotion route into HJS (and earlier, to Senior Division).
• Direct Recruits (DRs): Typically advocates from the Bar who are directly appointed as District Judges through a recruitment process involving written examination and interview, conducted under the supervision of the High Court.
• Cadre: A structured, sanctioned strength of posts of a class or category in a service. All officers within a cadre share a common seniority list and service conditions.
• Feeder Cadre: A lower‑rank cadre from which promotion is made into a higher cadre. For HJS, the feeder cadre is primarily Civil Judge (Senior Division).
• Seniority: The relative position or rank of officers within a cadre, generally based on date of appointment or placement on a roster. It affects promotions, postings, and eligibility for higher responsibilities.
• Merit‑cum‑Seniority: A promotion principle where merit is primary but, between candidates of comparable merit, seniority breaks the tie. Used for Selection Grade, Super Time Scale, and key administrative posts.
• Roster: A systematic schedule assigning roster points to categories (here, RP/LDCE/DR) to ensure that over time, recruitment adheres to a prescribed percentage (50:25:25). It is a practical tool to implement quota and determine seniority inter se sources.
• Quota–Rota System: A model where a percentage of vacancies (quota) is reserved for each source, and appointments are made by rotating through roster points (rota) corresponding to each source.
• Birthmark (in this context): The indelible attribute of original recruitment source (e.g., DR, RP, LDCE). The doctrine says that once different sources merge into a single cadre, this birthmark should not be used to differentiate or discriminate within the cadre.
• Selection Grade & Super Time Scale: Higher pay scales and grades within the same cadre (HJS) awarded on merit‑cum‑seniority. They reflect higher responsibility and seniority but do not constitute a new cadre.
• Principal District Judge (PDJ): The administrative head of the district judiciary in a district; generally, the senior‑most District Judge in that district.
• Articles 233–235 (Constitution of India):
  • Art. 233: Appointment of District Judges by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
  • Art. 234: Recruitment to judicial service other than District Judges (lower judiciary).
  • Art. 235: Control of High Courts over subordinate courts (posting, promotion, discipline).
• Article 309: Empowers the appropriate Legislature/Governor to make rules regarding recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or State, subject to the Constitution.
• Article 142: Enables the Supreme Court to pass such decrees or orders as are necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter, even filling gaps where no specific statutory rule exists.

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VIII. Critical Appraisal

1. Strengths of the Judgment

• Doctrinal Clarity:
  • The judgment offers a clear, principled reaffirmation of the loss of birthmark doctrine and the primacy of merit‑cum‑seniority within a common cadre, rooted in constitutional equality.
• Uniformity and Simplicity:
  • The move from disparate 40‑point rosters to a uniform 4‑point annual roster simplifies administration and ensures that officers across States are not subjected to radically different systems.
• Balanced Response to Grievances:
  • While firmly rejecting legally unsound proposals, the Court does not trivialise the concerns of promotees. Instead, it highlights and relies on structural solutions already in place (accelerated promotions, Rejanish route, etc.).
• Prospective, Non‑Disruptive Application:
  • By preserving existing seniorities and mandating prospective application, the Court avoids chaos and prolonged litigation that could follow a retrospective reshuffle.
• Judicial Self‑Awareness and Flexibility:
  • The Court is candid that the present regime may need revisiting once the full impact of Sixth AIJA and Rejanish is felt (para 99), signalling a pragmatic openness to course correction.

2. Possible Concerns and Open Questions

• Complexity of Implementation:
  • While the 4‑point roster is simple, the rules regarding delayed recruitment, non‑initiation, and diversion of vacancies are intricate. High Courts and State Governments will need considerable administrative and legal capacity to codify and apply them correctly.
• Persistence of Structural Asymmetries:
  • Even with a uniform roster, differences in recruitment practices, litigation patterns, and vacancy management across States may continue to produce local variations in promotion opportunities.
• Interface with Reservation Policies:
  • The judgment does not dwell on how the 4‑point roster for sources (RP/LDCE/DR) will operate alongside vertical and horizontal reservations (SC/ST/OBC/women/persons with disabilities), which are implemented through their own roster systems. Harmonising these frameworks will require careful rule‑making.
• High Court Elevation Criteria:
  • Although the Court correctly notes the DR disadvantage under R. Poornima, it does not address whether the 10‑year rule itself may require re‑examination to ensure a level playing field for all sources.

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IX. Conclusion

The 2025 Constitution Bench judgment in All India Judges Association v. Union of India crystallises and refines decades of jurisprudence on the composition and internal dynamics of the Higher Judicial Services. It does so by firmly rejecting attempts to recalibrate seniority within HJS based on lower‑cadre service, while simultaneously:

• affirming the loss of birthmark once officers from different sources enter the common HJS cadre;
• introducing a uniform, mandatory 4‑point annual roster (2 RPs, 1 LDCE, 1 DR) for inter se seniority at the point of induction; and
• crafting detailed, justice‑oriented rules to deal with delayed recruitment and unfilled vacancies, without disturbing settled seniorities.

In doing so, the Court balances individual grievances against the collective good, personal aspiration against institutional independence, and technical service law against the broader constitutional commitment to an independent, strong, and enlightened judiciary. The judgment stands as a significant precedent at the intersection of constitutional law, service jurisprudence, and judicial administration, and will guide High Courts and State Governments as they reshape their HJS rules in the months and years ahead.