Service of an arbitral award on a non-decision-making authorised representative does not trigger Section 34 limitation: Supreme Court reiterates the “decision-maker” test for Government parties

Case: M/s. Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2025 INSC 1062 (Supreme Court of India, 28 August 2025)

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J. and K.V. Viswanathan, J.

Introduction

The Supreme Court in M/s. Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal has reaffirmed a critical facet of the limitation regime under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 1996 Act). The Court held that the limitation period to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(3) commences only when a signed copy of the award is delivered by the arbitral tribunal to the “party” as contemplated by Section 31(5) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act. In the context of government entities, “party” must be understood as the person or functionary with the knowledge of the arbitral proceedings and the authority to take a decision on whether to challenge the award—i.e., a decision-maker. Delivery to a non-decision-making authorised representative (here, an Assistant Engineer who participated in the proceedings) does not trigger limitation.

The case arose from an arbitral award passed on 12 November 2013 in favour of the contractor (appellant). The State’s Section 34 petition was initially dismissed by the District Court as time-barred, but the Calcutta High Court reversed, holding the petition within time because the award had not been delivered to the decision-making “party” (the Secretary/Executive Engineer). The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view and directed expeditious disposal on merits.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court framed a neat question of law: whether delivery of a signed photocopy of the award to an authorised representative (Assistant Engineer) constitutes valid “delivery to the party” under Section 31(5), thereby triggering the limitation clock under Section 34(3).
Answer: No. The Assistant Engineer was neither a “party” to the arbitration agreement nor a decision-making authority competent to consider a challenge. Therefore, delivery to him did not start the limitation period.
Relying on Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 and Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 496, the Court reiterated that:
- “Party” in Section 2(1)(h) is the party to the arbitration agreement, and
- For government entities, the copy must be received by the functionary with knowledge of the proceedings and the authority to decide on post-award recourse.
Ark Builders (2011) 4 SCC 616 was affirmed on the principle that limitation runs from receipt of a signed copy delivered by the tribunal in the manner envisaged by Section 31(5).
The Supreme Court dismissed the contractor’s appeal, left the High Court’s order undisturbed, and directed the District Court to decide the State’s Section 34 petition on merits within six months.

Note: Although paragraph 1 of the judgment contains a slip suggesting the High Court held the Section 34 application time-barred, the operative portions make clear that the High Court set aside the District Court’s dismissal and directed a merits hearing, treating the application as within time. The Supreme Court affirmed that outcome.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Award dated 12.11.2013 passed in favour of the contractor (appellant).
An Assistant Engineer (authorised representative) present at the arbitral proceedings received a signed xerox copy of the award on the same day.
The State did not, at that time, serve or receive a signed copy at the level of the Secretary, Irrigation & Waterways, or the Executive Engineer—i.e., the decision-making functionaries who were the “parties” on record.
The State first became aware of the award only upon initiation of execution by the contractor; thereafter, it filed a Section 34 petition on 20.03.2014 and sought a certified copy from the arbitrator on 03.04.2014.
The District Court dismissed the Section 34 petition as time-barred, but the High Court reversed, holding that limitation had not commenced in the absence of valid delivery under Section 31(5) to the “party.”
The contractor appealed to the Supreme Court; appeal dismissed; High Court’s order to hear the Section 34 petition on merits affirmed.

Issues

Whether service/delivery of a signed xerox copy of the award on an authorised representative (Assistant Engineer) amounts to “delivery to the party” under Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
When does the limitation period under Section 34(3) commence, particularly for government entities with complex organisational hierarchies?

Statutory Framework

Section 31(1): An arbitral award must be in writing and signed by the members of the tribunal.
Section 31(5): After the award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.
Section 2(1)(h): “Party” means a party to an arbitration agreement.
Section 34(3): Application for setting aside may not be made after three months from the date on which the party has received the arbitral award (extendable by a further 30 days on sufficient cause, but not thereafter).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239

The cornerstone of this decision. Tecco Trichy held that for large governmental organisations, “delivery” under Section 31(5) must be to the person who:

is directly connected with and involved in the arbitral proceedings,
has knowledge of the subject matter, and
is in a position to take or facilitate the decision to challenge the award (a decision-maker or the immediate departmental head).

Delivery to a different arm (e.g., a general inward office) or a functionary without relevant control or knowledge does not trigger limitation. The present judgment applies this principle mutatis mutandis by holding that service on an Assistant Engineer—who is not a “party” to the agreement and not a decision-maker—is insufficient to start limitation.

2) Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors. v. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 9 SCC 496

Benarsi Krishna clarified that “party” in Sections 31(5) and 34(3) means the party to the arbitration agreement, not an agent, advocate, or any other representative. Proper compliance with Section 31(5) requires delivery of a signed award on the party itself. The present judgment relies on this rule to exclude delivery on the Assistant Engineer from constituting service on the “party.”

3) State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders, (2011) 4 SCC 616

ARK Builders established that the limitation under Section 34(3) begins when the applicant receives a signed copy delivered by the tribunal in the manner contemplated by law (Section 31(5)), not from any informal or third-party source. Here, the Court maintains that delivery must be to the “party” to start time; internal circulation or non-party receipt does not suffice.

4) Calcutta High Court: NAFED v. R. Piyarelal Import & Export Ltd. (2015)

Cited by the High Court for the proposition that an authentic photocopy bearing signatures suffices as a “signed copy.” The Supreme Court did not disturb this understanding; instead, it turned on “who” received the copy, not “what” constituted a signed copy. Together with ARK Builders, the position remains: a duly signed copy (original signatures reproduced or authentic signature-bearing copy) delivered by the tribunal to the “party” starts limitation.

Legal Reasoning

1) The identity of the “party” is decisive

The 1996 Act uses “party” consistently and precisely. The Court reiterates that:

“Party” is the entity/person who is a party to the arbitration agreement (Section 2(1)(h)).
Section 31(5) obliges the tribunal to deliver a signed copy “to each party.”
Section 34(3) ties limitation to when “the party” receives the award.

For a government department, Tecco Trichy’s functional test guides the identification of the “party” for receipt: the decision-making functionary with knowledge and control of the arbitral process. In this case, the Secretary, Irrigation & Waterways Department and the Executive Engineer were the parties; service on an Assistant Engineer did not meet Section 31(5).

2) Delivery under Section 31(5) is substantive, not formal

Echoing Tecco Trichy, the Court emphasises that delivery is a “matter of substance.” It triggers multiple limitation clocks (Sections 33(1), 33(4), and 34(3)). Because delivery starts and ends substantive rights periods, it must reach the proper “party”—not any officer or representative who lacks authority to act.

3) Knowledge vs. Receipt

The contractor argued that the State had knowledge because its representative collected a signed xerox copy. The Court rejects a “knowledge” test divorced from statutory delivery. The statutory trigger remains receipt by the “party” under Section 31(5), not mere awareness, not informal forwarding, and not receipt by an agent or non-party functionary.

4) Signed copy: authenticity accepted; recipient decisive

While the High Court correctly held that an authentic signed photocopy suffices, the Supreme Court’s decision turns on “to whom” it was delivered. Even a perfectly valid signed copy will not start limitation if it is not delivered to the “party” in the sense developed by Tecco Trichy and Benarsi Krishna.

Impact and Future Implications

A. For arbitrators

Ensure delivery of the signed award to the “party” as defined in Section 2(1)(h), and in the government context, to the decision-making functionary identified in the record (e.g., the signatory to the contract, departmental head who conducted the arbitration, or the official designated by the department as the contact for arbitration).
Maintain clear proof of delivery—name, designation, and authority of the recipient; date and mode of service; acknowledgment.
Where multiple government functionaries are shown as parties or decision-makers (e.g., Secretary and Executive Engineer), deliver to each to avoid disputes on commencement of limitation.

B. For award-holders (contractors, suppliers)

Do not assume that service on a field-level officer or representative will trigger limitation for Section 34. Serve the signed copy on the decision-making “party” named in the proceedings or contract—as clarified in Tecco Trichy and reaffirmed here.
Consider sending an additional copy to the authorised law officer or the department’s litigation cell, but this is supplemental; the Section 31(5) delivery must be to the “party.”
In execution planning, anticipate that limitation objections may arise; a robust service trail will mitigate delay risks.

C. For government departments

Internally designate the officer who is the decision-maker for post-award recourse and ensure that the arbitrator and counterparty have that officer’s service details.
Set up a protocol so that any award reaching non-decision-making officers is immediately escalated to the designated decision-maker to avoid unnecessary disputes and delays.
Remember that once validly delivered to the “party,” the three-month limitation (extendable by 30 days on sufficient cause) runs strictly; delays beyond that outer limit are fatal.

D. For courts

This judgment supports a contextual, function-based assessment in identifying the “party” for Section 31(5) delivery in government cases, aligning with Tecco Trichy.
It discourages dismissal of Section 34 petitions as time-barred when initial service was on non-party functionaries lacking decision-making authority.

E. Doctrinal clarity

Reaffirms the “decision-maker” test in government arbitrations for valid delivery under Section 31(5).
Separates “knowledge” from “statutory receipt”—only the latter triggers limitation.
Leaves intact the understanding that a signature-bearing photocopy can satisfy “signed copy,” as long as recipient is the proper “party.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Party” (Section 2(1)(h)): The actual party to the arbitration agreement. In government cases, this refers to the department represented by a specific decision-making officer (e.g., departmental head, contract signatory). Not an agent, lawyer, or subordinate officer unless they themselves are the contracting party or designated decision-maker.
“Signed copy” (Section 31): A copy of the award bearing the arbitrator’s signatures. Courts accept authentic signature-bearing photocopies or scanned signed copies, provided they are delivered by the tribunal in the manner contemplated by law.
“Delivery” (Section 31(5)): The tribunal’s act of delivering a signed copy to each party. It is substantive because it starts limitation periods for corrections (Section 33) and set-aside (Section 34).
Limitation (Section 34(3)): Three months from the date the party receives the signed award, with a possible extension of up to 30 days for sufficient cause. No further extension is permissible.
Knowledge vs. Receipt: Knowledge that an award exists is not enough. What matters is receipt by the proper “party” in law; otherwise, the limitation clock does not start.

Application of Principles to the Present Case

The Assistant Engineer who collected the signed xerox copy on 12.11.2013 was neither a “party” to the arbitration agreement nor the decision-making officer. His receipt did not constitute delivery under Section 31(5).
As the Secretary/Executive Engineer (the “party”) was not served, limitation under Section 34(3) did not commence on 12.11.2013.
The State’s Section 34 application filed on 20.03.2014 could not be dismissed as barred by limitation merely because the Assistant Engineer had obtained a signed copy earlier.
Therefore, the High Court rightly directed a hearing on merits; the Supreme Court affirmed and instructed expeditious disposal within six months.

Practice Pointers

Arbitration clauses with government entities should identify the designated officer for receipt of arbitral communications and awards.
Arbitrators should obtain and record acknowledgment of award delivery from the designated decision-maker(s) for each party.
Where multiple officials appear as “party” representatives, deliver to each to avoid a limitation dispute.
Maintain a clear chain of custody: dispatch records, acknowledgments with names/designations, and contemporaneous communications.
Award-holders should not rely solely on informal or field-level receipts; insist on Section 31(5)-compliant delivery to the party.

Conclusion

M/s. Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal consolidates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on when limitation begins for Section 34 challenges. The Court reiterates that:

Limitation under Section 34(3) starts only when a signed copy of the award is delivered by the tribunal to the “party” as per Section 31(5).
In government arbitrations, “party” means the decision-making functionary with knowledge and control of the arbitral proceedings. Service on subordinate authorised representatives (such as an Assistant Engineer) or agents/advocates is not sufficient.
Delivery is not a mere formality; it is the substantive trigger for all post-award time limits under the 1996 Act.

In affirming the High Court’s order and remitting the State’s Section 34 application for a merits hearing, the Supreme Court provides a clear procedural roadmap to arbitrators, award-holders, and government litigants alike. The message is unambiguous: to start the clock, serve the signed award on the right “party.” Failure to do so risks avoidable delays and challenges to enforceability.

Key Takeaways

Service on non-decision-making authorised representatives does not start Section 34 limitation.
For government entities, serve the decision-maker (e.g., Secretary/Executive Engineer/departmental head involved in the arbitration).
A signature-bearing photocopy can be a valid “signed copy,” but only Section 31(5)-compliant delivery to the proper party starts limitation.
Courts will resist time-bar objections where initial service was defective under Section 31(5).
Arbitrators and parties should proactively structure service to align with Tecco Trichy and Benarsi Krishna to avoid disputes.