UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2623 PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES; PPL SERVICES CORPORATION v.
IBEW LOCAL 1600,
Appellant
_____________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Catherine C. Henry, No. 5:24-cv-00072 Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, AND RENDELL, Circuit Judges Submitted: Nov. 9, 2026; Filed: Nov. 10, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Defendant IBEW Local 1600 ("IBEW") appeals the District Court's order vacating an arbitral award in favor of IBEW and against Plaintiffs PPL Electric Utilities and PPL Services Corporation (collectively, "PPL") (the "Award"). Because a district court must defer to an arbitrator's interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") unless it reflects manifest disregard of the agreement, we will vacate and remand for the District Court to enter an order enforcing the Award.
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* This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
Case: 25-2623 Document: 41 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026
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In late December 2022, PPL lineman Kyle Ross called out sick. PPL demanded a doctor's note, so Ross obtained one at a cost of $50.00. Ross provided the doctor's note to PPL and requested reimbursement. PPL refused, so Ross's union, IBEW, filed a grievance, which proceeded to arbitration under the CBA.
The arbitrator concluded the grievance was arbitrable, found PPL violated the CBA by not reimbursing Ross, and ordered reimbursement.1The arbitrator determined that CBA Article II, Section 3(A) required PPL to comply with regulations of
"governmental agencies."2App. 18. According to the arbitrator, this provision
"effectively incorporated into the [CBA]" the Pennsylvania Medical Pay Law ("MPL"), which is exclusively enforced by a governmental agency, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry ("DOLI"). App. 15; 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1003. The MPL is a criminal statute that prohibits "requir[ing] any employe[e] . . . to pay the cost of a medical examination, or the cost of furnishing any medical records, required by the employer as a condition of employment." 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1002. Noting that PPL did not dispute it was bound to comply with the MPL, the arbitrator determined that the cost of Ross's doctor's note was a reimbursable "condition of employment" under the MPL's terms because PPL "conditions entitlement to sick pay on the presentation of a
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medical certification."3App. 20. As a result, the arbitrator required PPL to reimburse Ross under CBA Article II, Section 3(A), and directed PPL to cease and desist from future MPL violations.
PPL sued IBEW to vacate the Award. IBEW counterclaimed, urging the District Court to enforce the Award. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted PPL's cross-motion, denied IBEW's cross-motion, vacated the Award, and remanded for further arbitration proceedings. PPL Elec. Utils. v. IBEW Loc. 1600, No. CV 24-0072, 2025 WL 2056870, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2025). Although the Court deferred to the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA as requiring compliance with the regulations of all government agencies that regulate PPL, including DOLI and the MPL, id. at *4, it held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by (1) defining the statutory term "condition of employment" in the MPL to include Ross's sick note rather than interpreting the CBA itself, id. at *4-6, and (2) thereby impermissibly adding a new contractual obligation to the CBA, id. at *6.
IBEW appeals.
II4
Courts have "very limited power to review a labor arbitration award by an
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arbitrator appointed pursuant to a [CBA]," Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Loc. 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir. 1992), and must defer to an "arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract" and his "honest judgment" as to the appropriate remedy for a contractual breach. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987).
[G]eneral[ly] . . . we must enforce an arbitration award if it was based on an
"arguable" interpretation and/or application of the [CBA], and may only vacate it if there is no support in the record for its determination or if it reflects a "manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction."
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting News Am. Publ'ns, Inc. Daily Racing Form Div. v. Newark Typographical Union, Loc. 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Courts may vacate arbitral awards "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). "An arbitrator exceeds [his] powers if [his] award fails to 'draw[ ] its essence from the [CBA].'" StoneMor, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 469, 107 F.4th 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). "An arbitration award draws its essence from the [CBA] if 'the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties['] intention.'" Tanoma Min. Co. v. Loc. Union No. 1269, United Mine Workers of Am., 896 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 Case: 25-2623 Document: 41 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/10/2026
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(3d Cir. 1969)). Here, the District Court incorrectly rejected the arbitrator's "arguabl[e]"
interpretation of the CBA. Newark Typographical, 918 F.2d at 24. It incorrectly viewed the arbitrator's analysis as adding a new contractual obligation. In fact, the arbitrator was authorized to determine whether PPL violated a term of the CBA. The CBA required PPL to comply with "regulation[s]" of "governmental agencies in accordance with law,"
App. 77,5including the MPL, whose terms are incorporated by reference into the CBA through Article II, Section 3(A).6Accordingly, when the arbitrator interpreted the MPL phrase "condition of employment" to cover Ross's medical certification, he was deciding whether PPL violated the CBA and was thus acting within his authority. See, e.g., Electrolux Home Prods. v. United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am.,
416 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The fact that contract interpretation requires the arbitrator to interpret law that is incorporated by reference does nothing to change [the] standard of review."); Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("When construction of the contract implicitly or directly requires an application of 'external law,' i.e., statutory or decisional law, the parties have
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necessarily bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the law and are bound by it."); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) ("The arbitrator . . . has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties.").
Having rationally determined that the CBA incorporates the MPL's requirements, the arbitrator reasoned that the MPL phrase "condition of employment" covers circumstances where "the Company conditions entitlement to sick pay on the presentation of a medical certification" regardless of "whether or not disciplinary action looms." App. 19-20. As such, the arbitrator concluded that (1) the MPL requires employers to reimburse employees for such medical certifications, (2) the CBA requires PPL to comply with this state law requirement, but (3) PPL failed to fulfill its obligation under the CBA by not reimbursing Ross.7Even if a court could construe the CBA
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differently, because the arbitrator's interpretation "can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties['] intention," it must be left undisturbed. Tanoma Min. Co., 896 F.2d at 748 (emphasis and citation omitted).8Because the Award was rationally derived from the CBA, the District Court erred.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand for the District Court to enter an order enforcing the Award.