State v. Garrett

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Supreme Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

Filing Date: November 4, 2026 2

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3

Plaintiff-Appellee, 4

v. NO. S-1-SC-40701 5

TYJE GARRETT, 6

Defendant-Appellant. 7

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 8

Drew D. Tatum, District Judge 9 Kurt J. Mayer 10

Albuquerque, NM 11

for Appellant 12

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 13 Santa Fe, NM 14

Tyler M. Sciara, Assistant Solicitor General 15 Albuquerque, NM 16

for Appellee 17

1

DECISION 1

ZAMORA, Justice. 2

{1} Defendant Tyje Garrett appeals from his convictions for first-degree willful 3 and deliberate murder and tampering with evidence. He raises three issues. First, 4 Defendant argues the State presented insufficient evidence of deliberation to support 5 his first-degree murder conviction because there was evidence that he was provoked. 6 Second, Defendant contends the district court committed fundamental error by 7 following the uniform jury instruction on first-degree murder instead of altering the 8 instruction to instruct the jury on sufficient provocation. Third, Defendant argues the 9 prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error during closing 10 argument. 11

{2} Finding no merit in these arguments, we affirm Defendant's convictions. We 12 exercise our discretion to dispose of this appeal by nonprecedential decision. Rule 13 12-405(B) NMRA. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to the law and the facts 14 necessary to decide the issues raised. See State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, ¶ 48, 15

110 N.M. 218, 794 P.2d 361 (explaining that nonprecedential decisions "are written 16 solely for the benefit of the parties," who know the details of the case). 17

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I. BACKGROUND 1

{3} On May 28, 2022, Defendant was at home celebrating his stepson's high 2 school graduation when his stepson's father, Michael Arellano (Victim), arrived at 3 the party. Victim encountered Defendant in the kitchen while Victim was getting 4 food. Partygoers testified that Victim appeared inebriated. An eyewitness for the 5 State recalled Defendant and Victim greeting each other in the kitchen, followed by 6 a tense and "passive aggressive[]" exchange. Defendant testified that Victim 7 behaved belligerently and cursed at him, startling the baby that Defendant was 8 holding in his arms, and almost causing the baby to hit her head on the kitchen island. 9 Defendant told Victim to leave. Defendant and Victim went outside and took off 10 their shirts in preparation for a physical fight, while other partygoers tried to 11 deescalate the situation. 12

{4} The men were separated but continued to yell at one another from across the 13 street for at least ten minutes. During that time, Victim repeatedly yelled the n-word 14 at Defendant and disparaged Defendant's family. Victim also threatened Defendant. 15 In turn, Defendant threatened Victim; he yelled, among other things, that Defendant 16

"would kill [Victim], or that he would shoot him, and he wouldn't feel bad." One 17 partygoer tried to convince Victim to call someone for a ride home, but instead of 18 doing so, Victim called his brother to ask for assistance in fighting Defendant. While 19

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on the phone, Victim used another racial slur to refer to Defendant, and he asked his 1 brother to "bring the guns" and "bring the guys" to "burn this [expletive] down." 2

{5} After a brief pause during which both men apparently "calmed down for a few 3 minutes," Defendant got in his truck, drove down the street, and parked. Defendant 4 then made a U-turn and drove back to where Victim was standing. Defendant shot 5 Victim twelve times, killing him. After shooting Victim, Defendant got back in his 6 truck and drove to another town, twenty-four miles away, where police detained him 7 at a gas station. Defendant was cooperative, and he was unarmed; he had thrown the 8 rifle out the window while he was driving. The rifle was recovered and entered into 9 evidence at trial. 10

{6} At trial, Defendant did not deny killing Victim. Instead, the defense's theory 11 was that Defendant did not deliberate before pulling the trigger. Defendant argued 12 that killing Victim was a rash or impulsive act arising from the provocation of 13 Victim's repeated racial slurs and threats against Defendant and his family; 14 therefore, he asserted, the killing amounted to voluntary manslaughter. 15

{7} Rejecting that theory, the jury found Defendant guilty of willful and deliberate 16 first-degree murder. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994). The jury also found 17 Defendant guilty of tampering with evidence for having thrown his rifle from his 18 truck as he drove away from the scene. NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (2003). The district 19

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court sentenced Defendant to life in prison plus three years, to run consecutively. 1 Defendant appeals directly to this Court. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 ("Appeals from 2 a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment 3 shall be taken directly to the supreme court."); accord Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA. 4 Further facts will be developed as necessary to the discussion. 5

II. DISCUSSION 6

A. Defendant's Conviction for First-Degree Murder Was Supported by 7

Substantial Evidence 8

1. Standard of review 9

{8} We defer to the jury's verdict when reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, 10

"'view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging 11 all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 12 verdict.'" State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶ 57, 572 P.3d 974 (quoting State v. 13 Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056). We ask "whether substantial 14 evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt 15 beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." 16 State v. Garcia, 1992-NMSC-048, ¶ 25, 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 18 that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Montoya, 19

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2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 53 (text only)¹(citation omitted). "So long as a rational jury 1 could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a 2 conviction, we will not upset a jury's conclusions." State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-3 003, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057 (text only) (citation omitted). 4

{9} Crucially, we do not consider alternative interpretations of the evidence when 5 reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 6 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 ("An appellate court does not evaluate [the 7 evidence] to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is 8 consistent with a finding of innocence."). We will not find insufficient evidence 9 merely because of additional contrary evidence favorable to the defendant as "the 10 jury is free to reject [the d]efendant's version of the facts." Montoya, 2015-NMSC-11 010, ¶ 52 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When reviewing for 12 substantial evidence, "we do not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for 13 that of the fact finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict." 14 Id. (text only) (citation omitted). 15

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2. The evidence of deliberation was substantial 1

{10} Defendant relies on evidence of provocation to support his claim that the 2 evidence of deliberation was insufficient. He argues that "the [S]tate did not present 3 direct evidence, or evidence from which a reasonable inference could be derived, 4 that he was able to carefully deliberate." Defendant contends that the State merely 5 presented evidence that Defendant had the opportunity to deliberate while sitting in 6 his truck, but did not present evidence that Defendant planned the killing. Defendant 7 argues that the evidence precludes a finding of deliberation because he "would not 8 have shot [Victim] had he not been sufficiently provoked by the constant racist jibes 9 and threats." 10

{11} Under our standard of review, this form of argument cannot prevail. The jury 11 was instructed on sufficient provocation in accordance with UJI 14-220 NMRA and 12 UJI 14-222 NMRA. Those instructions include direction that if a defendant killed 13 the victim as a result of sufficient provocation, they are guilty of voluntary 14 manslaughter. UJI 14-220. The jury duly considered the evidence of provocation 15 that Defendant relies on in his briefing and gave that evidence the weight that, in its 16 estimation, it deserved. On appeal, we do not "reweigh the evidence." State v. Perea, 17 2001-NMSC-026, ¶ 5, 130 N.M. 732, 31 P.3d 1006. In other words, when 18 considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's determination that 19

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Defendant deliberated before killing Victim, we consider only the evidence that 1 supports deliberate intent; we do not consider evidence that could have supported a 2 different result. See, e.g., Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶ 57; Garcia, 1992-NMSC-048, 3 ¶ 25. 4

{12} Viewing the evidence of deliberation in the light most favorable to the guilty 5 verdict, we conclude that the verdict rests on sufficient evidence. A verdict of willful 6 and deliberate first-degree murder under Section 30-2-1(A)(1) must be supported by 7 evidence that the defendant killed with the state of mind of "deliberate intention." 8 UJI 14-201 NMRA. "Deliberate" is defined as, "arrived at or determined upon as a 9 result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the 10 proposed course of action." Id. Thus, "[t]o constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer 11 must weigh and consider the question of killing and the slayer's reasons for and 12 against such a choice." Id. Direct evidence of deliberate intent is rare because, even 13 when there are witnesses to a killing, "the killer does not always speak aloud what 14 is in his mind." 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7(a), at 15 653 (3d ed. 2018); see also State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 94, 140 16 P.3d 515 ("Intent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the 17 case, as it is rarely established by direct evidence." (internal quotation marks and 18 citation omitted)). 19

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{13} Strong evidence was presented in the form of Defendant's own words before 1 shooting Victim. See, e.g., State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 29, 128 N.M. 2 711, 998 P.2d 176 (holding that a defendant's prior threats to kill the victim provided 3 substantial evidence of deliberation). Eyewitnesses testified that, throughout the 4 dispute leading up to the killing, Defendant unambiguously threatened to kill Victim 5 multiple times. These threats to kill Victim constituted evidence of deliberation. 6

{14} More specifically, Defendant said that he would shoot Victim, "and he 7 wouldn't feel bad" about it. Defendant attempts to minimize the importance of this 8 statement, arguing that it must be viewed in the context of "the anger and fear" that 9 Victim provoked and was merely "an impetuous, reactive utterance." But the jury 10 was not required to interpret Defendant's words in that manner. 11

{15} Additional circumstantial evidence also supported the jury's finding of 12 deliberate intent. The State presented evidence of a pause in the fighting during 13 which one eyewitness testified Defendant "calmed down for a few minutes"; 14 evidence that Defendant drove away, parked, then circled back to commit the killing; 15 evidence of a large number of wounds; evidence that Defendant fled the scene; and 16 evidence that Defendant disposed of the rifle. All of that evidence was probative of 17 deliberate intent. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 2026-NMSC-___, ¶¶ 20-21, ___ P.3d ___ 18 (S-1-SC-40503, Mar. 16, 2026) (holding that the defendant turning around and 19

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striking the victim with his truck a second time was circumstantial evidence of 1 deliberation); State v. Robinson, 1980-NMSC-049, ¶ 12, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 2 (concluding that evidence "the defendant turned his car around a cul-de-sac, came 3 back, stopped his car, got out of his car and shot" the victim "[gave] rise to a strong 4 inference of [the] defendant's deliberate intent to kill"), holding limited by Sells v. 5 State, 1982-NMSC-125, ¶¶ 7, 9, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162; State v. Flores, 2010-6 NMSC-002, ¶ 21, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641 ("[T]he jury could draw rational 7 inferences of deliberation from the large number of wounds."), overruled on other 8 grounds by State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶ 87, 478 P.3d 880; State v. Smith, 9 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 20, 367 P.3d 420 ("Substantial evidence of deliberation can 10 include . . . fleeing the scene [or] disposing of evidence."); see also, e.g., 2 LaFave, 11 supra, § 15.2(f), at 696 (stating that a defendant who is adequately provoked but 12 who "actually cools off . . . may be convicted of first-degree murder"). 13

{16} Given the abundant evidence supporting the jury's determination that 14 Defendant acted with deliberate intent, we have no difficulty concluding the jury's 15 verdict was supported by substantial evidence. 16

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B. The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by Instructing 1

the Jury on First-Degree Willful and Deliberate Murder in Accordance 2

with UJI 14-201 3

1. Standard of review 4

{17} "The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the 5 issue has been preserved. If the error has been preserved, we review the instructions 6 for reversible error. If not, we review for fundamental error." State v. Benally, 2001-7 NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). Defendant 8 acknowledges that he did not object at trial to the instructions he now challenges on 9 appeal, and he further acknowledges that we will therefore review for fundamental 10 error. "The doctrine of fundamental error applies only under exceptional 11 circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice." State v. Barber, 2004-12 NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. "Under this standard, we must 13 determine whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected . . . 14 from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror 15 with an accurate rendition of the relevant law." State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, 16 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When reviewing 17 for fundamental error, we first determine if error occurred; if so, we next determine 18 whether that error was fundamental." State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 14, 343 19 P.3d 1245 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20

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2. The district court did not commit error 1

{18} The district court instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree willful 2 and deliberate murder consistent with the language of UJI 14-201. The district court 3 further instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder 4 and voluntary manslaughter, following the language of UJI 14-210 NMRA and UJI 5 14-220. Because these instructions were given in accordance with the uniform jury 6 instructions, we presume they were free from error. See State v. Wilson, 1994-7 NMSC-009, ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 793, 867 P.2d 1175 ("[T]his Court's adoption of uniform 8 jury instructions proposed by standing committees of the Court establishes a 9 presumption that the instructions are correct statements of the law."). 10

{19} Nevertheless, Defendant argues that the first-degree willful and deliberate 11 murder instruction should have been modified to discuss the State's burden to 12 disprove sufficient provocation, as is done with self-defense. See, e.g., State v. 13 Parish, 1994-NMSC-073, ¶¶ 5, 8, 10, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 (holding that when 14 a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the jury instructions must reflect the 15 state's burden to disprove the claim). We disagree for two reasons. 16

{20} First, self-defense and provocation do not require the same type of jury 17 instructions because the former is a complete justification and the latter is a 18 mitigating circumstance. Self-defense negates the element of unlawfulness that is 19

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required to prove the criminality of any homicide. Id. ¶ 8. Thus, self-defense is a 1 lawful justification that completely relieves a defendant of criminal liability for any 2 level of homicide, including first-degree murder. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 3 9; see also NMSA 1978, § 30-2-7(A) (1963) ("Homicide is justifiable when 4 committed . . . in the necessary defense of [one's] life."); NMSA 1978, § 30-2-8 5 (1963) ("Whenever any person is prosecuted for a homicide, and upon his trial the 6 killing shall be found to have been excusable or justifiable, the jury shall find such 7 person not guilty and he shall be discharged."). Provocation is not a lawful 8 justification; it does not relieve the defendant of criminal liability. 2 LaFave, supra, 9 § 15.2(f) at 696. Instead, it only mitigates what would otherwise be second-degree 10 murder to voluntary manslaughter. Id. 11

{21} In contrast with second-degree murder under Section 30-2-1(B), lack of 12 provocation is not a statutory element of first-degree willful and deliberate murder. 13 See § 30-2-1(A)(1) (defining first-degree murder as "the killing of one human being 14

. . . without lawful justification or excuse . . . by any kind of willful, deliberate, and 15 premeditated killing"). And the mitigating circumstance of provocation does not 16 negate the element of unlawfulness by providing a lawful justification or excuse, as 17 described previously. Thus, contrary to Defendant's contention, the State does not 18

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have the burden to prove lack of provocation with regard to first-degree murder even 1 though it does have that burden with regard to second-degree murder. 2

{22} Second, the mens rea for first-degree willful and deliberate murder as stated 3 in UJI 14-201 precludes a conviction if the jury found the defendant acted under 4 sufficient provocation. It states that "[a] mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even 5 though it includes an intent to kill, is not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute 6 a deliberate killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and 7 the slayer's reasons for and against such a choice." Id. Under this instruction, the 8 jury could not find that Defendant had committed first-degree willful and deliberate 9 murder if it thought Defendant acted impulsively, regardless of the source of the 10 impulse—whether from adequate provocation or otherwise. Lack of provocation is 11 subsumed in that definition. 12

{23} Therefore, we hold that the district court properly instructed the jury on first-13 degree willful and deliberate murder. Finding no error, we do not reach the question 14 of whether the error was fundamental. 15

C. The Prosecutor's Statements in Closing Argument Did Not Constitute 16

Fundamental Error 17

{24} Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. 18 His arguments are diffuse, but appear to center around claims that the prosecutor 19 misstated the legal standard for provocation, impermissibly shifted the burden of 20

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proof, and relied on facts not in evidence to prove deliberate intent. Defendant asserts 1 these problems were pervasive, but acknowledges that he did not object at trial and 2 therefore our review is for fundamental error. We agree that fundamental error is the 3 standard of review. See State v. Sosa, 2009-NMSC-056, ¶ 26, 147 N.M. 351, 223 4 P.3d 348 (noting that "[w]here counsel fails to object" to alleged prosecutorial 5 misconduct in closing argument, "the appellate court is limited to fundamental error 6 review"). 7

{25} "Under the proper standard, we begin with the presumption that the verdict 8 was justified, and then ask whether the error was fundamental." Id. ¶ 37. We will 9 only find fundamental error "when prosecutorial misconduct in closing statements 10 compromises a defendant's right to a fair trial," and it is reasonably probable that 11

"the error was a significant factor in the jury's deliberations in relation to the rest of 12 the evidence before them." Id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 13

{26} Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor's statements amounted to 14 fundamental error. Defendant first challenges the prosecutor's statement that "'there 15 was no [sufficient] provocation'" because Defendant "'had time to drive down the 16 road' and 'sit in his truck for a few minutes.'" He contends that with these 17 statements, the prosecutor misstated the legal standard for sufficient provocation by 18

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erroneously inviting the jury to evaluate provocation "from a single frame in time" 1 and to ignore other evidence of provocation. 2

{27} We note it was not improper for the prosecutor to make arguments about 3 Defendant's mens rea when it was at issue in this case, and placing these remarks in 4 context further convinces us there was no error. These statements were made during 5 rebuttal argument, in response to the defense's closing argument that Defendant had 6

"no time to cool off" because "from the time [Defendant] pulled out of the driveway 7 to the time the shooting occurred was probably a minute, maybe two. No time at all." 8 The prosecutor's rebuttal of that point was as follows: 9

Did [Defendant] have time to cool off? Absolutely. You heard he had 10 time. He could have stayed in the house, as Mr. Angel testified. He went 11 back in the house. He came back out and got in his truck. He had time, 12 all of that time, to cool off. 13

If he was so worried about that, he could have ran over [Victim] right 14 then. He could have shot him with a firearm before he ever got in the 15 truck to leave. But no. There was no sufficient provocation. He had time 16 to drive down the road, sit in his truck for a few minutes before he 17 turned around and came back and killed [Victim]. 18

We view these statements as responsive to defense counsel's argument that there 19 was "no time at all" to cool off. As such, they were not improper. 20

{28} Second, Defendant asserts the prosecutor "repeatedly conflated proving the 21 intent element with disproving sufficient provocation" by "us[ing] the same 22 speculative inference for both." Although Defendant goes to some length to assert 23

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the State committed a "sleight of hand" that was "egregious" and could have 1

"intruded on a distinct constitutional protection," he does not cite the record to 2 demonstrate where these alleged repeated improprieties occurred. Therefore, we 3 decline to address this contention further. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (providing 4 that the argument section of a brief must contain "citations to authorities, record 5 proper, transcript of proceedings, or exhibits relied on"); Drake v. Rueckhaus, 1961-6 NMSC-033, ¶ 14, 68 N.M. 209, 360 P.2d 395 ("[W]e will not search the record to 7 determine that which appellant has the burden to point out to us under the rules."). 8

{29} Third, Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly introduced an element to 9 voluntary manslaughter by implying that a defendant must act "in the rush of the 10 moment." The prosecutor made this statement when discussing a hypothetical 11 situation that might satisfy the elements of voluntary manslaughter, such as if 12 Defendant "would have ran over" Victim shortly after Victim threatened to kill 13 Defendant. The use of hypotheticals to help jurors understand the elements of a 14 crime is not improper. See, e.g., State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-045, ¶¶ 40, 44, 124 N.M. 15 55, 946 P.2d 1066 (holding that a prosecutor's statement likening deliberate intent 16 to the choice between "french fries or baked potato" was not fundamental error 17 because it was "used merely as an illustration of the process one uses to weigh the 18 considerations of a contemplated course of action" and "did not in any way suggest 19

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to the jury that it should apply the law in a manner different than that prescribed by 1 the judge"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, ¶ 2 36, 146 N.M. 357, 210 P.3d 783. 3

{30} Defendant cites only one case, State v. Diaz, 1983-NMCA-091, ¶ 18, 100 4 N.M. 210, 668 P.2d 326, to support his contention that the prosecutor's "rush of the 5 moment" statement constituted misconduct. Diaz involved a prosecutor's statement 6 that the jury should consider the negative "message" the community would receive 7 if the jury returned a not guilty verdict. Id. That statement was improper because it 8 encouraged the jury to convict for reasons other than the evidence. See, e.g., State v. 9 Cooper, 2000-NMCA-041, ¶ 15, 129 N.M. 172, 3 P.3d 149 ("Prosecutorial 10 commentary that urges a jury to convict for reasons other than the evidence defies 11 the law and undermines the integrity of a verdict."). However, the hypothetical 12 described by the prosecutor in this case was not an encouragement to convict for 13 reasons other than the evidence. We conclude that Diaz is inapposite. 14

{31} Defendant also relies on Diaz to attack the prosecutor's passing mention that 15 Victim's level of intoxication showed he did not intend to harm Defendant's family. 16 Defendant claims this statement "is yet another instance of the state misdirecting the 17 jury's deliberations by misstating the law." However, Defendant does not 18 demonstrate how Diaz applies, and he provides no other authority for this claim, so 19

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we will not address it. See Lee v. Lee (In re Adoption of Doe), 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 1 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 ("We assume where arguments in briefs are 2 unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable to find any 3 supporting authority. We therefore will not do this research for counsel."). 4

{32} Fourth, Defendant argues that the prosecutor impermissibly relied on facts not 5 in evidence by stating "that wounds on [Victim]'s arm were 'defens[ive] wounds' 6 that showed [Victim] was" "trying to protect himself, when he's on the ground, from 7 being shot." He also challenges the prosecutor's statement that the road down which 8 Defendant drove after leaving the scene was a "busy road." Defendant argues these 9 characterizations of the evidence were facts not in evidence, and the prosecutor used 10 them to establish the element of deliberate intent. The State argues that, on the 11 contrary, these statements reflected reasonable inferences from the evidence: the 12 forensic evidence showed entrance and exit wounds on Victim's forearms, giving 13 rise to a reasonable inference that Victim raised his arms to protect himself from the 14 bullets; and there was evidence that Defendant was located at the gas station 15 approximately forty minutes after he left the scene, giving rise to a reasonable 16 inference that Defendant encountered traffic along the twenty-four-mile route. 17

{33} We agree with the State that the prosecutor's descriptions of "defensive 18 wounds" and a "busy road" were reasonable interpretations of the evidence. 19

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