City of Missoula v. Mugondozi

DA 24-0593

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 254

CITY OF MISSOULA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v.

BAGENDABANGA MUGONDOZI,

Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-32-2022-697 Honorable Jason Marks, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

James Park Taylor, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Jeff Sealey, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Keithi M. Worthington, Missoula City Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: August 19, 2026

Decided: October 27, 2026

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

10/27/2026

Case Number: DA 24-0593

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Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Bagendabanga Mugondozi appeals the Fourth Judicial District Court's order reversing the Missoula Municipal Court's dismissal of misdemeanor charges against him

"in furtherance of justice" under § 46-13-401(1), MCA. We affirm the District Court's holding that the Municipal Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

¶2 On August 20, 2021, a witness driving toward downtown Missoula, Montana, observed Mugondozi parked in a turnout. Mugondozi was seated in the driver's seat with a woman in the passenger seat. The witness observed Mugondozi punching the woman. The witness turned around and called 911, advising dispatch of what she saw and giving a description of Mugondozi and the woman. The witness also advised dispatch that she saw the woman's arms go up to block the punches.

¶3 Officer Amanda Hardin arrived on scene and observed Mugondozi holding the woman's arms. Officer Hardin noticed the woman's face was red and swollen and that she appeared to be crying. The woman explained to Officer Hardin that she worked two jobs and Mugondozi picked her up from her first job. Mugondozi became angry about the woman going to her second job. The woman stated that Mugondozi parked at the turnout, told her, "I'll show you who I am," and began to beat her. The woman attempted to exit the vehicle, but Mugondozi grabbed her left arm. Officer Hardin observed that the

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woman's left arm appeared to be red and swollen where Mugondozi grabbed her. The woman said she bit Mugondozi in an attempt to escape the vehicle. ¶4 Officer Michael Hoffman arrived on scene and spoke with Mugondozi. Mugondozi referred to the woman as his girlfriend and informed Officer Hoffman that the woman was pregnant with their child. Mugondozi admitted to Officer Hoffman that he struck the woman with an open hand slap to her face. The woman ran from Mugondozi, and he chased after her until law enforcement arrived. Officer Hoffman arrested Mugondozi and cited him for misdemeanor Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA). ¶5 Mugondozi moved to dismiss the PFMA charge in September 2022 under § 46-13-401(1), MCA. Mugondozi argued that the potential collateral consequences of a domestic violence conviction—potential deportation—outweighed the statutory maximum sentence. The City of Missoula (City) argued that Montana law does not allow the Municipal Court to consider collateral consequences when imposing a sentence mandated by law.

¶6 The Municipal Court granted Mugondozi's motion to dismiss. The City appealed to the District Court. The District Court reversed the Municipal Court's dismissal. It reasoned that the Municipal Court abused its discretion when it determined that the societal interest in continued prosecution was outweighed by speculative risks. Mugondozi then appealed the District Court's order to this Court. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Mugondozi was not convicted of a criminal offense and no final judgment of conviction had been entered. City of Missoula v. Mugondozi, No. DA 23-0284, Order (Mont. Aug. 15, 2023). On remand, Mugondozi pleaded guilty to

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the charge and filed a second appeal. The District Court reaffirmed its ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The district court acts as an intermediate appellate court when reviewing a municipal court's decision. City of Missoula v. Pope, 2021 MT 4, ¶ 5, 402 Mont. 416, 478 P.3d 815. We review "an appeal of a district court's decision on appeal from a municipal court as if the appeal originally had been filed in this Court." Pope, ¶ 5. ¶8 We review a court's dismissal under § 46-13-401(1), MCA, for abuse of discretion. State v. Pinkerton, 270 Mont. 287, 290, 891 P.2d 532, 535 (1995). A court "abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice." State v. Ellerbee, 2019 MT 37, ¶ 14, 394 Mont. 289, 434 P.3d 910 (citation omitted). This Court reviews a court's interpretation of a statute de novo. State v. Felde, 2021 MT 1, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 391, 478 P.3d 825. We give words in a statute their ordinary and usual meaning. Felde, ¶ 16.

DISCUSSION

¶9 "The court may, either on its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of justice, order a complaint, information, or indictment to be dismissed." Section 46-13-401(1), MCA. "[T]he court may not order a dismissal of a complaint, information, or indictment, or a count contained" therein "charging a felony, unless good cause for dismissal is shown and the reasons for the dismissal are set forth in an order entered upon the minutes." Section 46-13-401(1), MCA. Because Mugondozi's

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charge is a misdemeanor, a "furtherance of justice," rather than good cause, is required for dismissal. State v. Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. 213, 217, 772 P.2d 853, 856 (1989). ¶10 "The legislature has not attempted to define the phrase 'in furtherance of justice' . . . . [I]t is left for judicial discretion exercised in view of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society to determine what particular grounds warrant the dismissal of a pending criminal action." State v. Cummins, 257 Mont. 491, 493, 850 P.2d 952, 953 (1993) (quoting State ex rel. Anderson v. Gile, 119 Mont. 182, 187, 172 P.2d

583, 586 (1946)).

¶11 "Discretion is the freedom to act according to one's judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule." State ex rel. Anderson, 119 Mont. at 187, 172 P.2d at 586. We have recognized courts' broad discretion to dismiss a criminal case, but "the authority of the court to dismiss a proceeding is not unbridled, and must be exercised in view of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society." Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. at 217, 772 P.2d at 856 (citing State v. Roll, 206 Mont. 259, 261-62, 670 P.2d 566, 568 (1983); State v. Cole, 174 Mont. 380, 384, 571 P.2d 87, 89 (1977)). ¶12 We have upheld a court's refusal to dismiss charges under § 46-13-401(1), MCA, when the defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated. In Roll, we affirmed a district court's refusal to dismiss charges due to a continuance because it did not infringe on the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Roll, 206 Mont. at 262-63, 670 P.2d at 568. In Cummins, we concluded that the State had not violated the defendant's due process rights after a one-year and nine-month delay in executing the arrest warrant. Cummins, 257 Mont. at 492, 850 P.2d at 952-53. This Court affirmed the district court's refusal to dismiss the

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case because the sheriff's department repeatedly attempted to serve the warrant and the statute of limitations had not been violated. Cummins, 257 Mont. at 494, 850 P.2d at 954. ¶13 Defendants have both substantive and procedural constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to due process, and the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. IV, VI, XIV; Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 11, 17, 24. The Municipal Court concluded that Mugondozi had suffered no violation of his constitutional rights; Mugondozi concedes the same. Like Cummins and Roll, Mugondozi's constitutional rights have not been violated.

¶14 We also have looked to the following factors when considering whether a case was properly dismissed: (1) the weight of "the evidence indicative of guilt or innocence,"

(2) "the nature of the crime involved," (3) "the length . . . of the defendant's pretrial incarceration," and (4) the "harassment and burdens imposed upon the defendant by a trial." Cole, 174 Mont. at 384, 571 P.2d at 89 (citing People v. Superior Ct. of Marin Cnty.,

446 P.2d 138, 147-48 (Cal. 1968)). Cole restated the factors California courts apply when interpreting a section that mirrors the language of § 46-13-401(1), MCA.² ¶15 The Municipal Court did not analyze the Cole factors.³Mugondozi argues that Cole offers limited precedential value as its factors are outdated and fail to consider the unique

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facts of the current case. The City cites Cole as providing additional guidance for reviewing a motion to dismiss.

¶16 In its order granting Mugondozi's motion to dismiss, the Municipal Court stated:

[T]he [c]ourt is most compelled by, and concerned with, the potential impacts of the continued prosecution on the alleged victim. As stated in defense brief, the alleged victim has met with Defense counsel and expressed grave concerns over the prospect of Mr. Mugondozi being deported . . . The alleged victim is in school and relies on Mr. Mugondozi both financially and to raise their shared child. Although much debate between [the] parties focuses on the procedural rights of Defendant, such focus does not consider whether continued prosecution and potential deportation would be an unjust outcome from the perspective of the alleged victim who does not support continued prosecution . . . The direct and serious impacts of deportation, and the severe implications said deportation will have on the alleged victim and her child, far outweigh the societal interests in the continued prosecution of the case in pursuit of a misdemeanor conviction. The [c]ourt also believes that it is not in society's interest to continue to prosecute this case with such dire implications against the express wishes of the alleged victim. ¶17 The court explained that it "was left to determine whether a plea or potential conviction that could result in deportation[] . . . would be in the furtherance of justice."

The Municipal Court reasoned that "deportation would result in the alleged victim being partnerless, her child being fatherless and Mr. Mugondozi being thrusted back into a climate that would dramatically jeopardize his wellbeing."

¶18 Mugondozi contends that the Municipal Court appropriately analyzed the competing interests in the case when it considered both the impact of dismissal and the impact of continuing the prosecution. He argues that the court, not the prosecutor, decides whether dismissal would further the interests of justice. While Mugondozi echoes the Municipal Court's focus on "whether a potential deportation under the current plea agreement would result in an [u]njust outcome from the perspective of the alleged

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victim[,]" the City argues that the court should have balanced Mugondozi's constitutional rights against the interests of society. The City maintains that society has a heightened interest in the prosecution of PFMA crimes and that a court's misuse of discretion under § 46-13-401(1), MCA, intrudes on a prosecutor's authority as an officer of the executive branch.

¶19 Though not without limit, prosecuting attorneys have broad discretionary powers to determine when to file charges. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Dist. Ct., 260 Mont. 410, 415, 859 P.2d 992, 995 (1993) (noting that "a prosecutor should seek justice and not simply an indictment or a conviction." (citation omitted)). "The prosecutor is entrusted to 'determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution[.]'" State v. Ridge, 2014 MT 288, ¶ 11,

376 Mont. 534, 337 P.3d 80 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1982)). The District Court found from its review of the record that the City considered both Mugondozi's risk of deportation and the victim's wishes when it decided to continue to prosecute the case.

¶20 Section 46-13-401(1), MCA, gives a trial court the power to dismiss a case on its own or by motion of the prosecuting attorney. A court does not exceed its constitutional authority when it exercises discretion to dismiss a case in furtherance of justice as authorized by the statute, even over the prosecutor's objection. But its exercise of discretion, like any other such exercise, is reviewable for abuse. See State ex rel. Fletcher,

260 Mont. at 417, 859 P.2d at 996 (district court violated doctrine of separation of powers when it denied the prosecution's motion to dismiss after the county attorney determined there was insufficient evidence).

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¶21 PFMA is an aggravated form of assault that reflects "a distinct societal norm—the disapproval of violence against family members[.]" State v. Weatherell, 2010 MT 37, ¶ 14,

355 Mont. 230, 225 P.3d 1256. Because society has a significant interest in addressing this intimate crime, Montana law provides escalating sentences and allows prosecutors the ability to "stack" PFMA offenses. Section 45-5-206(3)(a)(ii), (iv), MCA (a defendant's third or subsequent conviction for PFMA is charged as a felony). The statute also requires counseling and treatment for defendants convicted of PFMA crimes. Section 45-5-206(4), MCA. In addition to any other sentence, the court must "require the offender to pay the victim's reasonable actual medical, housing, wage loss, and counseling costs."

Section 45-5-206(5), MCA. These statutes establish the public policy of Montana to see that crimes of domestic violence are prosecuted.

¶22 The Municipal Court in this case did not consider society's interest in enforcement of the laws against domestic violence or the factors we identified in Cole. It did not address the weight of the evidence—including an eyewitness report that Mugondozi was punching a woman inside a vehicle; Mugondozi's admission to slapping the woman on the face; and Officer Hardin's observation of injuries to the woman's face and arm. The court did not consider the nature of the crime involved—Mugondozi violently assaulted his pregnant girlfriend and prevented her from leaving. The court did not consider that it had released Mugondozi on his own recognizance the Monday after his Friday arrest, resulting in minimal pretrial incarceration. And Mugondozi did not argue, and the Municipal Court did not find, any harassment or unusual trial burden to Mugondozi. The court instead

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treated his uncertain removal and permanent family separation as established and relied exclusively on those considerations when it dismissed the charges. ¶23 We faulted the trial court in Schwictenberg for dismissing the case without giving adequate consideration to the interests of society. Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. at 218, 772 P.2d at 857. Here too, the Municipal Court failed to analyze the broader interests of society in focusing narrowly on the wishes of the victim and Mugondozi.

¶24 All defendants experience consequences from criminal conviction. In some cases, a collateral consequence may include leaving a family without support. The Municipal Court's reliance on unknown potential collateral consequences to Mugondozi and his family, when the defendant's rights had been protected and without considering the interests of society, failed to give proper consideration to factors we have articulated in determining whether a case should be dismissed in furtherance of justice. Courts have discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances at sentencing. Section 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA. Such considerations may include potential collateral consequences like the risk of deportation present in this case. The Municipal Court could consider such consequences at sentencing. But it abused its discretion when it dismissed the case based only on the unknown risk of such a collateral consequence and Mugondozi's personal circumstances.

¶25 The District Court concluded that

the Municipal Court's reasoning cannot carry the day against the strong baseline that the societal interest is best represented by enforcement of the laws as enacted, especially in light of the City's decision to prosecute after it considered both the risk of deportation and Doe's wishes, and in light of the fact that Mr. Mugondozi's constitutional rights were upheld.

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We agree. On the record in this case, we conclude that the Municipal Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case.

CONCLUSION

¶26 We affirm the District Court's decision reversing the Municipal Court's order dismissing the case.

/S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON

/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ JIM RICE