PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
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Sharon M. James, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis ("IFP"), appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's ("the District Court's") order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Because we agree that James' claims lack a plausible legal basis and are barred by immunity, we will affirm. James filed an IFP complaint, alleging constitutional and civil rights claims against several judges of this Court and one judge in the District Court ("the Judicial Defendants"), the United States, and the District Court Clerk of Court, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. These claims stem from James' belief that her prior employment discrimination litigation, spanning multiple cases and several years, was corrupted by a "fraud upon the court" and a conspiracy among the judiciary.1ECF No. 1 at 10. After the Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and that James' claims were largely an attempt to relitigate matters already adjudicated and based on an implausible predicate.2James appeals.
2
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the dismissal. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, see Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013), James' allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3
James sought relief from prior judgments by alleging that the Judicial Defendants committed "fraud upon the court." ECF No. 1 at 10. To the extent that she presented an independent action alleging fraud on the court, she faced a "demanding standard . . . requiring: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) that in fact deceives the court." Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005). James' allegations do not meet this threshold. Among other things, some of her allegations related to the purported fraud are too conclusory to state a claim and, as the District Court explained, all arise from an implausible claim that her lack of success in earlier litigation is the result of a far-reaching years-long conspiracy among judges of two courts and other government officials.4See Bell Atl.
3
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that a complaint must include
"more than labels and conclusions"). James is not eligible for injunctive or declaratory relief that she seeks against the Judicial Defendants. Although "absolute judicial immunity extends only to claims for damages," Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998), "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. James has not asserted facts to show that either of these exceptions applies. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that injunctive relief is available in this context only if a declaratory decree was violated, or if declaratory relief is unavailable). A judicial act or omission is still taken in a judicial capacity even "was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). James has not alleged any facts suggesting the Judicial Defendants acted outside this broad scope.5 Similarly, James' claims against the District Court Clerk were properly dismissed because he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for the acts that James
4
described, including mailing letters, providing copies of filings, and managing case transfers. Court personnel, such as clerks, enjoy quasi-judicial immunity when performing tasks like these that are an integral part of the judicial process. See Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011). James further contends that Judge Maryellen Noreika, who presided over this matter in the District Court, was required to recuse herself under to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) due to a "professional relationship" with Chief Judge Colm F. Connolly. C.A. Doc 12 at
24. Specifically, James argues that Judge Connolly acted as Judge Noreika's "direct supervisor," creating an inherent conflict. Id. Therefore, James claims Judge Noreika lacked jurisdiction over the matter, rendering her rulings void. Id. This argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the federal judiciary. A chief judge is first among equals, serving an administrative role, rather than having hierarchical or supervisory authority over judicial decisions of colleagues. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 136, 137 (defining a chief judge's role as administrative, rather than granting any power to review or overrule fellow district court judges). Consequently, this relationship did not require her recusal, and James does not appear to raise, and we do not discern, any other basis for recusal. See, e.g., Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC,
793 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that adverse rulings are insufficient evidence of judicial bias).
5
Insofar as James has raised any claims against the United States,6they are barred by sovereign immunity, as the United States has not consented to be sued for these judicial activities. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7James' requests in her "objection to participation of disqualified appellate judges" are denied as moot without prejudice to James' renewing her requests if she seeks rehearing. C.A. Doc No.
18. We also deny each of James' remaining pending motions and requests.8
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