ORDERED to make a monthly payment of $1,546.29 into an account established by the Circuit Clerk of Shelby County, Alabama beginning on February 5, 2025 and continuing thereafter on the fifteenth day of each month until BONY is in full and complete possession of the property …. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to establish such account within seven
(7) days of the date of this Order.
"3. Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in its entirety. BONY is GRANTED immediate possession of the Property and the
Court ORDERS that Counterclaim Plaintiffs have forfeited any right of redemption for failing to vacate the Property. BONY may immediately cause the Clerk of the Circuit Court to issue a Writ of Possession for the Property. The Court also GRANTS judgment in Counterclaim Defendants favor and against Counterclaim Plaintiffs on Counterclaim Plaintiffs' remaining Counterclaims for Unjust Enrichment (Count Three), Wrongful Foreclosure (Count Four), Slander of Title (Count Five), Breach of Contract (Count Six), violations of RESPA (Count Twelve), and claim for Declaratory Relief (Count Fifteen)."
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(Capitalization in original.) This appeal followed. Discussion
While we question whether the trial court's January 29, 2025, order was a final judgment because it did not address BONY's claim for mesne profits, we must first determine whether the trial court had subject- matter jurisdiction over this action, even though the parties have not raised this issue on appeal. See Murray v. Porter, 389 So. 3d 349, 350 (Ala. 2023) ("[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, it is the duty of this Court to consider the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu. McElroy v. McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872, 875 (Ala. 2017)."). In this case, BONY filed its original complaint solely against William and Ramona and fictitiously named defendants. However, at the time the original complaint was filed, William and Ramona were both deceased. In A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587, 595 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), the Court of Civil Appeals held, in part, that a father's custody action "was void at its inception because the sole named defendant was a deceased person who lacked the capacity to be sued in a custody action." In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
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"A deceased person lacks the capacity to be sued in an action such as the one initiated by the father, and, therefore, we conclude that the father, in asserting his custody claim in case number DR-10-882, failed to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. See 67A C.J.S. Parties § 54 (2002) ('The capacity to be sued exists only in persons in being and so, does not exist in the case of persons deceased, and a suit filed against a dead person does not invoke the jurisdiction of the court.' (footnotes omitted)). We adopt the explanation of the superior Court of Connecticut, which stated:
" ' "By its very terms, an action at law implies the existence of legal parties; they may be natural or artificial persons, but they must be entities which the law recognizes as competent."
Thompson v. Peck, 320 Pa. 27, 30, 181 A. 597 (1935). Corkin, the person named in the writ as the defendant in this case, was dead at the time of service. No such person existed at that time. The first count of the complaint is thus an action against nobody. Bateman v. Wood, 297 Mass. 483, 485, 9 N.E.2d 375 (1937). "[A] dead person is a nonexistent entity and cannot be a party to a suit. Therefore, proceedings instituted against an individual who is deceased at the time of the filing of suit are a nullity. Such proceedings are void ab initio and do not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court." Volkmar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 149, 151, 60 Ill. Dec. 250,
432 N.E.2d 1149 (1982); accord Richie v. Laususe,
892 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).'
"Noble v. Corkin, 45 Conn. Supp. 330, 332-33, 717 A.2d 301, 302-03 (1998)."
Id. at 594-95.
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Subsequently, in Maclin v. Congo, 106 So. 3d 405 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), the Court of Civil Appeals addressed a similar situation. In Maclin, Ernest Congo, individually and doing business as Congo Towing, and Justin Congo (referred to collectively as "the Congos") filed a complaint against Ronald Lee Brotherton and various fictitiously named defendants on May 26, 2009. A suggestion of death was filed notifying the trial court that Brotherton had died in May 2008. Subsequently, the Congos filed an amended complaint in which they added Progressive Specialty Insurance Company as a defendant and sought damages under the uninsured-motorist provision of an automobile-insurance policy that had been issued to Ernest and that allegedly covered Justin at the time of the accident. At the Congos' request, the trial court appointed T. Mark Maclin as the administrator ad litem for Brotherton's estate and substituted Maclin as a defendant. After a trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the Congos, and the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdicts. Maclin appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.
On appeal, Maclin argued that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction of the claims asserted against him because, he asserted, the
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" 'appointment of an administrator ad litem by a circuit [court] does not create a legal entity which can be sued.' " 106 So. 3d at 408. The Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"We do not reach the merits of Maclin's argument, however, because we conclude that the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over the cause of action. The Congos filed their complaint against Brotherton on May 26, 2009. At that time, Brotherton was deceased. Proceedings instituted against an individual who is deceased at the time the action is filed are a nullity and do not invoke the trial court's jurisdiction. A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587, 595 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). The Congos' action against Brotherton was therefore void ab initio. Id. The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain an amendment of the complaint or any further motions or pleadings; it was required to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ex parte Owens, 65 So. 3d 953, 955-56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). Because the Congos' complaint failed to invoke the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, all subsequent actions by the trial court are void. See A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d at 587 (' "The absence of subject-matter jurisdiction renders void any judgment entered in the action."
Moore v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 876 So. 2d 443, 448 (Ala. 2003).'). See also A.E., 100 So. 3d at 587 (Moore, J., concurring in the result)."
Id.
In this case, William and Ramona, the only named defendants in the original complaint, were both deceased at the time BONY filed that
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complaint.1Therefore, BONY's action was void ab initio. Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any amendments to the complaint, to substitute the estate for Roberta, or to entertain any further motions or pleadings. See Maclin, supra; cf. Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 411 So. 3d 1228 (Ala. 2024) (holding that a complaint naming only a State institution of higher learning that was entitled to absolute immunity was void ab initio, that the trial court did not obtain jurisdiction over the original complaint, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain amendments to the complaint or to allow the plaintiff to later substitute named defendants for fictitiously named defendants in the original complaint). Rather, the trial court had " 'no alternative but to dismiss the action' " for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel.
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Whetstone, 935 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Ala. 2006) (quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999)); see also Maclin, supra. Because "[a] void judgment will not support an appeal,"
we reverse the trial court's order in favor of BONY and SPS and remand this action with instructions that the trial court vacate its order and dismiss the action, without prejudice.2Dalton Drug Co. v. OptumRx, Inc., 424 So. 3d 1254, 1262 (Ala. 2025).
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Stewart, C.J., and Sellers, Cook, and Parker, JJ., concur.