2
press coverage after the unsealing of the indictment in this case. (Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in ECF No. 679).)
LEGAL STANDARD
"It is 'well settled that the public and press have a qualified right of access to judicial documents and records filed in civil and criminal proceedings.'" United States v. Silver, No. 15- CR-93, 2016 WL 1572993, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (quoting Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265 (4th Cir. 2014)). This "presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts, although independent . . . to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice." Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). In deciding whether to permit sealing or redacting of materials, a court: (1) "determines whether the record at issue is a judicial document — a document to which the presumption of public access attaches;" (2) if so, the court "determine[s] the weight of the presumption of access to that document;" and (3) "identif[ies] all of the factors that legitimately counsel against disclosure of the judicial document and balance those factors against the weight properly accorded the presumption of access." Giuffre v. Maxwell, 146 F.4th 165, 175 (2d Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
This is not a case in which third-party news organizations seek access to sealed or redacted filings. See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 112-14; Silver, 2016 WL 1572993, at *2. Rather, the defendants seek to make the contents of their brief public before the Court rules on the motions in limine and before the trial. The government argues that "redacting the names and identifying information of third-party corporate entities" from the defendants' response to the government's motions in limine, "including entities with current and/or former employees that
3
may be witnesses at trial, is warranted to protect their privacy interests" under Amodeo. (ECF No. 675 at 1.) The "presumption of public access in filings submitted in connection with discovery disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than the presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection with dispositive motions," and the court's reasons for sealing these materials "usually need not be as compelling as those required to seal summary judgment filings," like those at issue in Lugosch. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049-50); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121-23 (noting the "weight of the presumption" given to summary judgment materials "is of the highest"). The defendants argue that the government does not meet the "high standard" in Lugosch (ECF No. 679 at 3); they do not address the "somewhat lower" presumption in the motion in limine context described in Brown. Under these circumstances, the lower presumption of access applies to the materials at issue in this case.
The defendants also assert that the government's interests — the privacy of the financial institutions and the protection of potential witnesses in the upcoming criminal trial — are not sufficient to justify redaction because the financial institutions "have repeatedly been identified by name [in news articles] since this case was indicted," and there is therefore "no interest — much less a 'higher value' — served by redacting information that is already public." (ECF No. 679 at 2.) This is not persuasive. The defendants say only that the names of certain financial institutions are public. They do not address the government's other concerns, including that there is information that could identify potential witnesses.
Moreover, the government maintains, and the defendants do not dispute, that the defendants agreed previously "to redact the names of third-party individuals." (ECF No. 675 at 1.) Redacting information that could identify these third parties is consistent with the
4
approach to which the parties agreed (id.), and is consistent with the recent practice in this case (see, e.g., ECF No. 558 at 2, 5-8, 22-23 (denying defendants' Brady motion for materials from prior enforcement actions against alleged victim financial institutions)). The Court has considered the parties' arguments and concludes that at this stage of the proceedings, the "competing considerations" of "privacy interests," preserving the confidentiality of sources, and protecting witnesses warrant redacting the information at this time. Lugosch, 435 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050). This approach is consistent with the only criminal case the defendants cite — Silver — in which Judge Valerie Caproni sealed materials related to a motion in limine before the trial and unsealed them only after the defendant was convicted. See 2016 WL 1572993, at *1. Accordingly, redaction of the names of third-party corporate entities and other identifying information is appropriate. See id. at *3 (noting redaction is "a viable remedy" in some circumstances (quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at
1053)).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the government's motion is granted. The parties are directed to confer about redacting names and other identifying information of third-party corporate entities described in the defendants' response, filed under seal at ECF No. 668, especially to the extent that the information identifies potential witnesses in the upcoming trial. The parties should resolve any other disputes about redactions without involving the Court. If the parties cannot
5
reach agreement on the redactions consistent with this order, they are directed to file their proposed redactions, identifying any areas of dispute, under seal by April 20, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge Dated: Brooklyn, New York April 13, 2026
s/Ann M. Donnelly