IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
INVICTUS GLOBAL MANAGEMENT,
LLC, INVICTUS SPECIAL SITUATIONS
I GP, LLC, CINDY CHEN DELANO, and
AMIT PATEL,
Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v.
INVICTUS SPECIAL SOLUTIONS
MASTER I, L.P.,
Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant Below, Appellee. §
§ No. 283, 2025
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§ Court Below—Court of Chancery § of the State of Delaware §
§ C.A. No. 2023-1099
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Submitted: January 28, 2026 Decided: April 13, 2026 Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery. REVERSED.
Rudolf Koch, Esquire, Robert L. Burns, Esquire, Susan Hannigan Cohen, Esquire, Nicole M. Henry, Esquire, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Lars C. Golumbic, Esquire, GROOM LAW GROUP, Washington, District of Columbia for Defendants-Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Appellants Invictus Global Management, LLC, Invictus Special Situations I GP, LLC, and Amit Patel.
Todd C. Schiltz, Esquire, Oderah C. Nwaeze, Esquire, Renèe M. Dudek, Esquire, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Stephanie L. Gutwein, Esquire (argued), FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana for Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff, Appellant Cindy Chen Delano. Ronald N. Brown, III, Esquire, Aaron S. Applebaum, Esquire (argued), DLA PIPER LLP (US), Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee/Plaintiff Invictus Special Situations Master I,
L.P.
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VALIHURA, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns whether advancement of litigation expenses for the defense of state-law claims brought in state court impermissibly relieves former ERISA fund fiduciaries of responsibility or liability in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").1Defendants served as fiduciaries of an ERISA fund and received certain rights to indemnification and advancement from the fund under its governing documents. In October 2023, Defendants were removed from their positions as ERISA fiduciaries and in October 2023, the fund brought state-law claims in state court alleging that Defendants breached their state-law fiduciary duties in violation of the fund's governing documents.
Defendants brought a counterclaim seeking an advance of defense costs under the fund's governing documents. In response, the fund asserted that advancement from fund assets was barred by ERISA. ERISA section 1110 provides that "any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy."2The Court of Chancery determined that, based on federal case law and United States Department of Labor ("DOL") guidance, section 1110 renders "void any contractual provision that purports to allow an ERISA-regulated plan to indemnify and
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advance funds to an ERISA fiduciary using plan assets."3Thus, the court held that even though the former fund fiduciaries were entitled to advancement under Delaware law, the provisions enabling advancement to the former fund fiduciaries from ERISA assets "were invalid at the time they were entered into."4The court also stated that a bar on advancement is particularly appropriate where Defendants have not shown an ability to repay advanced sums.
On interlocutory appeal, Defendants argue that advancement is not barred by ERISA because (1) the requested advancement for state-law claims, which is subject to recoupment, would not relieve ERISA fiduciary duty or responsibility and (2) advancement is not contingent on a showing of ability to repay under either the fund's governing documents or ERISA. We agree. Therefore, we REVERSE the Court of Chancery's holding that the advancement sought here for state-law claims is barred by ERISA.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY5
A. The Fund and the Fund's Governing Documents Plaintiff-appellee, Invictus Special Situations Master I, L.P. (the "Fund"), is a privately held fund formed to make and hold investments.6ERISA investors invested in the Fund, and the Fund contains ERISA assets. Defendants-appellants are Invictus Global
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Management, LLC ("IGM"), Invictus Special Situations I GP, LLC ("Invictus GP"), Amit Patel, and Cindy Chen Delano (collectively, with IGM, Invictus GP, and Patel,
"Defendants"). Delano and Patel owned and controlled IGM and Invictus GP. IGM served as the Fund's management company via a management agreement (the "Management Agreement"), and Invictus GP served as the Fund's general partner via a partnership agreement (the "Partnership Agreement").
Both the Management Agreement and the Partnership Agreement are Fund governing documents under which Delano and Patel "agreed to manage Fund assets as ERISA plan assets; for IGM to serve as a qualified professional asset manager; and for Invictus GP to be subject to the standard of a fiduciary under Title I of ERISA."7Invictus GP also specifically agreed to conduct its affairs and the affairs of the Fund so that (1) the Fund "will not engage in any non-exempt prohibited transaction with respect to an ERISA
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Partner who is subject to section 406 of ERISA and the rules and regulations thereunder[]"
and (2) the Fund "shall comply with the requirements of section 404(b) of ERISA and the regulations thereunder[]."8
Section 3 of the Partnership Agreement sets forth indemnification and advancement rights. First, section 3.03(b) of the Partnership Agreement states, in relevant part, that the Fund shall
indemnify and hold harmless each Indemnified Person from and against any damages, costs, losses, claims, liabilities, actions, and expenses, including reasonable legal and other professional fees and disbursements and all expenses reasonably incurred investigating, preparing, or defending against any claim whatsoever, judgment, fines, and settlements[], incurred by such Indemnified Person arising out of or relating to this Agreement[.]9 However, the Partnership Agreement permits this indemnification for an Indemnified Person's actions or omissions only where "(a) such Indemnified Person acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the Partnership and (b) such actions or omissions did not constitute Disabling Conduct."10 The Partnership Agreement defines Disabling Conduct broadly to include:
with respect to any Person (other than an Indemnified Person that is a member of the Advisory Committee), (a) any of (1) fraud, gross negligence, willful misconduct, a violation of any civil or criminal law involving fraud, embezzlement, financial misconduct, misappropriation of funds or applicable securities laws, or (2) a material breach of such Person's fiduciary duties to the Partnership or a material breach of this Agreement or the []
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Management Agreement; or (b) any conviction of such Person of a criminal felony[.]11
"Indemnified Person" includes Invictus GP as the Fund's "General Partner" and IGM as the Fund's "Management Company," as well as each entity's "respective employees, officers, directors, and representatives[.]"12
Second, section 3.03(e) of the Partnership Agreement states that the Fund shall advance "[e]xpenses reasonably incurred by a[n] Indemnified Person in defense or settlement of any claim that may be subject to a right of indemnification hereunder" "upon the receipt of a written undertaking by or on behalf of such Indemnified Person to repay such amounts to the extent that it is ultimately determined that such Indemnified Person is not entitled to be indemnified hereunder."13
Section 6 of the Management Agreement provides that Covered Persons shall be entitled to "indemnification, including advancement of expenses, with respect to the Funds on the same terms and conditions applicable to 'Indemnified Persons' (or other equivalent term) in the Fund Agreements."14The Management Agreement defines Covered Persons as IGM and "its Affiliates, officers, directors, agents, stockholders, members, employees
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and partners" and states that Covered Persons "shall be considered 'Indemnified Persons' for all purposes of the Fund Agreements[.]"15
B. The Underlying Litigation
On September 29, 2023, the Fund's controlling limited partners removed Invictus GP and IGM as the Fund's general partner and management company, respectively.16On October 30, 2023, the Fund filed this action for breach of contract in the Court of Chancery seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.17The Complaint alleged that Defendants breached the Partnership Agreement and Management Agreement by withholding information and approximately $10 million in Fund assets after the Fund removed Invictus GP and IGM as its general partner and management company.
Defendants answered the complaint and brought counterclaims alleging that under the Partnership Agreement and Management Agreement, they were entitled to advancement from the Fund for their legal expenses. In response, the Fund asserted that the requested advancement was barred by ERISA. On the eve of trial in early 2024, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the "District Court") citing the ERISA defense. The Fund moved to remand, arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.18Indeed, the Fund argued
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that "[n]one of the claims in the Fund's complaint have any connection to federal law, including ERISA."19Defendants countered that "the Fund's claims were subject to complete federal preemption under ERISA."20The District Court granted the Fund's motion to remand noting that, although ERISA is "subject to exclusive federal court jurisdiction[,]" a "federal defense does not confer subject matter jurisdiction[,]" and Defendants were vague as to which counts they believe were preempted.21 Following remand to the Court of Chancery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery concluded that Defendants "violated the partnership and management agreements by retaining after their removal nearly $10 million and large amounts of information belonging to the Fund."22The court then entered judgment in favor of the Fund on its claims for breach of contract and declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also held that, as a matter of Delaware law, Defendants were entitled to advancement from the Fund, observing that "Delaware policy favors indemnification and advancement[,]" and that "[a]ny doubts should be resolved in favor of advancement[.]"23 Delaware law[;] [t]he claims for injunctive relief are based on Delaware law[;] [and] [t]he Defendants' advancement counterclaims, in turn, are governed by Cayman law or Delaware law, depending on the agreement under which indemnification and advancement are sought." A726 (Fund's Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 2).
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However, it declined to rule on the ERISA-based defense, stating that the parties had not
"satisfactorily articulate[d] why [the Court of Chancery] should or even can address the contours of ERISA."24The court then entered orders implementing its advancement ruling (the "Implementing Orders").25
In November 2024, the Fund filed a new complaint and an emergency motion for injunctive relief in the District Court, relying upon the ERISA defense.26The Fund also successfully moved the Court of Chancery to stay the Implementing Orders pending the District Court's decision on the Fund's emergency application.27In January 2025, the District Court denied the Fund's emergency application.28After the parties agreed to a stipulation of dismissal of the federal action, Defendants moved to enforce the Implementing Orders in the Court of Chancery and the Fund moved for partial summary judgment on its ERISA defense.
In May 2025, the Court of Chancery granted the Fund's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Defendants' motion for enforcement.29The court observed that
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ERISA section 1110 renders void as against public policy "any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part[]."30The court also stated that "Third Circuit case law has interpreted this language and U.S. Department of Labor guidance on it as rendering void any contractual provision that purports to allow an ERISA-regulated plan to indemnify and advance funds to an ERISA fiduciary using plan assets."31 The court determined that, under the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's interpretation in Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Koresko,32the provisions entitling Defendants to advancement from the Fund's ERISA assets "were invalid at the time they were entered into."33The court also stated that a bar on advancement is particularly appropriate where (1) "defendants seek advancement for claims on which defendants have already been adjudicated to have misappropriated Fund assets" and (2) "defendants have not shown any ability to repay advanced sums[.]"34 On June 30, 2025, the Court of Chancery certified Defendants' interlocutory appeal framing the issue as:
Whether, in a state court action involving what are asserted to be state law claims, an affirmative defense asserted by an ERISA-regulated fund under ERISA § 1110 bars state law counterclaims asserted by the fund's ERISA
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fiduciaries under the fund's governing documents for advancement of their legal expenses out of the fund's assets.35
This Court accepted Defendants' application for interlocutory review on August 13, 2025.36
II. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Defendants raise two arguments supporting their contention that the Court of Chancery erred in holding that ERISA section 1110 bars advancement for their state-law claims.37First, the advancement sought cannot relieve Defendants of any ERISA responsibility or liability because only state-law claims are at issue and any advancement is subject to an undertaking to repay. Second, ERISA section 1110(a) does not bar all advancement from ERISA plan assets.
In response, the Fund argues that the Court of Chancery correctly applied unambiguous Third Circuit case law holding that section 1110 of ERISA renders void any provision of a contract purporting to relieve a fiduciary from fiduciary responsibility, duty or liability.38The Fund disagrees that "decades of case law" permit advancement from ERISA plan assets and that "[a]t most, some cases permit 'indemnification' only after a fiduciary has been absolved of wrongdoing."39The Fund argues that (1) "Defendants try
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to redirect the inquiry to the specific claims and relief sought in litigation, but it is the fiduciary's conduct, not the claim asserted in litigation, that is determinative[]" and (2)
"[a]dvancement and indemnification provisions are commonly subject to repayment, including those that have been found to be void under section 410 of ERISA."40 Alternatively, the Fund argues that advancement is barred (1) based on Defendants' already proven misconduct and inability to repay advanced funds and (2) by ERISA section 1106 as an impermissible extension of credit from the Fund. The Fund asserts that "federal case law and Department of Labor guidance require evidence of ability to repay[]" and that the Court of Chancery correctly found that "Defendants offered no evidence of ability to repay, which Defendants do not challenge on appeal."41
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"This Court reviews de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment."42"We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, because they include questions of law."43
IV. ANALYSIS
Because the Court of Chancery has determined that Defendants are entitled to advancement as a matter of Delaware law, the sole issue here is whether advancement of litigation expenses related to state-law claims is otherwise barred by ERISA. Section
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1110(a) of ERISA renders void, as a matter of public policy, contract provisions that purport to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for a violation of ERISA fiduciary duties.44Defendants argue that the requested advancement is not barred by ERISA here because this advancement, which is conditioned on an undertaking and which is sought for expenses incurred for the defense of state-law claims in state court, does not relieve Defendants from ERISA responsibility or liability. We agree and hold that the requested advancement does not violate section 1110. Accordingly, we REVERSE the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the advancement sought here is barred by ERISA. A. Section 1110(A) Bars Provisions That Purport to Relieve A Fiduciary From Responsibility Or Liability
"In ERISA cases, '[a]s in any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute[.]'"45ERISA establishes "standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans[.]"46Specifically, section 1104 provides that "[a]n ERISA fiduciary must discharge his responsibility 'with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence' that a prudent person 'acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters' would use."47And section 1106 "supplements the fiduciary's
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general duty of loyalty to the plan's beneficiaries [] by categorically barring certain transactions deemed 'likely to injure the pension plan.'"48ERISA section 1110(a) states that "any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy."49"Thus, '[i]f an ERISA fiduciary writes words in an instrument exonerating itself of fiduciary responsibility, the words, even if agreed upon, are generally without effect.'"50
The DOL has issued guidance regarding the DOL's interpretation of section 1110
"insofar as that section relates to indemnification of fiduciaries."51The DOL interprets section 1110 "to permit indemnification agreements which do not relieve a fiduciary of responsibility or liability under part 4 of title I."52For example, indemnification provisions
"which leave the fiduciary fully responsible and liable, but merely permit another party to satisfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary in the same manner as insurance purchased under section 410(b)(3), are [] not void[]."53However, the DOL has also interpreted this section to
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render[] void any arrangement for indemnification of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan by the plan. Such an arrangement would have the same result as an exculpatory clause, in that it would, in effect, relieve the fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the plan by abrogating the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations.54
1. Indemnification and Advancement Are Distinct The Fund argues that both indemnification and advancement have the exculpatory effect of "abrogating the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations."55Yet the Fund has not shown how the requested advancement
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would abrogate the Fund's right to recovery from Defendants for ERISA breaches where that advancement is sought for expenses incurred in defending state-law claims and requires an undertaking to repay the advanced funds if liability is found.
"While the rights to indemnification and advancement are correlative, they are still discrete and independent rights, with the latter having a much narrower scope."56
"Advancement provides corporate officials with immediate interim relief from the personal out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings."57But "the ultimate right to keep payments characterized as an 'advancement' depends upon whether the former corporate millions of dollars of defense costs to fight the very Fund, to fight against the interests of plan participants that they promised to protect shifts from the Defendants onto the plan participants.
Id. at 25:27-26:29.
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official is entitled to indemnification."58"If it is subsequently determined that a corporate official is not entitled to indemnification, he or she will have to repay the funds advanced."59Because "[t]he corporation maintains the right to be repaid all sums advanced, if the individual is ultimately shown not to be entitled to indemnification[,]" the corporate official remains liable for non-indemnifiable claims even after receiving an advance of funds.60Thus, "the decision to extend advancement rights should ultimately give rise to no net liability on the corporation's part[,]" because "the advancement decision is essentially simply a decision to advance credit."61
B. The Requested Advancement Does Not Violate Section 1110
The requested advancement does not relieve ERISA fiduciary responsibility or liability by abrogating the Fund's right to recover from Defendants for ERISA breaches because the requested advancement is expressly contingent on a written undertaking. The
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agreements provide that the Fund shall advance funds only "upon the receipt of a written undertaking by or on behalf of such Indemnified Person to repay such amounts to the extent that it is ultimately determined that such Indemnified Person is not entitled to be indemnified hereunder."62And the agreements preclude indemnification for actions and omissions that constitute Disabling Conduct.63
Disabling Conduct is defined broadly in the Partnership Agreement to include "a material breach of such Person's fiduciary duties to the Partnership or a material breach of this Agreement or the [] Management Agreement[.]"64These agreements require Invictus GP and IGM to conduct their affairs in compliance with "the standard of care of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan under ERISA" including with respect to both sections 1104 and 1106.65Therefore, any breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA, including breaches of the prudent person standard and per se violations, would constitute non-indemnifiable Disabling Conduct. Thus, the Fund retains the right to recover from Defendants for any ERISA fiduciary duty breaches.
Further, this advancement does not implicate ERISA fiduciary responsibility or liability because it is sought for expenses incurred in defending state-law fiduciary duty claims in state court. In the words of Section 1110, it does not "relieve a fiduciary from
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responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part[]."66 Accordingly, the requested advancement does not impermissibly relieve ERISA responsibility or liability in violation of section 1110.
The parties have not cited any decision of any court that has applied the relevant provisions of ERISA to bar advancement for expenses incurred in defending claims arising under state law.67The Fund, relying on Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Koresko, asserts that courts "interpret section 410 to mean that ERISA prohibits advancement from plan assets."68Yet various federal court opinions suggest that advancement is permissible under section 1110 even when it is sought for expenses incurred in defending ERISA claims.69And the DOL has issued an advisory opinion stating
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that certain indemnification provisions - which provided for advancement from an ERISA fund - were not rendered void by section 1110.70Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not create a new rule in Koresko that section 1110 categorically bars advancement from ERISA funds even where advancement is contingent on an undertaking requirement and is sought for state-law claims in state court. In Koresko, the Third Circuit, in a non-precedential decision, determined that advancement was barred in that case because the court "agree[d] with the District Court that th[e] indemnification provision, or Koresko's reliance on th[e] provision to seek plan assets for advancement costs, [wa]s in violation of ERISA."71Koresko involved a benefit arrangement facilitated through a multiple employer trust where "[e]mployer contributions [were] received into the REAL VEBA Trust to be held for the benefit of all employees covered in the arrangement."72The Secretary of Labor brought an "enforcement action against Koresko and related entities for breach of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974[]."73No state-law claims were at issue. id. at *11 n.5 (observing further that "absent any finding of breach of fiduciary duty, the current reimbursement of expenses is not prohibited by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a) and 1110(a)[]").
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Koresko controlled the entity that served as trustee of the REAL VEBA Trust and sought advancement under trust documents that provided "indemnification for legal fees and expenses, 'in advance, unless it is alleged and until it is conclusively determined that such Claims arise from the Trustee's own negligence or willful breach of its obligations specifically undertaken pursuant to'" the Master Trust Agreement.74Although the Koresko court did not address whether an undertaking was required either by the agreements or by statute, we note that the relevant agreements do not appear to explicitly condition advancement on an undertaking and there is no suggestion in the opinion that an undertaking was otherwise required.75
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The Koresko court's analysis focused on whether "the District Court order denying Koresko from relying on plan assets to cover his litigation costs [w]as a proper interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 1110 and 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4."76It first distinguished indemnification provisions that provide for indemnification from ERISA fund assets from provisions that provide for indemnification from a third party, stating that "[t]he [DOL] allows a trustee to seek indemnification from another party, as long as the indemnification does not come from the plan itself."77It then declined to follow Harris v. GreatBanc Trust Co., because "[u]nlike in Harris, in this case, Koresko was seeking advancement costs from the plans themselves, not another party."78The Koresko court stated that advancement from the funds themselves "would effectively 'abrogate[] the plan's right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations.'"79Thus, it determined Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of L. Addressing Appointment of Penn Public Tr. as Co-Tr.). The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Single Employer Welfare Benefit Plan Trust "is essentially identical to the REAL VEBA Trust[]" and that the operative documents of these trusts are also essentially identical. Koresko, 646 F. App'x at 233 n.3.
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that "[a]lthough Koresko could have relied on liability insurance or indemnification through another party, he could not rely on plan assets to front his legal costs."80 Koresko is distinguishable and does not control the outcome here. The claims for which Defendants seek advancement are not ERISA claims, as the Fund has repeatedly acknowledged.81Further, the advancement sought here would not abrogate the Fund's right to recover from Defendants for ERISA breaches because this advancement is expressly contingent on an undertaking. That does not appear to have been the case in
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Koresko. And even though the Koresko court's analysis did not consider the impact of an undertaking, its conclusion that advancement under the relevant provision would effectively abrogate the plan's right to recovery seems to rely on an assumption that advancement would be provided without any expectation of repayment even if liability was found.82Advancement that is expressly contingent on an undertaking does not have the same impermissible effect.
Accordingly, we conclude that the advancement requested here is not barred by section 1110. This result reflects the distinction between the separate rights of advancement and indemnification.83Further, it balances the policy in Delaware favoring advancement rights under our well-established state law against the important federal interest in protecting ERISA plan assets.84
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The Fund argues alternatively that section 1110 bars advancement because the
"Court of Chancery's prior rulings and Defendants' admissions satisfy the standard for prohibiting advancement under Johnson v. Couturier.85The Fund contends that under Johnson, "advancement may be enjoined under section 410 if (i) there is a likelihood that a fiduciary duty was breached or (ii) the ERISA fiduciary is unable to demonstrate an ability to repay."86
FUND: Yes, your Honor. Delaware -- well, at least, Delaware policy. Delaware policy favors advancement and puts the issues of fiduciaries ahead of a corporate company that has agreed to provide advancement.
Id. Although the Court of Chancery observed that the Management Agreement is governed by Delaware law and that the Partnership Agreement is governed by Cayman law, the court applied Delaware law to both agreements, in part, because "no party cite[d] a specific Cayman statute or court opinion to explain what Cayman advancement law entails or perhaps, more importantly, how it differs from Delaware law." A952 (Sep. 9, 2024 Telephonic Ruling) (noting that "the parties cite[d] extensively to and argue[d] Delaware law in support of their motions[]"). The Fund has not appealed the Court of Chancery's application of Delaware law. See A2210 (Order Granting Interlocutory Appeal 8) (granting "[t]he motion to strike the notice of cross-appeal" and noting that "[t]o the extent that the Fund seeks to raise an issue—contractual entitlement to advancement—that was decided more than six months before this appeal was filed, the cross- appeal is procedurally improper."). Nor has it cited any authority showing a difference between Cayman law and Delaware law regarding advancement policy.
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However, in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit considered advancement of defense costs in the context of a preliminary injunction.87There, the litigation expenses were incurred defending against ERISA fiduciary duty claims. The Johnson court had to analyze the likelihood of success on the merits and whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm. Here, we are not considering the advancement issue through the lens of a preliminary injunction. Nor are we considering claims brought under federal ERISA law. Further, the Ninth Circuit's decision also relied on a determination that the indemnification provisions in Johnson were likely void under section 1110 because they
"clearly 'purport[] to relieve' Defendants from their fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA."88The indemnification provisions "provide[d] complete indemnity so long as the challenged acts or omissions d[id] not involve deliberate wrongful acts or gross repay.'" (quoting Blankenship v. Alpha Appalachia Hldgs., Inc., 2015 WL 3408255, at *26 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2015))); Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 213 (noting that the right to advancement depends on the "uniquely crafted advancement provisions[]"); Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 WL 1358761, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002) ("If it chose, EDS could have conditioned former employees' advancement rights on an undertaking, proof of an ability to repay, or even the posting of a secured bond."), aff'd, 820 A.2d 371 (Del. 2003) (mem.). The relevant agreements do not require a showing of ability to repay because these provisions conditioned advancement only on an undertaking requirement. See Reddy, 2002 WL 1358761, at *4 ("Having been accorded the freedom to craft its bylaws as it wished, EDS cannot point to its own drafting failures as a defense to Reddy's advancement claim[.]"). And that requirement was met here. See A954 at 11:23-24 (confirming Delano's undertaking); A696 ¶ 54 (acknowledging receipt of undertakings). Further, the Court of Chancery has already determined that Defendants are entitled to advancement as a matter of Delaware law. A979-80 (Chancery Court Bench Ruling on Advancement at 36). As to the Court of Chancery's statement that Defendants have misappropriated Fund assets and have not shown any ability to repay advanced sums, there has been no ultimate and final determination on the merits.
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negligence."89The Ninth Circuit determined that the indemnification agreements
"effectively limit Defendants' liability under ERISA because, so long as they do not engage in deliberate wrongful acts or gross negligence, Defendants will be indemnified—even if they violated the ERISA 'prudent man' standard of care."90
The Johnson court also found it significant that the signed undertakings - under which each Defendant agreed to repay advanced defense costs - did not "provide the ESOP with any recourse should Defendants be found to have violated only their fiduciary duties under ERISA."91Therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined that advancement was
"tantamount to asking ESOP participants to pay for Defendants' defense costs, with no recovery possible or at least highly unlikely—even if Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the ESOP—so long as Defendants did not engage in deliberate wrongful acts or gross negligence."92Thus, advancement under those provisions, would effectively abrogate the ESOP's right to recovery for ERISA breaches. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that Plaintiffs demonstrated that "section 410(a) likely renders void the
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indemnification agreements and advancement provisions therein."93The Fund has not shown that the indemnification provisions at issue here are similarly impermissible.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the Court of Chancery's holding that ERISA bars advancement. The matter is remanded to the Court of Chancery.