Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

TASBY v. THE STATE

THIRD DIVISION

DOYLE, P. J.,

MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk's office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 29, 2025

NOT TO BE OFFICIALLY

REPORTED

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0067. TASBY v. THE STATE. PADGETT, Judge.

After a jury trial, Marcus Dynell Tasby was convicted of aggravated child molestation.1Tasby appeals following the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court

1 The jury found Tasby guilty of aggravated child molestation, OCGA § 1 6-6-4 (c) and aggravated sodomy, OCGA § 16-6-2. At sentencing, the trial court merged the aggravated sodomy conviction into the aggravated child molestation conviction. The State was represented by competent counsel, did not bring any possible merger error to our attention by a cross-appeal, and sets forth in its brief that it is not asking this Court to review or remand this case on any potential sentencing merger issues. So, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct any erroneous merger issues. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).

1

erred in granting the State's reverse Batson2challenge; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. Facts and procedural history Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,3the record shows that in February 2018, M. C., who was a minor, lived in a trailer with her father (the

"Father") and her siblings. Several other people lived with them, including Lacie Lightening, Christian Nichols, and Nichols's two children. Tasby lived in a nearby trailer. On the night of February 17, the Father hosted a smaller gathering at his trailer. The Father invited Tasby to join, and Tasby and his wife attended the event. Tasby had brought a gun and let some of the children there play with it, but someone at the

2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712 , 90 LE2 d 69) (1986). Criminal defendants, as well as the State, are subject to the restrictions placed upon jury selection in Batson. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 59 (IV) (112 SCt 2348, 120 LE2d 33) (1992). Thus, "[t]he equal protection clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230, 230 (486 SE2d 48) (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Dunn v. State, 304 Ga. 647, 647 n. 2 (821 SE2d 354) (2018) (In McCollum, the test announced in Batson was extended to peremptory juror challenges made by criminal defendants. It is sometimes called a "reverse Batson" challenge.).

3 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 3 07, 3 19 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2

party made Tasby put it away. Tasby and his wife eventually left the trailer when the gathering was shutting down for the night. At some point, Nichols left to get food. M. C. fell asleep in her bedroom alone, and the other kids in the trailer slept in the living room. The Father straightened up the home and then went into his room to shower. The Father later checked on the children in the living room and on M. C. in her room. The Father opened M. C.'s door, which was not shut when he went to shower, and turned on the light. The Father saw that M. C. was standing on the bed, against the wall, with her pants down, while Tasby was at the foot of the bed "going at her, facing her." The Father saw "fear in [M. C.'s] face." The Father then charged at Tasby, hit him in the face, and knocked Tasby to the ground. The Father saw Tasby's gun, so he tried to take it from him. The Father and Tasby fought over the gun, which then fired. The Father realized he no longer had control of the gun, so he grabbed M. C. and fled the house with her and his other children. The Father started walking to a gas station to call police.

Lightening had been sleeping, but she woke up to use the bathroom and heard the commotion. She walked into M. C.'s bedroom and saw the Father and Tasby fighting over the gun. Lightening grabbed Nichols's son, M. N., took him into her

3

bedroom, and called Nichols and told her to return. Nichols saw the Father and M. C. walking, and they entered Nichols's car and headed back to the trailer to pick up Lightening and M. N. Then they all drove to a gas station and called law enforcement. They eventually spoke with a sheriff's deputy about what had happened. Later, officers executed a search warrant for Tasby's residence and recovered two firearms from his bedroom.

At trial, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner ("SANE") testified that M. C. told her that Tasby put a gun to her head and told her to pull her pants down. The SANE testified that the Father told her that Tasby had licked M. C.'s external genitals. The SANE swabbed M. C.'s external genitalia, and the DNA from the swab matched Tasby's DNA obtained from a swab of his mouth. Tasby was charged with aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, two counts of aggravated assault, and first degree burglary. After a trial, a jury found Tasby guilty of aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy and not guilty of the other charges. Following the denial of Tasby's motion for new trial, he appeals.

4

2. This appeal a. Tasby first argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated child molestation. In particular, Tasby contends that there was no direct evidence that Tasby's mouth contacted M. C.'s sex organs and that the Father acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not see Tasby touch M. C. Tasby contends that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the DNA on M. C.'s genitalia was from Nichols's five year-old son, M. N. We disagree.

Tasby was indicted for aggravated child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) for "comitt[ing] an indecent act to [M .C.], a child under the age of 16 years, involving the mouth of the accused and the sexual organs of said child, with the intent to satisfy the sexual desires of himself by performing oral sex on said child, said act involving an act of sodomy[.]" At trial, the Father testified that he saw Tasby "going at" M. C., with M. C.'s pants down, while she was standing on the bed, and Tasby was standing at the foot of the bed. Additionally, evidence was introduced that a genital swab was conducted on M. C. and that the DNA on the swab matched Tasby's DNA. This evidence was sufficient to sustain Tasby's conviction for aggravated child molestation,

5

and the jury was able to decide whether Tasby committed this crime. See Robins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 70, 72 (1) (679 SE2d 92) (2009) (in-court identification and DNA evidence sufficient to prove identity of perpetrator); Winkfield v. State, 275 Ga. App. 456, 458 (1) (620 SE2d 670) (2005) (circumstantial evidence coupled with DNA evidence sufficient to prove identity of perpetrator). As such, this enumeration of error is unavailing. See Weyer v. State, 333 Ga. App. 706, 712 (1) (b) (776 SE2d 304) (2015) (jurors are "entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence based on their own common-sense understanding of the world" when considering circumstantial evidence).

b. Tasby next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that his trial counsel purposefully discriminated against white jurors and then in re-seating three white jurors.4We disagree.

It is unconstitutional for a prosecutor or defense counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror because of the juror's race or gender. Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 134, 135 (1) (598 SE2d 466) (2004). In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 89-98 (III) (106 SCt 1712, 90 LE2d

4 The trial court also re-seated a fourth white juror, but Tasby does not assert any error on appeal with respect to the re-seating of that juror. Thus, Tasby has abandoned any claim of error with regard to this juror. Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1).

6

69) (1986), the United States Supreme Court set out a framework for evaluating whether a prosecutor's peremptory strikes were racially discriminatory, and that framework has been extended to strikes that discriminate as to gender and to strikes made by defense counsel. See J. E. B. v. Alabama, 511 U. S. 127, 145-146 (114 SCt 1419, 128 LE2d 89) (1994). Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 59 (112 SCt 2348, 120 LE2d

33) (1992).

Johnson v. State, 363 Ga. App. 809, 810 (1) (872 SE2d 787) (2022) (punctuation omitted).

A Batson challenge involves three steps:

(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent's discriminatory intent.

Thomas v. State, 309 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (847 SE2d 147) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). We review the trial court's decision on this issue for an abuse of discretion. See Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 887, 889 (2) (734 SE2d 41) (2012).

7

i. Step one During jury selection, the State objected that Tasby used all nine of his peremptory strikes "against whites only" and asserted that it was a prima facie

"reverse Batson" case. The trial court heard argument on the issue and found that there was a prima facie showing of discrimination since eight of the stricken jurors were white, a ninth was Hispanic, and none were African Americans. Because the trial court directed Tasby to explain its strikes and ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary question of whether the State had established a prima facie case of discrimination is moot. Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 200 (1) (739 SE2d 682) (2013); see also Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. 774, 779

(3) (b) (809 SE2d 769) (2018); Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 52 (2) (a), n.2 (743 SE2d

333) (2012). We therefore turn to Batson's second step and examine Tasby's reasons for striking the white jurors.

ii. Step two

"At step two, the proponent of the strike need only articulate a facially race-neutral reason for the strike. Step two does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Thomas, 309 Ga. at 490 (2) (citation and punctuation

8

omitted). The trial court thus required Tasby to provide the reasons for his peremptory strikes. Tasby gave the following explanations for exercising his peremptory strikes.

Tasby's race-neutral explanation for striking Juror 31, a white male, was that he

"came off upper class, upper middle class . . . We had [a] no for conservative. We thought Republican, because of the nature of the job and the nature of the job that his wife had." In response, the State argued, "when you hear conservative Republican, that's saying, white. That would be like the State saying they struck someone because they're a Democrat and they're black."

Tasby's race neutral explanation for striking Juror 78, a white male, was that he

"[h]ad very long facial hair, big huge beard, long hair," and that "he may very well lock in with our client's father who also lives in a trailer park, as well as the victim, the alleged victim, in the case." The State responded that other jurors had beards whom Tasby did not strike, including a black male juror. Tasby's race neutral explanation for striking Juror 108, a white male, was that he, like Juror 31, worked at Robins Air Force Base, and "the social status reason[.]"

9

iii. Step three

"At the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of the strike opponent's prima facie showing and the explanations given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity." Thomas, 309 Ga. at 491

(2) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court determined that the explanation for striking Juror 31 was "an implausible justification and a pretext for purposeful discrimination by saying that someone works at Robins Air Force Base and, therefore, they must be conservative Republican. To me, it's the same thing as saying they're white." The trial court then found that it was an improper racially- discriminatory purpose for striking Juror 31. The trial court likewise determined that the explanation for striking Juror 108 was the same as the one for striking Juror 31 and was also a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Finally, the trial court determined that the explanation for the strike of Juror 78 that "because he had long hair, he must live in a trailer park," was "a very stereotypical pretext for purposeful discrimination," especially when he was not the only potential juror a with beard.

10

Where an explanation for the exercise of a peremptory strike is given, "the trial court must ultimately decide the credibility of such explanation, and because the third step of the . . . procedure mandates that the trial court act as the trier of fact, the trial court's findings are to be given great deference and are to be affirmed unless clearly erroneous." Dunn v. State, 304 Ga. 647, 652 (2) (821 SE2d 354) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Viewed in this light, the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting defense counsel's explanations for the strikes as pretextual. Tasby sought to strike Juror 78 in part because of his long hair and beard, but did not oppose the seating of other jurors with a beard. During step three of a Batson challenge, the opponent of the strike may carry its burden of persuasion by showing that similarly-situated members of another race were seated on the jury. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that striking Juror 78 for his appearance was a pretext for race. See Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 331 (2) (657 SE2d 263) (2008).

Similarly, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that the strikes against Juror 31 and Juror 108 were proxies for race. See Congdon v. State, 262 Ga. 683, 685 (424 SE2d 630) (1993) ("Mere place of residence, or any other factor closely

11

related to race, should not be regarded as a legitimate basis for exercising peremptory challenges without some corroboration on voir dire that the challenged venirepersons actually entertain the bias underlying the use of that factor."). c. Tasby next contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to examine M. C.'s mother, by failing to cross-examine a forensic DNA analyst, and by failing to object to the SANE's hearsay testimony.

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Tasby must prove both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. See Jones v. State, 300 Ga. 543, 544 (2) (796 SE2d 659) (2017). With regard to the first prong, Tasby "must show that the lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms." Id. The second prong requires a showing that, but for counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability the result at trial would have been different. See id.

In evaluating whether trial counsel's performance was deficient, our inquiry is focused on the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. When evaluating counsel's reasonableness, we consider the attendant circumstances of the challenged conduct and judge from counsel's perspective at the time

12

with every effort made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. The law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden, an appellant must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.

Feder v. State, 319 Ga. 66, 70 (3) (901 SE2d 561) (2024) (citations and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]rial tactics and strategy, no matter how mistaken in hindsight, are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them." Entwisle v. State, 340 Ga. App. 122, 128 (1) (a) (796 SE2d 743) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(i) Failure to examine M. C.'s mother as a witness Tasby argues that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to call M. C.'s mother as a witness, whom Tasby claims had exculpatory information, and that such failure was presumptively prejudicial due to M. C.'s mother having accused Tasby's trial counsel of sexual misconduct when he interviewed her at the Peach County Jail the day before trial began, thereby creating a conflict between his counsel's interests and his own. However, Tasby's trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing

13

that he decided not to call M. C.'s mother as a witness because "[i]t seems that she was wishy-washy about what she could recall and what she couldn't recall. That being the case, I'm not so sure I wanted to call her as a direct witness, because we were limited as to how we could handle questions of a direct witness. . . . I didn't see her as being a favorable witness, that we could depend on for our side." Thus, we cannot say counsel's strategic decision not to call this witness was "so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made [it] under similar circumstances." Jackson v. State, 318 Ga. 393, 410 (4) (c) (897 SE2d 785) (2024); see Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 72 (3) (663 SE2d 206) (2008) ("In the realm of specific decisions regarding trial strategy, and in particular decisions about which witnesses should be called to testify, defense attorneys are afforded wide discretion.").

(ii) Failure to cross-examine the forensic DNA analyst Tasby next argues that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to cross-examine Jordan Schmitz, who was the GBI's forensic DNA analyst and who matched the DNA on M. C.'s genitalia to Tasby. Specifically, Tasby contends that his trial counsel should have asked questions regarding the absence of serological analysis, alternate causalities to the presence of male DNA on the genital area swab, or counsel's

14

misapprehension that the haplotype profile created exclusively matched Tasby and his male relatives. Tasby contends that, had counsel engaged in informed adversarial cross-examination on these issues, it would have placed complex DNA evidence into context, which would have strengthened Tasby's defense theory that the contributor of the genetic material was Nichols's five-year-old son, M. N. However, Tasby's trial counsel questioned the DNA analyst about the possibility that the DNA could match someone other than Tasby, asking "The results. Is it 1 out of 220 and -- 1 out of 224, and 1 out of 2,488, and any paternal male relatives, and all that? That's more than just Mr. Tasby, right, that fit that profile using the loci?" Schmitz answered "It could be

. . ." So, trial counsel elicited testimony from Schmitz that the DNA could have matched someone else, and, thus, Tasby's counsel was not deficient in failing to cross- examine Schmitz on the DNA evidence.

(iii) Failure to object to Sheri Leslein's hearsay testimony Tasby next alleges that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the SANE's hearsay testimony. Specifically, Tasby contends that his trial counsel should have objected to the SANE's testimony that the Father told her that Tasby licked M. C. But this was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the

15

matter asserted. Rather, it was offered because the SANE testified that she performed the DNA test on M. C.'s genitalia due to the Father's statement. Sarmiento-Naranjo

v. State, 365 Ga. App. 34, 36 (2) (877 SE2d 284) (2022). Thus, Tasby's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to this statement. See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 763 (3) (814 SE2d 396) (2018) ("Failure to make a meritless objection cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance.").

d. Cumulative error

Finally, Tasby requests that we consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, resulting from any actual or assumed trial court errors and deficiencies in trial counsel's performance. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020); Mitchell v. State, 308 Ga. 1, 9 (2) (f) (838 SE2d 820) (2020). "To establish cumulative error, [Tasby] must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied [Tasby] a fundamentally fair trial."

Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 107 (4) (891 SE2d 866) (2023). However, as Tasby has not established multiple instances of deficiency, we need not assess cumulative prejudice. See Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 771 (3) (d) (848 SE2d 448 (2020)

16

("Assessing cumulative prejudice is necessary only when multiple errors have been shown.").

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.

17

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

TASBY v. THE STATE
(Jan 5, 2026)