Per NIH's own public statement on Twitter,12the Supplemental Guidance's displacement of negotiated rates would lead to $4 billion in annual savings. That is, NIH's imposition of a 15% indirect cost reimbursement rate would lead it to withhold $4 billion that it would have paid out pursuant to the negotiated rates. We have every reason to presume that if, in fact, $4 billion represented the same proportion of NIH's appropriated budget as did its approved deviations in the third quarter of 2017, NIH would have provided us with financial information to demonstrate that equivalence. But NIH has put forth nothing in the record that would allow us to conclude that the Supplemental Guidance's "fiscal effect" is "proportional" to the "fiscal effect" of the deviations allowed in the third quarter of 2017.13 Id.
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Instead, NIH argues only that the "fiscal effect" of the 15% indirect cost reimbursement rate on the agency's overall medical-research spending would be negligible because the $4 billion in savings would be reallocated to reimburse direct costs. That representation is inconsistent with NIH's public statement, which touted $4 billion in savings, not in increased spending on direct costs. But even if we ignored that inconsistency, our conclusion would be the same for the reason we have already explained -- namely, there is no basis for determining that $4 billion represents the same proportion of NIH's appropriated budget as did its approved deviations in the third quarter of 2017.
***
In summary, Congress went to great lengths to ensure that NIH could not displace negotiated indirect cost reimbursement rates with a uniform rate. As a result, the appropriations rider provides three independent grounds for invalidating NIH's Supplemental Guidance. First, the rider's requirement that NIH follow the regulations governing deviations from negotiated rates as they existed in the third quarter of 2017 prevents NIH from disregarding those regulations. Second, the rider's prohibition deviation approvals in the third quarter of 2017, the Supplemental Guidance would still be unlawful pursuant to the appropriations rider's first two provisions, as we have explained.
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on NIH taking "a modified approach to" those deviation regulations categorically prevents NIH from changing the way indirect costs are reimbursed. And third, the rider's requirement of proportionality between the "fiscal effect" of approved deviations in the third quarter of 2017 and in subsequent fiscal years prevents NIH from approving deviations that result in a greater financial impact than its approved deviations in that quarter. Although the plain text of the appropriations rider prohibits NIH from imposing an across-the-board indirect cost reimbursement rate, statutory context provides further
"confirmatory evidence of Congress's intent." McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2007). As noted above, the appropriations rider was a direct response to the first Trump administration's proposal to impose a uniform 10% indirect cost reimbursement rate. Not only did Congress decline to adopt the Trump administration's proposed cap on indirect cost reimbursements, but Congress also went further and enacted the rider. Even the first Trump administration recognized that this rider "prohibit[s] [NIH] by law from reducing grantee administrative costs and shifting these resources to support direct research." We see no reason to ignore this backdrop against which the appropriations rider was enacted. After all, "we are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are
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free." Dep't of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019) (citation modified).
We thus hold that the Supplemental Guidance violates the congressionally enacted appropriations rider.
C. The Regulatory Provisions
We turn now to NIH's contention that the district court erred in holding that the Supplemental Guidance contravenes HHS's regulations. As noted above, if the Supplemental Guidance violates HHS's regulations pertaining to deviations from the negotiated rates, it necessarily also violates the first sentence of the appropriations rider requiring NIH to comply with those regulations. See supra Section II.B.1.
To briefly recap, HHS's regulations require it to negotiate with each grant recipient to agree upon an indirect cost reimbursement rate. See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 75 app. III. Once a negotiated rate is settled upon and memorialized in a NICRA, it generally "must be accepted by all [f]ederal awarding agencies."
Id. § 75.414(c)(1).14"An HHS awarding agency" such as NIH "may
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use a rate different from the negotiated rate for a class of [f]ederal awards or a single [f]ederal award only . . . when approved by a [f]ederal awarding agency head or delegate based on documented justification as described in paragraph (c)(3) of [§ 75.414]." Id. Paragraph (c)(3) provides that "[t]he HHS awarding agency must implement, and make publicly available, the policies, procedures and general decision making criteria that their programs will follow to seek and justify deviations from negotiated rates." Id. § 75.414(c)(3). The district court concluded that the Supplemental Guidance contravenes this regulatory scheme in several ways.
[f]ederal award only . . . when approved
by a [f]ederal awarding agency head or
delegate based on documented
justification as described in paragraph
(c)(3) of this section.
. . .
(3) The HHS awarding agency must implement, and make publicly available, the policies, procedures and general decision making criteria that their programs will follow to seek and justify deviations from negotiated rates.
(4) As required under § 75.203(c), the HHS awarding agency must include in the notice of funding opportunity the policies relating to indirect cost rate reimbursement, matching, or cost share as approved. . . .
45 C.F.R. § 75.414(c).
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1. The "Class" Requirement
The district court held that the Supplemental Guidance does not apply to "a class of [f]ederal awards," as § 75.414(c) requires. The term "[c]lass of [f]ederal awards" is defined in the regulations as "a group of [f]ederal awards either awarded under a specific program or group of programs or to a specific type of non-[f]ederal entity or group of non-[f]ederal entities to which specific provisions or exceptions may apply." 45 C.F.R. § 75.2. NIH acknowledges that it may deviate from the negotiated rate only with respect to a "group" of awards, but it argues that "[n]othing in the regulations limits the size of the group of awards that may be adjusted." NIH's argument, however, cannot be reconciled with the definition of a "[c]lass of [f]ederal awards" as a group of grants "awarded under a specific program" or
"to a specific type of . . . entity." Id. In context, this repeated use of the word "specific" can only reasonably be understood to restrict the relevant "group" of awards to a finite subset of all federal awards. Id. Moreover, as the district court explained, "[i]f a 'class of [f]ederal awards' actually means all [f]ederal awards, the definition provided . . . in § 75.2, and the inclusion of 'a class of [f]ederal awards' in § 75.414(c)(1), would be . . . superfluous and meaningless." Massachusetts v. NIH, 770 F. Supp. 3d 277, 298 (D. Mass. 2025); see Corley, 556 U.S. at 314.
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NIH argues in the alternative that the Supplemental Guidance does, in fact, apply to a "group" of awards -- those made to institutions of higher education ("IHEs"). As the plaintiffs correctly point out, NIH did not make this argument in its briefing before the district court. NIH therefore cannot so argue before us now. See U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 125 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff's argument "is waived, having been raised only in 'cursory fashion' before the district court").15But even if we entertain NIH's argument, it fails on its merit.
The Supplemental Guidance provides: "Pursuant to this Supplemental Guidance, there will be a standard indirect rate of 15% across all NIH grants for indirect costs in lieu of a separately negotiated rate for indirect costs in every grant."
(Emphasis added.) Later, the Supplemental Guidance states: "For any new grant issued, and for all existing grants to IHEs retroactive to the date of issuance of this Supplemental Guidance, award recipients are subject to a 15 percent indirect cost rate."
(Emphasis added.) While the latter sentence refers to "all
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existing grants to IHEs," the portion of the sentence mentioning IHEs is offset by commas. The limitation "to IHEs" can therefore be read only as modifying the term "existing grants."16Thus, by its plain language -- the broad references to "all NIH grants" and
"any new grant issued" -- the Supplemental Guidance applies to more than grants awarded to IHEs. NIH makes little effort to explain otherwise, instead contending that the Supplemental Guidance contains "inartful language," and NIH meant to convey that the 15% rate would apply only to IHEs. We cannot, of course, disregard what the Supplemental Guidance actually says in favor of what NIH now wishes it said.
2. The Procedural Requirements
The district court also held that NIH's issuance of the Supplemental Guidance did not comply with the procedural requirements of 45 C.F.R. § 75.414(c)(3). The district court concluded that, by announcing an across-the-board 15% indirect cost reimbursement rate, NIH failed to articulate the "policies, procedures and general decision making criteria" that it "will follow to seek and justify deviations from negotiated rates." 45 C.F.R. § 75.414(c)(3). NIH asserts that it has satisfied the requirement that it publicize its "policies, procedures and
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general decision making criteria" because that requirement
"actively contemplates that NIH may announce generally applicable 'polic[y]'" like the one-size-fits-all cap announced in the Supplemental Guidance. And NIH contends that the Supplemental Guidance does not set forth any "further 'procedures and decision making criteria' . . . because the policy does not contemplate any individualized redetermination of indirect-cost rates."
That contention reveals a fatal regulatory flaw in the Supplemental Guidance. The regulations contemplate precisely the
"individualized" or group-specific "redetermination of indirect- cost rates" that NIH disavows. Most obviously, § 75.414(c)(3) cannot permit NIH to announce a "generally applicable 'polic[y]'"
that governs -- in the language of the Supplemental Guidance --
"all NIH grants" because, as we have explained, § 75.414(c)(1)'s
"class" requirement prohibits exactly that. See supra Section II.C.1. Paragraph (c)(3) cannot be interpreted to allow what paragraph (c)(1) expressly forbids. Moreover, reading § 75.414(c)(3) as permitting NIH to announce an across-the-board 15% indirect cost reimbursement rate would allow paragraph (c)(3) to effectively override the many regulatory provisions outlining the process to negotiate reimbursement rates on an institution- by-institution basis.
Relatedly, the district court concluded that
§ 75.414(c)(3) itself provides for a two-step sequential process,
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which NIH violated by purporting to impose a 15% rate "in one fell swoop." Massachusetts, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 298. Like the district court, we read the plain language of paragraph (c)(3) to mandate a sequential process: first, NIH announces "the policies, procedures and general decision making criteria" upon which it
"will" -- in the future -- base its deviation decisions; and second, NIH applies those policies, procedures, and criteria to determine whether a departure from the negotiated rate for a given award or an appropriately defined class of awards is "justif[ied]."
45 C.F.R. § 75.414(c)(3). That two-step reading is underscored by paragraph (c)(4), which, as noted above, provides that NIH "must include in the notice of funding opportunity the policies relating to indirect cost rate reimbursement," id. § 75.414(c)(4), so that a prospective grant recipient can "make an informed decision about whether to submit an application," id. § 75.203(c)(2). NIH concedes that it did not abide by a two-step sequential process in issuing the Supplemental Guidance. Instead, it asserts that "[n]othing in the text of [§] 75.414(c)(1) and (3) expressly calls for a multi-stage adjudicative process." As explained above, however, paragraph (c)(3), particularly when read in conjunction with paragraph (c)(4), can only be interpreted as providing for a two-step process.
NIH also claims that § 75.414(c)(4)'s requirement to include in any notice of funding opportunity its policies relating
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to indirect cost rate reimbursement as they exist when the notice goes out does not prevent NIH from changing those policies whenever it wants. If that were so, § 75.414(c)(4)'s notice requirement would be meaningless. And it certainly would do nothing to
"help . . . applicant[s] make . . . informed decision[s]." Id. § 75.203(c)(2).
We therefore agree with the district court that the Supplemental Guidance is contrary to HHS's regulations.
III.
In sum, we conclude that the district court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. We also hold that NIH's attempt, through its Supplemental Guidance, to impose a 15% indirect cost reimbursement rate violates the congressionally enacted appropriations rider and HHS's duly adopted regulations. The district court's decision is therefore affirmed.
So ordered.