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Robert Brian Thomas Ruee Adams v. Amanda Lynn Skardoutos

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

November 14, 2025

168310

ROBERT BRIAN THOMAS RUEE ADAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 168310

COA: 369392

Wexford CC: 22-030412-NO

AMANDA LYNN SKARDOUTOS, JOHN

THOEL, MELISSA THOEL, ARTHUR FEYERS,

PATRICIA FEYERS, MICHAEL LONG, JASON

ELMORE, COREY WIGGINS, and JOHANNA

CAREY,

Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 13, 2025 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. C AVANAGH, C.J. (concurring).

The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., undoubtedly arms governmental entities and their agents with a strong shield against tort liability. But that shield is not an impenetrable one. To that end, I write separately to question the applicability of the GTLA when Michigan's Child Protection Law (CPL), MCL 722.621 et seq., is at play. Specifically, should the CPL be construed as a statutory exception to individual governmental immunity under the GTLA when a government-employed mandatory reporter fails to comport with the law? Although our Court of Appeals said no in Jones v Bitner, 300 Mich App 65 (2013), I question Jones's reasoning and holding on this point. While I believe this jurisprudentially significant issue is worthy of our further attention, plaintiff does not ask us to overrule Jones on this basis, and individual governmental immunity is not the only immunity asserted by defendant. Therefore, I concur in the Court's denial because further consideration of the interplay between the GTLA and the CPL is best left for a future case in which the issue is squarely presented.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE GTLA AND THE CPL

This case involves the GTLA and the CPL, both of which permit liability in certain instances while forbidding it in others. "The GTLA, MCL 691.1401 et seq., affords broad

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immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies and their employees whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." Beals v Michigan,

497 Mich 363, 370 (2015). When individual employee liability is at issue, MCL 691.1407(2) provides immunity from negligence claims if certain elements are met:

[E]ach . . . employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the . . . employee . . . while in the course of employment . . . if all of the following are met:

(a) The . . . employee . . . is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c) The . . . employee's . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. The necessary corollary flowing from this provision is that a government employee may be liable for tortious conduct if one or more of the elements is not met—say, by engaging in grossly negligent conduct that is "the proximate cause" of a plaintiff's injuries. MCL 691.1407(2)(c).

The CPL has a narrower focus. Generally speaking, it "outlines various requirements regarding the reporting and investigation of suspected child abuse." Lavey v Mills, 248 Mich App 244, 251 (2001). One such requirement mandates certain individuals—including a number of government employees—to report suspected child abuse or neglect:

(1) An individual is required to report under this act as follows:

(a) A physician, dentist, physician's assistant, registered dental hygienist, medical examiner, nurse, person licensed to provide emergency medical care, audiologist, psychologist, physical therapist, physical therapist assistant, occupational therapist, athletic trainer, marriage and family therapist, licensed professional counselor, social worker, licensed master's social worker, licensed bachelor's social worker, registered social service technician, social service technician, a person employed in a professional capacity in any office of the friend of the court, school administrator, school counselor or teacher, law enforcement officer, member of the clergy, or regulated child care provider who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or child neglect shall make an immediate report to centralized intake by

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telephone, or, if available, through the online reporting system, of the suspected child abuse or child neglect. [MCL 722.623.] Importantly, the CPL subjects these mandatory reporters to liability under some circumstances while immunizing them in others. Taking the liability provision first, MCL 722.633(1) provides that a "person who is required by this act to report an instance of suspected child abuse or neglect and who fails to do so is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by the failure."1Yet those who do report suspected child abuse or neglect may be entitled to immunity under MCL 722.625, which provides that a "person acting in good faith who makes a report, cooperates in an investigation, or assists in any other requirement of this act is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred by that action." The CPL thus includes both a cause of action for its violation and a grant of immunity for those who in good faith aim to comply with its requirements. Comparing these statutes reveals important distinctions in their respective liability and immunity provisions. Most notably, the standard for individual liability under the CPL is lower than the immunity exception under the GTLA. The GTLA precludes immunity, and therefore permits liability, only when the governmental employee's conduct was both grossly negligent and "the proximate cause" of the child's injuries. MCL 691.1407(2)(c) (emphasis added). Emphasizing the definite article "the," this Court's current precedent has strictly interpreted the phrase "the proximate cause" to mean "the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury, not 'a proximate cause.' " Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 446 (2000). The CPL, on the other hand, does not require a showing of gross negligence and instead assigns liability if the child's injures were "proximately caused by"—not "the proximate cause of"—the failure to report. MCL 722.633(1). The CPL's immunity provision is also narrower, protecting mandatory reporters only when they actually report, assist with an investigation, or otherwise help carry out the CPL's requirements. MCL 722.625. The CPL thus provides no immunity for failing to report— only liability.

II. GTLA EXCEPTIONS

Considering the material differences between the GTLA and the CPL, I question whether the GTLA's individual immunity provision applies to actions brought under the CPL. To be sure, "the GTLA proclaims to contain all exceptions to governmental immunity" through its " '[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act' " language. Ballard v Ypsilanti Twp, 457 Mich 564, 569 (1998), quoting MCL 691.1407(1). But we have

1 MCL 722.633(2) adds that a "person who is required by this act to report an instance of suspected child abuse or neglect and who knowingly fails to do so is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both."

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nonetheless recognized that other exceptions can "exist outside the act." Ballard, 457 Mich at 569. The Legislature therefore "remains free to amend or abolish governmental immunity by creating exceptions to it, either within the GTLA, or in the context of another statute." Id. "Whether an express statutory enactment creates an exception to governmental immunity is resolved by reference to the language of the statute." State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Corby Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich App 480, 485 (2006). Against that backdrop, our Court of Appeals analyzed the interplay between the CPL and GTLA in Jones, 300 Mich App 65. In Jones, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-police officer violated MCL 722.623 by failing to report suspected child abuse or neglect. Id. at 69. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant's conduct

"proximately caused" the child's injuries under MCL 722.633(1). Id. at 71. The defendant responded by invoking individual governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), arguing that its stricter "the proximate cause" standard governed the dispute. Id. The panel was thus tasked with deciding which statute governed: the CPL's mandatory reporting provision or the GTLA's individual governmental immunity provision. The Jones Court resolved this battle of the statutes by holding that the "narrower"

governmental immunity provision carried the day. Id. at 76. In so doing, the panel first recognized the general rule that the Legislature is free to enact exceptions to governmental immunity in other statutes. Id. But the Court ultimately concluded that this general rule did not apply to the issue before it because the individual governmental immunity statute was enacted after the CPL. Id. This mattered because, in the panel's view, a "more recently enacted law has precedence, especially when the statute is both the more specific and the more recent." Id. at 77. For these reasons, the Jones Court concluded that the "mandatory reporting statute must be read in conjunction with, and is therefore limited by, the governmental immunity statute." Id. The Jones defendant therefore escaped liability under the CPL.

Like Jones, a number of other cases have analyzed whether statutes outside the GTLA are best read as exceptions to governmental immunity. As detailed below, the results are mixed.

Begin with this Court's decision in Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132 (1991). In that case, we held that the former Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA)2—which imposed liability on certain actors for gross negligence or willful misconduct—acted as a limited exception to governmental immunity. Id. at 138. We first observed that the Legislature, in adopting the EMSA, expressly included governmental agencies in the definition of "person." Id. Next, we explained that the Legislature "clearly meant to single

2 The former EMSA, which was repealed by 1990 PA 179, is now codified at MCL 333.20901 et seq. See State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 271 Mich App at 490 n 8.

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out certain governmental employees and their governmental employers for standards of immunity different from those extant in the more comprehensive GTLA." Id. Indeed, "the EMSA provided specific circumstances in which immunity from tort liability was granted and limited with regard to governmental units, whereas § 7 of the GTLA provides a general grant of immunity to governmental units for unspecified circumstances involving tort liability." Id. at 139 (emphasis added). We also noted that the more-specific EMSA was enacted after the operative GTLA provision. Id. The Malcolm Court therefore concluded that the EMSA was best considered as an "exception to or an amendment of" GTLA immunity. Id.

Our decision in Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530 (1998), hummed a similar tune. There, this Court held that governmental entities may be held liable under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., because the Legislature

"expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of 'employer.' " Id. at 551. Moreover, a general cause of action exists under the WPA, subjecting such employers to liability under certain circumstances. See MCL 15.363.3Under Anzaldua, then, the WPA operates as another exception to governmental immunity. Id.

A few cases have, however, parted ways with Malcolm and Anzaldua. In Ballard,

457 Mich 564, this Court held that the recreational land use act (RUA)4does not operate as an exception to governmental immunity. This Court reasoned that, unlike the statutes at issue in Malcolm and Anzaldua, the RUA neither "define[d] the persons to whom it applies to include either the state or its political subdivisions," id. at 576, nor created a

"necessary inference that the Legislature intended to waive immunity" given the lack of conflict between the RUA and GTLA, id. at 576-578. Likewise, the Court of Appeals in State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 271 Mich App 480, distinguished Malcolm and Anzaldua in

3 For similar reasons, Michigan appellate courts have held that the GTLA does not foreclose actions under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., against governmental entities. See, e.g., Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195 (2002) ("However, there are other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act."). These decisions generally reason that the ELCRA "specifically includes state and political subdivisions and their agents as employers covered by the act." Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 (1993).

4 The version of the RUA at issue in Ballard, MCL 300.201, was repealed in 1994 , but was shortly thereafter reenacted in substantively similar form and is now codified at MCL 324.73301. See 1994 PA 451; 1995 PA 58; Ballard, 457 Mich at 575 n 9.

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. November 14, 2025

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Clerk holding that the former "MISS DIG act"5did not constitute an exception to governmental immunity because the act did not "specifically address governmental immunity," "establish a general cause of action for breaches of the duties it imposes," id. at 486, or establish a standard of immunity different from the GTLA, id. at 490. Rather, "the only section within the Act that impose[d] liability omit[ted] public agencies from its coverage." Id. Finding no conflict between the statutes, the Court held that the former MISS DIG act did not waive or abrogate GTLA immunity. Id. at 491.

In my view, these cases provide a few nonexhaustive considerations that are instructive in analyzing whether a statutory provision outside the GTLA constitutes an exception to governmental immunity. First, does the statute expressly reach governmental agencies or their actors? Second, does the statute provide standards of liability or immunity that differ from those contained in the GTLA? Third, does the statute include a general cause of action for its violation? And finally, which statute is the more specific and recently enacted?

III. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals in Jones did not fully wrestle with all of these considerations in arriving at the conclusion that a governmental actor who violates the CPL was immune from tort liability under the GTLA. While I believe that this Court should examine Jones's holding in the right case, plaintiff does not ask us to overrule Jones on these grounds. Nor is it immediately clear whether my concerns about Jones's holding apply with the same force when, as here, the defendant also claims absolute immunity under the GTLA pursuant to his role as the highest appointive executive official in his agency. See MCL 691.1407(5). Accordingly, I concur in the Court's decision to deny leave to appeal.

5 This version of the act, officially titled the "MISS DIG underground facility damage prevention and safety act" and codified at MCL 460.701 et seq., was repealed, and the current version is codified at MCL 460.721 et seq. See 2013 PA 174.

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Robert Brian Thomas Ruee Adams v. Amanda Lynn Skardoutos
(Nov 14, 2025)