IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
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COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2025
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0224-MR
JAMES F. DINWIDDIE, JR. APPELLANT
V.
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2025-CA-0457
GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 23-CR-00181
KENNETH HAROLD GOFF, II APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
AND RICK HARDIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMONWEALTH
ATTORNEY AND PROSECUTOR FOR
THE 46TH CIRCUIT
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
James F. Dinwiddie, pro se, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus by the Court of Appeals.1Dinwiddie seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and requests this Court issue a writ of prohibition declaring the Grayson Circuit Court is without jurisdiction over his criminal charges and a writ of mandamus directing that same court to dismiss
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the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. Because the trial court does, in fact, possess jurisdiction over this case, we affirm the Court of Appeals and deny Dinwiddie's request for writs of prohibition and mandamus. Following the death of his father in 2012, Dinwiddie was appointed by the Grayson District Court as the executor of his father's estate. The estate was to be distributed in equal shares to Dinwiddie and his three siblings. One sibling's share was held in trust with Dinwiddie serving as trustee. The trust was registered in Fayette District Court which ultimately removed Dinwiddie as trustee in May of 2022 for various breaches of the trust including conversion of approximately $130,000 which represented a trust beneficiary's share of the proceeds from the sale of a building. Shortly thereafter, the Grayson District Court removed Dinwiddie as executor for violations of his fiduciary duties to the estate, including transferring over $7,600 in estate assets to his personal account. Less than a week before his removal, Dinwiddie transferred an additional $74,000 in estate assets to his personal account. Because he emptied his personal account almost immediately thereafter, those funds could not be recovered.
In July of 2023, Dinwiddie was indicted in the Grayson Circuit Court on one count of theft by failure to make required disposition of property of $10,000 or more.2In response, Dinwiddie petitioned the Court of Appeals for extraordinary and declaratory relief. Pertinent to the issue at bar, Dinwiddie
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alleged the jurisdiction of the Grayson Circuit Court had not been properly invoked and, because his actions arose in a probate matter, the Grayson District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes relative thereto and no criminal action could lie in circuit court. The Court of Appeals rejected his assertions and denied the requested writ. This appeal followed. As he did before the Court of Appeals, Dinwiddie maintains that the only court with jurisdiction over him is the Grayson District Court. In support, Dinwiddie reiterates the assertions made below,3insisting it is impossible for an executor to be guilty of a crime under KRS 514.070 because any misfeasance or malfeasance by an executor would constitute only a civil violation which must be resolved in the probate action. He also baldly claims that he is the first and only person to be so charged in the entire history of the Commonwealth. Thus, he argues he is entitled to the requested writs. His assertions are wholly without merit.
Writs of prohibition and mandamus constitute extraordinary remedies. Therefore, "we have always been cautious and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief." Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)). On direct appeal from the Court of Appeals in a writ case, the role
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of this Court is to "review the Court of Appeals' legal rulings de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and ultimately its decision to grant or deny extraordinary relief for abuse of discretion." Commonwealth, Energy & Env't Cabinet v. Shepherd, 366 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2012) (citing Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2004)). The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky.
2000)).
The standard for the issuance of an extraordinary writ was detailed in this Court's decision in Hoskins v. Maricle:
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.
150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). Thus, there are two classes of writ actions: those where the trial court is alleged to be acting outside its jurisdiction and those where the trial court is acting within its jurisdiction but is alleged to be acting erroneously. Dinwiddie seeks a writ of the first class.
The first class of writs focuses on the lower court's authority to act in the case, or jurisdiction. Since the jurisdiction of each level of court is clearly established, either by the Constitution, statute, or rule, petitions alleging this ground are resolved by legal interpretation of the provisions granting jurisdiction.
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Cox v. Braden, 266 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Ky. 2008). In the context of writs of the first class, "jurisdiction" "means jurisdiction of the subject matter," which is the authority of a particular court to decide the matter or issues before it. Commonwealth v. Eckerle, 470 S.W.3d 712, 721 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Watson v. Humphrey, 293 Ky. 839, 170 S.W.2d 865 (1943)). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns "the court's power to hear and rule on a particular type of controversy." Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Ky. 2007). See also Spears v. Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Ky. 2016) (noting that "subject matter jurisdiction does not mean jurisdiction over 'this case;' rather, it means jurisdiction over 'this kind of case.'"). If a court has been empowered by statute or constitutional provision to adjudicate the type of case identified in the pleadings, it has subject matter jurisdiction. Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Ky. 2012).
Jurisdiction of the circuit courts of Kentucky is dictated by § 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution. Unless vested in some other court, the circuit court has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes. Thus, circuit courts maintain general subject matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions. Plainly then, the Grayson Circuit Court has subject matter to hear Dinwiddie's felony criminal action.
Seemingly recognizing this fundamental principle, Dinwiddie attempts to frame the issue differently, arguing the Grayson Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over his particular case. However, his assertions are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law regarding jurisdiction.
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Particular-case jurisdiction is a type of subject-matter jurisdiction wherein the trial court has "jurisdiction over the particular case at issue, which refers to the authority and power of the court to decide a specific case, rather than the class of cases over which the court has subject-matter jurisdiction." Milby v. Wright, 952 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ky. 1997). "This kind of jurisdiction often turns solely on proof of certain compliance with statutory requirements and so- called jurisdictional facts, such as that an action was begun before a limitations period expired." Nordike, 231 S.W.3d at 738. In summary, it has been "our frequent holding that errors in the procedural invocation of a court's jurisdiction relate to particular- case jurisdiction, not general subject-matter jurisdiction[.]"
[Commonwealth v.] Steadman, 411 S.W.3d [717,] 723 [(Ky. 2013)]. Peeler v. Simcoe, 718 S.W.3d 589, 595-96 (Ky. 2025). The record before us reveals no indication of any errors in the procedural invocation of the Grayson Circuit Court's jurisdiction nor any infirmities relative to this particular case. Dinwiddie's argument reveals he is laboring under the false impression that Kentucky's probate laws control this matter based on his flawed reading and interpretation of various provisions of the probate statutes. His belief that any misfeasance or malfeasance of an executor constitutes a civil probate matter which can never be criminalized is in error. While true that all probate matters other than those contested in an adversary proceeding must be heard in the district court, KRS 24A.120(2), Dinwiddie fails to appreciate the criminal nature of the acts he stands accused of engaging in. The mere fact that he was acting in the capacity of an executor when his alleged criminal activities occurred does not immunize him from criminal prosecution. The indictment against him was not brought to divest the district court of jurisdiction over the probate matter, nor does the probate matter hold some mystical power divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction over criminal matters. Plainly, while
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the two cases are linked factually, they are legally—and jurisdictionally— distinct and may proceed separately. His contentions to the contrary are without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals and deny Dinwiddie's petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus. All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
James F. Dinwiddie, Jr., pro se
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth Harold Goff, II, pro se
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky James Daryl Havey
Assistant Solicitor General
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
RICK HARDIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMONWELATH ATTORNEY AND
PROSECUTOR FOR THE 46TH CIRCUIT:
Rick Hardin, pro se