(Alaska 2007) (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 83(1) (A.L.I.
1982)).
26 Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904, 914 (Alaska 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow, 81 P.3d 982, 985 (Alaska
2003)).
27 Allen v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enf't Div., 15 P.3d 743, 747 (Alaska 2000) (quoting State, Dep't of Fish & Game, Sport Fish Div. v. Meyer, 906 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Alaska 1995)).
28 Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offs. Comm'n, 426 P.3d 890, 893, 899 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Alaska R. App. P. 601(b), which provides that "appeal may be taken . . . from a final decision of an administrative agency").
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complaint; or (3) remand the complaint to the executive director of the Commission for consideration by the Commission on a regular rather than an expedited basis.29
The Commission chose the last option in both cases. RGA argues that because the expedited process authorizes the Commission to issue civil penalties after an expedited hearing, its decision is final.
But it does not follow that if the Commission declines to impose civil penalties and instead seeks further investigation, such a decision is final too. Here the Commission did not impose any penalties on RGA at the conclusion of the expedited hearings. Instead, at the conclusion of both expedited hearings, the Commission ordered further investigation by its staff. The order issued in Case No. 22-01-CD stated that there was no evidence of ongoing campaign coordination, which justified the Commission's decision not to make an expedited ruling, but did not conclude that illegal coordination never took place. Similarly, in the order issued in Case No. 22-04- CD, the Commission declined to find a violation "on an expedited basis." But the Commission stated that there remained the question of whether Rexrode's efforts to establish an independent expenditure group under Alaska law were legally sufficient. Consequently, the Commission did not fully dispose of the complaints before it. Because the expedited proceedings did not culminate in final decisions, but rather led to further proceedings on a "regular" basis, the post-hearing subpoenas did not violate the doctrine of res judicata.
C. Issuing Subpoenas After The Expedited Hearing Did Not Violate Substantive Due Process.
RGA argues that Hebdon's attempt to continue the investigation and "re- litigate the same matters" alleged in the complaints is so unfair and arbitrary that it violated RGA's right to substantive due process. We are not persuaded.
29 AS 15.13.380(d).
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"Substantive due process is denied when a legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate government purpose."30An asserted denial of due process "is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case."31
The expedited procedure authorized by AS 15.13.380(d) has a reasonable basis given the need to timely enforce campaign finance laws. Expedited proceedings are intended to address cases where "the alleged violation, if not immediately restrained, could materially affect the outcome of an election or other impending event"
and "cause irreparable harm that penalties could not adequately remedy."32But if violations are not presently occurring or imminent, the statute gives the Commission the option of investigating the allegations at a regular pace.33
This structure gives the Commission the flexibility to move fast when necessary and to conserve resources and act more deliberately when possible. Allowing a matter that is initially expedited to be remanded for further investigation is not akin to double jeopardy, nor does it shock the universal sense of justice, as RGA suggests. The subpoenas did not violate RGA's right to substantive due process.
D. The Statutory Framework For Expedited Proceedings Is Not Unenforceable Due To Absurdity.
RGA's final argument is somewhat hard to discern. It appears to argue that the Commission both conclusively resolved the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. It then suggests that, if this statute is interpreted to allow this outcome, it
30
In re Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018, 1024 (Alaska 2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974)).
31
Id. at 1026 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850
(1998)).
32
AS 15.13.380(c).
AS 15.13.380(d)-(e).
33
is unconstitutional due to absurd results. RGA appears to argue that it is absurd to allow the agency to fail to prove its case and then take another bite at the apple. RGA's argument rests on a mistaken view of the Commission's ruling. The Commission did not conclusively find that no violations occurred. Its remand for regular proceedings is comparable to a court holding a trial after denying a motion for preliminary injunction — a routine process, and far from absurd. Recall that AS 15.13.380, the expedited process invoked by the
Commission, authorizes three courses of action: (1) if the Commission finds a violation has occurred or is occurring, it shall enjoin or remedy the violation and impose a penalty; (2) if the Commission finds "the respondent has not or is not about to engage"
in a violation, it shall dismiss the complaint; or (3) the Commission may remand the complaint for consideration on a regular basis.
The Commission did not take incompatible actions, as RGA suggests. In Case No. 22-01-CD the Commission found that the complainant did not establish
"ongoing coordination," which is not the same as a finding that no unlawful coordination had occurred. In Docket 22-04-CD the Commission described evidence suggesting the possibility of unlawful coordination between the groups and
"remand[ed] this case to its Executive Director on a non-expedited basis to review whether" the efforts to create legal separation "were legally sufficient." In doing so the Commission noted that complainants did not have a real chance "on such an expedited timeline" to contest testimony by RGA's officials and noted that "[f]urther discovery could be useful in substantiating or disproving" RGA's assertions. In light of this
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We also find unpersuasive RGA's assertion that this process is so unusual, the legislature could not have intended it. The superior court pointed out that AS 15.13.380's provision for expedited hearing followed by regular process is similar to statutes authorizing interim custody orders, short-term protective orders, or preliminary injunctions. RGA is correct that these other procedures are not perfect analogies. But the similarities are enough to rebut RGA's argument that the legislature could not have meant to allow the Commission to undertake regular process if the expedited process yielded inconclusive results.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's order granting Hebdon's motion for summary judgment and denying RGA's motion for summary judgment.
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