| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) |
District court gatekeeping role for expert testimony under Rule 702; reliability and relevance requirements. |
Anchored the Court's analysis of expert admissibility and the requirement that proffered expert testimony be reliable and relevant. |
| Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2006) |
Proponent's burden to show qualification and reliable methodology; resolve doubts in favor of admissibility. |
Cited to emphasize the proponent's burden and that factual basis attacks go to credibility/weight rather than admissibility; guided denial of Daubert motions. |
| Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) |
Court's leeway in determining reliability and that Rule 702 applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. |
Supported Court's flexible approach to evaluating Bisbee's and Kleck's methodologies and reliance on specialized experience. |
| Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1988) |
The factual basis of expert opinion affects credibility, not admissibility. |
Used to reject arguments that perceived gaps in Bisbee's background warranted exclusion rather than cross-examination. |
| Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 2001) |
Expert testimony inadmissible only when fundamentally unsupported. |
Supported the Court's conclusion to admit both experts because neither was so fundamentally unsupported as to be excluded. |
| Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1995) |
Standards for excluding fundamentally unsupported expert testimony. |
Referenced in conjunction with Bonner to affirm the admissibility standard applied. |
| Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2006) |
Rule 702 does not require perfect symmetry between an expert's experience and the subject matter. |
Applied to reject Fleet Farm's contention that Bisbee lacked necessary symmetry of experience to opine on FFL compliance and industry practice. |
| Khoday v. Symantec Corp., 93 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (D. Minn. 2015) |
Industry knowledge and contextual experience can suffice for expert testimony even without technical familiarity with the exact product. |
Used as support for finding Bisbee's experience adequate to opine on industry expectations and compliance practices. |
| United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 1994) |
Experts may discuss facts they relied on, particularly technical forms and agency practices, to contextualize opinions. |
Applied to reject Fleet Farm's narrative-testimony objection to Bisbee's discussion of ATF forms and agency guidance. |
| Ocasio v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 8:13-1962, 2015 WL 2062611 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2015) |
Permits experts to discuss relied-upon documents when it contextualizes an opinion. |
Supported the Court's conclusion that Bisbee could refer to ATF forms and Fleet Farm training materials as part of his analysis. |
| S. Pine Helicopters, Inc. v. Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc., 320 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2003) |
Expert testimony on pure legal matters is inadmissible because matters of law are for the judge. |
Guided the Court's caution about experts offering legal conclusions, but the Court concluded Bisbee's use of legal terms did not transgress because his testimony described industry norms rather than defining legal standards. |
| United States v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982) |
Expert testimony is not defective merely because it uses words of a legal standard. |
Supported the Court's determination that Bisbee's testimony using terms like "duty" did not require exclusion so long as he did not instruct on the law. |
| Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2003) |
Some degree of speculation in expert testimony can be permissible; focus on reasoned application of experience to facts. |
Used to reject Fleet Farm's argument that Bisbee's causation-related opinions were speculative and thus inadmissible. |
| Hartley v. Dillard's, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2002) |
Court distinctions between admissibility and weight of expert evidence. |
Applied to conclude objections to Dr. Kleck's methodology go to weight, not admissibility. |
| Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) |
Summary judgment standard: material fact and genuine dispute definitions. |
Set forth the legal standard governing the Court's summary judgment analysis. |
| Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) |
Require viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving all reasonable inferences. |
Applied to the Court's standard of review on the cross motions for summary judgment. |
| Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) |
When parties tell different stories, courts should not adopt a version blatantly contradicted by the record for summary judgment purposes. |
Reiterated as part of the summary judgment standard exposition. |
| Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) |
Origins and scope of parens patriae; states' quasi-sovereign interests. |
Framed the Court's parens patriae standing analysis and the need to pass the Snapp test. |
| Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) |
Two-part test for parens patriae standing: state must articulate an interest apart from individual private parties and express a quasi-sovereign interest. |
Cited as the controlling test; Court concluded the State asserted a quasi-sovereign interest in public safety and well-being and thus satisfied Snapp. |
| Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) |
State interest affecting "the general population" as part of parens patriae analysis. |
Referenced to support the proposition that the State alleged harms affecting Minnesota's general population and not only identifiable individuals. |
| State ex rel. Hatch v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 703 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) |
Permissible for a state parens patriae action to overlap factually with private litigation so long as the state asserts a distinct quasi-sovereign interest. |
Applied to reject Fleet Farm's argument that overlap with the private Truck Park victims defeats standing. |
| Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) |
Example where state sought to vindicate interests of specific identifiable private parties (egg farmers) and lacked parens patriae standing. |
Distinguished by the Court as inapposite; used to illustrate contrast with this case's diffuse public-safety allegations. |
| Harrison v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 78 F.4th 765 (5th Cir. 2023) |
Example of a state attempting to assert interests of a specific group (individual students). |
Distinguished on similar grounds to Koster. |
| Staub as Tr. of Weeks v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 2021) |
Proximate cause doctrine under Minnesota law; proximate cause sometimes decided by the court, other times a jury question. |
Supported the Court's explanation that proximate causation is typically a jury question but can be resolved as a matter of law in some circumstances; the Court found disputed issues here for jury resolution. |
| Green Plains Otter Tail, LLC v. Pro-Env't, Inc., 953 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2020) |
Application of Minnesota law regarding proximate cause and intervening acts. |
Cited in the proximate causation and intervening criminal acts analysis to explain when a chain of causation is broken. |
| Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983) |
Intervening act severs liability only if not reasonably foreseeable. |
Used to analyze foreseeability of intervening criminal acts and whether they break causation. |
| Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1992) |
Discusses superseding intervening efficient cause doctrine. |
Used in the intervening-act discussion to frame when the chain of causation is broken. |
| Hilligoss v. Cross Cos., 228 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1975) |
Criminal acts of a third person can be superseding causes only if not reasonably foreseeable. |
Applied to conclude a jury could find the criminal misuse of firearms sold to Horton or Elwood was foreseeable. |
| George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006) |
But-for causation and related proximate cause principles. |
Invoked to reject Fleet Farm's argument that but-for causation fails because straw purchasers could have obtained guns elsewhere; the Court noted Minnesota law does not require proving exclusivity of cause. |
| Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 2008) |
Substantial factor test for proximate cause under Minnesota law. |
Applied to evaluate whether Fleet Farm's conduct could be considered a substantial factor in causing harm; Court found triable issues. |
| In re North Mankato City Council, No. A21-0143, 2021 WL 4517273 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2021) |
Public nuisance precedent involving limited, aesthetic harms affecting few neighbors. |
Distinguished on scope and severity of harms; Court concluded the nuisance alleged here is broader and concerns public safety rather than aesthetic inconvenience. |
| Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1999) |
Elements of aiding and abetting under Minnesota law and requirement of actual knowledge. |
Key authority for concluding aiding-and-abetting requires actual knowledge; Court granted summary judgment in Fleet Farm's favor on that claim because the State failed to show actual knowledge. |
| Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850 (D. Minn. 2013) |
Constructive knowledge deemed insufficient for aiding and abetting under Witzman. |
Cited to support the proposition that constructive knowledge is insufficient to satisfy Witzman's knowledge requirement. |
| Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A., 913 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2019) |
Affirmed Varga's approach and emphasized actual knowledge requirement. |
Reinforced Court's conclusion that the record lacks evidence of actual knowledge required for aiding and abetting. |
| Johnson v. Johnson, 611 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) |
Negligent entrustment elements and discussion of foreseeability and control; reluctance to extend doctrine to sales. |
Used to explain Minnesota precedent's limits and the Court's decision not to extend negligent entrustment to commercial sales of firearms; supported granting summary judgment on negligent entrustment. |
| Bertelsen v. Walker, No. 19HA-CV-19-4898, 2020 WL 11039168 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 2020) |
Court questioned whether negligent entrustment should apply to sales. |
Referenced alongside Johnson to justify decline to expand negligent entrustment doctrine to Fleet Farm's retail sales. |
| Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 2002) |
Elements of negligence (duty, breach, injury, proximate cause). |
Summarized applicable negligence framework and supported denial of summary judgment on negligence claims where triable issues exist. |
| Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2011) |
Duty exists where the defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable risk to a foreseeable plaintiff; foreseeability often a jury question. |
Used to explain duty and foreseeability considerations; supported leaving negligence questions for jury resolution. |
| Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) |
Foreseeability often a jury question; cited for duty/foreseeability principles in products-liability context. |
Illustrative authority for foreseeability principles cited in negligence discussion. |
| Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981) |
Negligence per se may result from statutory violations where harmed persons are within the statute's intended protection. |
Applied in analyzing negligence per se viability; Court denied summary judgment on negligence per se given triable issues. |
| Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977) |
Rule that breach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se where statute protects the harmed class and harm is of the type the statute intended to prevent. |
Cited to frame the standard for negligence per se and support denying summary judgment on that claim in part. |
| Brady v. Walmart Inc., No. 8:21-1412, 2024 WL 2273382 (D. Md. May 20, 2024) |
Persuasive authority interpreting the PLCAA predicate exception to include violations committed with constructive knowledge. |
Cited as persuasive support for the State's position that constructive knowledge may suffice under the PLCAA predicate exception (not binding). |
| City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004) |
Discusses the "free public services doctrine" and municipal cost-recovery (used in the Court's footnote addressing the doctrine's absence in Minnesota). |
Referenced to explain why Fleet Farm's twelfth affirmative defense (public services doctrine) fails as a matter of Minnesota law and practice. |
| In re Minnwest Bank Litig. Concerning Real Prop., 873 N.W.2d 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) |
Comparative fault considered in the context of monetary and injunctive relief. |
Cited by Fleet Farm but the Court explained Minnwest is not controlling for whether comparative fault applies when damages are not sought; Court concluded comparative fault defenses are inapplicable here. |
| N. Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D.N.C. 2008) |
Courts have rejected applying comparative fault in suits seeking injunctive relief. |
Used to reject Fleet Farm's contention that comparative-fault defenses bar equitable relief the State seeks. |
| Soderberg v. Anderson, 922 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2019) |
Assumption of risk is part of contributory negligence and is factored into comparative fault. |
Applied to find assumption-of-risk and comparative-fault defenses inapplicable when the State is not seeking proprietary damages. |
| Minnesota v. Fleet Farm LLC, 679 F. Supp. 3d 825 (D. Minn. 2023) |
Prior decision in this litigation (motion-to-dismiss stage) addressing remand and dismissal issues. |
Cited to note the Court's prior denial of remand and denial of Fleet Farm's motion to dismiss; the Court declined to revisit that dismissal-stage conclusion here. |