II. OVERRULING RUSEN IN PART
The issue in Rusen was whether a court, upon revok- ing multiple terms of probation based upon a single violation, could impose terms of imprisonment that were consecutive to each other. The defendant contended that consecutive sen- tences were precluded by a sentencing guidelines rule, OAR 213-012-0040(2), that required concurrent sentences in that situation. The state argued in response that that rule conflicted with a different rule—OAR 213-012-0010—that expressly incorporated ORS 137.123, and thus, authorized consecutive sentences. On review, this court first addressed a "threshold issue": whether ORS 138.105(9) precluded appellate review of the consecutive incarceration terms that the trial court had imposed. 369 Or at 695. Much of our opinion on review was devoted to that issue, and we concluded that ORS 138.105(9)
"precludes review of a sentencing challenge only when" cer- tain conditions are met. Id. Because those conditions were not Oregonian A1, C6 (Sept 12, 1986). The editorial board highlighted victim-cen- tered provisions in the measure, including "giv[ing] crime victims more of a for- mal role in court procedures, protecting them from pretrial contact by defen- dants, allowing them to watch trials even if called as witnesses, [and] letting them comment at sentencing and parole hearings[.]" Id.
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140 State v. Logston present in Rusen, we concluded that ORS 138.105(9) did not bar appellate review in that case. 369 Or at 695-96. Turning to the merits, we attempted to "harmo- nize" the two conflicting rules, concluding that OAR 213- 012-0010 (with its incorporation of ORS 137.123) and OAR 213-012-0040(2) "should be understood as addressing dif- ferent stages of sentencing: the former rule applies to initial sentencing immediately following the convictions, while the latter rule refers to probation revocation proceedings." 369 Or at 703.14Accordingly, we rejected the state's argument that the trial court's imposition of consecutive probation revocation sanctions was authorized by OAR 213-012-0010 (with its incorporation of ORS 137.123). 369 Or at 704. In attempting to harmonize the two conflicting rules, this court also rejected—in a footnote—the state's argument that "sentences" as used in ORS 137.123(2) should be interpreted to include probation revocation sanctions, as we had interpreted the term "sentences" in Article I, sec- tion 44(1)(b), in Lane, and that, if interpreted that way, then ORS 137.123(2) itself would directly authorize the trial court to impose consecutive sentences upon revocation of proba- tion. Rusen, 369 Or at 698 n 8. We concluded in that footnote that, "to the extent that ORS 137.123(2) applies at all, it would apply only through OAR 213-012-0010." Id. The conclusion that ORS 137.123 does not directly apply upon revocation of probation is wrong and should be overruled. As discussed above, the text, context, and history of ORS 137.123 all demonstrate that that statute directly authorizes trial courts to impose consecutive sentences upon revocation of probation in some circumstances, and thus, that statute does not apply "only through OAR 213-012-0010." Id. (Emphasis added.) The contrary conclusion in Rusen is wrong.
14 In my view, a better way to "harmonize" the two conflicting rules in Rusen would have been to recognize that the rule cited by the state—OAR 213-012- 0010—is a general rule that applies to all sentences, while the rule cited by the defendant—OAR 213-012-0040(2)—is a more specific rule that squarely applied to the sentencing issue presented in that case. Those rules could be harmonized by applying the principle that the specific rule controls over the general one. See ORS 174.020(2) ("When a general provision and a particular provision are incon- sistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent."); Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 334 Or 367, 374, 50 P3d 1163 (2002) (applying principle).
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Cite as 374 Or 101 (2025) 141 Rusen's misinterpretation is understandable. Because the court was presented with arguments about how to harmonize two conflicting sentencing guidelines rules, Rusen did not analyze the text, context, or history of ORS 137.123.15Nor did it mention the statements in the Guidelines Manual confirming that a court's discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences "is granted to the judiciary by statute." Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual 112 (1989) (citing former ORS
137.122 (1985) and ORS 137.123); see also id. (stating that OAR 213-012-0010 "confirms that existing statutory law con- trols the sentencing judge's threshold choice of consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple convictions" (emphasis added)). Thus, Rusen's conclusion that ORS 137.123 does not directly apply upon revocation of probation was more of an offhand rejection of an alternative argument offered by the state than a full-blown analysis of the intended scope of
ORS 137.123.
As explained above, analyzing the text, context, and history of ORS 137.123 reveals that that statute directly authorizes a court to impose, upon revocation of probation, a sentence of imprisonment that is consecutive to a sentence that the defendant is serving at the time of revocation. Although a sentencing guidelines rule precluded consecu- tive sentences in Rusen, that rule could not deprive the court of authority granted by statute. Id. ("While the guidelines have been approved by the legislature, they retain their sta- tus as administrative rules. When those rules conflict with statutes, the statutory provisions control"); Fisher Broad., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 321 Or 341, 355, 898 P2d 1333 (1995) (legislative choice under statute cannot be overruled by department regulation); Univ. of Or. Coop. Store v. Dep't of Rev., 273 Or 539, 550, 542 P2d 900 (1975) ("[A]n administra- tive agency may not, by its rules, amend, alter, enlarge or limit the terms of a legislative enactment."). Accordingly, the
15 Justice Duncan suggests that Rusen's holding that ORS 137.123 does
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142 State v. Logston second holding in Rusen—that consecutive sentences were not authorized in that case by statute—should be overruled. In conclusion, I would decide this case on statutory grounds and hold that, upon revoking defendant's probation, the Lake County court had authority under ORS 137.123 to impose a term of imprisonment that was consecutive to the Jefferson County prison sentence that defendant was serv- ing at the time. In so doing, I would overrule the conclu- sion in Rusen, 369 Or at 698 n 8, that ORS 137.123 does not directly authorize consecutive sentences upon revocation of probation.
Because I fully agree with the majority opinion's disposition of this case and its analysis of Article I, section 44, I respectfully concur.
James, J., and Masih, J., join in this concurring opinion.
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