FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
BROWN and WATKINS, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk's office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 30, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0196. SHAHID v. ESAAM. WATKINS, Judge.
After the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce, Nimat Shahid ("Wife") filed a petition to reopen the case and set aside the final judgment, arguing that service by publication was improper. The trial court denied the motion, using an order that relied upon non-existent case law. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to hold a new hearing on Wife's petition. We also levy a frivolous motion penalty against Diana Lynch, the attorney for Appellee Sufyan Esaam ("Husband").
According to Wife's October 2023 verified petition to reopen case, Husband filed a complaint for divorce in April 2022, service was performed by publication, and
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the trial court entered a final judgment in July 2022. In the petition, Wife averred that she had moved to Texas after she and Husband separated in July 2021 and that Husband failed to use reasonable diligence to determine her whereabouts before obtaining service by publication of his divorce complaint. Following a hearing, the superior court denied Wife's motion. We granted Wife's application for discretionary review, and this appeal followed.
1. Citing Reynolds v. Reynolds,1Wife argues that the superior court erred when it denied her petition to reopen the case and set aside the divorce decree because Husband did not make a sufficient showing of due diligence to allow service by publication under OCGA § 9-11-4 (f). Wife points out in her brief that the trial court relied on two fictitious cases in its order denying her petition, and she argues that the order is therefore, "void on its face."
In his Appellee's Brief, Husband does not respond to Wife's assertion that the trial court's order relied on bogus case law. Husband's attorney, Diana Lynch, relies on four cases in this division, two of which appear to be fictitious, possibly
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"hallucinations" made up by generative-artificial intelligence ("AI"),2and the other two have nothing to do with the proposition stated in the Brief.3 Undeterred by Wife's argument that the order (which appears to have been prepared by Husband's attorney, Diana Lynch) is "void on its face" because it relies on two non-existent cases, Husband cites to 11 additional cites in response that are either hallucinated or have nothing to do with the propositions for which they are cited. Appellee's Brief further adds insult to injury by requesting "Attorney's Fees on Appeal" and supports this "request"4with one of the new hallucinated cases. We are troubled by the citation of bogus cases in the trial court's order. As the reviewing court, we make no findings of fact as to how this impropriety occurred,
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observing only that the order purports to have been prepared by Husband's attorney, Diana Lynch. We further note that Lynch had cited the two fictitious cases that made it into the trial court's order in Husband's response to the petition to reopen, and she cited additional fake cases both in that Response and in the Appellee's Brief filed in this Court.
As noted above, the irregularities in these filings suggest that they were drafted using generative AI. In his 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts warned that "any use of AI requires caution and humility."5 Roberts specifically noted that commonly used AI applications can be prone to
"hallucinations," which caused lawyers using those programs to submit briefs with cites to non-existent cases.6
Although the present case may be the first occasion for a Georgia appellate court to confront the problems that can flow from a lawyer's apparent adoption of generative-AI, other courts have commented on the issue. In a 2023 opinion, a federal
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district court noted in Mata v. Avianca, Inc., that "there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance. But existing rules impose a gatekeeping role on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings."7 In that case, the attorneys had abandoned their responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the AI tool ChatGPT, then continued to stand by the fake opinions after judicial orders called their existence into question.8
Indeed,
[m]any harms flow from the submission of fake opinions. The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of a party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system. And a future litigant
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may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.9
Here, as in Mata, Lynch's use of fictitious cases and citations has deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to appropriately respond to her arguments. As to Lynch's request for attorney fees "for the costs incurred in responding to this appeal[,]" that section of Appellee's Brief provides:
1. OCGA § 9-15-14: This statute authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees if the court finds that an action, including an appeal, lacked substantial justification or was filed to delay or harass.
2. Johnson v. Johnson, 285 Ga. 408 (2009): The court awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a divorce appeal, finding that the appeal was without merit and amounted to frivolous litigation. We cannot find the cited case, Johnson v. Johnson, either by case name or citation. And, not surprisingly, we could not locate the case by its purported holding, which is a blatant misstatement of the law. More than 30 years ago, this Court held that "OCGA § 9-15-14 does not authorize the imposition of attorney fees and
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expenses of litigation for proceedings before an appellate court of this state."10Since then, our Supreme Court has consistently and clearly reiterated this point multiple times: "attorney's fees incurred in connection with appellate proceedings are not recoverable under OCGA § 9-15-14."11
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that we granted Wife's application for discretionary review (Case Number A25D0396) which "established as a matter of fact and law that her appeal is not frivolous."12"As used in [OCGA § 9-15-14], 'lacked
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substantial justification' means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious." OCGA § 9-15-14 (b). Thus, even if OCGA § 9-15-14 were an appropriate avenue to recover attorney fees for the costs of defending a frivolous appeal, our grant of Wife's application should have prompted Husband to reconsider his approach before filing the Appellee's Brief.
Under the circumstances and given the indisputably clear state of the law, Husband's attorney, Diana Lynch, cannot reasonably have believed, as the Appellee's Brief "requests," that this Court would "award attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 for the costs incurred in responding to this appeal." Further, Lynch provided no other basis for an award of "attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a divorce appeal,"
other than a fictitious case, which purported to be a 2009 case from the Supreme Court of Georgia.
To be clear, we make no factual finding as to who (or what) inserted the fictitious cases into the superior court's order.13We are deeply troubled, however, that SE2d 66) (2019) (denying motion for sanctions under Court of Appeals Rule 7 (e) (2), having granted application for discretionary appeal and vacating the order at issue).
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Lynch submitted to this Court an Appellee's Brief, completely ignoring the second of two arguments that Wife raised in her Appellant's Brief and Application for Discretionary Review (wherein Wife pointed out the two fictitious cases in the trial issues of fact.").
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court's order),14and provided 11 bogus case citations15out of 15 total,16one of which was in support of a frivolous request for attorney fees.
Therefore, we impose a $2,500 frivolous motion penalty on Lynch, which is the most the law allows, pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 7 (e) (2).17We have no
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information regarding why Appellee's Brief repeatedly cites to nonexistent cases and can only speculate that the Brief may have been prepared by AI.
2. As to Wife's argument that the trial court erred by denying her petition to reopen case, we are unable to conduct meaningful review of that ruling. In the Appellee's Brief, Husband argues that the superior court's factual findings are not reviewable because Wife failed to cause a transcript of the court's hearing to be included with the Record on Appeal.
It is true that "where an appeal is taken which draws in question the transcript of the evidence and proceedings, it shall be the duty of the appellant to have the transcript prepared at the appellant's expense."18Thus, the general rule is that "in the absence of a transcript or legal substitute for a transcript, "there is no evidence before [the appellate] court and the judgment of the trial court on evidentiary matters cannot be reviewed." However, this rule is based on the presumption that trial courts follow $2,500 against any party and/or a party's counsel in any civil case in which there is a direct appeal, application for discretionary appeal, application for interlocutory appeal, or motion that is determined to be frivolous."); see also Court of Appeals Rule 7 (a) (inherent power of Court).
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the law, and that presumption can be rebutted.19"[T]he absence of a transcript does not authorize such presumption of correctness when the record plainly shows harmful error."20
In this case, Wife has rebutted the presumption of regularity by pointing out that both of the cases cited in the order denying her petition to reopen do not exist.21 Because the order denying her motion to set aside the divorce decree has a defect apparent on its face, we cannot conduct any meaningful appellate review of the merits of Wife's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over her person.22Accordingly,
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we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The superior court is specifically directed to hold a new hearing on Wife's motion to set aside the divorce decree.
3. In sum, we vacate the superior court's order and remand for further proceedings, including a new hearing on Wife's motion to reopen. We also impose a $2,500 penalty against Lynch. This penalty shall constitute a money judgment in favor of Wife (Nimat Shahid) against Husband's attorney (Diana Lynch), and the trial court is directed to enter judgment in such amount upon return of the remittitur in this case.23
Judgment vacated and case remanded. Barnes, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. Appendix.
The following is a list of fictitious cases included in Appellee's Brief:
• In the Interest of J. M. B., 296 Ga. 786 (2015) consider it.").
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• Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274 (702 SE2d 888) (2010)24
• Brown v. Brown, 264 Ga. 48 (1994)
• Walker v. Georgia, 309 Ga. 749 (2021)
• Ramos v. Ramos, 279 Ga. 487 (2005)
• McRae v. McRae, 263 Ga. 303 (1993)
• Johnson v. Johnson, 285 Ga. 408 (2009) Appellee's Brief also contains four citations to real cases that have nothing to do with the proposition stated:
• Blasingame v. Blasingame, 249 Ga. 791 (294 SE2d 519) (1982)25
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• Wilson v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 728 (2007)26
• Brown v. Tomlinson, 246 Ga. 513 (1980)27
• Jones v. State, 277 Ga. 36 (2003)28 Husband's Response to Wife's Petition to Reopen Case provides citations to seven cases, none of which appear to exist. In addition to the two hallucinated cases that made it into the trial court's order, the Response cites the following non-existent cases:
• Fleming v. Floyd, 237 Ga. 76 (226 SE2d 601) (1976)
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• Christie v. Christie, 277 Ga. 27 (586 SE2d 57) (2003)
• Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. App. 320 (342 SE2d 780) (1986)
• Robinson v. Robinson, 277 Ga. 75 (586 SE2d 316) (2003)
• Reynolds v. Reynolds, 288 Ga. App. 688 (2008)
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