BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 329 (2d ed. 1902)). "An appeal from denial of a CR 60(b) motion is limited to the propriety of the denial not the impropriety of the underlying judgment." Bjurstom v. Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 450-51, 618 P.2d 533 (1980). An "unappealed final judgment cannot be restored to an appellate track by
19
means of moving to vacate and appealing the denial of the motion." State v. Gaut, 111 Wn. App. 875, 881, 46 P.3d 832 (2002). "The exclusive procedure to attack an allegedly defective judgment is by appeal from the judgment, not by appeal from a denial of a CR 60(b) motion." Bjurstom, 27 Wn. App. at 451 (citing De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1977), overruled in part by United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354 (1981)).
Generally, arguments addressing the propriety of the judgment would not be considered because they are not appropriate for appeal. See id. In that case, and absent another reason that the denial of a CR 60 motion was in error, an appellate court would affirm the default judgment. See id. Exceptions to this rule exist for issues affecting constitutional rights, a trial court's jurisdiction, and we may exercise our discretion to resolve any issue as justice may require. RAP 12.2 ("The appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the decision being reviewed and take any other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require."); State v. Santos, 104 Wn.2d 142, 145- 46, 702 P.2d 1179 (1985). Though the landlord did not raise this issue, we exercise our RAP 12.2 discretion and reach the tenant's arguments on the underlying judgment in order to provide guidance to trial courts considering the indigent tenant's right to counsel and procedures implementing that right. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that default was improperly entered. Accordingly, the default ruling is reversed and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
20
3. The landlord is not entitled to appellate attorney fees The landlord seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1(1), RCW 59.18.410(1), and .290(3). See Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 17, 462 P.3d 869
(2020).
RAP 18.1(a) allows a party to recover reasonable attorney fees and expenses provided the party "request[s] the fees or expenses" and "applicable law grants to a party the right to recover." The party must do so in a separate section of their opening brief. RAP 18.1(b). Courts award attorney fees to the prevailing party "'only on the basis of a private agreement, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity.'" Tedford, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 17 (quoting Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 497, 506, 761 P.2d 77 (1988)). RCW 59.18.410(1) provides for reasonable attorney fees as provided in RCW 59.18.290(3), which states, "Where the court has entered a judgment in favor of the landlord restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the landlord."
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court erred in entering the default judgment order. See RCW 59.18.410(1), .290(3). The landlord has not shown that applicable law permits recovery of fees and expenses under RAP 18.1(a). Accordingly, we deny the landlord's request for attorney fees on appeal.5
21
CONCLUSION
RCW 59.18.365(3) directs tenants to respond in writing to the eviction summons with a "notice of appearance." A tenant who responds "will be notified of [their] hearing date in a document called an 'Order to Show Cause.'" RCW 59.18.365(3). The tenant in this case filed a written notice of response by the deadline listed on the summons. The tenant complied with the eviction summons. The trial court therefore erred in entering a default judgment based on the tenant's failure to answer.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's entry of default and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
entering money judgment against a tenant who had not been personally served). Because we deny the landlord's attorney fee request under RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 59.18.410(1), and we have only the tenant's briefing on issue, we decline to address it.
22
_______________________________
WE CONCUR: