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Case Summary: U.S. Bank National Association v. Frances L. Mack n/k/a Frances L. Mack-Marion

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property in 2001 and took out a new mortgage. In 2020, Respondent U.S. Bank National Association, as successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings. In response, Mack-Marion asserted several counterclaims, including a request for a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from pursuing the equitable remedy of foreclosure because the 2001 mortgage loan closed without attorney supervision (relying on Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer).

The Master-in-Equity granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim on two independent grounds: (1) the Master concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, interpreting Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine whether conduct amounted to the unauthorized practice of law; and (2) alternatively, the Master concluded the claim failed to state a cause of action because the mortgage in question was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed; the case was certified to the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether circuit courts (and Masters-in-Equity sitting by reference) have subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action that include factual allegations of the unauthorized practice of law, or whether such matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
  2. What procedure should be followed when a novel question arises about whether certain conduct constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
  3. Whether, on the merits, Matrix Financial Services Corp. v. Frazer bars a lender from equitable relief for loans closed without attorney supervision when the mortgage was recorded prior to Matrix's effective date (i.e., whether the complaint states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Mack-Marion sought declaratory relief that U.S. Bank was barred from equitable foreclosure because the 2001 mortgage closed without attorney supervision, invoking Matrix.
  • She also asked the Court to reconsider Matrix and apply it retroactively to loans closed without attorney supervision regardless of the recording date.

Respondent's Arguments

  • U.S. Bank moved to dismiss Mack-Marion's declaratory judgment claim. One ground the Master relied upon was that the Master (and circuit court) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide claims intertwined with allegations of unauthorized practice of law, based on Hambrick.
  • As an alternative ground, U.S. Bank argued the claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because Matrix's remedy applies only prospectively and Mack-Marion's mortgage was recorded before Matrix's effective date; thus Matrix does not bar equitable foreclosure here.

Amicus Curiae

The opinion notes the participation of amicus curiae on behalf of the American Legal & Financial Network, but the opinion does not contain a detailed account of the amicus arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer, 394 S.C. 134, 714 S.E.2d 532 (2011) Holds lenders are not entitled to equitable remedies to enforce mortgage loans that closed without attorney supervision (subject to Court's remedy). The Court reiterated Matrix bars lenders from equitable relief when loans closed without attorney supervision, but emphasized Matrix's remedy operates prospectively only; therefore mortgages recorded before August 8, 2011 remain enforceable in equity. Applied to conclude Mack-Marion's mortgage (recorded before that date) did not bar U.S. Bank from foreclosure.
Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 370 S.C. 118, 634 S.E.2d 5 (Ct. App. 2006) Interpreted earlier decisions to mean the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law; applied an "intertwined" test to preclude certain claims. The Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action that include factual allegations of the unauthorized practice of law, and rejected the "intertwined" test Hambrick applied.
Rish v. Rish, 443 S.C. 220, 904 S.E.2d 862 (2024) Corrected prior cases that imprecisely and inaccurately referred to different procedural and substantive rules as limitations on a court's "subject matter jurisdiction." Cited as supporting authority for correcting Hambrick's mischaracterization of jurisdictional limitations.
State v. Price, 441 S.C. 423, 895 S.E.2d 633 (2023) Similar correction concerning misstatements about subject matter jurisdiction in prior cases. Cited to support the Court's correction of prior misdescriptions of subject matter jurisdiction.
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by South Carolina Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 123 (1992) The Court declined to adopt proposed rules and instructed that questions whether conduct constitutes the unauthorized practice of law should be determined in the context of actual cases or controversies; invited interested persons to bring declaratory judgment actions in the Court's original jurisdiction when novel issues arise. The Court explained this decision was not intended to confer exclusive subject matter jurisdiction on the Supreme Court over all claims involving unauthorized practice allegations; rather, it reserved original jurisdiction to resolve novel questions. The Court reaffirmed the appropriate procedure for novel questions (file declaratory action in the Court's original jurisdiction).
Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 560 S.E.2d 612 (2002) Holds there is no private right of action for the unauthorized practice of law in South Carolina; accepted a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a novel question. The Court reaffirmed Linder's holding that there is no independent civil cause of action for unauthorized practice of law, but clarified that conduct including unauthorized practice may be evidence relevant to existing civil remedies; Linder supports staying trial court litigation where a novel question is presented and petitioning the Supreme Court.
Seels v. Smalls, 437 S.C. 167, 877 S.E.2d 351 (2022) States subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Cited for the standard of review applicable to the jurisdictional question.
Medlock v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 404 S.C. 25, 743 S.E.2d 830 (2013) Referenced for the procedure that novel unauthorized practice questions should be presented to the Court's original jurisdiction. Cited to support the Court's guidance on filing declaratory judgment actions in original jurisdiction for novel questions.
In re S.C. NAACP Hous. Advoc. Program, 442 S.C. 189, 897 S.E.2d 691 (2024); Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 420 S.C. 452, 803 S.E.2d 707 (2017) General principle: the Court has declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of the unauthorized practice of law and resolves those matters case-by-case. Cited to illustrate the Court's longstanding approach of declining to define the unauthorized practice of law comprehensively and resolving such questions in context.
BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder, 398 S.C. 619, 731 S.E.2d 547 (2012) Reaffirmed that Matrix's remedy was prospective only and clarified that mortgages recorded before August 8, 2011, would be enforceable in a court of equity. Applied to determine that Mack-Marion's mortgage was recorded before August 8, 2011; thus Matrix does not bar equitable foreclosure and the Master properly dismissed the declaratory claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on that alternative ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main parts: jurisdictional analysis and alternative disposition on the pleadings.

Jurisdictional analysis:

  • The Court reviewed the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, noting the broad original jurisdiction of the circuit courts as general trial courts under the South Carolina Constitution and that a Master-in-Equity has the same authority as a circuit judge when matters are referred (Rule 53(c), SCRCP).
  • The Court explained the Supreme Court's constitutional and statutory authority to regulate the practice of law, and recounted its prior practice of resolving questions about the unauthorized practice of law either in the context of an actual case or, for novel questions, by accepting declaratory judgment actions in the Court's original jurisdiction (citing In re Unauthorized Practice of Law and related decisions).
  • The Court analyzed Linder, which accepted a declaratory judgment in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction on a novel question and held that there is no private cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law. The Court stressed that Linder did not intend to deprive trial courts of jurisdiction to decide civil causes of action that include factual allegations of unauthorized practice.
  • The Court concluded Hambrick was wrongly decided to the extent it treated the presence of allegations of unauthorized practice as stripping circuit courts of subject matter jurisdiction and adopting an "intertwined" test to preclude related claims. The Supreme Court overruled that aspect of Hambrick and held circuit courts (and Masters-in-Equity) have subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action that include factual allegations of the unauthorized practice of law. Trial courts may also adjudicate equitable actions and contempt motions where the conduct has already been characterized by this Court as unauthorized practice.
  • The Court clarified procedure: when a genuinely novel question arises about whether particular conduct constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, the parties should file a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction; if such a question arises during litigation, the trial court should stay the action pending resolution by the Supreme Court.

Alternative disposition (Rule 12(b)(6) analysis):

  • Even though the Master erred in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court considered U.S. Bank's alternative ground that the claim fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP.
  • The Court reiterated the holding of Matrix that lenders who closed loans without attorney supervision may be barred from equitable remedies, but emphasized Matrix's remedy was prospective only. The Court cited BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder, which clarified that mortgages recorded before August 8, 2011, would remain enforceable in equity.
  • Mack-Marion's mortgage was recorded before August 8, 2011. Therefore, even accepting the alleged unauthorized practice of law, Matrix does not bar U.S. Bank from seeking equitable foreclosure on this mortgage. As a result, Mack-Marion failed to state a viable claim that would entitle her to the requested declaratory relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held (1) that circuit courts and Masters-in-Equity have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate civil causes of action that include factual allegations of the unauthorized practice of law (overruling Hambrick to the contrary), and (2) that the Master's dismissal of Mack-Marion's declaratory judgment claim was nonetheless proper under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP because Matrix's equitable bar applies prospectively and Mack-Marion's mortgage was recorded before Matrix's effective date. The Court affirmed the Master's order as modified.

Implications:

  • The Supreme Court overruled the portion of Hambrick that held circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over civil claims involving allegations of the unauthorized practice of law, restoring trial courts' authority to hear such cases.
  • The Court reaffirmed Linder's core holding that South Carolina does not recognize an independent private cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law; however, allegations or evidence of unauthorized practice may be relevant to and admissible in existing civil remedies (e.g., fraud, unjust enrichment) if the plaintiff can show proximate damage from the conduct.
  • The Court clarified the procedure for novel questions about unauthorized practice: those questions should be presented to the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction via declaratory judgment actions; trial courts should stay litigation when a novel question is pending before the Supreme Court.
  • On the specific dispute, because the mortgage was recorded before August 8, 2011, Matrix does not bar U.S. Bank from equitable foreclosure, and no retroactive application of Matrix was warranted.

Disposition: AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. Kittredge, C.J., Few, James, and Acting Justice Donald W. Beatty, concurred.

U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, as successor to U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee, for Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-C, Respondent, v. Frances L. Mack n/k/a Frances L. Mack-Marion, Appellant.

HILL, JUSTICE

Heard May 22, 2024

Appeal From Orangeburg County James B. Jackson, Jr., Master-in-Equity.

Andrew Sims Radeker, of Radeker Law, P.A., of Columbia, for Appellant.

M. McMullen Taylor and David Shelton Kershaw, both of Riley Pope & Laney, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Chad Wilson Burgess and Mary Winter Clark Dawson, of Brock & Scott, PLLC; Reginald Patrick Corley and Jordan Daniel Beumer, of Scott & Corley, P.A.; and John Judson Hearn, of Rogers Townsend, LLC, all of Columbia, as Amicus Curiae for American Legal & Financial Network.

HILL, JUSTICE

Appellant Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property in 2001, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, Respondent U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), started foreclosure proceedings against Mack-Marion. Mack-Marion asserted several counterclaims in response-one of which sought a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from the equitable remedy of foreclosure because the 2001 mortgage loan closed without attorney supervision. See Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer, 394 S.C. 134, 140, 714 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2011) (holding lenders are not entitled to equitable remedies to enforce mortgage loans that close without attorney supervision). The Master granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss, relying on two grounds. First the Master ruled it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Mack-Marion's declaratory judgment claim. The Master interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 370 S.C. 118, 124-25, 634 S.E.2d 5, 8-9 (Ct. App. 2006) to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a party has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Second, the Master ruled that, even if it had jurisdiction, Mack-Marion failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim because the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and we granted her motion to certify the appeal to this Court.

Today, we overrule Hambrick to the extent it holds South Carolina circuit courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear causes of action involving allegations of the unauthorized practice of law. See Rish v. Rish, 443 S.C. 220, 224, 904 S.E.2d 862, 864 (2024) (correcting "our prior cases that imprecisely and inaccurately referred to different procedural and substantive rules as limitations on a court's 'subject matter jurisdiction'"); State v. Price, 441 S.C. 423, 434 n. 4, 895 S.E.2d 633, 638 n. 4 (2023) (same). We also clarify the procedure a party should follow when a claim involves the unauthorized practice of law. Finally, we reaffirm that Matrix only applies prospectively. Accordingly, we hold the Master had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mack-Marion's declaratory judgment claim and properly dismissed it under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. We therefore affirm as modified.

I.

In Hambrick, the court of appeals interpreted our decisions in In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by South Carolina Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 305, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992)- where the Court held the definition of the unauthorized practice of law would be determined on a case by case basis-and Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 497, 560 S.E.2d 612, 623 (2002)-where the Court held there is no private right of action for the unauthorized practice of law in South Carolina-as depriving the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear any of the Hambricks' claims. We now clarify In re Unauthorized Practice of Law and Linder do not alter the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts to determine civil causes of action that may include allegations of conduct involving the unauthorized practice of law.

The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Seels v. Smalls, 437 S.C. 167, 172, 877 S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (2022). The South Carolina circuit court is a "general trial court with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases[.]" S.C. Const. art. V, § 11. Upon reference, a Master-in-Equity has the same power and authority that a circuit judge sitting without a jury would have in a similar matter. Rule 53(c), SCRCP.

South Carolina constitutional and statutory law grant this Court the duty to regulate the practice of law in this state. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10 (2011). In 1991, the South Carolina Bar submitted a set of proposed rules governing the unauthorized practice of law in South Carolina to the Court. In re Unauthorized Prac. of L., 309 S.C. at 305, 422 S.E.2d at 124. We chose not to adopt the rules, reasoning the better course is to determine "what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context of an actual case or controversy." Id. Recognizing the elusiveness of a comprehensive definition of what amounts to practicing law, we have declined to give one. In re S.C. NAACP Hous. Advoc. Program, 442 S.C. 189, 198, 897 S.E.2d 691, 695 (2024); Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 420 S.C. 452, 46061, 803 S.E.2d 707, 711-12 (2017); Medlock v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 404 S.C. 25, 28, 743 S.E.2d 830, 831 (2013). We have directed that, where it is unclear whether a person has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, "any interested individual who becomes aware of such conduct" should "bring a declaratory judgment action in this Court's original jurisdiction to determine the validity of the conduct." In re Unauthorized Prac. of L., 309 S.C. at 307, 422 S.E.2d at 125. This invitation by the Court was not intended to grant us exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any cause of action that included allegations of the unauthorized practice of law. Rather, the Court was signaling it would accept a declaratory judgment action in our original jurisdiction when the action involves a novel issue regarding what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. See Rule 245(a), SCACR.

The Court considered such a declaratory judgment action in Linder. In Linder, the novel question of whether the conduct of a public insurance adjuster constituted the unauthorized practice of law arose in the midst of a contract dispute. 348 S.C. at 481, 560 S.E.2d at 615. Because of the presence of this novel question, the trial court prudently stayed the litigation so the parties could petition this Court to determine whether the adjuster's actions constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Consistent with In re Unauthorized Practice of Law, we accepted the parties' declaratory judgment action in our original jurisdiction. The Linders also asked this Court to recognize a private right of action for the unauthorized practice of law. We declined to do so. Id. at 496-97, 560 S.E.2d at 622-23.

In Hambrick, the Hambricks alleged their mortgage lender charged them for "legal fees" when there was no lawyer involved in the transaction. 370 S.C. at 121, 634 S.E.2d at 6. The Hambrick Court held that, because the plaintiff's causes of action were "intertwined" with the mortgage lender's unauthorized practice of law in closing the loan without an attorney present, even the Hambricks' unjust enrichment claim based on the fee scam was precluded by Linder. The court of appeals also rejected the Hambricks' argument that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the unjust enrichment claim because this Court had already declared that the conduct at issue (closing a loan without a lawyer) constituted the unauthorized practice of law.

Hambrick was wrongly decided. While the court of appeals did not err in finding the Hambricks could not recover damages from their mortgage lender merely because their mortgage closed without an attorney (a private cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law), it did err in finding the Hambricks' unjust enrichment claim failed because it was "intertwined" with allegations that the defendant's conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 124, 634 S.E.2d at 8 ("Every allegation in the complaint ultimately stems from the Hambricks's assertion that Ditech engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the loan transaction."). We accordingly overrule the Hambrick "intertwined" test and hold circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil causes of action that include factual allegations of the unauthorized practice of law. The circuit courts may also adjudicate equitable actions and contempt motions that involve conduct this court has already deemed to constitute the unlawful practice of law. The Master therefore erred in dismissing Mack-Marion's claim on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

However, we reaffirm Linder's holding that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law. A party must show something more than the unauthorized practice of law to have a valid claim. Although there is no independent civil cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law, a party who has been proximately damaged by conduct that includes the unauthorized practice of law may still avail himself of any appropriate existing civil remedy. The mere fact that the conduct includes the alleged unauthorized practice of law will not defeat recovery, and evidence of such conduct is admissible. For example, one who has lost money or property due to actions of a fraudster may still pursue a civil action for fraud, even if the fraud was accomplished or accompanied by actions amounting to the unauthorized practice of law. If these actions reflect conduct that we have previously deemed the unauthorized practice of law, the trial court shall proceed and resolve the case like any other. But we will continue to resolve novel issues of whether conduct involves the unauthorized practice of law in our original jurisdiction.

We clarify that, when there is a novel question regarding whether an unlicensed individual has engaged in activities that should only be conducted by a member of the South Carolina Bar, the parties should file a declaratory judgment action in the Court's original jurisdiction. Medlock, 404 S.C. at 28, 743 S.E.2d at 831. If this novel question surfaces in the midst of litigation, the trial court should stay the action until this Court decides the declaratory judgment action. We anticipate such novel questions will rarely arise, given the ample precedent available to guide our trial courts.

II.

As an alternative sustaining ground, U.S. Bank contends the Master correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim for failure to state of cause of action. See Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. We agree.

Matrix bars a lender from "the benefit of equitable remedies when that lender failed to have attorney supervision during the loan process as required by our law," but only after the effective date of that opinion. Matrix, 394 S.C. at 140, 714 S.E.2d at 535. In BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Kinder, 398 S.C. 619, 624, 731 S.E.2d 547, 550 (2012), we reaffirmed the prospective-only nature of the remedy issued in Matrix and clarified that mortgages recorded before August 8, 2011 would be enforceable in a court of equity. Mack-Marion's mortgage at issue here was recorded before August 8, 2011. Therefore, regardless of Mack-Marion's lender's alleged unauthorized practice of law, U.S. Bank is not barred from the equitable remedy of foreclosure.

Mack-Marion asks us to readdress Matrix and declare it applies retroactively to any loans closed without an attorney supervision, regardless of the recording date. We see no sound reason to do so.

Accordingly, the Master's order dismissing Mack-Marion's declaratory judgment claim is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KITTREDGE, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ, and Acting Justice Donald W Beatty, concur.

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U.S. Bank v. Mack
(Jan 23, 2025)