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BIGGS CARDOSA ASSOCIATES INC. AND MAHVASH HARMS, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CHRISTOPHER BRADBURY, Defendant and Appellant.

BIGGS CARDOSA ASSOCIATES INC. AND MAHVASH HARMS, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CHRISTOPHER BRADBURY, Defendant and Appellant. H031633 California Court of Appeal, Sixth District May 29, 2009

         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

         Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. CV045807

          Duffy, J.

         Acting in propria persona, Christopher Bradbury appeals from the $106,300 judgment entered against him after a jury concluded that he had breached a severance contract with his former employer, Biggs Cardosa Associates, Inc., by disparaging Biggs and his former supervisor, Mahvash Harms, in internet postings and e-mail communications with third parties. But without clearly articulated claims of error from which we can ascertain Bradbury’s actual contentions, without reasoned or cogent legal argument in his briefs, and further without a reporter’s transcript of the trial or pertinent other components of an adequate appellate record, we are not in a position to review the merits of Bradbury’s claims and we accordingly affirm the judgment. Bradbury purports to also be appealing from the trial court’s post-trial order concerning permanent injunctive relief. But he has not appealed from this separately appealable order and it is thus beyond the scope of our review.

         STATEMENT OF THE CASE

         I. Factual Background

For background and context only, we take the underlying facts largely from the complaint and exhibits attached thereto and from what apparently were offered as trial exhibits. We are left to do so because of the absence of reporter’s transcript of the trial testimony or an indication in the record of what documents were actually admitted into evidence at trial.

         Biggs is a structural engineering firm and Harms is one of its principals. For about three years and four months, Bradbury was employed by Biggs as a staff engineer until his employment was terminated on April 29, 2004 under a Separation Agreement and Release. Under the Agreement, Bradbury received $6,300 in severance pay and released and waived all claims against Biggs (and its directors, officers, employees, and agents, among others, which would presumably include Harms) relating to his employment, including those unknown claims as covered by Civil Code section 1542. He also agreed not to at any time “commence, maintain or prosecute any action,... complaint, claim, grievance or charge with any court, administrative agency, arbitrator or any other body or person....” And both parties agreed not to “make any disparaging comments about the other to any third party” except for “responses to any governmental agency or court inquiries, or testimony under oath.”

         On August 18, 2004, Bradbury sent an e-mail to 18 recipients, including educators, other engineers, newspaper writers, and others. The e-mail’s subject line was “I Have a Really Funny San Francisco Bay Area Weather Story to Tell You” and its text suggested that Biggs had improperly designed a building. After making this suggestion, it said, “Well folks, I decided to alert my boss about this issue. After all, you wouldn’t want your building to fall down after that spring thaw, would you? Well, my Iranian boss, Mahvash Harms, principal of the San Jose-based structural engineering firm of Biggs Cardosa Associates calls me into her office and tells me that ‘[s]now loads don’t matter!’ I’m so excited I have it on tape! I don’t know about you, folks, but rain turning to snow was something I learned in 8th grade science class. After all, roof collapses aren’t something you want, especially during a blizzard like the one that occurred in New York back in 1977. If [Biggs] can’t understand something [as] simple as weather, how can they design a building in an earthquake-prone place like the Bay Area? [¶] As many people out there may not know, [Biggs] is one of the firms selected to design the BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) extension from Fremont to San Jose. Recently, yours truly was told by [Biggs] that I was too efficient for their company. What does that mean for you folks out there? It means that [Biggs] can use their stupidity to ring up the BART project like banks ring up fees on fake [free-]checking. After that incident, it’s no wonder that Mahvash Harms is known to people as the dumbest Iranian.” [¶] After that incident, I left [Biggs] and worked at a better company paying much more.”

         When Biggs learned of the e-mail, it retained counsel, Andrew Castricone of Gordon & Rees LLP, who requested Bradbury to retract the e-mail and to refrain from further disparaging or tortious activities in violation of the Agreement. On September 1, 2004, Bradbury apparently responded by an e-mail directed to Biggs’s counsel, which was also copied to the recipients of his prior e-mail. This e-mail said to Castricone in part, “I must formally apologize for taking this story too far. I understand you are doing your job as a lawyer. I should have left out the name of the employer as well as my comments about ethnicity. I got a little carried away....” To Harms, the e-mail said in part, “Mahvash Harms, if you are reading this, I took it a little too far on you and harmed your reputation in a way you did not deserve. I embellished the story a little bit. I didn’t mean to use racism when I stated your ethnicity.... Mahvash, I should at least have left your name out of this.” To the third-party recipients of his prior e-mail, Bradbury’s second e-mail said in part, “As for this weather & snow load e[-]mail, folks, please do not forward it to anyone. I’m sorry for embellishing this story and hope to earn your trust again with reliable information. If some of you like the story, I will write an anonymous version of the story for which Andrew [Castricone] & Mahvash Harms will review and approve (with a comical ending, of course) before sending. This will have no mention of the firm itself because it is defamation. Folks, it will appear just like one of those letters to the editor without the firm name.”

         Twelve days later, on September 13, 2004, Bradbury sent another e-mail to the same recipients. This one said in part, “Please be advised that the e[-]mail message I previously forwarded to you entitled “I Have a Really Funny San Francisco Bay Area Weather Story to Tell You” was intended to be humorous, rather than a statement of fact. I now realize that the tone and content of the message contains racial slurs, and is also defamatory and disparaging of both [Biggs] and [Harms]. [¶] In reality, the design I mentioned was completed with the correct load capacity, and I have no criticisms of the firm’s or Ms. Harms’ qualifications and capabilities. This story was only intended as a lesson to others so they won’t make the same mistake again. I meant them no ill will, apologize for any harm to their reputation, and hereby retract the statement in its entirety. [¶] There has also been some misunderstanding to the public in general. Many people have asked whether my previous employer has placed a gag order on me. For the past two weeks, it has been the most discussed topic in New York State! And I must answer back. After all, you don’t want people to assume the worst from my silence. And with silence, there is plenty of talk to go around. I want to assure you that the only gag order is not to mention my old company or to defame them. [¶] I will not be repeating this story and request that it be deleted from your computers, and that it not be forwarded or shared with anyone else.”

         According to Biggs, four days later and despite his previous retraction, Bradbury made similar disparaging comments about Biggs and Harms at a trade show. This prompted Biggs’s counsel to again remind him of his contractual obligation to refrain from this activity.

         Some five months later and using the pseudonym “Triple X,” Bradbury posted an entry on the internet website www.rip-offreport.com entitled “[Biggs] Hires Lawyers to tell Ex-Employees Not to Talk to Family Members.” The piece referred to the same events as the previous e-mails and included other similar disparaging statements against Biggs and Harms. It included statements such as, “Folks, you might want to think twice before working for or hiring this firm” and “Also, [Biggs] was awarded the preliminary design for the BART extension into San Jose. The reason he got rid of me is so that he could hire younger engineers making more mistakes and charging more money on the projects. Think of it as a way to get more money easily instead of saving the client money. [Biggs] will see the BART extension as their new cash cow and will try to milk it” as well as “If I were a client, I wouldn’t hire them because [of] the way they treat their clients and their ex-employees.” Regarding Harms, the post said, among other things that she “is a real doozy, folks. She’s Iranian and as President Bush claims, is a citizen of Iran, an axis of evil. Seems like her only duty is to ring up the fees on engineering projects so she can claim that large share of profit sharing” and “She’s a lying liar, a macrobitch with a microbrain, an undercover agent of the CIA, the Center of Idiot Americans.”

         On March 8, 2005, Biggs’s counsel again contacted Bradbury to advise him that he was yet again in breach of the Separation Agreement and Release, to demand that he refrain from further actionable conduct, and that he return the severance payment with interest. According to Biggs, Bradbury did not respond but instead apparently showed up at Biggs’s offices, leaving only after several requests.

         Biggs and Harms filed this action on July 25, 2005, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, defamation (slander), defamation (libel), and intentional and negligent interference with economic advantage. Bradbury retained counsel and answered the complaint by general denial with affirmative defenses that did not include anything about the Agreement being entered into under duress. The defenses did include allegations that the contract was induced by fraud.

         In November 2005, in response to Bradbury’s request for a settlement demand, Biggs’s counsel wrote Bradbury’s counsel a letter containing a settlement proposal. After receiving a copy of the letter, Bradbury posted another piece on www.rip-offreport.com entitled “[Biggs] Sues Former Hardworking Employees and Forces Them to Declare Bankruptcy After They Leave The Company.” The post included statements such as: (1) “Folks, I worked a hard three years for these idiots and now I have to pay their lawyer over $16,000 & $7,000 of my money in lawyers’ fees for talking about snow and for talking to my brother-in-law;” (2) “I guess [Steve] Biggs Laden doesn’t remember these things. He’s suffering from rolling mental blackouts, in my opinion;” (3) “Also, the public is finding out as they should because they believe they should never do business with B[iggs] C[ardosa] A[ssociates]. I think BCA=Be Careful Anyone;” (4) “Also, many people may not know that [Biggs] president Steve Biggs donates money to candidates who violate democracy;” and (5) “This complaint gets updated and retracted when Moron Sleaze [Gordon & Rees LLP] and Biggs-iot Car-bozo drop[] their lawsuit against me. I want to owe nothing for talking to my family. Biggs Cardosa sucks. But I guess people are going to find out, so the campaign continues.”

         On January 20, 2006, Bradbury updated his last internet post on www.rip-offreport.com with a rebuttal entitled “Does this sound familiar? Just an opinion on the head of the company.”

         On February 5, 2006, Bradbury again updated his previous internet posting, this time with the title “Free Speech Quote for Complaint.”

         On February 13, 2006, Biggs’s counsel was notified that Bradbury had made a threat of workplace violence directed at him. The threat was contained in a letter from Bradbury to his own counsel. It said, “Personal comment: I guess that Andrew [Castricone] must like workplace shootings because I cannot even discuss this situation with my family.” In response, Castricone’s law firm, Gordon & Rees LLP, sought and obtained injunctive relief from the San Francisco and Santa Clara County superior courts prohibiting violence or threats of violence by Bradbury against Stephen Biggs, Mark Cardosa, Harms, and Biggs’s attorneys.

Bradbury appears to have terminated the attorney-client relationship with his former attorney by letter dated February 4, 2006. He has subsequently represented himself in this litigation both here and in the court below.

         On May 11, 2006, Bradbury again added a “rebuttal” to his November 2005 internet posting. This was entitled “Check Out Who [Biggs] is Linked To.” The post included links to various other websites and suggested that Stephen Biggs had associated with “some crooked politicians under investigation.”

         Two weeks later, on May 26, 2006, Bradbury added yet another rebuttal. This one referred to the restraining orders and was entitled “[Biggs] Uses Their Attorneys to Keep Former Employees from Working, Eating, or Seeking Medical Attention.” The post said in part, “Folks: [¶] Biggs-iot Car-bozo is at it again. They have done the most heinous thing ever to a former employee. Without provocation, they filed papers with the court so their former employees can’t go to work, see their doctors, or even eat. If this is how they treated dedicated workers, can you imagine how they treat their clients? K2A Architects, Mark Thomas, Santa Clara County VTA, and VBN Architects may have inadvertently worked with these crooks. [¶] Plus, we’ll tell you how they inadvertently hurt the spouses of their own employees.”

         On June 3, 2006, Bradbury added yet another post entitled “[Biggs] Claims Defamation Against Former Employees for What Others Say” and another on July 18, 2006, entitled “[Biggs] Claims Defamation by a [Former] Employee Because of What [Someone] Says.” Each of these postings contained disparaging statements against Biggs or Harms.

         On August 15, 2006, Bradbury posted another update entitled “[Biggs] Sues Former Employee Who Saved Santa Clara County Lots of Money on Retrofitting the County Courthouses.” This post said, “Mahvash Harms did the most amazing thing. She wants employees to work hard. Then after performing the work, she fires them along with Steve Biggs-Laden. [¶]... [¶] Folks, I saw the public document and I couldn’t believe how dumb [Biggs] is.... [¶] Folks, this [proves] that Mahvash Harms and her [Biggs] cronies will do anything to destroy hard-working professional engineers. It’s so bad they’d ruin their careers if they could. [¶] After all, [Biggs] used their attorneys at the San Francisco based law firm of Gordon & Rees headed by attorney Andrew Castricone, more like Moron & Sleaze, to keep them from working or seeking medical attention. Plus, folks, if you’re going to sue someone, wouldn’t you sue the person who actually committed a crime?”

         Bradbury added an update to the posting on August 30, 2006, three more in September, and one more in October. They all were of the same flavor as the prior postings and contained additional rambling attacks against Biggs, Harms, and their attorneys.

Many of these internet postings are replete with offensive and disparaging language and attacks on Biggs, Harms, and their counsel. We give but a sampling here to provide a flavor of Bradbury’s voluminous cyber tirades.

         On November 25, 2006, Bradbury, using another pseudonym, sent an e-mail to various recipients that included some of Biggs’s clients. The e-mail’s subject line said, “[Biggs’s] Mahvash Harms Bad Company—Read the Ripoff Report for More Details.” The e-mail included direct links to www.rip-offreport.com and its text said in part, “Check these links about the unethical and immoral structural engineering firm named Biggs Cardosa Associates, headed by ultra-idiotic Iranian and San Jose State University alumnus Mahvash Movassat Harms. This bitch is so bad she fires hard-working employees and sues them in Santa Clara County Court after she fires them. She’s completely inferior. And now the whole world’s going to know.”

         As litigation proceeded in the trial court, Bradbury’s internet postings included his descriptions of various proceedings, including a settlement conference and pre-trial proceedings in which he had participated, and further rambling attacks against Biggs, Harms, and their attorneys.

         II. Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings

         At trial in April 2007, both sides submitted proposed jury instructions, Bradbury limiting his to various CACI form instructions and Biggs and Harms submitting both CACI and BAJI form instructions on various matters. Also at trial, Biggs and Harms voluntarily dismissed their tort claims and proceeded to try before a jury their claim for breach of contract. And according to Biggs, during trial, Bradbury continued to update his initial internet posting on www.rip-offreport.com, supplementing that with various postings on www.youtube.com, www.gabcast.com, and his own blog, http://biggscardosasucks.blogspot.com.

The record does not contain an indication of what instructions were ultimately given.

         The jury returned its special verdict against Bradbury in the amount of $106,300 and on April 19, 2007, judgment on the verdict was entered against him in this amount plus prejudgment interest. Bradbury filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on May 31, 2007. After trial, Biggs and Harms filed a memorandum of costs and moved for an award of contractual attorney fees. Bradbury opposed neither and an amended judgment was apparently filed nunc pro tunc on July 23, 2007 to add $4,935 in costs and $95,020 in fees to the amount of the judgment. Bradbury did not appeal from the amended judgment.

The judgment did not determine the right to fees and costs but included blank spaces with dollar symbols ($_____) for “costs and disbursements” and for attorney fees.

The amended judgment is not included in the record, nor is any order granting the motion for an award of fees.

         And because of Bradbury’s ongoing post-judgment conduct that continued to violate the Separation Agreement and Release, Biggs and Harms moved post-trial to permanently enjoin him from making further publications defaming or disparaging them in violation of the Agreement and directing him to “retract or delete existing postings, including postings made after the court entered a jury verdict against him....”

         Over Bradbury’s opposition, the court determined that “in spite of the Judgment against him, Bradbury continues to intentionally engage in a course of conduct which disparages [Biggs] and its employees” and that “Bradbury’s vitriolic letters and internet postings throughout this litigation (including the most recent ones) show great contempt for [Biggs]. The content of these documents contains more than just criticism of the competency of the company’s work or the treatment of its employees. The allegations are oftentimes offensive and insulting and are also troubling in that they on occasion not only refer to [Biggs] employees but to their family members as well.’ The court issued a permanent injunction on July 2, 2007 ordering Bradbury to “cease and desist from making any further statements, written or oral, in any forum or media, about [Biggs] in violation of the nondisparagement clause.... Mr. Bradbury may converse about any matter with his counsel, religious guide, or mental health care giver, so long as said individual agrees to keep any such communication confidential.” Bradbury did not appeal from the injunction.

         DISCUSSION

We preliminarily and generally observe that Bradbury’s 64-page opening brief fails to clearly articulate and analyze particular claims of error by processes of legal reasoning or to show any resulting prejudice from alleged errors.

         I. The Scope of Our Review

         Bradbury states in his opening brief that what is before us are “consolidated appeals” and that we are “asked to decide whether a contract between [Bradbury] and [Biggs] is legal and binding and whether a permanent injunction prohibiting [Bradbury] from discussing his bad experiences with his former employer [Biggs] is unlawful.”

         But Bradbury has only appealed from the judgment entered after jury verdict. He did not appeal from the post-trial injunctive order entered some two and a half months later, which is separately appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) & (6).) Accordingly, the scope of our review is limited to the judgment and does not include claims of error regarding the permanent injunction. And because the judgment determined liability on the complaint against Bradbury and the record does not reveal that Bradbury pursued any affirmative relief in the court below that was resolved by the judgment, the scope of our review does not extend to what appear to be Bradbury’s affirmative claims for relief argued on appeal—for damages for malicious prosecution or constructive discharge and for attorney fees or other relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.18 governing SLAPP back actions and remedies.

He did not appeal from the amended judgment that added costs and attorney fees to the judgment. Although it is not necessary to separately appeal from such a post-trial order where the right to be awarded fees and costs has already been determined by the initial judgment and all that remains to be decided is the amount of fees and costs (Grant v. List & Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 998; Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Patriot Homes, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 82, 84, fn. 1), Bradbury has not raised any contentions in briefing related to fees and costs. Accordingly, any such claims have been forfeited or waived.

         I. Bradbury Has Not Shown Reversible Error

         A. Bradbury’s Claims

         To the extent Bradbury has raised contentions on appeal that are within the scope of our review, and to the further extent we can ascertain these contentions, they are (1) that the court erroneously sustained evidentiary objections at trial; (2) that the court erred by instructing the jury in accordance with BAJI instructions offered by Biggs and Harms; and (3) that the evidence at trial did not support the jury’s determination that Bradbury breached a validly formed contract.

         B. Basic Principles of Appellate Review

         Before reaching these claims, it is important to observe here the fundamental rule of appellate review that the trial court’s judgment is presumed correct and further that it is the appellant’s burden to show prejudicial error. “All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Because the appellant carries the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness, it is necessary for the appellant to provide an adequate record to demonstrate the alleged error. The failure to do so requires that the issue be resolved against appellant. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [“if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed”]; Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 [argument is forfeited on appeal by failure to include transcript of hearing or copy of minute order].)

         It is also the appellant’s burden to present argument supported by relevant legal authority on each point raised. This requires more than simply stating a bare conclusion that the judgment, or any part of it, is erroneous and leaving it up to the appellate court to figure out why. It is not the court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with argument and citations to relevant authority, the court may treat the point as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 775 [issue deemed waived where appellants failed to support claim with argument, discussion, analysis, or citation to the record, or to include trial proceedings in the record].)

         Moreover, the arguments in an appellant’s briefs must include coherent analysis and discussion, supported by pertinent authority that discloses the course of logical or legal reasoning by which the appellant comes to the conclusions he or she wants us to adopt. (Berger v. California Insurance Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007.) And the arguments must “be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review.” (Sebago, Inc v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1388.) The failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review may be considered as a concession of a lack of merit. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.) “ ‘[I]t is an attempt to place upon the court the burden of discovering without assistance from appellant any weakness in the arguments of the respondent. An appellant is not permitted to evade or shift his [or her] responsibility in this manner.’ ” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 102.)

         As noted, Bradbury represents himself on appeal, as he did at trial below. Under the law, one may act as his or her own attorney if he or she so chooses but the rules of appellate review just discussed apply to all litigants without regard to the status of their legal representation. In other words, Bradbury is not exempt from the foregoing rules because he is representing himself on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) “ ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1247.) Accordingly, when a party appears in propria persona, he or she is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure and evidence as an attorney—no different, no better, no worse. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639; Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 156, 160-161.)

         C. Exclusion of Evidence

         As far as we can tell, Bradbury contends that the trial court erred by excluding unspecified evidence through the granting of unspecified motions in limine filed by Biggs and Harms and by sustaining unspecified evidentiary objections made on the grounds that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, § 352) or that it was hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

         Generally, appellate courts apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to any trial court ruling on the admissibility of evidence. (Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476.) “ ‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence... will not be disturbed [on appeal] except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice....’ [Citations.]” (San Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1419.) Further, “even where evidence is improperly excluded, the error is not reversible unless ‘ “it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached absent the error. [Citations.]” [Citation]’ [Citations.]” (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431-1432.)

         In short, Bradbury has failed to cite to any specific evidence in the record that was excluded or any specific ruling that he contends constituted error. He has further failed to address his claims in the context of the applicable standard of review or demonstrate that he preserved error in regard to the exclusion of evidence by providing a record that shows the requisite offers of proof. (Evid. Code, § 354; Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [offer of proof required in trial court to preserve claim that evidence was wrongly excluded].) But what’s more, without a reporter’s transcript of the trial that would include a record of the court’s rulings on specific items of evidence or motions in limine, we are not in a position to review any evidentiary rulings by evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in a particular way in a particular instance or in assessing prejudice. The record is simply inadequate to allow meaningful appellate review of claims of error in the exclusion of evidence. On this silent record therefore, the claimed errors, to the extent they are articulated, cannot be affirmatively shown. This default leads to the presumption of correctness and our consequent rejection of Bradbury’s unspecific claims that evidence was erroneously excluded at trial. (Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9; Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 498.)

         D. The Use of BAJI Jury Instructions

         Bradbury contends in effect that it was error per se for the court to have instructed the jury in accordance with unspecified BAJI instructions that Biggs and Harm had offered along with other CACI instructions.

CACI are the form civil jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council, first published in 2003. BAJI (Book of Approved Jury Instructions) instructions were routinely used as a form of standard jury instructions in civil cases before that. Likewise, CALCRIM are the form criminal instructions approved by the Judicial Council. These were first published in 2005 and were preceded by CALJIC (California Jury Instructions, Criminal) in terms of standard form instructions in criminal cases.

         Instructional error is prejudicial and constitutes ground for reversal only when likely to mislead the jury. Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial “ ‘where it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ ” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580.) In conducting our review of instructional error claims, “we must examine the evidence, the arguments, and other factors to determine whether it is reasonably probable that instructions allowing application of an erroneous theory actually misled the jury.” (Id. at p. 581, fn. 11.) “A ‘reasonable probability’ in this context ‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ [Citation.]” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 682.) Thus, in considering whether instructional error is harmless, “[w]e will not reverse a judgment unless ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) In the case of civil state law error, this standard is met when ‘there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’ [Citation.]” (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 939.) In other words, instructional error only constitutes grounds for reversal when, in light of the entire record, there was actual prejudice to the appealing party.

         Bradbury in essence contends that it is error per se for a trial court to give BAJI instead of CACI instructions to a jury. This contention is unfounded. As Biggs and Harms point out, while rule 2.1050(e) of the California Rules of Court encourages the use of CACI instructions, there is no authority that compels the use of only CACI instructions in civil cases or that forbids the use of BAJI or other valid instructions in a particular case. (People v. Thomas (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 461, 465-466 [no authority mandates use of CALCRIM instructions in criminal trial to the exclusion of CALJIC or other valid instructions].)

Rule 2.1050(e) of the California Rules of Court provides in part that the use of instructions approved by the Judicial Council is “strongly encouraged. If the latest edition of the jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council contains an instruction applicable to a case and the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, it is recommended that the judge use the Judicial Council instruction unless he or she finds that a different instruction would more accurately state the law and be understood by jurors. Whenever the latest edition of the Judicial Council jury instructions does not contain an instruction on a subject on which the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed, or when a Judicial Council instruction cannot be modified to submit the issue properly, the instruction given on that subject should be accurate, brief, understandable, impartial, and free from argument.”

         Moreover, Bradbury does not identify any particular instruction the content of which is argued to be legally erroneous. Nor did he provide a record from which we can ascertain what instructions were actually given or analyze whether, in light of all the evidence, a particular instruction was likely to mislead the jury and was prejudicial in that a result more favorable to Bradbury would have obtained absent the erroneous instruction. The lack of a clearly articulated claim of error, supported by reasoned legal argument and pertinent authorities framed in the context of the appropriate standard of review, coupled with an inadequate record, precludes meaningful appellate review of Bradbury’s claims of instructional error. Without providing these components basic to the review process, Bradbury cannot overcome the presumption of correctness that we assign to the judgment. We accordingly reject Bradbury’s claims of instructional error.

         E. Insufficient Evidence to Support Breach of a Valid and Enforceable Contract

         To the extent we can ascertain his claims, Bradbury contends that the evidence adduced at trial did not support the determination that he breached a validly formed and enforceable contract. He specifically contends that he entered into the Severance Agreement and Release under duress and as a result of undue influence and he concedes that whether he did so is a question of fact. He further contends that the evidence established that the Agreement violates public policy and is unconscionable, claims that without a reporter’s transcript, we cannot tell have been preserved. And he challenges the credibility of witnesses at trial, specifically asserting that they are “liars.” But all of these claims, whether preserved or not, suffer from the absence of an adequate record because they rest on the sufficiency or substantiality of the evidence adduced at trial to support the judgment. We generally review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims under the substantial evidence test, under which the trial court’s resolution of disputed issues of fact must be affirmed so long as supported by substantial evidence. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)

         It is the appellant’s burden to establish that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.) In meeting that burden, the appellant is charged with presenting an adequate record from which the error is demonstrated. (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1295.) In the case of an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her failure to provide a reporter’s transcript of the trial is fatal. “Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of an error. [Citation.] The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. [Citations.]” (In re Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)

         National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, presents an instructive example in resolving Bradbury’s attacks on the judgment based on the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellants there—an attorney and his professional corporation—asserted a number of challenges to the judgment, including the absence of evidence to support a contract action or other basis for personal liability against them. (Id. at p. 518.) The court of appeal rejected these and other challenges, citing as a basis the appellants’ to provide a reporter’s transcript of the trial proceedings. “[The appellants] contend that ‘the judgment is incorrect, erroneous and inconsistent with the facts and the law applicable thereto.’ When the record on appeal is on the clerk’s transcript alone, the appellate court does not presume that the record contains ‘all matters material to a determination of the points on appeal,’ unless the error claimed appears on the face of the record. [Citation.] [¶] ‘It is axiomatic in appellate review that a judgment of a lower court is presumed correct. [Citation.] This presumption has special significance when... the appeal is based upon the clerk’s transcript.’ [Citation.] ‘It is elementary and fundamental that on a clerk’s transcript appeal the appellate court must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the findings, and that the only questions presented are as to the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether the findings support the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [¶] Here, the appeal is based solely upon the clerk’s transcript and the record does not provide any evidentiary basis whatever for attacking the trial court’s rulings.... The record on appeal does not contain any testimony regarding the formation, existence, interpretation, or performance of the contract between the parties, nor is there a settled statement which might support the allegations of claimed error. We therefore presume the receipt of sufficient evidence in favor of the judgment. [¶] [The appellants’] argument focuses entirely on the fact that the written contract was, on its face, only between [the respondent] and the [professional c]orporation. However, we have nothing in the record to show us what evidence was presented to the trial court which supported its ultimate finding that [the attorney] was also a party.... There was no error.” (Id. at pp. 521-522.)

Bradbury here elected an appellant’s appendix in lieu of clerk’s transcript under rule 8.124 of the California Rules of Court. As an appendix serves the same function as a clerk’s transcript, this distinction is one without a difference for purposes of our analysis.

         Here the jury found that Bradbury had breached the Agreement not to disparage Biggs or its employees and that Biggs and Harms had suffered damages in the amount of $106,300 as a result. This liability was founded on the single cause of action for breach of written contract alleged in the complaint. On appeal, Bradbury elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript. Because the record contains no testimony whatever concerning the breach of contract claim or any of Bradbury’s defenses thereto, we will “presume[] that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error. [Citation.]” (In re Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Here that presumption extends to issues relating to the formation and breach of the Agreement as well as damages sustained as a result of Bradbury’s breach. His sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges that are unsupported by any testimony from the record must therefore fail.

It suffices to say that Bradbury’s “Appendix of Testimony Matrix” attached to his opening brief in which he purports to summarize the trial testimony and to which he refers in briefing is no substitute for a reporter’s transcript and it is meaningless for purposes of appellate review.

         DISPOSITION

         The judgment is affirmed.

          WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., McAdams, J.

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Biggs Cardosa Associates Inc. v. Bradbury
(May 29, 2009)