JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 15 CR 11378 Honorable Alfredo Maldonado, Judge Presiding JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Torrez Moore was convicted of theft and financial institution fraud stemming from a scheme in which he attempted to obtain title to five homes in Chicago by filing fraudulent documents with the Office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. Before trial, defendant informed the circuit judge (now retired, and not the judge who tried the case) that he wanted to proceed pro se. But the circuit court never furnished defendant with the admonishments required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 before it accepted defendant's waiver of his right to counsel. And the record shows that there was not substantial compliance with Rule 401. We thus reverse his convictions. We further find, contrary to defendant's claims, that the evidence was sufficient to convict him, and thus there is no double-jeopardy bar to retrial.
¶ 2 I. Rule 401(a)
¶ 3 We first consider defendant's argument that the circuit court failed to admonish him in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) before it accepted his waiver of counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se. We begin with the relevant background information before proceeding to our analysis.
¶ 4 A. Background
¶ 5 In July 2015, a grand jury returned a 21-count indictment against defendant charging him, among other crimes, with two counts of theft of greater than $1 million (Class X felonies), one count of financial institution fraud (Class X), and three counts of financial criminal enterprise (Class 1 felony). See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014); (720 ILCS 5/17-10.6(c)(2) (West 2014). The gist of the indictment was that defendant, "in furtherance of a single intention and design," attempted to obtain title to five parcels of property in Chicago—10821 South Wood Street; 10929 South Esmond Street; 4200 West Rosemont Avenue; 9022 South Indiana Avenue; and 9148 South Greenwood Avenue—by filing "fraudulent adverse possession documents with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office. ¶ 6 The sentencing range for a Class X felony is 6 to 30 years' incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012). A sentence for a Class 1 felony ranges from 4 to 15 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012). ¶ 7 Defendant was arraigned on July 28, 2015. At that time, he accepted appointment of the Public Defender of Cook County. Another individual named David Farr, who was charged under a separate indictment, but who was targeted and arrested during the same investigation, appeared at that time as well and was likewise appointed counsel. See People v. Farr, 2020 IL App (1st) 171514-U, ¶ 35 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 8 Defendant next appeared before the court on September 9, 2015. At that hearing, David Farr was once again present as well. Both defendant and Farr were represented by counsel at the September 9 hearing. (As noted earlier, the judge at this hearing later retired, and a different judge presided over the trial.) ¶ 9 During the hearing, the court addressed Farr and defendant separately, beginning with Farr. Farr's attorney informed the court that Farr asked him to withdraw and wished to represent himself. The following colloquy took place between the court, Farr, and the State:
"THE COURT: You choose to represent yourself in this matter.
[FARR]: Yes, sir. Actually, I want to put something on the record as well.
THE COURT: Here let me just do one step at a time.
[FARR]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What Class am I dealing with here?
MR. JAKALSKI [Assistant State's Attorney]: Class X.
THE COURT: Okay. You're charged with the offense should you be found guilty the minimum is six 6 years, the maximum is 30, and it is not probationable so it's a penitentiary case so I don't know what the facts of the case are, I apologize.
MR. FARR: Yes.
THE COURT: I need to advise that if you represent yourself in these particular matters I would hold you to the same degree as I would hold any attorney that is in front of me representing—
[FARR]: I object to that due to Haines v. Kerns that I am not an attorney and you cannot keep to the same standards of that of an attorney. That is case law as well.
THE COURT: Well, I disagree with that case, and I'm tell [
sic] you I'm following the law of the State of Illinois when I indicate that to you there's no additional advantages to the individual that represents himself in the case.
[FARR]: Okay we'll [sic] I'm not representing myself pro se, sir. I'm representing myself in propria pur suri juris.
THE COURT: I understand you representing yourself in this. I recognize because I have been doing this a long time. Lots of people have lots of different ideas, and I respect that.
[FARR]: Yes.
* * *
THE COURT: Okay. I need to go through a series of questions with you, are representing yourself once I determine that you can represent yourself.
[FARR]: Yes.
THE COURT: Whatever you choose to do is fine okay. Okay how old are you?
[FARR]: If I answer these questions, that said adverse possession notice or something" and a lease for the property. Wheeler learned that defendant was the "landlord" for the property. When Thomas showed the documents, Wheeler asked if she could take them to make copies. According to Wheeler, Thomas "hesitated" and then said "no." Wheeler then told Thomas that she was "paying rent to somebody that does not own the property." In response, Thomas gave Wheeler defendant's name and phone number. ¶ 118 Wheeler then called defendant and left a voicemail message. On the message, Wheeler informed defendant that he was not supposed to rent the Indiana Avenue Property because he did not own it. Defendant never returned Wheeler's call. ¶ 119 Eventually, the occupants were removed, and the home became vacant. The home was then rehabbed and eventually sold.
¶ 120 j. Detective Mike Zuber—The Indiana Avenue Property
¶ 121 On June 30, 2015, Chicago Police Detective Mike Zuber was assigned to a task force that was responsible for executing a search warrant at the Indiana Avenue Property. Before June 30, he had little involvement in the investigation. During the search, Detective Zuber recovered doorknobs, a lock, and a padlock from a drawer in the kitchen. From a different kitchen drawer, Detective Zuber recovered another lock and doorknob, as well as a "chain with a cut padlock." After the police executed the warrant, they left an "advisory letter" with the occupants "stating to vacate the property."
¶ 122 k. Benjamin Safford—The Indiana Avenue Property
¶ 123 Benjamin Safford testified that from 2013 to 2016, he worked as a "field tech" for a real estate company named JBB Management. His job was "dealing with foreclosed properties" by "servicing the properties weekly, photographing conditions, [and] checking occupancy weekly." He explained that "if the properties were occupied," he would "track[] them to make sure that they weren't abandoned," and "[i]f they were vacant," he would "set[] up lockboxes so that brokers could access them and real estate agents could access them or contractors that were doing repairs on the homes, hanging For Sale signs ***." ¶ 124 JBB Management was responsible for managing the South Indiana Avenue Property. On February 9, 2015, Safford went to the South Indiana Avenue Property in response to a report the previous day from a contractor stating that "the locks had been changed and that someone was occupying the unit." When Safford arrived at the property, he noticed that a "For Sale" sign as well as a "warning sign with the brokerage phone number" had been removed from the front window. In addition, lockboxes on the gas meter and front door had been removed, and the locks had been changed. ¶ 125 During the visit, Safford knocked on the door. A woman named Sadie Thomas answered the door. Thomas told Safford that she was renting the house and presented a lease that listed defendant as the landlord. JBB eventually had Thomas removed from the property. Thereafter, Safford began making weekly visits. During these visits, Safford discovered that the property was still occupied. In June 2015, Safford was present for a raid in which "[t]he sheriffs and members of the FBI went into the property to clear it ***." He explained he was "there with the locksmith to facilitate the lock change after the people were removed." Safford testified that to his knowledge, no one had permission to move into the Indiana Avenue Property.
¶ 126 12. Randy Conatser—Wood Street, Esmond Street, and Indiana Avenue Properties
¶ 127 Randy Conatser was a foreclosure manager for Fannie Mae. He testified about the Wood Street Property, Esmond Street Property, and Indiana Avenue Properties. ¶ 128 With respect to the Wood Street Property, Fannie Mae acquired possession and ownership via foreclosure in August 2013. Fannie Mae then engaged Barbara Thouvenell, a realtor with PRS Realty, to manage the property. On December 31, 2015, the Wood Street Property was sold for $191,477. ¶ 129 With respect to Esmond Street Property, Fannie Mae acquired possession and ownership via foreclosure in January 2012. Before Fannie Mae acquired the property, it was owned by City Mortgage. In February 2013, Fannie Mae "required City Mortgage to repurchase" the Esmond Street Property. Fannie Mae engaged Gary Weglarz, a realtor with Applebrook Realty, to manage the property. The Esmond Street Property did not sell while it was owned by Fannie Mae. When the property went into foreclosure, the unpaid balance on the property's mortgage was $370,500. ¶ 130 With respect to the Indiana Avenue Property, Fannie Mae acquired possession and ownership via foreclosure in April 2014. Fannie Mae engaged Brandt Booker, a realtor with Sotheby's, to manage the property. On May 10, 2016, the Indiana Avenue Property was sold for $190,000. When the property went into foreclosure, the unpaid balance on its mortgage was $238,500. ¶ 131 Conatser never gave defendant permission: (1) to occupy; (2) rent on Conatser's or Fannie Mae's behalf; (3) change the locks; or (4) remove anything from the Wood Street, Esmond Street, and Indiana Avenue Properties. He further testified that while Fannie Mae was in possession of those properties, it paid the property taxes on those properties.
¶ 132 5. The Greenwood Avenue Property
¶ 133 a. Officer Matthew Birdsong
¶ 134 On April 1, 2015, Chicago Police Officer Matthew Birdsong was dispatched to the Greenwood Avenue Property. Other officers were already on-scene and speaking to some of the property's occupants, who he described as "male *** African American between the ages of—teenage years, mid 20s maybe." The occupants were still in the home when he arrived. In addition to the occupants, Officer Birdsong saw a person named Leon Ivy, who claimed to be the property manager. According to Officer Birdsong, Leon stated that he went to the property, which was previously vacant, to do some work and discovered that a For Sale sign had been removed, and there were people living inside. ¶ 135 Officer Birdsong then spoke to the people inside the property, several of whom had the last name "Thomas." Later, defendant came to the property. Defendant told Birdsong that he had obtained the property through adverse possession and was renting it to the occupants. The occupants and defendant produced documents bearing the letterhead of the Department of Transportation, but his superiors determined that they were "false." ¶ 136 Once that determination was made, the police spoke to defendant again to give him "an opportunity to show us some sort of documentation, anything he could provide to show us that what he was saying was legitimate," which defendant was unable to do. Eventually, Birdsong told defendant that the people in the building "needed to leave" and that "they have no established residency there." ¶ 137 In response, defendant "became very highly agitated" and "very verbally combative" and began "swinging his arms all over and getting very loud with the volume of his voice and stepping to and from to us." Defendant eventually told the police, "just take me to jail." They did. Once defendant was placed in custody, Birdsong spoke to the occupants, telling them that "it was in their best interest that they need to leave because it's not their property" and that they were "illegally occupying it." The people then "packed up their things" and vacated the property.
¶ 138 b. Leon Ivy
¶ 139 Leon Ivy was the Director of Sales and Acquisitions for a company called Manage Chicago, Inc., a real estate company that bought, sold, and managed property. The Greenwood Avenue Property came under Manage Chicago's control in March 2014; Ivy was the property's listing agent and manager. As part of his job duties, Ivy visited the Greenwood Avenue Property "[u]sually twice a week[,]" which included performing an interior inspection of the property. ¶ 140 Ivy then testified that on April 1, 2015, a realtor called asking to show the Greenwood Avenue Property. Ivy gave the realtor the lockbox code. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes later, the realtor called back and said "Hey, your lockbox is gone and there are people on your property." That was surprising because, that last time Ivy had visited, the Greenwood Avenue Property had a For Sale sign, an alarm, locks, and a lockbox for realtors. ¶ 141 Ivy "immediately went to the property and noticed the sign and lockbox were gone and a young guy answered the door." Ivy also stated that the locks had been changed. Ivy testified that the person who answered the door identified himself as "Arshad." ¶ 142 The following day, Ivy called the police, stated that there were "unauthorized *** occupants on the property," and asked the police to meet him at the property. Ivy then returned to the Greenwood Property, where, in addition to Arshad, he observed "about seven or so other people were in the property." Ivy testified that once the police arrived, "we questioned the guys and—Arshad, mainly—about why they were there." According to Ivy, Arshad "explained the house belonged to them, some weird phrase he used and that they were going to call—I believe he referred to [defendant] as his uncle or something." Thereafter, according to Ivy, approximately an hour to an hour and a half later, defendant "came walking down the street" and "had a conversation with the police." ¶ 143 Thereafter, the State asked Ivy, "what was the value of [the Greenwood Avenue Property] at that time when it was for sale?" Ivy answered, "[w]e had it listed at about 140,000." Ivy testified that the Greenwood Avenue Property eventually was sold. He stated that he never, at any time before the property was sold, gave permission to anyone, including defendant, to enter, possess, or rent the property, nor did he give anyone, including defendant, permission to remove the lockbox, change the locks, or remove anything from the property. ¶ 144 On cross-examination, Ivy testified that Chicago Manage purchased the Greenwood Avenue Property following a foreclosure. He stated that at the time he discovered Arshad and his family at the property, it had been vacant and on the market for three to four months.
¶ 145 6. Rosemont Avenue Property
¶ 146 a. Elizabeth Fitzpatrick
¶ 147 Elizabeth Fitzpatrick worked as a real estate agent with Caldwell Banker in 2014. She also operated a staging company that furnished vacant homes to prepare them for sale. She had experience working with properties in foreclosure. When working with foreclosures, she "take[s] guardianship of the property[,]" puts "all the utilities in [her] name[,]" "take[s] care of the lawn service[,]" and "take[s] care of any repairs." ¶ 148 In June 2014, Fitzpatrick was engaged to list the Rosemont Avenue Property. She also staged the property using items she personally owned. From June to October 2014, she visited the property several times a week to perform inspections, take pictures, meet repairmen, and facilitate showings with other brokers and customers. ¶ 149 Sometime in late October 2014, Fitzpatrick visited the Rosemont Avenue Property and noticed that her "Caldwell Banker sign was not on the front lawn." She also observed a No Trespassing sign posted on the door that had not been there when she last visited the property. (The sign was the same No Trespassing sign previously discussed). As Fitzpatrick approached the house, she noticed that "the windows were covered in what looked like brown butcher paper" which prevented her from seeing into the home. When she reached the front door, she saw that the lock box where she kept keys to the home had been removed. She was unable to enter the home, not having access to the keys stored in that lock box. ¶ 150 Fitzpatrick then looked through a small gap in brown paper near the door and saw two or three people inside the home. Fitzpatrick "knocked on the door and said, you know, who are you? What are you doing in this house?" She testified that the people inside the home "just laughed at me" and "said go away." ¶ 151 After that encounter, Fitzpatrick called her supervisor, then the police. A week or two later, the police called Fitzpatrick and asked her to accompany them to the Rosemont Avenue Property to help identify which items of property inside the home belonged to her. Fitzpatrick stated that when she and the police arrived, three "black men" came out onto a balcony off the master bedroom and began "taunting the police and laughing and swearing." ¶ 152 When the Rosemont Avenue Property was first listed for sale, it was priced at $729,900. But the property was damaged by the occupants and had to be taken off the market while repairs were made. Specifically, Fitzpatrick explained that "the custom front doors had to be replaced," as well as a side door and the garage door. In addition, Fitzpatrick had to "get rid of" some of her staging items, and "[t]here was something wrong with the master bedroom Jacuzzi tub which had to be repaired." All in all, Fitzpatrick estimated that the property had sustained "around $10,000" in damages. Fitzpatrick testified that the Rosemont Avenue Property eventually sold in April 2015 for "about" $675,000. When asked by the State whether the property's value was "affected by this incident," Fitzpatrick answered "[y]es." ¶ 153 When Fitzpatrick was guardian of the Rosemont Avenue Property, U.S. Bank paid the property taxes. She never gave defendant permission to "take over" the Rosemont Avenue Property. Likewise, she never gave defendant permission to rent the property, take down her signs, change locks, remove the lock box, or file paperwork with the Recorder of Deeds regarding the property.
¶ 154 b. Lieutenant William Mullane
¶ 155 Chicago Police Lieutenant William Mullane testified that at around 11:30 a.m. on October 22, 2014, he responded to 4200 West Rosemont Avenue. Lieutenant Mullane saw "one of my sergeants, a few of my officers there, a realtor who had the listing of that property, and there were subjects inside the house." Lieutenant Mullane spoke to the people in the home. He remembered two of their names—Arshad and Yusef Thomas—but he could not recall the name of a third person who was inside the home. ¶ 156 During the visit, Mullane learned that the Rosemont Avenue Property was for sale. He also learned that the people in the home were "claim[ing] that they were tenants in the house, that they had a lease, and that they were living there with their father." Mullane stated that the people in the home were using a legal term with which he was unfamiliar. He also explained that while he was on-scene, he accessed the Recorder's website and saw that "there was a filing recently filed regarding that property and possession of it" that "referred to adverse possession." ¶ 157 At that point, Lieutenant Mullane left. But his investigation continued. He explained that after the October 22 visit, "we learned that the property was not available for lease, that it was the property of the agent that was selling it for a company, and that there should be nobody in the house." Consequently, on October 28, 2014, Lieutenant Mullane and other law enforcement officers returned to the Rosemont Avenue Property to (1) "see if somebody was there[,]" (2) "inform them that if there is a lease, that it is not a valid lease because nobody had the right to lease the property[,]" and (3) "notify them that they didn't belong there and that they had 24 hours to leave the property" or "they would be arrested for trespassing." ¶ 158 During the October 28 visit, Lieutenant Mullane determined that the property was occupied. He explained that "[t]wo subjects came out of the property, and there was another subject up on the roof of the garage." Mullane then spoke to Arshad, and Yusef showed him a lease for the property that listed defendant as the landlord. At that point, Mullane "advised them that nobody had the right to lease the property and that they had 24 hours to remove themselves from the property. Otherwise, they would be removed and charged with criminal trespass." ¶ 159 On October 29, 2014, Lieutenant Mullane returned to the Rosemont Avenue Property. He was accompanied by two police officers and a SWAT team. Initially, Lieutenant Mullane approached the home with the two officers and knocked on the door. Lieutenant Mullane heard "voices on the other side of the door." He "explained to them that there should be nobody in the property" and instructed the people inside the home to come out—a request they "refused." At that point, Lieutenant Mullane "signalled [sic] for forceable entry" and "stepped out of the way and let the SWAT Team enter the property." After the SWAT team entered the home, the people inside were removed and arrested. ¶ 160 Lieutenant Mullane then testified that there was a No Trespassing sign posted on the front door. (The sign, which was admitted into evidence, was identical to the No Trespassing sign posted outside the Esmond and Wood Street Properties.). After the occupants were removed, Lieutenant Mullane and the officers entered the home, where they discovered a "for sale" sign in a closet in the basement and a deadbolt lock that had been "compromised." In addition, Lieutenant Mullane also noted that the master lock used by the realtors to secure keys to the home had "clearly been forced open." ¶ 161 After that, the State rested. Defendant did not present any witnesses. In closing argument, defendant complained about the secrecy of the banking system and lamented the unfairness of foreclosures. He asked, rhetorically, "What do people do? Especially if you don't have no money?" His answer: "[Y]ou can find solutions in the law." And that solution was adverse possession, which was "not a crime." He urged that "we" should "fight against this [banking] system" to protect the homeless and children and the poor." "And adverse possession," he argued, "is just the rock that I'm using in my sling against this Goliath ***." ¶ 162 After deliberating, the jury found defendant guilty of theft, continuing financial crime enterprise, and financial institution fraud. The court then held a sentencing hearing and ultimately sentenced defendant to 11 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
¶ 163 B. Analysis
¶ 164 Defendant raises several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. He claims the State failed to prove that his actions were "in furtherance of a single intention and design" as required to join his various thefts into one crime that aggregates the value of all property stolen. He likewise claims that the State failed to prove a criminal motive and failed to prove the values of the various properties. We take the questions in that order. We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.
¶ 165 1. "Single Intention and Design"
¶ 166 Defendant committed five separate acts of theft that could have been charged separately. Instead, the State charged all five thefts as one offense, so it could aggregate the values of the five properties into a single Class-X felony offense of theft of property over $1 million. (It charged two fraud offenses, too, but recall that they merged into the theft count on which defendant was sentenced.) ¶ 167 To combine the multiple thefts into one count, the State used section 111-4(c) of the Criminal Code, the joinder statute. See 725 ILCS 5/111-4(c) (West 2014). Section 111-4(c) provides that two or more acts or transactions that constitute certain enumerated theft- or fraud-related crimes may be charged as a single offense in a single count if, among other reasons, "such acts or transactions by one or more defendants are in furtherance of a single intention and design ***." (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 168 Defendant here is charged with scheming to take possession of five different properties, in one form or another (dwelling in it or renting it out as if he were the owner), in a specific way, claiming the right of adverse possession over those properties. And through the joinder statute, the State aggregated the values of the properties into one theft of property exceeding $1 million in value. ¶ 169 When the State relies on this joinder language, as it did here on the theft charge (as well as the charges on which defendant was convicted), the allegation that the acts were "in furtherance of a single intention and design" is an element of the offense that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 101 (2008); People v. Walton, 2013 IL App (3d) 110630, ¶ 23. Defendant claims the State failed to carry that burden. ¶ 170 Before determining whether there was sufficient evidence that defendant's conduct fell within that statutory language, we must determine what that language means. So our sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis devolves momentarily into a question of statutory construction and thus one of law. See People v. Smith, 2019 IL App (1st) 161246, ¶ 24 (sufficiency of evidence of aggravated sexual assault depended on meaning of statutory phrase "during the commission of"); People v. Barnes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142886, ¶ 21 (sufficiency of evidence of armed-violence conviction depended on interpretation of mob-action statute that served as predicate for conviction). ¶ 171 We must determine, in other words, what it means for multiple acts to be committed "in furtherance of a single intention and design." We start with the plain language of the statute. Board of Education of City of Chicago v. Moore, 2021 IL 125785, ¶ 20 (most reliable indicator of legislative intent is plain meaning of language). ¶ 172 The word "intention" is a term rarely seen within the Criminal Code of 2012 compared to the truncated and far more familiar "intent." But we find the words "intention" and "intent" to be synonymous for our purposes. ¶ 173 First, as for any undefined statutory word, "it is entirely appropriate" to turn to the dictionary. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 330 (2007). Black's Law Dictionary defines "intention" as "the willingness to bring about something planned or foreseen; the quality, state, or condition of being set to do something." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("Intention"). That is not very different than its definition of "intent," which is "the mental resolution or determination to do" a thing. Id. ("Intent"). Indeed, Black's definition of "intent" is nearly identical to Merriam-Webster's definition of "intention," which is "a determination to act in a certain way" and references, as a synonym, "intent." ¶ 174 Beyond that, we would add that our supreme court has agreed with this court that the phrase "single intention and design" includes a mental state. See People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 101 (2008); People v. Arbo, 213 Ill. App. 3d 828, 832 (1991). We are aware of four mental states recognized in Illinois criminal law, including "intent." See 720 ILCS 5/4-4 - 4-7 (West 2012) (defining mental states of intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence). So it would be odd if the word "intention" did not mean "intent," a term quite familiar to the criminal law. ¶ 175 That brings us to the word "design" within the phrase "single intention and design." Black's tellingly defines "design" in its noun form as "1. A plan or scheme. 2. Purpose or intention combined with a plan." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("Design"). Merriam-Webster's most applicable definition is "a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid down." ¶ 176 The running theme there is a scheme or plan of some sort. And when we consider the word "design" in the overall context of section 111-4(c), that strikes us as spot-on. After all, that section does not allow for the joinder of just any group of offenses; it is limited to crimes that involve the deprivation of property or services through non-forceful means. See 725 ILCS 5/111-4(c) (West 2012). Sometimes those crimes are labeled "theft" and sometimes "fraud," both of which were charged in this case. But the reason those offenses may be joined into a single offense—thus raising the offense from multiple misdemeanors to a single felony or, as here, from lower-class felonies to a single felony of a higher class—is that they are linked by the single scheme the defendant employed to perpetrate each of these nonviolent crimes. ¶ 177 This reasoning squares with what guidance we glean from our supreme court's consideration of section 111-4(c). The first of those cases is People v. Brenizer, 111 Ill. 2d 220, 222 (1986), involving four charges of theft, each of which contained multiple, smaller instances of theft that were aggregated to raise each of the four theft charges from a misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony. The defendant was an employee at Bergner's department store with authority to make purchases on behalf of Bergner's at a discount food store. Id. at 221. The State alleged that, over the span of 2½ years, defendant abused that authority by (1) stealing over $800 in cash; (2) stealing food and general merchandise in excess of $300; (3) making unauthorized purchases at the store for items he converted to his personal use; and (4) charging back certain purchases so that Bergner's issued him reimbursement checks. Id. at 222. ¶ 178 The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding it unfair to join all the smaller, non-felony thefts into larger charges of felony theft. The supreme court reversed. In holding that it was proper for the State to merge multiple misdemeanor offenses of theft into single felony offenses under section 111-4(c), the court cited a decision from the New York Court of Appeals as follows:
" 'Logic and reason join with all the authorities that have considered the question, in holding that the People may prosecute for a single crime a defendant who, pursuant to a single intent and
one general fraudulent plan, steals in the aggregate as a felon and not as a petty thief. If this were not so, a crime of grand larceny would go unpunished and a felon escape because the law classified him only as a petty thief.' " (Emphasis added;
other emphasis removed.)
Id. at 228 (quoting
People v.
Cox, 36 N.E.2d 84, 87 (N.Y. 1941)).
¶ 179 The court's emphasis there on a single fraudulent plan supports our interpretation that the phrase "in furtherance of a single *** design," in the context in which it appears under section 111-4(c), refers to a single scheme that unites all the individual merged offenses. ¶ 180 As does the decision in
People v.
Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82 (2008), where our supreme court held that the mere evidence of 15 distinct separate thefts by an employee from the store where he worked, without more, was insufficient to show a single intention and design. The trial was by stipulation, at which the evidence showed that defendant admitted to stealing 15 video games over the course of six weeks, as well as pocketing the sales proceeds of other merchandise he sold to customers, because he needed money.
Id. at 87. But he was not charged for the money he pocketed; he was charged only for stealing the 15 video games that he took home. With regard to those video games, defendant admitted "that he would just take a game he wanted ***."
Id. at 88. ¶ 181 On appeal from his conviction for felony retail theft, the defendant argued that his 15 individual thefts were not in furtherance of a single intention and design but, rather, were 15 "individual impulses to steal Xbox [video] games."
Id. at 99. Our supreme court agreed and reversed the conviction outright. The court found that the State failed to prove a single intention and design, proving instead only that "defendant stole 15 Xbox video games for himself, and that he would just take a game that he wanted."
Id. at 100. ¶ 182 In other words, absent any other proof as to the defendant's state of mind or the existence of some plan, Rowell's series of impulsive thefts were just that—a series of impulsive thefts without an overarching plan or "design."
Rowell only underscores our view that the phrase
"single *** design" must mean some kind of scheme or plan that unites the individual acts of theft, as opposed to a mere series of thefts or takings that are the product of individual impulses. ¶ 183 To put this all together, the phrase "in furtherance of a single intention and design" under section 111-4(c) must mean two or more acts undertaken to further (1) a single intent to steal or defraud and (2) employing a single scheme or plan throughout, no matter the number of different victims. ¶ 184 With that in mind, a jury could have reasonably found that defendant's actions fell within this language. That is, the jury could have found that defendant acted with the singular intent to exert unauthorized and permanent control of houses that did not belong to him and doing so via a single fraudulent scheme—claiming an unfounded right of adverse possession and filing bogus papers with the Recorder of Deeds accordingly. ¶ 185 We begin with the "single intention" prong. Defendant argues, on the one hand, that no evidence of defendant's mental state was introduced; on the other, he claims that to the extent that various motives could be attributed to defendant—a protest against the banks, a desire to "homestead," a desire to put a roof over his head, a desire to profit by renting out these homes to families—they are just that,
multiple intentions, not a single one. ¶ 186 We cannot agree with either claim. For one thing, one's mental state or intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof; the trier of fact may rely on circumstantial evidence of intent.
People v.
Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 408 (1995). The State here was not required to directly prove defendant's intent (though, as we will explain, a jury could have found that it did so). ¶ 187 As for defendant's various reasons for committing these crimes, defendant is blurring the clear distinction in the law between intent and motive. The State will often try to show a defendant's motive for committing a crime and is entitled to do so, as it tends to make it more
believable that a defendant committed an intentional act.
People v.
Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1157 (2006);
People v.
Hale, 326 Ill. App. 3d 455, 466 (2001); see
People v.
Durkin, 330 Ill. 394, 404, 405 (1928) ("the presence of a motive which would lead the accused to commit the act charged is always important in the consideration of the question whether the act done was done with criminal intent."). ¶ 188 But it is critical to distinguish between elements the State was required to prove and other evidence it may introduce to support proof of those elements. Proof of a "single intention" was required here. Motive was not. The reason or reasons
why defendant committed these crimes was not something the State was required to prove. It makes no difference whether he exerted unauthorized control over these properties because he was protesting the state of foreclosures in this country, because he wanted one of the houses for his own use, because he wanted to profit by renting out these properties to individuals and families—or any combination thereof. ¶ 189 To convict defendant of the thefts and aggregate the values of the properties under the joinder statute, the State was required to prove that defendant acted with the single intention to exert unauthorized control over these properties and permanently deprive the true owners of the beneficial use of the properties.
725 ILCS 5/111-4(c) (West 2014);
720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014). The State more than sufficiently did so. ¶ 190 Indeed, when viewing this element properly and not looking under the hood for the motive or reasons for his actions, the evidence of defendant's intent was overwhelming. For one thing, defendant filed papers with the Recorder of Deeds claiming a right to these properties, the very purpose of which was to exert control over the properties and deprive the owners of their beneficial use. When questioned by Detective Purdy, defendant admitted that he had taken
possession of the properties. Nor did defendant, at any point during the trial, make any effort to deny as much. ¶ 191 Defendant's statement to Detective Purdy, and his theory at trial, was not a denial that he took over these properties, nor a denial that he intended to keep them permanently, but rather a claim that his actions were not "unauthorized" because he obtained them legally via adverse possession. That was certainly an available theory, but the jury was not required to accept it. The jury could have reasonably found, instead, that defendant knew what he was doing was illegal, and that he intended to use the law of adverse possession and a series of bogus documents as a ruse to fleece owners out of their property without their knowledge, much less their consent. ¶ 192 The proof of a "single design" was likewise ample and, indeed, uncontested. When defendant endeavored to steal each of the five parcels of property at issue in this case, he did so by following an identical scheme. In each instance, defendant (1) filed the same set of patently fraudulent documents with the Recorder's Office; (2) removed exterior locks, For Sale signs, and/or realtor-installed lockboxes from doors to gain entry; and (3) installed his own (ironic) "No Trespassing" sign on the property. A jury easily could have concluded that defendant's actions were pursuant to a "single design." ¶ 193 Defendant responds that we are being too liberal in our reading of the phrase "single intention and design" in the joinder statute and that, by such a broad interpretation, the State could charge virtually any series of thefts as one offense with the value of the properties aggregated, turning misdemeanors or low-level felonies into far greater offenses. Your garden-variety pickpocket, for example, who walks through a crowded bus and slips his hand into the pockets and purses of the passengers, stealing small amounts of money from a dozen people,
would find his thefts of $20 from this person, $50 from that one, $10 from another, suddenly aggregated into a higher-class offense, with higher penalties. ¶ 194 To that point, we have several responses. First, our duty is to follow the plain language of the statute, which we have done here. It is not our province to comment on the wisdom of the legislature's choices. We are not allowed to decide that a statute is written too broadly for our liking, and thus we must clip its edges. Second, there is no claim here of overbreadth or other constitutional defect, so we need not consider it. ¶ 195 Third, even if the pickpocket example were valid—if a series of pickpocket thefts on a bus could be construed as part of one single scheme or plan, a question we obviously need not decide—the General Assembly would certainly be within its prerogative to decide that a serial misdemeanant's actions should be punished as a single felony to deter those misdemeanor acts. ¶ 196 And finally, we would challenge the premise of defendant's argument to some extent. Yes, in some sense, this language appears quite broad. But we must keep in mind, first, that section 111-4(c) applies not to all crimes but only to a limited segment of crimes that relate to theft or fraud—non-forcible crimes that often (though not always) involve a fraudulent scheme. That, alone, narrows its scope. Second, the requirement is both of a single intention and a single design, which again narrows its breadth. ¶ 197 And third and perhaps most importantly, intent is the highest level of mental state known to the law, and here it heightened the State's burden beyond that which it otherwise would have borne. The crime of theft, for example, requires a "knowing[]" violation (along with, in this case, an intent to permanently deprive one of his property).
720 ILCS 5/16-1(a) (West 2014). The crime of financial institutions fraud requires proof that the defendant "knowingly" executed or attempted to execute a scheme to defraud. 720 ILS 5/17-10.6(c) (West 2014). Likewise,
committing a continuing financial crimes enterprise requires a "knowing[]" violation.
Id. § (h). So at least we can say that, in permitting the aggregation of these offenses and property values to bump the crime up to a higher class of felony, the legislature likewise bumped up the State's burden of proof. See
Brenizer, 111 Ill. 2d at 228 (noting State's "added burden" of proving single intention and design as precondition to using section 111-4(c)). ¶ 198 We likewise reject defendant's suggestion that the evidence was insufficient because not all of the properties entered foreclosure or became vacant at the same time, and the thefts were spread out over time. Section 111-4(c) contains no temporal requirement, no specification that the acts must be committed simultaneously or close in time. The unifying link between these crimes (other than the "intention" to steal or defraud) is not an element of time or proximity but the employment of a single design—a single scheme. ¶ 199 Indeed, the amount of time over which defendant perpetrated his crimes here (September 2012 to May 2015) is not materially longer than the span of time over which the defendant committed his thefts (2½ years) in
Brenizer, 111 Ill. 2d at 222. The court in
Brenizer relied favorably on its earlier decision in
Woods v.
People, 222 Ill. 293, 297 (1906), where the defendant stole gas from the gas company's pipeline over a period of 22 months (March 1903 to December 1904). See
Brenizer, 111 Ill. 2d at 227. Though the court in
Brenizer recognized that the siphoning of gas in
Woods "may have been more in the nature of a continuous taking" (
id.) than the periodic but repeated thefts committed by Brenizer, our supreme court nevertheless found that the value of the property and money stolen by Brenizer could be aggregated as long as the State could prove a single intention and design (as well as other elements no longer required to be proven under section 111-4(c)).
Id. at 227-28.
¶ 200 Finally, defendant relies heavily on our supreme court's decision in
Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, discussed above. We find it distinguishable, first, for the reason we have already noted: that case did not involve any kind of coordinated scheme; for all the State proved at the stipulated trial, defendant was merely stealing video games impulsively when he found ones he liked, not as part of some preconceived plot or scheme.
Id. at 100. ¶ 201 And the reason the proof of Rowell's mental state was so deficient was probably because the notion of the State bearing the burden of proving a "single intention and design" was completely absent from the case. That is, the information under which defendant was charged did not cite section 111-4(c) or mention the phrase "single intention and design;" the State never mentioned that element at trial; the defense was never put on notice that it was even an element against which it had to defend; and the court never mentioned it when rendering its verdict.
Id. at 85, 95-96. The entire concept of "single intention and design" was a phantom element throughout the trial. So
Rowell does not compel a different result here. (We acknowledge that the jury was not instructed on this element here, either; that is a claim of trial error we will discuss later; but the proof of single intention and design was far greater here than in
Rowell, and defendant here at least knew he was being charged with a single intention and design.) ¶ 202 Based on all we have said above, taken in the light most favorable to the State and putting aside any claimed trial errors as we must, the jury had more than sufficient proof that defendant's actions were in furtherance of a single intention and design.
See, respectively, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "Intention," at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intention (site last visited April 8, 2021); www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intention#synonyms (site last visited April 8, 2021).
See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "Design," at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/design (site last visited April 8, 2021). --------
¶ 203 2. Lack of Criminal Intent
¶ 204 Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove that defendant acted with criminal intent to deprive the owners of their properties, as opposed to a good-faith belief that his possession of these five properties was valid under the doctrine of adverse possession. He says he believed the properties were abandoned and that he was following the necessary process of obtaining the properties through adverse possession. ¶ 205 As noted, to prove defendant guilty of theft, the State had to prove that defendant (1) "knowingly *** obtain[ed] or exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of the owner" and (2) "intend[ed] to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the property." 720 ILCS 5/16-1 (West). Evidence of intent to permanently deprive the owner of property is usually circumstantial, including inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances as well as "the act of theft itself." People v. Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, ¶ 31. A jury may also infer a defendant's intent "from fraudulent or deceptive acts that facilitated the theft." Id. ¶ 206 To be sure, "[a] bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that one has a right or claim to another's property, can negate an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property." People v. Baum, 219 Ill. App. 3d 199, 201-02 (1991). But that is for the trier of fact to decide. See People v. Winters, 151 Ill. App. 3d 402, 406 (1986). And as noted, we will not disturb that finding if a rational jury, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have made such a finding. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d 274, 278 (2004). ¶ 207 Briefly, there are two ways a claimant may establish title to property through adverse possession. Under the first approach, "the claimant must prove possession of a property for a 20-year period and the 'possession must have been (1) continuous; (2) hostile or adverse; (3) actual; (4) open, notorious, and exclusive; and (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.' " People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142877, ¶ 41 (quoting Brandhorst v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 37); see 735 ILCS 5/13-101 (West 2012). Under the second approach, "a claimant can show actual and adverse possession of lands for seven years, contemporaneously with paying taxes under color of title." Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142877, ¶ 41; see 735 ILCS 5/13-109 (West 2012); 735 ILCS 5/13-110 (West 2012). ¶ 208 Against that legal backdrop, a reasonable jury could have easily discredited defendant's claim that he was merely attempting to engage in bona fide acquisitions of the properties via adverse possession. True, the jury did hear defendant try to elicit testimony, through his cross-examinations, that he possessed the properties openly, and his possession was clearly hostile and adverse to the interests of the true owners' interests. But the jury also heard extensive testimony from which a rational juror could have easily concluded that defendant's claimed intent to adversely possess the properties was actually a "ruse," and that his "true intentions were to steal" the properties at issue in this case. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142877, ¶ 43. ¶ 209 To begin, defendant's adverse possession defense was closely tied to his purported belief that the properties he was trying to take were vacant and abandoned. Even giving defendant the benefit of the doubt that the properties were vacant, his claim that they were abandoned bordered on the ludicrous. As multiple witnesses testified, the properties at issue in this case had "For Sale" signs posted. The right to alienate—that is, to sell or otherwise convey—one's property is one of the primary rights of an owner. Department of Transportation v. Anderson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 309, 312 (2008). Evidence that a property is for sale is thus powerful proof that the property has not been abandoned, regardless of whether anyone currently resides there. ¶ 210 And the evidence showed that someone had broken into the properties and removed and changed the locks, further evidence undermining defendant's claim. See Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142877, ¶ 43 (reasonable jury could have disbelieved defendant's claim that he merely intended to adversely possess, not steal, home when evidence showed that defendant broke into home's garage using crowbar). Add to that Thomas's testimony that she personally told defendant his adverse possession filings were legally deficient—coupled with defendant's dismissive wave-off of her advice and the facially improper nature of the documents that defendant filed at the Recorder's Office—and the jury easily could have rejected defendant's claim that he was merely trying in good faith to adversely possess the properties. ¶ 211 We thus find no merit to the claim that the State failed to prove criminal intent to permanently deprive the owners of their property.
¶ 212 3. Proof of Property Values
¶ 213 Next, defendant claims that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not prove that the total value of the properties he stole exceeded $1 million as required to sustain the Class X conviction for felony theft. We again employ the Jackson standard and ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could have found this element satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278. ¶ 214 The value of stolen property is the fair cash market value at the time and place of the theft. People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 336 (2007). "The opinion testimony of one who has sufficient knowledge of the property and its value to give a reasonable estimate, received without objection, is sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to establish value." People v. Harden, 42 Ill. 2d 301, 305-06 (1969). "[T]he State need not prove the exact dollar value of the property taken in a theft" but "need only establish that the fair cash market value of the property at the time of the theft exceeds" the threshold required under the statute. People v. Davis, 132 Ill. App. 3d 199, 203 (1985). ¶ 215 Here, that monetary threshold, putting together the five properties taken, was $1 million in fair market value. The State says it proved that the collective value of the properties exceeded that value: $164,000 (South Esmond) + $191,400 (South Wood) + $675,000 (West Rosemont) + $190,000 (South Indiana) + $140,000 (South Greenwood) = $1,360,000. ¶ 216 At the outset, the State claims that defendant is not attacking the sufficiency of the proof but the foundation for the State's opinion testimony—an objection he forfeited by failing to raise it at trial. To the extent that his arguments relate to the qualifications of a witness or the assumptions on which a witness testified, we agree that he forfeited any such foundational objections. But we do not take his arguments as such. We agree with defendant that he is challenging the sufficiency of the proof, which is not subject to forfeiture. ¶ 217 We first consider defendant's argument, applicable to each property, that "[a]t most, the value of the theft" he committed "was the value of the occupancy of the properties," which the State failed to prove. This argument is predicated on a misapplication of our supreme court's opinion in Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, where defendant was charged with theft by deception after running up $15,000 in unpaid charges during a multi-month stay at a hotel. At issue there was (1) whether the defendant's occupancy of the hotel room constituted "property" under the Criminal Code and (2) whether the defendant's occupancy of the hotel room permanently deprived the owner of the beneficial use of its property. The court answered both questions affirmatively. See id. at 334-36. ¶ 218 We can pause our recitation of Perry there, because the basic facts of that case are miles away from what happened here. In Perry, the defendant stole a hotel room, so by definition, any loss the hotel suffered had to be pegged to the room's rental rate. Every day the defendant failed to pay rent was a day the hotel could have rented the room to a paying customer, so the analysis was straightforward: Rental rate multiplied by days occupied equals value of the theft. In our case, by contrast, the property owners were not renting out the homes; they were trying to sell them. This argument might hold water if defendant moved into a rental apartment and stiffed the landlord, but that is clearly not what happened. Perry is not remotely on point. ¶ 219 We should also address another theme running through all of defendant's attacks on the market value testimony. He argues that recent sales of those properties (recent, that is, to the time of the theft) are inadequate proof of their fair market value in and of themselves. He does so by referring to these recent sales of these properties as their "cost at the sale" (emphasis ours) and then quotes a 1958 decision of our supreme court for the proposition that "proof of cost alone does not establish the fair cash market value at the time and place of the receipt of the property," even if "that cost, together with other proof, may afford the basis for a valid finding as to value." People v. Todaro, 14 Ill. 2d 594, 601 (1958). ¶ 220 The supreme court's quotation is indisputably correct, but defendant's attempt to shoehorn the sales of these homes into that doctrine is not. The recent sales price of a home is not its "cost"—not to the owner/seller of the property, at least. The term "cost" refers to how much the owner paid for the property initially, as opposed to what it would be worth on the open market at any given time. For example, in Todaro, the defendant stole over 200 bottles of liquor. Id. at 595. The owner paid nearly $600 for that liquor. That was the owner's cost. Id. at 601. That, alone, would not have been enough to establish fair market value—what those bottles could fetch on the open market—but in that case, the State presented other evidence or market value to prove the minimum threshold for theft. ¶ 221 Far from being an inadequate measure of a property's fair market value, a recent arms-length sale of the property is, by definition, about the best evidence anyone could ever provide of a property's fair market value—it is not some theoretical estimate but proof that a neutral buyer actually paid a certain price for that property on the open market. See, e.g., Gateway-Walden, LLC, v. Pappas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162714, ¶ 33; Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031, ¶ 43. ¶ 222 That is not to say that defendant could not poke holes in this evidence, and he attempts to do so, as we will discuss below. But generally speaking, we reject the notion that a reasonable juror could not rely on proof of a recent sale of the property as proof of its fair market value. ¶ 223 Defendant lodges two attacks on the State's evidence concerning the value of the Rosemont Avenue Property. First, he contends that Fitzpatrick's testimony that the property sold for "about 675 [thousand], somewhere," shows that "she was uncertain about the sale price of the home." To be sure, Fitzpatrick's equivocation gives us some pause. But the equivocation was minor—she gave a specific number, not a broad price range, so any invitation for speculation was minimal. And defendant did not cross-examine Fitzpatrick on this point. ¶ 224 As we have already noted, "[t]he opinion testimony of one who has sufficient knowledge of the property and its value to give a reasonable estimate, received without objection, is sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to establish value." Harden, 42 Ill. 2d at 305-06. Accepting defendant's characterization of Fitzpatrick's testimony, that describes our situation: Fitzpatrick had knowledge of the property and its value, and she at worst gave a "reasonable estimate" of its value that was "received without objection" and not tested through cross-examination. It was sufficient. ¶ 225 Second, defendant claims that Fitzpatrick's testimony was insufficient because she testified to what property was worth when it was sold in April 2015, not what it was worth when defendant occupied around October 2014. We disagree on this point as well. ¶ 226 Fitzpatrick testified that before defendant's occupation of the Rosemont Avenue Property, it was listed for sale in June 2014 for $729,000 (defendant's occupation began sometime thereafter and ended on October 29, 2014). The listing price, alone, is at least probative, if not necessarily conclusive, evidence of the property's value. See United States v. Bryson, 94 Fed. Appx. 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The listing price and any recent sales are key factors an appraiser uses to determine the fair market value of a property."); State v. Dixon, 947 N.W.2d 563, 577 (Neb. 2020) ("It seems obvious that the price at which an item is offered for sale generally reflects the seller's opinion of the item's market value, and while that is certainly not conclusive evidence of the item's market value, it is nevertheless relevant evidence."). ¶ 227 As stated, the Rosemont Avenue Property sold in April 2015 for $675,000. At trial, neither party introduced any evidence directly showing, or from which the jury could have inferred, that the conditions in the real estate market for the neighborhood where the Rosemont Avenue Property was located appreciably changed between October 2014 and April 2015. A reasonable jury thus could have taken $675,000 as a reasonable estimate of the fair market value of the property at the time of the theft. ¶ 228 Defendant's citation to People v. Castro, 109 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1982), does not convince us otherwise. Castro was convicted of felony theft of property in excess of $150 after he stole a snowblower from a store. The store owner testified that (1) he bought the snowblower used for $300 at least five years earlier, (2) the snowblower currently had a broken handle, and (3) the snowblower would "probably" cost $600 new. Id. at 563. ¶ 229 We reversed the conviction, as neither the cost nor the replacement cost was the proper standard—the State had to prove the fair market value at the time of the theft. Id. at 569-70. The proof was insufficient because (1) "the record disclose[d] that the snowblower was used for five years subsequent to purchase and had a broken handle[]" and (2) "none of the questions propounded to the complainant related to fair cash market value, but instead concerned the actual price paid and speculation as to its retail value if purchased new five years earlier." Id. at 568-69. ¶ 230 Here, in contrast, the State presented at least a rough approximation of the property's fair market value in June 2014 ($729,000) and in April 2015 ($675,000). And again, this evidence of fair market value was not the "cost" of this property as that term should be understood in this context. Castro is distinguishable. ¶ 231 Next, defendant argues that the State failed to prove the fair market values of the Wood Street, Esmond Street, Rosemont Avenue, and Indiana Avenue properties because it only introduced evidence of their recent sales prices without also showing that these sales occurred in arms-length transactions. ¶ 232 Dominguez testified that the Esmond property sold for $164,000 in June 2015. Thouvenell testified that the Wood property sold in December 2015 for $191,477. Conatser testified that the Indiana property sold in May 2016 for $190,000. It is true that there was no evidence as to whether those sales took place in arms-length transactions, which would have been preferable. See Pappas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162714, ¶ 33. But there is no debating that the sales prices these properties fetched were, at a minimum, competent evidence of their fair market value at that time, and sufficiently close in time to the thefts to support evidence of their fair market value at the time of the theft. And defendant was free to challenge the neutrality of these sales transactions but did not. Absent any challenge to this evidence, the trier of fact was within its province to rely on it. Harden, 42 Ill. 2d at 305-06. ¶ 233 The constitution does not require the State to introduce the best evidence or turn over every evidentiary stone—it requires sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the State has proven each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Curtis v. Montgomery, 552 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Jackson requires that the prosecution put forward enough evidence of each element of the offense that a rational fact finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.)). With regard to four of the five properties, at least, the State did so here. ¶ 234 The valuation of the fifth property, the Greenwood property, is more problematic in that the only evidence given was the property's listing price. Leon Ivy testified that the Greenwood property was listed for sale at $140,000 and eventually sold. The sales amount was not mentioned. As we have noted, the listing price is relevant evidence of a property's fair market value, as it demonstrates some considered estimate of what an owner believes it can get on the open market for a property. See Bryson, 94 Fed. Appx. at 392; Dixon, 947 N.W.2d at 577. But standing alone, the listing price is likely insufficient to establish fair market value. See Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing L.P., 220 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Id. 2009) (listing price "is not substantial and competent evidence of [property's] fair market value."); Reed v. Reed, 763 N.W.2d 686, 696 (Neb. 2009) (same). ¶ 235 But as the State notes, even if we put aside the Greenwood property altogether, the four other properties were valued collectively at more than $1.2 million. We thus find that a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the fair market value of these four properties exceeded $1 million. ¶ 236 Because we have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions, a retrial would not violate double jeopardy.
¶ 237 III. Instructional Error
¶ 238 Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the jury did not receive an instruction on the element of single intention and design. Because we are reversing based on inadequate Rule 401(a) admonishments, it is an issue we need not consider. But in light of our remand for retrial, we would note that defendant is correct that the trial court must instruct the jury on the elements of the charged offense. People v. Ayoubi, 2020 IL App (1st) 180518, ¶ 53; People v. Fonder, 2013 IL App (3d) 120178, ¶ 22. And as noted earlier, proof that defendant's individual acts of theft were in furtherance of a single intention and design is an element of the offense and thus required a jury instruction. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d at 101; Walton, 2013 IL App (3d) 110630, ¶ 23. If the State again charges these multiple thefts as single offense under section 111-4(c), a jury instruction on this element is required.
¶ 239 CONCLUSION
¶ 240 We reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. ¶ 241 Reversed and remanded.
Attorneys for Appellant:
James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, Drew A. Wallenstein, and Jonathan Krieger, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee:
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon Walters, and Paul Colin Kiefer, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.