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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KELVIN WILLIAMS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

BIGELOW, P. J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA130465) APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed in part and remanded with directions. Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Kelvin Williams. Sharon M. Jones and Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Tyrelle Smith. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Michael C. Kelly and Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendants Kelvin Williams and Tyrelle Smith were convicted of the first-degree murder of one victim (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders of two other victims (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664). In 2016, we affirmed their convictions, but modified their judgments to correct miscalculated presentence custody credits. (People v. Williams (May 23, 2016, B259888) [nonpub. opn.].) We now reconsider our original opinion in light of a recent decision, People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 (Canizales), which clarifies when it is appropriate to give a kill zone instruction. We also consider recently enacted legislation related to firearm enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53. We remand the matter for resentencing, but otherwise affirm the judgments.

Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Williams also summarily asserts his conviction for first degree murder should be reversed because a defendant cannot be convicted as an aider and abettor to first degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, citing to In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216. The transfer order by the Supreme Court did not include a reference to this theory or to In re Martinez. In any case, Williams provides no argument or authority to support his claim beyond the one sentence in his brief. Therefore, we do not address it.

FACTS

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) received numerous calls regarding gang fights in the area of 91st and San Pedro Streets during the month of August 2013. The Main Street Crips gang claimed that area as its territory. "DEA" is a clique or subset within the Main Street Crips. Both defendants belonged to the DEA clique. Smith's gang moniker was "Dulo" or "D." Williams's gang moniker was "Infant D-Hog" or "Infant." Smith's brother also belonged to DEA.

Main Street Crips was feuding with the 92 Hat Gang Watts Crips (Hat Gang) in August 2013. Deshawn Dixon, the murder victim in this case, was a member of the Hat Gang. Thomas Turner and Edward Thomas, the attempted murder victims in this case, were also Hat Gang members. As part of the feuding during that period, Dixon had "jumped" Smith's brother. Hat Gang members had also shot at Smith's brother.

On August 27, 2013, LAPD officers responded to a report of a shooting at 91st and San Pedro Streets at approximately 10:00 a.m. They found Dixon lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to his abdomen. An ambulance transported Dixon to the hospital, where he died approximately two hours later.

On appeal, there is no dispute that Smith and Williams went to the location of the shooting together or that Smith personally used a firearm to shoot Dixon from a car in which Williams was also riding. There is also no dispute that Turner was very near Dixon, and Thomas was, at the least, in the vicinity of Dixon. Defendants presented no affirmative evidence in their defense. The facts we set forth come from the prosecution's case.

A. Robin Johnson

On the morning of August 27, 2013, Smith was with his girlfriend of three years, Robin Johnson. They were driving in his car on San Pedro Street in the area of 92nd Street when two men on foot "mad-dogged" Smith, or gave him dirty looks. Smith returned the dirty looks. Smith, who was driving, turned on 94th Street and told Johnson he was going to pick up Williams so they could fight. Smith kept the car running as he stopped in front of Williams's house and yelled his name. Williams came out of his house, and Smith shouted at him to "grab the thing." Johnson asked him what he meant by the "thing." Smith said, "A gun." Johnson told him she was scared; he did not respond. Still, Johnson thought they were just going to fist fight, not kill someone.

At the preliminary hearing, Johnson said she did not ask Smith what he meant by "the thing."

Williams went back inside the house and came out again. Johnson did not see anything in his hands when he came out the second time. She never saw Williams give anything to Smith or put anything in the glove compartment. But she also never saw Williams lift his shirt and could not say whether he had anything in his waistband.

Williams got into the backseat behind Johnson (who was the front passenger). Smith told Williams they were "going to go fight." He drove back to San Pedro and 94th Streets and parked alongside the curb. Both he and Williams exited the car and walked away. Johnson stayed in the front passenger seat and talked to a friend sitting on the sidewalk. Smith returned and reached through the passenger window for the glove compartment. Johnson did not see whether he took anything out. She was concerned something bad might happen, but she did not see Smith take anything because her seat was laid back and she was looking toward her friend on the sidewalk. She told officers that she saw Smith put something in his waistband then, but at trial she did not remember seeing that.

After reaching into the car, Smith ran north toward 91st Street. Johnson's friend told her to "get him" before he got "himself into some mess." Johnson got into the driver's seat and followed Smith in the car. She yelled at him to get in the car, but he ignored her. She was nervous and afraid "something [was] happening." Because Smith was not listening to her, she drove past him and tried to catch up with Williams.

LAPD obtained surveillance video of San Pedro Street from a liquor store on the corner of San Pedro and 93rd Streets. Consistent with Johnson's testimony, the video showed Williams walking northbound on San Pedro Street to 91st Street, and approximately 30 seconds later, Smith running the same direction with his right hand at his waistband. The video also showed Smith's car driving away from the curb and following Smith as he ran down the street.

Johnson found Williams on San Pedro Street between 92nd and 91st Streets, yelling and cursing at the two men who had given Smith dirty looks. Smith was nearby talking to someone on a bike. She made one or two U-turns on San Pedro Street as she was trying to convince Williams and Smith to get in the car. They both got into the car at 92nd Street, and she immediately started driving north toward 91st Street. Smith sat in the passenger seat and Williams in the backseat on the passenger side. Smith rolled down his window, and Johnson heard him "click the gun back." She told him, "Please don't do it." But he put his arm out the window and started shooting before the car had reached 91st Street. Johnson heard multiple shots and then looked at the passenger's side rear-view mirror. She saw one man on the ground and another standing next to him.

Johnson did not see anybody on the street with a gun, either when Smith was shooting or afterward when she looked in the mirror, nor did she hear any shots fired in her direction. When Detective Nathan Kouri of the LAPD interviewed her months later, she told him she saw members of the Hat Gang coming from a yard and digging in their pants pockets like they were reaching for something. At trial, she denied that she saw them coming from a yard or digging in their pockets.

After the shooting, Johnson was scared and stopped the car after driving away from the scene. She told Smith, "I don't want to have nothing to do with this," exited the car, and walked to her brother's house. She was scared to contact police and did not break up with Smith. The police arrested her and Smith on October 15, 2013. Officers found the shirt Smith wore on the day of the shooting at her house.

When Detective Kouri interviewed her after her arrest, she denied being at the shooting for the first hour or so of questioning. She eventually relayed the true facts as she stated them at trial, because she became worried that her unborn child would be taken from her otherwise. She was two to three months pregnant. At some later date, prosecutors offered her a plea agreement in exchange for her truthful testimony. But she stated she would have testified truthfully even if they had not offered her a plea agreement; she felt it was "the right thing to do." She pled guilty to accessory after the fact with a gang enhancement. The court had not yet sentenced her.

B. Thomas Turner

Turner (one of the attempted murder victims) lived on San Pedro Street near the 91st Street intersection. He lived three or four houses north of the corner of San Pedro and 91st Streets. Officers found Dixon in front of the house neighboring Turner's. The prosecution subpoenaed Turner to testify, but he refused to even let the clerk swear him in.

Detective Kouri interviewed Turner three times after the shooting, including once on the day of the shooting. The pair of shorts he wore on that day had two holes in it. Detective Kouri searched Turner's home on the day of the shooting. He recovered a .22-caliber gun from his bedroom.

C. Edward Thomas

Thomas (the second attempted murder victim) testified in the prosecution's case. The prosecution also subpoenaed Thomas. He admitted that he did not want to testify, but he did nevertheless. His testimony at trial differed in many respects from his statements to police and to another witness—Katrina Shaw—made right after the shooting.

Detective Kouri interviewed Thomas on the day of the shooting. During that interview, Thomas suggested he was standing at the corner of San Pedro and 91st Streets when shots were fired. (He insisted at trial that the statement "came out wrong" because there were some parts of the interview the detective did not record.) No one in the group returned fire at the car. The shooter fired six to seven shots from the car.

At trial, Thomas said he was inside Turner's house watching television on August 27, 2013, when he heard gunshots, which prompted him to run outside. The shooting was still happening when he came outside, and Turner and Dixon were near the corner. He made it to the gate and then turned around and ran back toward the house. Thomas did not know if anyone in the group returned fire at the car. Turner and Dixon were also running away from the shooter back to Turner's house. Dixon did not make it back to the house. He did not see Turner come into the house and get a gun before the shooting started, and he never saw Turner in possession of a gun when he went outside. He denied speaking to Shaw at all about the shooting. He said Detective Kouri forced him to say the things he said during the police interview. The detective, for his part, denied that he forced Thomas to say anything during the interview.

D. Katrina Shaw

Shaw is a cousin of Dixon's mother. She was close to Dixon. She gave a statement to the police two days after the shooting. Thomas told her what happened the day of the shooting. His account to Shaw was as follows.

Thomas, Turner, and Dixon stayed at Turner's house the night before the shooting. When they woke up the next morning, Dixon and Turner went to the corner store and returned at a run because two men were chasing them. Turner, who was hot-headed, was mad. He got a gun and went outside. Dixon followed him outside to try to calm him. Thomas said he also went outside when Dixon and Turner did. A car pulled up with "Infant" and "D" inside, the same men who had just chased Dixon and Turner. Both men in the car shot at him. ("[O]ne shot, then the other one shot.") The shooters were from the DEA gang. Dixon had previously fought with one of the two shooters, but Shaw was not clear on about which one.

E. David Cathy

David Cathy is Smith's cousin. At trial, Cathy took the oath and, after indicating Smith was his cousin, refused to testify further. The court warned him it would hold him in contempt. He agreed to accept the consequences but returned the next court day of his own volition and testified further. Cathy was in custody on November 24, 2013, after a parole search at his residence. He denied that officers interviewed him on that date. He also denied being a gang member. He never told officers that he knew something about a murder involving Smith. The prosecution played selected portions of a recorded interview with Detective Yung Mun to impeach him, and Cathy denied making the statements on the recording. In fact, he denied that it was his voice at all on the recording. He did not know who was talking to the detective on the recording. He acknowledged that the prosecutor and Detective Kouri visited him the week before he testified, and when the prosecutor told him she intended to call him, he cried and said he would not testify.

Detective Mun testified later about the information he received from Cathy. He and his partner recorded an interview with Cathy on November 24, 2013. The interview occurred at Cathy's request. At the time, Cathy was in custody and had been arrested for reasons unrelated to the shooting. He told jailers that he had information he was willing to give in exchange for help on his case. But the detectives never offered him anything in exchange for his information. They told Cathy his information had to be corroborated before anything was offered to him, and they would pass the information to the investigating officers on the case. Cathy was cooperative throughout the interview.

Cathy told the detectives he had information about a "murder" involving Smith, his partner Johnson, and Infant. His information was as follows. Smith was a member of Main Street Crips, as was Cathy himself. People in the gang looked up to Smith. The murder victim was from the Hat Gang. The Hat Gang had been feuding with Smith's brother, also a Main Street Crips member. The Hat Gang had "jumped" and shot at Smith's brother. Smith said he "ain't going for none of that" and he "ain't doing no playing."

Smith had Infant with him on the day of the shooting. Infant asked him, "You want me to bring the gun[?]" Smith replied, "Yeah, bring it." Cathy was unsure whether Infant actually gave Smith a gun. Smith, Johnson, and Infant drove to where Smith had seen some Hat Gang members earlier. Infant tried to chase them on foot and told Smith, "Come on. Let's fight." But Smith told him to stop chasing them and said the Hat Gang members "didn't want to fight." They both got into the car with Johnson driving. Johnson told Smith, "It ain't worth it. Don't even do it." He responded, "No, I'm tired of these—I'm tired of these niggas." Johnson drove toward the Hat Gang members. On the way there, Smith cocked the hammer back on the gun. They saw four or five Hat Gang members exiting a residence and "they appeared to [be] mess[ing] around with their pants" or "pulling up their pants and all that." Smith thought they had a gun. He fired multiple shots and hit one of them. He kept shooting after one man fell.

Smith sold the gun he used in the shooting to another gang. Cathy knew about the shooting because Smith called him afterward. He asked for Cathy's advice because Cathy had "gone through a similar situation." Smith was crying and told Cathy he was "just protecting himself and his pregnant girlfriend."

F. Other Evidence from the Police Investigation

Investigators found 7 nine-millimeter casings on San Pedro Street south of 91st Street, and two live .22-caliber rounds on San Pedro Street north of 91st Street. The nine-millimeter casing furthest from Dixon's body was approximately 270 feet away from him. The nine-millimeter casing closest to him was approximately 192 feet away. The 7 nine-millimeter casings were fired from the same gun.

The investigators found the live .22-caliber rounds approximately six feet north of where Dixon was lying, in front of the house neighboring Turner's house. These two live rounds were cycled through the .22-caliber gun found in Turner's house, but they were never fired. They did not have any firing pin marks on them. The gun was in working condition and would have fired if someone had pulled the trigger.

Detective Kouri searched Williams's residence in October 2013. Among other things, he recovered a nine-millimeter loaded handgun from Williams's bedroom. Subsequent testing revealed the gun was not the one used in the shooting.

G. Gang Expert

Detective Christian Mrakich, the prosecution's gang expert, is a member of the LAPD's gang task force. He testified in part as follows. Witnesses are often uncooperative with police investigating alleged gang crimes because gang members are known to retaliate with violence against those who give information to the police. This applies even when witnesses are themselves members of a gang and may have information inculpating rival gang members. When one's own gang is the victim, he or she is expected to not cooperate with the police; the gang handles retaliation for the crime against it "on the street." For example, if one member of a gang is "jumped" or shot at by a rival gang, other members of the victim's gang join together and retaliate for that "disrespect." An affront to one member of the gang is an affront to the entire gang.

PROCEDURE

The amended information charged Smith and Williams with the murder of Dixon (count 1), and the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders of Turner and Thomas (counts 2 & 4), along with alleging gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1)). As previously noted, the jury found defendants guilty as charged and found Dixon's murder to be in the first degree. The jury also found the gang and firearm enhancements to be true. The court sentenced both defendants to total prison terms of 90 years to life. They timely appealed.

Count 3 related to another alleged attempted murder victim. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss Count 3.

We modified the judgments to correct miscalculated presentence custody credits as to both defendants, but otherwise affirmed. Defendants sought review from the California Supreme Court. The court granted review, but deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591. On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Canizales. (Id. at pp. 606-607.) On October 16, 2019, it transferred the matter to this court, and directed us to vacate our opinion and reconsider the appeal in light of Canizales.

DISCUSSION

I. Issues Relating to the Kill Zone Theory

The People contend this issue has been forfeited on appeal because defendants failed to object to the CALCRIM No. 600 instruction at trial. We may review any claim of instructional error that allegedly affects a defendant's substantial rights even in the absence of an objection. (§ 1259; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976-977, fn. 7.) As we did in the initial opinion, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of this issue. --------

Defendants assert Canizales requires reversal of their two attempted murder convictions because the evidence did not support instructing the jury on the kill zone theory and the error was prejudicial. We find no instructional error. Defendants further challenge the accuracy and completeness of the instruction itself, relying on Canizales's observation that CALCRIM No. 600 should be revised. As to this contention, we find any error harmless.

A. Standard of Review

" 'The trial court has the duty to instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence [citations] and has the correlative duty "to refrain from instructing on principles of law which not only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the effect of confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on relevant issues." [Citation.] "It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference [citation]." [Citation.]' " (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 920-921.) Therefore, the court must give a requested instruction "if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration." (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.)

"We review a claim of instructional error de novo." (People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378 (Fiore).) "When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner." (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.) We do not determine the correctness of the instruction from a consideration of only part of an instruction or from only one instruction in isolation. (Fiore, supra, at p. 1378.) "If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ' "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the Constitution.' " (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam).) Jurors are presumed to have understood and followed the trial court's jury instructions. (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422.)

If a jury has been instructed on the kill zone theory in error, the error is reviewed for prejudice under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 (Aledamat).) Under this standard, "[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Ibid.) In other words, the reviewing court must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 615.)

B. The Kill Zone Theory

Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill, or express malice, and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) "To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The defendant's mental state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim. Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended victim, but not of others." (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 328 (Bland).) "[A]lthough the intent to kill a primary target does not transfer to a survivor, the fact the person desires to kill a particular target does not preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within what is termed the 'kill zone' " for attempted murder. (Id. at p. 329.)

The kill zone theory is illustrated in the following hypothetical. "[C]onsider a defendant who intends to kill A and, in order to ensure A's death, drives by a group consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with automatic weapon fire or an explosive device devastating enough to kill everyone in the group. The defendant has intentionally created a 'kill zone' to ensure the death of his primary victim, and the trier of fact may reasonably infer from the method employed an intent to kill others concurrent with the intent to kill the primary victim. When the defendant escalated his mode of attack from a single bullet aimed at A's head to a hail of bullets or an explosive device, the factfinder can infer that, whether or not the defendant succeeded in killing A, the defendant concurrently intended to kill everyone in A's immediate vicinity to ensure A's death." (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 330.)

In Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591, the Supreme Court held the kill zone theory may serve as the basis for an attempted murder conviction "when the jury finds that: (1) the circumstances of the defendant's attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm — that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target's death — around the primary target; and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within that zone of harm." (Id. at pp. 596-597.) "In determining the defendant's intent to create a zone of fatal harm and the scope of any such zone, the jury should consider the circumstances of the offense, such as the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged victims, and the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target. Evidence that a defendant who intends to kill a primary target acted with only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or death for those around a primary target does not satisfy the kill zone theory." (Id. at p. 607.)

In Canizales, five shots were fired at a primary target and his companion from 100 feet away at a block party. The shots were "going everywhere" and killed an innocent bystander rather than the intended target. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 609.) The court concluded, "The evidence presented here showed that from a substantial distance [the defendant] shot five bullets in the direction of a target who immediately ran down a city street after the first shot was fired. This evidence was insufficient to support instruction on the kill zone theory." (Id. at p. 611.) Having determined the theory was not supported by the evidence, the Canizales court declined to address the defendant's constitutional challenge to the standard kill zone instruction found in CALCRIM No. 600. However, it observed, "the standard instruction should be revised to better describe the contours and limits of the kill zone theory as we have laid them out here." (Id. at p. 609.)

C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Instructing the Jury on the Kill Zone Theory

The jury was properly instructed with the kill zone theory here. The facts of this case correspond closely with the hypothetical situation described in Bland: Smith and Williams intended to kill Dixon, who was a member of a rival gang and who had "jumped" and shot at Smith's brother. In order to ensure Dixon's death, they drove by a group consisting of Dixon, Thomas, and Turner, and attacked the group with a hail of seven bullets, enough to kill everyone in the group. There is no dispute Turner was very near Dixon, and Thomas was, at the least, in the vicinity of Dixon. Additionally, Cathy testified Smith continued to shoot even after Dixon fell to the ground. Bland tells us that these facts demonstrate defendants intentionally created a kill zone to ensure the death of the primary target, Dixon, and the jury may reasonably infer from the method employed an intent to kill others concurrent with the intent to kill the primary target. Guided by Bland, we conclude sufficient evidence supported the trial court's kill zone instruction to the jury.

Canizales does not change our conclusion. First, Canizales did not overrule Bland. Instead, the court relied upon Bland's analysis and referenced the hypothetical set out in Bland to reach its decision. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.) Second, the factors identified in Canizales lead us to the same conclusion; that is, the only reasonable inference to be made from the circumstances of the attack—the proximity of the victims to the primary target, the effectiveness of the attack, the continued attack even after the primary target fell to the ground, and the number of shots fired—is that defendants intended to create a kill zone.

Defendants make much of the fact they were 196 to 270 feet away from the victims and fired "relatively few shots [] into an open area," arguing the Canizales court found that a much closer distance and a similar number of shots was insufficient to support a kill zone instruction. Thus, they claim, the circumstances of the attack in this case were also insufficient to support a kill zone instruction. Unlike in Canizales, however, the evidence here demonstrates the shots were not "going everywhere" despite the greater distance. Instead, the evidence showed the shots were effective: Dixon was immediately killed with a shot to his chest and fell to the ground and there were bullet holes in Turner's shorts. Neither victim had the opportunity to flee, unlike those in Canizales. Canizales acknowledged that the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the defendant's attack "at least informed" whether an inference of a kill zone could reasonably be drawn. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 611.) In short, the distance between the victims and the shooters and the number of shots fired are only two factors to be considered under Canizales. They are not dispositive.

D. Any Error in the Standard Kill Zone Instruction Was Harmless

Relying on Canizales, defendants further contend CALCRIM No. 600 failed to provide a sufficient definition of the term "kill zone" and failed to instruct the jury as to what circumstances to consider in deciding whether to convict based on the kill zone theory. We find any error to be harmless.

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 600 as follows: "To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to kill that person." Elsewhere, the instruction stated: "A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same time intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or 'kill zone.' In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of Thomas Turner and Edward Thomas, the People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill Deshawn Dixon but also either intended to kill Thomas Turner and Edward Thomas, or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill Deshawn Dixon or intended to kill Thomas Turner or Edward Thomas by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of Thomas Turner and Edward Thomas."

We acknowledge CALCRIM No. 600 did not enumerate the six circumstances Canizales identified as bearing on a defendant's "intent to create a zone of fatal harm and the scope of any such zone" and did not expressly state an attempted murder conviction is appropriate under a kill zone theory if the "only reasonable inference" from these circumstances "is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm." (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.) Canizales, however, reversed on the ground the evidence failed to warrant an instruction on a kill zone theory. Despite observing that the standard instruction should be revised, the high court stopped short of finding CALCRIM No. 600 inaccurate or incomplete in describing the kill zone theory. (Canizales, at p. 609.) Additionally, Canizales declined to reach the contention that CALCRIM No. 600 was constitutionally infirm. (Canizales, at p. 618.) Thus, the court did not expressly invalidate CALCRIM No. 600.

Even if we accept defendants' contention CALCRIM No. 600 was inaccurate or deficient under Canizales, however, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because a reasonable jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13; Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 615.)

Here, the People relied both on a kill zone theory and a theory that defendants specifically intended to kill Turner and Thomas. The evidence of their intent to target Turner and Thomas was strong. There was an ongoing feud between rival gangs, the Main Street Crips and the Hat Gang, in August 2013. Smith and Williams were members the Main Street Crips and Thomas and Turner were members of the Hat Gang. Defendants had altercations with Dixon and Turner that precipitated the shooting. Dixon and Turner "mad-dogged" Smith. Afterwards, Johnson observed Williams yelling and cursing at Dixon and Turner. Although he was not part of the original altercation, Thomas told Shaw that both defendants shot at him, "like one shot, then the other shot."

Additionally, Smith's brother had been shot at by Hat Gang members. When his girlfriend attempted to stop him from confronting Thomas and Turner, Smith replied, "No, I'm tired of these - I'm tired of these niggas." Smith also stated, "I'm tired of these niggas keep playing - playing with me like I'm some joke." These statements indicated Smith intended to shoot all Hat Gang members, not just Dixon. Smith's intent was demonstrated when he continued to shoot even after Dixon was fatally wounded from the first shot and fell to the ground. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury would have concluded defendants intended to target Thomas and Turner as well as Dixon and would have rendered the same verdict absent any error in the kill zone instruction.

II. We Will Allow Remand for the Trial Court to Exercise its Discretion to Strike One or More of the Firearm Enhancements Given that the Attorney General Concedes the Issue

Defendants next seek resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 620), effective January 1, 2018, which amended sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h), to give the trial court discretion to strike previously mandatory firearm enhancements. (§ 12022.5, subd. (c) ["The court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section. The authority provided by this subdivision applies to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law."]; § 12022.53, subd. (h) [same].)

As to count 1, defendants' sentences each included one 25-years-to-life term for a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As to counts 2 and 4, two additional 20-year terms were imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (c).

The discretion to strike a firearm enhancement may be exercised as to any defendant whose conviction is not final as of the effective date of the amendment. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 742-748; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323.) Defendants' convictions are not yet final and they are entitled to remand. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 ["a defendant generally is entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while his case is on appeal"]; People v. Smith (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465 ["[a] judgment becomes final when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari have expired"]; see also Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230 ["[t]he rule applies to any such [criminal] proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it"].)

The Attorney General concedes remand is required for resentencing under SB 620. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence as to both appellants. We thus find it doubtful that the court will change its mind upon remand. However, given that both parties agree remand is appropriate, we will not enter the fray to find otherwise.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony enhancements as to both defendants under SB 620. The judgments are otherwise affirmed.

BIGELOW, P. J. WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, J.

STRATTON, J.

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