HAGEN, Judge
Opinion Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
No. 131910817 Marshall M. Thompson and Andrea J. Garland, Attorneys for Appellant Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE KATE APPLEBY concurred. JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred in part and concurred in the result, with opinion. HAGEN, Judge: ¶1 Howard Wayne Hood appeals his convictions for rape and forcible sodomy. Before trial, Hood sought to exclude evidence that he had been excommunicated from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible "other act" evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The district court admitted the evidence to explain the context of Hood's relationship with the alleged victim. We conclude that this was a proper, non-propensity purpose and that the evidence was relevant to assessing the victim's credibility on the question of consent. But because we also conclude that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence and that its admission was harmful, we vacate Hood's convictions and remand for a new trial.
Judge Kate A. Toomey has resumed the use of her birth name and is now known as Judge Kate Appleby.
BACKGROUND
Relationship Between Hood and W.B.
¶2 Hood met the alleged victim, W.B., on a dating website in March 2013. W.B. was a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and assumed that Hood was as well because his profile picture showed a photograph of the church's founder in the background. According to W.B., on their first date, Hood told her he had not gone to church for some time but had attended that same day and wanted to resume his involvement in the church. He said he was grateful to meet someone like her who was a member so that she could help him come back into "full fellowship" with the church. At trial, W.B. explained that "full fellowship" means taking steps to "live the teachings of the gospel" and being able to "take the sacrament" and "receive anally with his penis while saying, "Isn't this a fun game we're playing?" According to W.B., she told Hood, "No, . . . this isn't fun." After this incident, she met with her ecclesiastical leader, the bishop, and confessed that she "had allowed" the act even though she did not want it to happen. She testified that the bishop counseled her to refrain from participating in the sacrament for three weeks. ¶5 At trial, Hood painted a different picture of the couple's relationship. He testified that W.B. was eager to engage in sexual activity, including oral sex and intercourse, and "never talked to [him] about not wanting to have sex because she was taking her religion seriously." Hood testified that he and W.B. talked little about religion and that the topic was not central to their relationship. According to Hood, they had a sexual relationship for months before he told W.B. that he was trying to return to the church after having been excommunicated.
"The sacrament is the formal blessing and administering of bread and water representing the body and blood of Christ to Church members," which is "the equivalent of communion in many other Christian churches." Sacrament, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Newsroom, www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/sacrament [https://perma.cc/L7FL-3875].
In the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, excommunication, or loss of church membership, is the "most serious sanction the disciplinary council may prescribe." Church Discipline, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Newsroom, www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/church-discipline [https://perma.cc/J8XZ-WW84]. Importantly, church discipline is not reserved solely for "apostasy," or public opposition to church doctrine. Id. "Church discipline may be required for someone guilty of serious criminal offenses." Id. In particular, the church expresses "zero tolerance for abuse of any kind, including child abuse, spousal abuse, sexual abuse or child pornography, and anyone engaged in these practices would rightly face both criminal prosecution and Church discipline." Id. Other "serious personal sin, including abortion or sexual sin, may require disciplinary action as part of the repentance process," but excommunication is considered "a course of last resort and is only taken when less serious disciplinary measures are insufficient." Id.
Charged Conduct
¶6 On October 19, 2013, W.B. left Hood's apartment after an argument, inadvertently leaving her checkbook there. That night, Hood sent her a text that she had forgotten her checkbook, and W.B. responded, asking if she could retrieve it the next day. Because of the argument, she suggested he hand her the checkbook at the door if he did not want her to come into the apartment. But when she arrived the next day, Hood hugged her and told her he was sorry for what had happened. W.B. testified she felt ill that morning and told Hood that she was "really tired." He led her into his bedroom and suggested she take a nap. ¶7 W.B. testified that, after she fell asleep, Hood entered the room, removed her pants, and performed oral sex on her. When she woke, Hood held her down and ignored her pleas to stop. According to W.B., she was sobbing when Hood put on a condom. She begged, "No, Howard, no," then froze in "complete and utter shock" while he raped her. ¶8 In contrast, Hood testified that W.B. initiated the encounter by suggesting they take a nap together. According to Hood, they began "making out" in the bedroom and he performed oral sex on W.B. only after she asked him to give her an orgasm. Hood testified that, after the oral sex, he retrieved condoms from his car before returning to the bedroom to have intercourse with her.
Motion to Exclude Under Rule 404(b)
¶9 The State charged Hood with one count of rape and one count of forcible sodomy. At trial, Hood voiced concern over whether the State intended to elicit testimony regarding his excommunication from the church. Hood acknowledged that although it may be permissible to explain that he was not a church member, it was a 404(b) issue "to say he's been excommunicated in the past." The district court initially agreed that there was "no reason" for such evidence. The State objected, arguing that Hood's excommunication was a central component of his relationship with W.B. The State explained that W.B. would testify that "Hood made it very clear that he was excommunicated, but that he wanted to come back to the church and that . . . plea for help, spiritually speaking, was one of her reasons for staying in contact with him." The State posited that Hood's excommunication and his professed desire to return to the church were "very probative of why [W.B.] maintain[ed] contact with this person who [was] making . . . repeated [sexual] overtures." ¶10 Hood conceded that W.B. could testify that he "left the church, . . . he wasn't a member, he's trying to come back to the church," but he objected to the admission of evidence that he had been excommunicated. The district court questioned whether it was possible to "shape or mold [W.B.'s] testimony beyond what the facts actually are" to avoid mentioning the excommunication. It noted that Hood's status in the church was "a fairly central part of the ongoing relationship between these parties" and ruled that it would allow Hood's statements to W.B. regarding his excommunication.
Before trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to offer evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but it did not include the evidence of Hood's excommunication. Given its arguments on appeal, the State presumably concluded that such evidence fell outside the scope of rule 404(b). Hood did not ask the district court to exclude the excommunication evidence based on lack of notice, nor has he raised that issue on appeal. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (requiring reasonable notice of other act evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial).
Use of Excommunication Evidence at Trial
¶11 At trial, the State presented evidence that Hood had been excommunicated from the church but never disclosed what Hood did to merit that sanction. In its opening statement, the State referred to Hood's professed desire to "get back [to being] active in the church" and his pleas for W.B. to help him do so as the method he used to manipulate W.B. into forgiving him and staying in the relationship. The prosecutor did not use the term "excommunication" or otherwise refer to official church discipline. ¶12 During trial, however, the State elicited testimony about Hood's excommunication from three witnesses. First, W.B. testified that Hood told her he had been excommunicated. Because he had lost his membership in the church, Hood told her that he needed to "retake the discussions" with the church missionaries and then "be found worthy to be rebaptized to be able to have the blessings of the gospel in his life." ¶13 Second, during cross-examination, Hood confirmed that he told W.B. of his excommunication. In a subsequent line of questioning, the State reiterated that Hood had been "officially excommunicated from the church." ¶14 Third, the State offered testimony from Hood's ex-wife about his excommunication. She testified that, soon after they met, Hood told her he "was trying to get in good standing with the church because he had been excommunicated." She explained that "there's certain things that if you do them, like morality, different things like that, then you have to go and confess to your bishop or stake president or whatnot, and then . . . they hold a council, and if they find that you're lacking, they can excommunicate you." Hood's ex-wife testified that obeying the "law of chastity" was important to maintaining good standing in the church. ¶15 In its closing argument, the State directly referred to Hood's excommunication. The prosecutor argued that Hood's professed "interest in rekindling the flame of faith" explained why the "naïve" and "religious" W.B. continued to forgive and wanted to "believe that he will be better." ¶16 The jury convicted Hood of rape and forcible sodomy. He appeals those convictions.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 Hood argues that the district court erred by allowing the State to elicit testimony about Hood's "prior conviction for an unknown transgression in an . . . ecclesiastical court." A district court's decision to admit other-act evidence under rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 56, 391 P.3d 1016. Under this "deferential standard of review," the question before the appellate court "is not whether we would have admitted [the] evidence. It is whether the district judge abused his broad discretion in doing so." Id. ¶18 Hood raised three additional issues on appeal, but because his first claim of error requires us to vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial, it is unnecessary for us to reach the remaining issues. See State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, 223 P.3d 1137.
"We recognize that we may address issues raised on appeal that are likely to arise again upon remand." State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, 223 P.3d 1137; see also State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 49, 416 P.3d 1132 ("Although it is unnecessary to our decision, we retain the authority to reach issues when we believe our analysis could prove helpful on remand.") Although Hood has raised an additional rule 404(b) challenge that is likely to arise again on remand, we decline to reach that issue. The district court admitted testimony from Hood's ex-wife that Hood "at least once had sex with her while she was asleep, despite her verbal protests upon waking." The district court rejected the State's argument that this testimony was admissible based on the "doctrine of chances," but it did admit the evidence to prove Hood's intent and the victim's lack of consent. On appeal, the State asked us to affirm the admission of the ex-wife's testimony based on the doctrine of chances even though the district court expressly rejected that theory. The State contends that "the doctrine-of-chances rationale for proving lack of consent is not an alternative theory at all, because the cases holding that prior acts are admissible to prove lack of consent are, in fact, grounded in the doctrine of chances." In support of its position, the State relies on Utah Supreme Court decisions issued after the district court's ruling in this case. See generally State v. Lopez, 2018 UT 5, ¶¶ 48-64, 417 P.3d 116; State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34, ¶¶ 24-27, 398 P.3d 1032. By not reaching this issue, we leave the district court free on remand to reconsider the admissibility of this evidence in light of recent case law. See Blackmore v. L & D Dev. Inc., 2016 UT App 198, ¶ 30, 382 P.3d 655 (noting that "on remand from an appeal, the district court retains discretion to decide whether to reconsider any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal" (quotation simplified)).
ANALYSIS
¶19 At trial, Hood argued that evidence regarding his excommunication was inadmissible under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Under that rule, "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such evidence "may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Id. R. 404(b)(2). In other words, evidence "is not admissible to prove that a defendant has a propensity for bad behavior and has acted in conformity with his dubious character," but may be admissible "if it is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶ 29, 256 P.3d 1102. ¶20 As our supreme court has recognized, the difficulty in applying rule 404(b) "springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences—and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16, 296 P.3d 673, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. On one hand, exposing the jury to evidence of a defendant's acts of misconduct may lead to an impermissible inference "that the defendant has a reprehensible character, that he probably acted in conformity with it, and that he should be punished for his immoral character in any event." Id. ¶ 29. "On the other hand, the rule also recognizes that acts of prior misconduct may also sustain an alternative—and entirely permissible—inference." Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶ 36. When offered for a non-propensity purpose, "such evidence is admissible so long as it satisfies rules 402 and 403." Id. (quotation simplified).
I. Applicability of Rule 404(b)
¶21 Before analyzing whether these requirements were met, we first address the State's alternative argument that the evidence at issue is not subject to rule 404(b). The State contends that evidence of Hood's excommunication does not fall within rule 404(b) for three reasons: (1) excommunication is not "a crime, wrong, or other act," (2) Hood's statements about his excommunication were not offered to prove that they were true but only that they had been made, and (3) telling W.B. that he had been excommunicated was intrinsic to the crimes with which he was charged and not subject to rule 404(b). Although none of these arguments were made to the district court, an appellate court may affirm "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record," even if such ground or theory "was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Goodsel v. Department of Bus. Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) (quotation simplified). But, for the reasons set forth below, we do not find these alternative arguments persuasive. A. Other Act Evidence ¶22 First, the State claims that excommunication does not fall within rule 404(b) because it "represents a person's standing in victim that he was a sex offender, made immediately before their first sexual contact, "was 'part and parcel' with the sexual contact" and "relevant to complainant's 'level of intimidation and cooperation/consent.'"). In describing the alleged rape and sodomy, W.B. never referred to Hood's excommunication or suggested that it facilitated or otherwise played a role in the commission of those offenses. At most, the evidence explained why W.B. maintained her troubled relationship with Hood and was present in his home during the alleged offense. ¶33 Establishing some minimal relevance to the State's narrative is insufficient to place other-act evidence beyond the reach of rule 404(b). If it were otherwise, application of rule 402 would be the first and last step of the analysis. Because evidence of Hood's excommunication was not so closely connected to the charged crimes to be intrinsic, rule 404(b) applies to this other-act evidence.
A majority of Utahns are members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. See Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study, http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/ [https://perma.cc/W9L3-R2ZK].
The phrase "other acts" in rule 404(b) could arguably include "any conduct, good or bad, that tends to reflect on the person's character." See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 22B Federal Practice & Procedure Evidence § 5245 (2d ed. 1987). Alternatively, "other acts" can be "read along with the first two categories so it only covers conduct that resembles crimes or wrongs." Id. Because an act that results in excommunication is most often similar in nature to a "crime" or "wrong," which includes the "violation of religious and ethical norms," id., we do not reach the question of whether "other acts" might also include specific incidents of behavior that bear on the defendant's character but do not amount to misconduct.
Although the State claims that it "did not suggest that [Hood's] statements about his excommunication were true," it assumed the truth of Hood's status in the church during his cross-examination, when it prefaced a question by stating that Hood had been "officially excommunicated from the church."
II. Application of Rule 404(b)
¶34 Having determined that rule 404(b) applies, we turn to whether admission of the evidence exceeded the district court's discretion. Evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct "must clear several evidentiary hurdles before admission—rules 404(b), 402, and 403." State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 57, 349 P.3d 712 (quotation simplified). "These requirements can be distilled into a three-part test: the prior bad-act evidence (1) must be offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose, (2) must be relevant to that noncharacter purpose, and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. (quotation simplified). ¶35 Here, the district court did not conduct this three-part analysis on the record. Under prior case law requiring a "scrupulous examination" of rule 404(b) evidence, failure to do so would have been an independent basis for reversal. sexual acts were nonconsensual by explaining that she maintained her relationship with Hood, despite their disparate views on premarital sex, because Hood had asked her to help him return to "full fellowship" with the church. Allowing Hood's proposed evidence that he was a former church member, while excluding testimony that his status resulted from excommunication, would leave no gaps in the natural sequence of events or otherwise diminish the "evidentiary depth" of the State's narrative. See id. at 189-90. Disclosing the excommunication itself added nothing to the legitimate probative value of the evidence. See State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 30 (holding that, although the state was free to reject a proposed stipulation, its rejection had "probative implications" and reinforced "the conclusion that the prosecution's purpose was not to tell a legitimate narrative to the jury but instead to present an improper one"), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. The only thing to be gained was an increased risk that the jury would draw impermissible inferences about Hood's character. ¶52 The State's avowed purpose for using the evidence would have been equally well served by admitting evidence of Hood's estrangement from and renewed interest in the church while still granting his 404(b) motion to exclude his excommunication. The additional probative value of the excommunication evidence, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Given the facts of this case, the district court's decision to admit evidence of Hood's excommunication exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
In rejecting this alternative proposal, the district court questioned whether it would be possible to "shape or mold [W.B.'s] testimony beyond what the facts actually are." As with all pre-trial rulings, the parties would have complied by instructing their witnesses to avoid the prohibited topic and by carefully tailoring their examination questions or seeking permission to proceed by leading questions, if necessary. --------
III. Harmfulness
¶53 Finally, we consider whether this evidentiary error necessitates reversal. "Even if the admission of rule 404(b) evidence by the [district] court was in error, reversal on appeal is not appropriate unless [the defendant] demonstrates that the comparative morality, were pervasive throughout trial. For example, W.B. testified about her interaction with the church missionaries, discussions with her bishop, her attendance at church services, priesthood blessings, the "law of chastity" and other church teachings, the founding of the church and "restoration of the . . . keys of the priesthood," and her religious convictions generally. In contrast, the State painted Hood as lacking any sincere religious convictions. At one point, the prosecutor even questioned whether Hood had made a "real attempt . . . to hear the Gospel again, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints." ¶56 In short, we agree with Hood that "the entire trial devolved into an exploration of [his] perceived religious failings." The evidence suggested that W.B. was the type of person who would refuse consent based on her religious convictions and that Hood was the type of person who would disregard such objections. We are not suggesting that the State's strategy was necessarily improper, only that it exacerbated the potential prejudice from the improper admission of Hood's excommunication. In the context of this case, evidence that a disciplinary body had previously found Hood guilty of a sufficiently serious moral transgression that warranted expulsion from his faith may have suggested that he had an immoral character and the propensity to commit the crimes charged. In a case that turned on conflicting testimony regarding consent, there is a reasonable probability that such propensity evidence unfairly influenced the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
¶57 The probative value of Hood's excommunication was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Because there is a reasonable probability the erroneous admission of this 27 evidence affected the outcome of the trial, we vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge (concurring in part and concurring in result): ¶58 I concur in Part II.C and Part III of the majority opinion and concur in the result reached in this case. While I disagree that the evidence of Hood's excommunication constitutes "other act" evidence pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, I agree with the majority that there is a reasonable probability that the introduction of the excommunication evidence prejudiced Hood.