Harvey 1390 LLC v. Bodenheim

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Docket Number

Attorney(S)

David E. Frazer, New York, for appellant. Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP, New York (Alexa Englander of counsel), for respondents.

Judges

Angela M. Mazzarelli

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a summary nonpayment proceeding involving a rent-stabilized tenant who sought to vacate a warrant of eviction. The tenant had been granted a stay of execution of the eviction warrant for 15 days by the Civil Court, New York County. The Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, reversed that stay order, prompting review by the Appellate Division. The tenant had made partial payments and was seeking charitable assistance to cover outstanding rent arrears.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Civil Court abused its discretion in granting a stay of execution of a warrant of eviction for a short period to allow the tenant to pay outstanding arrears.
Whether a tenant's difficulty in obtaining funds can constitute "good cause" to vacate or stay a warrant of eviction under RPAPL 749(3).
The extent of the court's discretion in vacating a warrant of eviction prior to its execution based on the tenant's circumstances and efforts to pay arrears.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent-Appellant (Tenant)

The tenant argued for a stay of execution of the eviction warrant to allow time to pay remaining arrears.
The tenant demonstrated good faith by making partial payments and actively seeking charitable assistance to cover the balance.
The tenant emphasized the short amount owed and the imminent receipt of funds from charities.

Petitioners-Respondents (Landlord)

The landlords contended that the stay should not be granted, relying on precedent where tenants with histories of extensive defaults and failure to appear were denied relief.
They argued that difficulty in obtaining funds alone does not constitute good cause to vacate or stay a warrant of eviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chelsea 19 Assocs. v. James, 67 A.D.3d 601, 889 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2009)	Enforcement of stipulations of settlement is favored; difficulty obtaining funds alone does not establish good cause to vacate eviction warrant.	The court distinguished the instant case from Chelsea 19, noting the tenant here made partial payments and showed good faith efforts, unlike the tenant in Chelsea 19.
RPAPL 749(3)	Statutory provision granting courts authority to vacate a warrant of eviction prior to execution for good cause shown.	The court confirmed its discretionary power to vacate or stay eviction warrants upon showing of good cause.
Matter of Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 (1994)	Court may vacate a warrant of eviction and return tenant to possession even after warrant execution.	Supported the principle that courts retain discretion to protect tenants when good cause is shown.
102–116 Eighth Ave. Assoc. v. Oyola, 299 A.D.2d 296, 749 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2002)	Good cause determination is entrusted to the court's sound discretion based on facts and circumstances.	The court applied this principle to find no abuse of discretion in granting a stay here.
Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Scott, 271 A.D.2d 273, 707 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2000)	Supports vacating eviction warrants when tenant makes appreciable payments and demonstrates good faith.	Used as precedent to justify the stay based on tenant’s partial payments and efforts to secure assistance.
Bushwick Props., LLC v. Wright, 34 Misc.3d 135, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 52389[U]	Warrant stayed where tenant diligently sought assistance and obtained a commitment letter for arrears.	Analogous to the tenant’s situation here, supporting the stay of eviction warrant.
Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Heim, 158 Misc.2d 982, 607 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Term 1993)	Eviction decisions involve fact-sensitive inquiries balancing equities, including tenant’s history and arrears amount.	The court emphasized the fact-specific nature of the inquiry in affirming the stay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized that while enforcement of stipulations of settlement is generally favored, courts retain discretionary authority under RPAPL 749(3) to vacate or stay eviction warrants for good cause. The court analyzed the tenant’s conduct, noting partial payments, active efforts to secure charitable assistance, and a relatively small arrearage that was about to be paid. These factors distinguished the tenant’s case from Chelsea 19 Assocs. v. James, where the tenant had a history of extensive defaults and failed to appear or provide reasonable excuses. The court emphasized the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry, requiring a balancing of equities including the tenant’s history, the amount owed, and the tenant’s efforts to remedy the default. On this basis, the court found no abuse of discretion in the Civil Court’s decision to stay execution of the warrant for 15 days to permit payment of arrears.

Holding and Implications

The Appellate Division reversed the Appellate Term’s order and reinstated the Civil Court’s order to the extent of granting a 15-day stay of execution of the eviction warrant from the date of service of this order on the petitioners-respondents. This stay permits the tenant to pay outstanding arrears.

The decision reaffirms the court’s discretionary power to grant stays or vacate eviction warrants for good cause shown, particularly where tenants demonstrate good faith efforts to pay arrears. It clarifies that difficulty in obtaining funds may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances. No new precedent was established; rather, the ruling applied established principles to the facts before the court.

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HARVEY 1390 LLC, et al., Petitioners–Respondents, v. Matthew BODENHEIM, Respondent, John Cassarino, Respondent–Appellant.

MAZZARELLI

David E. Frazer, New York, for appellant. Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP, New York (Alexa Englander of counsel), for respondents.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., CATTERSON, MOSKOWITZ, RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.

Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered September 17, 2010, which, in a summary nonpayment proceeding, reversed an order of the Civil Court, New York County (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), entered on or about March 9, 2010, granting respondent-appellant tenant's motion to vacate the judgment to the extent of staying execution of a warrant of eviction for 15 days, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the Civil Court order reinstated to the extent of staying execution of the warrant of eviction for 15 days from service upon petitioners-respondents of a copy of this order, to permit payment of any outstanding arrears.

Although enforcement of stipulations of settlement is favored ( Chelsea 19 Assocs. v. James, 67 A.D.3d 601, 602, 889 N.Y.S.2d 564 [2009] ), a court always retains the power to vacate a warrant of eviction prior to its execution for “good cause shown” (RPAPL 749[3]; see Matter of Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 682, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 [1994];102–116 Eighth Ave. Assoc. v. Oyola, 299 A.D.2d 296, 749 N.Y.S.2d 724 [2002];Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Scott, 271 A.D.2d 273, 273–274, 707 N.Y.S.2d 55 [2000] ). In fact, the court is permitted, in appropriate circumstances, to vacate a warrant of eviction and return a tenant to possession even after the warrant has been executed (Matter of Brusco, 84 N.Y.2d at 682, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724). A determination as to whether good cause exists is entrusted to the sound discretion of the court upon review of the particular facts and circumstances presented ( see 102–116 Eighth Ave. Assoc., 299 A.D.2d at 296, 749 N.Y.S.2d 724).

We find that Civil Court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to stay the execution of the warrant for a short period to allow this longtime rent-stabilized tenant to pay his remaining arrears. The tenant demonstrated that he approached charities and agencies to obtain assistance, tendered almost all of the payment due, and showed that he would soon receive enough charitable assistance to satisfy the arrears ( see Parkchester Apts., 271 A.D.2d at 273–274, 707 N.Y.S.2d 55 [court properly exercised its discretion to vacate a warrant of eviction where, inter alia, the tenant had made appreciable payments and included with his motion payment exceeding the arrears due] ).

Contrary to petitioners' view, our decision in Chelsea 19, 67 A.D.3d 601, 889 N.Y.S.2d 564 does not require a different result. In that case, we declined to vacate a default judgment and warrant of eviction for a tenant who had a history of “extensive and unexplained rent defaults” (21 Misc.3d 129 [A], 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 52013[U], 2008 WL 4513867 [App. Term 2008], affd.67 A.D.3d 601, 889 N.Y.S.2d 564 [2009] ), and failed to appear in opposition to the landlord's motion for issuance of a warrant of eviction. When the tenant subsequently sought to vacate the judgment, he provided no “excuse whatsoever” (id.), let alone a reasonable excuse, for his default. Moreover, he failed to pay the amounts due under the stipulation of settlement, as well as subsequently accruing rent arrears, for more than six months, at which time he made full payment. Under those circumstances, the Chelsea 19 tenant's “claimed difficulty in obtaining funds,” standing alone, did not provide good cause to vacate the warrant (67 A.D.3d at 602, 889 N.Y.S.2d 564).

Here, the tenant did not sit idly by or fail to appear, resulting in entry of judgment by default. Instead, he made partial payments, engaged in good faith efforts to secure emergency rental assistance to cover the arrears and, at the time Civil Court stayed execution of the warrant, owed less than a month's rent, which was forthcoming from a charity ( see Bushwick Props., LLC v. Wright, 34 Misc.3d 135[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 52389[U], *1–2, 2011 WL 6934404 [App. Term 2011] [warrant stayed where the tenant diligently applied to organizations for the arrears and belatedly received a commitment letter for the full amount of the arrears] ).

We note that nothing in Chelsea 19 abrogates a court's authority, in the exercise of its discretion, to vacate a warrant of eviction based on a showing of good cause. Nor does the case stand for the proposition that a court may never consider a tenant's difficulty in obtaining funds when determining, under all the circumstances, whether good cause exists to stay an eviction warrant. These cases involve fact-sensitive inquiries, and must be decided after review of all the circumstances, including the extent of the delay, the length and nature of the tenancy, the amount of the default and the particular tenant's history, as well as a balancing of the equities of the parties ( see Parkchester Apts. Co. v. Heim, 158 Misc.2d 982, 983–984, 607 N.Y.S.2d 212 [App. Term 1993] ).