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Docket Number

No. 14–618.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

Acts

Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Habeas Corpus — Particular Proceedings — State Custody; Remedies In Federal Courts

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Smart Summary

Woods v. Donald (U.S. Supreme Court, No. 14–618, Mar. 30, 2015) (per curiam)

Factual and Procedural Background

After a day of drinking and smoking marijuana, Cory Donald and four others (Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya) decided to rob a drug dealer, Mohammed Makki, at Makki’s home in Dearborn, Michigan. Donald and Moore entered the house while Liggins waited in the car. A witness in the home, Michael McGinnis, heard a scuffle and gunshots, and Makki was later found dying. After the incident, Donald reported that he had stolen $320 and that Moore accidentally shot him; Donald later checked into a hospital for a gunshot wound to his foot and was arrested about three weeks later.

The State charged Donald with first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins and Zaya pleaded guilty; Donald was tried jointly with Moore and Saine. At trial, the prosecution introduced (over objections by Moore and Saine) a telephone-call chart involving Moore, Saine, and Zaya; Donald’s attorney declined to object, stating it did not affect his client. When trial resumed after a short recess, Donald’s counsel was absent for roughly 10 minutes while the telephone chart was discussed; the judge proceeded on the view that Donald’s counsel had already indicated no interest because it did not apply to Donald, and counsel later reiterated that position upon returning.

The jury convicted Donald on all counts, and he received a life sentence for felony murder plus concurrent terms of 10½ to 20 years on the robberies. On direct appeal, Donald sought a new trial on the theory that counsel’s absence during the telephone testimony denied effective assistance of counsel; the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. In federal habeas proceedings, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted relief and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the state court acted contrary to, and unreasonably applied, United States v. Cronic. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of Donald’s Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” Supreme Court precedent.
Whether Supreme Court holdings “clearly establish” that Cronic’s presumed-prejudice rule applies when defense counsel is briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants (including whether that portion of trial was a “critical stage” under the Court’s cases).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent Cory Donald’s Arguments

Donald argued he was entitled to a new trial because his attorney’s absence during the phone-call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
In federal habeas, Donald did not contend the state-court decision was based on a factual error; he argued instead that the decision was “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)	Prejudice may be presumed when a defendant “is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial”; applies only in circumstances “so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”	The Court held no Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that Cronic applies to a brief absence during testimony about codefendants, and thus AEDPA barred Cronic-based habeas relief.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)	Ordinary ineffective-assistance framework: deficient performance and prejudice; strong presumption counsel acted reasonably.	Used to contrast the usual standard with the Sixth Circuit’s use of Cronic’s presumed-prejudice approach.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002)	Characterized “critical stage” as one with “significant consequences for the accused”; declined to presume prejudice where counsel failed to “mount some case for life” at sentencing after prosecution evidence and closing.	The Court emphasized Bell did not involve counsel’s absence, undermining the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on it to expand Cronic in this setting.
Donald v. Rapelje, 580 Fed. Appx. 277 (6th Cir. 2014)	Described trial facts; Sixth Circuit decision granting/affirming habeas relief under Cronic.	Identified as the decision reversed; its “similar to” reasoning was rejected as insufficient under AEDPA.
Donald v. Rapelje, 2012 WL 6047130 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2012)	Referenced for factual detail in the record (McGinnis account).	Cited as part of the factual narrative.
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ––––, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014)	AEDPA is “difficult to meet”; “clearly established Federal law” includes only Supreme Court holdings (not dicta); “unreasonable application” must be objectively unreasonable; also warns against defining rights at too high a level of generality and recognizes state-court discretion where contours are unclear.	Used to set the governing AEDPA standard and to fault the Sixth Circuit for overgeneralizing and for not respecting state-court discretion.
Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1781 (2013)	Quoted (via White) for the proposition that AEDPA’s standard is “difficult to meet.”	Reinforced the high bar to habeas relief.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)	Petitioner must show the state ruling was so unjustified that error is beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement; habeas is a guard against “extreme malfunctions,” not ordinary error correction.	Applied to conclude the state court’s refusal to apply Cronic was not an “extreme malfunction” warranting habeas relief.
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam)	AEDPA reflects a presumption that state courts know and follow the law.	Used to justify deference to the Michigan court’s adjudication.
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ––––, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013)	Ineffective-assistance review under AEDPA is “doubly deferential,” affording both the state court and counsel the benefit of the doubt.	Supported the Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Circuit insufficiently deferred to the state court.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011)	Quoted (via Burt) regarding “doubly deferential” AEDPA review.	Reinforced the deference applicable to ineffective-assistance claims on habeas review.
Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 1 (2014) (per curiam)	Where the Court has not confronted “the specific question presented,” a state decision cannot be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law; warns against framing issues at too high a level of generality.	Central to the holding that the Michigan court’s decision was not “contrary to” Supreme Court holdings because none addressed counsel’s brief absence during testimony about other defendants.
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006)	If circumstances are only “similar to” Supreme Court precedents, the state decision is not “contrary to” the holdings.	Used to reject the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on mere similarity to Supreme Court cases applying Cronic.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)	Quoted (via White) for the idea that where the “precise contours” of a right are “unclear,” state courts have “broad discretion.”	Supported the conclusion that fairminded jurists could disagree about applying Cronic here.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judgment)	Quoted (through White and Lockyer) regarding “precise contours” being unclear.	Used as part of the quoted support for state-court discretion under AEDPA when doctrine is unsettled.
Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) (per curiam)	In habeas cases, the Court may express “no view on the merits of the underlying [constitutional] principle” beyond the AEDPA question.	Invoked to clarify the Court was not deciding the underlying Sixth Amendment merits outside AEDPA’s “clearly established law” constraint.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the case in the “narrow context of federal habeas review” under AEDPA, which permits relief only if the state court’s merits decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court holdings. The Court emphasized AEDPA’s demanding nature: only Supreme Court holdings count as “clearly established” law, and a state court’s application must be objectively unreasonable—beyond fairminded disagreement—to justify relief.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded the Sixth Circuit erred by treating Cronic as clearly controlling. The Court stated it has never addressed whether Cronic applies to “testimony regarding codefendants’ actions.” It further explained that Cronic itself did not involve counsel’s absence, and that the earlier cited “total absence” cases referenced in Cronic did not involve circumstances like this case. Bell v. Cone likewise did not involve counsel’s absence; it addressed a different asserted failure at sentencing.

Because no Supreme Court case confronted the “specific question presented,” the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision could not be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law. The Court also rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the testimony was “similar to” critical-stage cases, noting that similarity does not establish a “contrary to” violation and that the Sixth Circuit framed the issue too generally. The Court stressed the testimony at issue concerned other defendants, and observed that Donald’s own defense theory was that he was present but did not participate, including having “nothing to do with the planning among his codefendants.” The Court stated that none of its holdings address counsel’s absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the defendant’s own theory of the case.

On the “unreasonable application” prong, the Court held the Sixth Circuit wrongly deemed the state court’s decision objectively unreasonable on the view the evidence might indirectly inculpate Donald. Citing the Court’s repeated AEDPA guidance (including that unclear doctrinal contours leave state courts “broad discretion”), the Court concluded that within Cronic’s contours a fairminded jurist could decide a presumption of prejudice is not warranted for a short absence during testimony about other defendants where that testimony was irrelevant to the defendant’s theory. The state court’s refusal to apply Cronic therefore was not the kind of “extreme malfunction” that federal habeas review is designed to remedy.

Finally, the Court explicitly expressed no view on the underlying Sixth Amendment merits apart from AEDPA’s limits; the dispositive point was the absence of a Supreme Court holding extending Cronic to these circumstances.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED. The Court granted the petition for certiorari and Donald’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

The direct consequence is that federal habeas relief based on Cronic was deemed unavailable because the Supreme Court has not held that Cronic applies to a brief absence of counsel during testimony about other defendants under these circumstances. The Court stated it set no new Sixth Amendment merits precedent beyond applying AEDPA’s “clearly established law” limitation.

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Jeffrey WOODS, Warden v. Cory DONALD.

PER CURIAM.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the underlying state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Here, the Sixth Circuit held that respondent Cory Donald's attorney provided per seineffective assistance of counsel under United States v. Cronic,466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), when he was briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants. Because no decision from this Court clearly establishes that Donald is entitled to relief under Cronic,we reverse.

After a day of drinking and smoking marijuana, Cory Donald and four others—Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya—decided to rob a drug dealer named Mohammed Makki. Donald, Moore, and Liggins drove to Makki's home in Dearborn, Michigan, wearing black skull caps and coats. Moore and Donald entered the house, while Liggins waited in the car.

Michael McGinnis, one of Makki's drug runners, was in the house at the time. When Donald and Moore came through the door, McGinnis raised his hands and dropped face-down to the floor. He heard

a scuffle in the kitchen and two gunshots as someone said, “ ‘[L]et it go.’ ” Donald v. Rapelje,580 Fed.Appx. 277, 279 (C.A.6 2014). After that, McGinnis felt a gun on the back of his head while someone rifled through his pockets saying, “ ‘[W]hat you got, what you got?’ ” Donald v. Rapelje,2012 WL 6047130, *3 (E.D.Mich., Dec. 5, 2012). He also heard one of the two men whisper to the other, “ ‘I got shot, I got shot.’ ” 580 Fed.Appx., at 279. After Moore and Donald left, McGinnis found Makki slumped against the refrigerator dying.

About seven minutes after they entered the house, Moore and Donald returned, guns in hand, to Liggins' car. Donald told the others that he had stolen $320 and that Moore had accidentally shot him during the crime. That night, Donald checked into a hospital for a gunshot woundto his foot. Police arrested him about three weeks later.

The State charged Donald with one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins and Zaya pleaded guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine. His defense theory was that he was present at the scene of the crime but he did not participate. At trial, the government sought to admit a chart chronicling phone calls from the day of the crime among Moore, Saine, and Zaya. Moore and Saine's attorneys objected, but Donald's attorney declined, saying: “ ‘I don't have a dog in this race. It does not affect me at all.’ ” Id., at 280. The court admitted the exhibit and took a short recess.

When the trial resumed, Donald's counsel was not in the courtroom. At first, the judge indicated that he would wait for the attorney. But he then decided to proceed because Donald's counsel had already indicated that the exhibit and testimony did not apply to his client. About 10 minutes later, the lawyer returned. The judge informed him that “ ‘up until that point we only were discussing the telephone chart,’ ” to which the attorney replied, “ ‘[Y]es, your Honor, and as I had indicated on the record, I had no dog in the race and no interest in that.’ ” Ibid.

The jury found Donald guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony-murder count and to concurrent prison terms of 10 ½ to 20 years for each of the armed robbery counts. On appeal, Donald argued that he was entitled to a new trial because his attorney's absence during the phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his claim, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted federal habeas relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's decision in Cronic. In the normal course, defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the familiar framework of Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires a showing that “counsel's performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” And when reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.,at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

In Cronic,however, we held that courts may presume that a defendant has suffered unconstitutional prejudice if he “is denied counsel at a critical stage of his

trial.” 466 U.S., at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. And in Bell v. Cone,535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), we characterized a “critical stage” as one that “held significant consequences for the accused.” According to the Sixth Circuit, these statements should have compelled the Michigan court to hold that the phone call testimony was a “critical stage” and that counsel's absence constituted per seineffective assistance. Without identifying any decision from this Court directly in point, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the relevant testimony in this case was “similar to” our cases applying Cronic. 580 Fed.Appx., at 284.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may grant habeas relief only when a state court's decision on the merits was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” decisions from this Court, or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Donald does not argue that the state-court decision in his case was factually erroneous. Instead, he argues that the decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.

AEDPA's standard is intentionally “ ‘ “difficult to meet.” ’ ” White v. Woodall,572 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014)(quoting Metrish v. Lancaster,569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1781, 1786, 185 L.Ed.2d 988 (2013)). We have explained that “ ‘clearly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions.” White,572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(some internal quotation marks omitted). “And an ‘unreasonable application of’ those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Id.,at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(same). To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to “show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

Adherence to these principles serves important interests of federalism and comity. AEDPA's requirements reflect a “presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woodford v. Visciotti,537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)(per curiam). When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal habeas review thus exists as “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, supra,at 102–103, 131 S.Ct. 770(internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where AEDPA review must be “ ‘ “doubly deferential” ’ ” in order to afford “both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow,571 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013)(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,563 U.S. 170, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)).

The Sixth Circuit should not have affirmed the Cronic-based grant of habeas relief in this case. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not contrary to any clearly established holding of this Court. We have never addressed whether the rule announced in Cronicapplies to testimony regarding codefendants' actions. In Cronicitself, we rejected the defendant's claim that his counsel's lack of experience and short time for preparation warranted a presumption of prejudice, not a claim based on counsel's absence. See 466 U.S., at 663–666, 104 S.Ct. 2039. When announcing the rule in Cronic,we cited earlier cases finding prejudice where “counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” Id.,at 659, n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039. But none of those cases dealt with circumstances like those present here. And Belldid not involve the absence of counsel; instead, we declined to presume prejudice where a capital defendant's counsel “failed to ‘mount some case for life’ after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a closing statement.” 535 U.S., at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843.

Because none of our cases confront “the specific question presented by this case,” the state court's decision could not be “contrary to” any holding from this Court. Lopez v. Smith,574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1, 4, 190 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014)(per curiam). The most that the Sixth Circuit could muster was that “[t]he testimony of a government witness is similar to the trial events that th[is] Court has deemed to be critical stages.” 580 Fed.Appx., at 284. But that conclusion is doubly wrong. First, if the circumstances of a case are only “similar to” our precedents, then the state court's decision is not “contrary to” the holdings in those cases. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin,549 U.S. 70, 76–77, and n. 2, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Second, the Sixth Circuit framed the issue at too high a level of generality. See, e.g., Lopez, supra,at ––––, 135 S.Ct., at 3–4. The relevant testimony was not merely “testimony of a government witness”; it was prosecution testimony about other defendants. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit considered the testimony relevant to Donald because he was being prosecuted on an aiding-and-abetting theory for felony murder. But Donald's position was that he had nothing to do with the planning among his codefendants. And none of our holdings address counsel's absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the defendant's own theory of the case.

Nor was the state court's decision an unreasonable application of our cases. The Sixth Circuit stated “that a critical stage of trial is a ‘step of a criminal proceeding ... that h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.’ ” 580 Fed.Appx., at 284(quoting Bell, supra,at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843). And it held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was “objectively unreasonable” because the phone call evidence might have indirectly inculpated Donald in the eyes of the jury. But that holding is not correct. Just last Term we warned the Sixth Circuit that “where the ‘ “precise contours” ’ of [a] right remain ‘ “unclear,” ’ state courts enjoy ‘broad discretion’ in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims.” White,572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 1705, (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade,538 U.S. 63, 76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), in turn quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,501 U.S. 957, 998, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and in judgment)). Within the contours of Cronic,a fairminded jurist could conclude that a presumption of prejudice is not warranted by counsel's short absence during testimony

about other defendants where that testimony was irrelevant to the defendant's theory of the case.

Cronicapplies in “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 466 U.S., at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Michigan Court of Appeals' refusal to apply it to these circumstances was not the “extreme malfunction” required for federal habeas relief. Harrington,562 U.S., at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770.

III

Because we consider this case only in the narrow context of federal habeas review, we “expres[s] no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle.” Marshall v. Rodgers,569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1451, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013)(per curiam). All that matters here, and all that should have mattered to the Sixth Circuit, is that we have not held that Cronicapplies to the circumstances presented in this case. For that reason, federal habeas relief based upon Cronicis unavailable.

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperisare granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Woods v. Donald