MURRAY v. BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL

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Docket Number

File No. 209923

Attorney(S)

Brennan, McNamara Brennan, for the plaintiff. Pullman, Comley, Bradley Reeves, for the defendants.

Judges

CIOFFI, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Elizabeth Murray, was employed by Bridgeport Hospital under a contract for an indefinite term, terminable at will. She was discharged from her employment and subsequently filed a complaint containing multiple counts challenging her termination and related conduct by the hospital. The defendant hospital filed a motion to strike the second, fourth, and fifth counts of the complaint. This opinion addresses the court's ruling on that motion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff’s allegations in the second count, claiming wrongful discharge combined with failure to conduct a job performance evaluation constituting an intentional tort, state a legally sufficient cause of action.
Whether the plaintiff’s fourth count, alleging wrongful discharge based on age and sex discrimination and contractual breach, survives a motion to strike given the at-will nature of the employment contract.
Whether the fifth count, alleging intentional torts of interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is legally sufficient to withstand a motion to strike.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The hospital argued that the second count fails because the plaintiff did not allege that the discharge violated any clear public policy, and there was no duty under an implied contract to conduct job performance evaluations.
The fourth count should be stricken because the employment was at-will, terminable for any reason with notice, and the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract limiting discharge to insubordination or dishonesty was incorrect.
The fifth count’s claim of tortious interference is defective as there are no allegations that the individual defendants acted outside the scope of their authority or for personal gain, and thus cannot be liable for interference with contract.
The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the fifth count should be evaluated on the factual question of whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous.

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff contended that the combination of wrongful discharge and failure to evaluate constituted an intentional tort under an implied contract.
She argued that the termination was discriminatory based on age and sex, and that the contract limited discharge to certain causes, implying it was not terminable at will.
The plaintiff maintained that the failure to conduct a job performance evaluation by supervisors interfered with her contractual relationship and caused emotional distress.
She relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as recognized in Magnan to support her claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426 (1959)	Employment contracts for indefinite terms are terminable at will, reflecting employer's absolute right to terminate.	Supports the general rule that the plaintiff’s employment was terminable at will.
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)	Exception to at-will employment: tort liability arises if discharge violates clear public policy.	Controls the analysis of wrongful discharge claims; the plaintiff failed to allege violation of public policy.
Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 37 Conn. Sup. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980)	Recognizes implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, limited to contract actions.	Distinguished by the court as inapplicable to tort claims alleged in the second count.
Bowman v. Grolsche Bierbrouweij B.V., 474 F. Supp. 725 (D. Conn. 1979)	An agent acting within scope of authority cannot be liable for interfering with his principal’s contract unless acting for personal gain.	Applied to reject tortious interference claim absent allegations of personal gain or malice by individual defendants.
Vassardakis v. Parish, 36 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)	Liability for inducing breach of contract if done solely for self-interest.	Supports requirement that interference be unjustified and motivated by personal interest; no such allegation here.
Bradkin v. Leverton, 32 N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1057, 303 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1969)	Imposes tort liability for inducing breach of contract for private benefit or personal feelings.	Cited as foundation for Connecticut rule in Bowman; no evidence of such conduct here.
Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla. 1953)	Express allegation of personal benefit required to state cause of action for intentional interference with contract.	Used to support striking the interference claim for lack of such allegation.
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976)	Recognition of intentional infliction of emotional distress in employment context.	Provides legal framework for evaluating the plaintiff’s emotional distress claim.
Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Sup. 305, 329 A.2d 609 (1973); Restatement (Second) Torts § 46	Elements required to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress.	Outlined the four elements the plaintiff must prove to succeed on the emotional distress claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the general principle that employment for an indefinite term is terminable at will, thus allowing the employer broad discretion to discharge an employee. It noted the exception from Sheets that tort liability for discharge arises only when discharge violates a clear public policy. The plaintiff failed to allege any such public policy violation, rendering the second count’s wrongful discharge claim legally insufficient.

Regarding the second count’s claim that the hospital’s failure to conduct a job performance evaluation combined with termination constituted an intentional tort, the court distinguished tort from contract duties. The failure to evaluate was premised on an implied contract, which does not impose tort duties. Thus, absent an independent tort duty, the claim could only proceed as a contract action, not tort.

The plaintiff’s reliance on Magnan was rejected because that case recognized a contract cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, not a tort cause of action as alleged in the second count.

In the fourth count, the court rejected the plaintiff’s interpretation that the employment contract limited discharge to insubordination or dishonesty. The contract explicitly allowed termination with notice for any reason, consistent with at-will employment. The plaintiff’s age and sex discrimination claims were noted as properly addressed exclusively through the Fair Employment Practices Act, not by private lawsuit. The fourth count was therefore stricken.

For the fifth count’s tortious interference claim, the court found no allegations that the individual defendants acted outside their authority, for personal gain, or out of malice. Without such allegations, the claim failed as a matter of law because an agent cannot interfere with his principal’s contract legitimately.

As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court recognized this tort in the employment context and outlined the four required elements. The court denied the motion to strike this claim because whether the failure to conduct a job evaluation was extreme and outrageous enough to cause severe emotional distress is a factual question for trial.

Holding and Implications

The court GRANTED the defendant's motion to strike the second and fourth counts of the plaintiff’s complaint, and DENIED the motion to strike the fifth count.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff’s claims for wrongful discharge and discrimination under the second and fourth counts are dismissed at this stage, while the claims for intentional torts of interference with contract and infliction of emotional distress in the fifth count proceed. The court’s ruling adheres to established legal principles regarding at-will employment and the limited circumstances under which tort liability can arise from discharge. No new legal precedent was established.

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ELIZABETH MURRAY v. BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL ET AL.

Where one's employment is at the will of his employer, tort liability for discharge will arise only where the discharge contravenes a clear public policy. The plaintiff, an at will employee of the named defendant hospital, brought an action against the hospital challenging her discharge. The hospital moved to strike the second, fourth and fifth counts of the complaint. In the second count, the plaintiff alleged that she had been wrongfully discharged, that the hospital had failed to conduct an evaluation of her job performance and that her termination, in combination with that failure, constituted an intentional tort. Because she did not claim that the discharge contravened any clear public policy, because the hospital owed her no duty under an implied contract to conduct a job performance evaluation, and because what she alleged in the second count about an implied contract did not support her allegations therein of intentional tort, the court ordered that count stricken. In the fourth count, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital had discriminated against her on the basis of her age and sex and further alleged that she could be discharged only for insubordination or dishonesty. Since, however, her employment contract was for an indefinite term and terminable at will and nowhere barred the hospital from terminating her with notice and for any reason, the court ordered the fourth count stricken. In the fifth count, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital had committed the intentional torts of interference with a contract and of infliction of emotional distress. Since the nature of the hospital's failure to conduct a job performance evaluation, i.e., whether that failure was so extreme and outrageous as to cause the intentional infliction of emotional distress, was a question of fact, the court denied the defendant's motion to strike the fifth count.

CIOFFI, J.

The plaintiff was discharged from employment at the defendant Bridgeport Hospital. The employment contract was for an indefinite duration and was terminable at will. The defendant now moves the court to strike the second count, the fourth count and the fifth count of the plaintiff's complaint.

As a general rule, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will, reflecting the view that an employer has the absolute right to run his business as he sees fit. Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426 (1959). In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), the court carved out an exception to the employment at will doctrine and held that an "employer [may] be responsible in damages if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." Consequently, public policy imposes some limits on an employer's unfettered discretion to terminate the employment of someone hired at will. Id., 476. Moreover, by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge, the court set forth the premise that a contractual right, such as an employer's right to discharge his at will employee with or without cause, can be performed in a tortious manner. Id., 475.

The second count alleges that the defendant wrongfully discharged the plaintiff and further alleges that the defendant failed to conduct a job performance evaluation pursuant to an implied contract. The plaintiff, moreover, asserts that "termination" in combination with the defendant's "failure to evaluate" constitutes an intentional tort.

The rule enunciated in Sheets, supra, however, is controlling. Contract rights, in the employment at will context, may give rise to tort liability where the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 475. The plaintiff, however, has failed to allege a public policy limitation on the defendant's absolute right to terminate in this instance.

Moreover, the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's wilful "failure to evaluate" and "termination" taken together constitute an intentional tort is inaccurate. As set forth above, the discharge was not tortious. Consequently, the defendant's act of failing to conduct an "evaluation" must independently give rise to a claim sounding in tort in order for the second count to survive the present motion to strike. The "failure to evaluate" allegation is premised on an implied contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. One authority notes that the fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the interests protected. Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) 592, 613. The duties of conduct giving rise to tort actions "are imposed by law, and are based primarily upon social policy." Id. "Contract actions [however] are created to protect the interest in having promises performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of . . . the parties' manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the contract." Id. In the present case there was no duty owed by the defendant, apart from the contract, to perform the "evaluations," and consequently the plaintiff can only maintain an action ex contractu.

Finally, the plaintiff contends that the second count states a cause of action under Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 37 Conn. Sup. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980). The court in Magnan held that in employment contracts there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which may be breached if the conduct of the employer constitutes "an aspect of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id., 41. The Magnan court consequently recognizes a new cause of action in contract in the employment at will context. Id., 40, 41; see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). ( Monge spawned the rule in Magnan and was a contract action.) Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (suit on an implied covenant of good faith is a contract action). The second count, however, alleges intentional tort, whereas the Magnan rule is limited to contract actions as found in the first count.

Accordingly, the second count is hereby ordered stricken.

The fourth count reiterates the alleged tort of wrongful discharge that was alleged in the second count. The plaintiff further alleges that her termination was based on her age and/or sex and that the defendant's failure to provide the "Formal Grievance Procedure" was a breach of contract. The express contract which forms the basis of the plaintiff's fourth count is for an indefinite term and terminable at will. The plaintiff construes the termination section of the contract to mean that she can be discharged only for "insubordination [or] dishonesty," to imply that the contract is not terminable at will. The plaintiff has misconstrued the section by overlooking the operative language which provides that "[e]mployees can be discharged without notice and without terminal vacation" for certain enumerated reasons. This section of the contract does not bar the defendant from terminating an employee with notice for any reason or for no reason.

Since the contract is terminable at will, Sheets is controlling. The plaintiff concedes that when an allegation is made with respect to a protected category under the Fair Employment Practices Act, such as an allegation of age or sex discrimination, the exclusive remedy is in the procedures established by the act, and there is no cause of action for a private lawsuit. Consequently, the plaintiff contends that "the right to enforce express contracts" is an important public policy limitation under Sheets. The right to enforce express contracts does not fall within the purview of the Sheets doctrine, and an ordinary contract action cannot be transformed into a tort by linking public policy to contract enforcement. In fact, the gravamen of the plaintiff's grievance is properly characterized as a contract action as already set forth in the third count.

Accordingly, the fourth count is hereby ordered stricken.

The fifth count alleges the intentional torts of interference with contract and infliction of emotional distress. Consequently, the alleged torts will be treated seriatim to determine if either tort is legally sufficient.

The plaintiff alleges that two executive supervisors of the defendant hospital interfered with the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant hospital by failing to conduct a job performance evaluation.

An agent acting legitimately within the scope of his authority cannot be held liable for interfering with or inducing his principal to breach a contract between his principal and a third party, because to hold him liable would be, in effect, to hold the corporation liable in tort for breaching its own contract. Bowman v. Grolsche Bierbrouweij B.V., 474 F. Sup. 725, 733 (D. Conn. 1979). An agent, however, can be held liable for such interference or inducement if he did not act legitimately within his scope of duty but used the corporate power improperly for personal gain. Id. In Vassardakis v. Parish, 36 F. Sup. 1002, 1004-1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), the court held that an officer or employee actuated solely by self-interest could be held liable in tort for inducing his principal to dismiss another employee. Still later, the court in Bradkin v. Leverton, 32 N.Y. App. Div. 2 d 1057, 1058, 303 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1969), stated that tort liability should be swiftly imposed whenever an officer, director, employee or stockholder induces a breach of contract for private benefit or to satisfy personal feelings against a third party. The Connecticut rule as enunciated in Bowman relied on Bradkin.

In the fifth count there is no allegation that the individual defendants profited in any way by inducing the alleged breach. Similarly, there is no allegation that the defendant's acts were actuated by personal feelings against the plaintiff. In short, lack of justification is a condition precedent to liability, Vassardakis v. Parish, supra, 1005. Even a liberal reading of the allegations do not support an inference that the individual defendants took advantage of their relationship with the corporation to divert corporate benefits elsewhere to their own benefit or that they harbored personal feelings against the plaintiff. Consequently, the claim for tortious interference is defective. See Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Sup. 37 (N.D. Okla. 1953) (an express allegation that the defendant personally benefited from his acts, which led to the discharge of the plaintiff, is necessary to state a good cause of action for intentional interference with contract relations in this context).

The fifth count also alleges that the individual defendants wilfully and wantonly failed to conduct a job performance evaluation of the plaintiff with the knowledge that that failure would cause mental distress.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized in the employment context. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under this tort, four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Sup. 305, 329 A.2d 609 (1973); 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46.