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In re SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. ERISA LITIGATION.

ORDER

Clinton Williams's brother organized a series of armed bank robberies that took place over a four-month period in 2006. For his involvement, a jury convicted Williams of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, two counts of bank robbery by force or violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and two counts of using and carrying; a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced him to 552 months' imprisonment. Williams appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed his conviction, but we remanded to the district court for it to reconsider Williams's sentence in light of evidence of his mental disability and the fact that his brother was the ringleader of the robbery scheme, which might have impacted his ability to think for himself. United States v. Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2009). On remand, the district court sentenced Williams to 444 months' imprisonment.

Williams's counsel now moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that there is no non-frivolous basis for appeal. Williams has not responded to our invitation to comment on his counsel's motion. We therefore limit our review to the issues identified in counsel's facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel's brief considers whether there are any potential challenges to the sentence Williams received. Our decision remanded Williams's case to the district court for a specific reason: to address the impact of Williams's disability on his sentence and the combination of Williams's disability with his susceptibility to manipulation by his brother. Therefore, counsel is correct to limit its consideration to potential challenges only to Williams's sentence and not to his conviction. See United States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 250-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that scope of district court's power on remand is limited to the issues the appellate court remands).

Counsel is correct that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal. On remand, defense counsel moved for a psychiatric examination, and one was performed on Williams. In light of the examination, defense counsel maintained that Williams was subject to manipulation by his brother and argued he was the least culpable of his co-defendants. The government agreed with defense counsel's requested sentence of 444 months, and the district court imposed that term. This sentence was 108 months lower than what Williams had initially received.

A statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 32 years largely drove Williams's sentence. The convictions for. carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence carried a 7-year sentence on one count to be served consecutively to a 25-year sentence on another count. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(C). A defendant may only receive a sentence below a statutory minimum if the defendant qualifies for the "safety valve" exception in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) or the government makes a motion for a reduction based on the defendant's substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Neither exception applies here.

The 32 years imposed pursuant to statute had to be served consecutively to whatever sentence Williams received on the other counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). The advisory guideline range for the other counts in this case was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the arguments based on Williams's mental disability and susceptibility, the district court accepted the parties' stipulation that 60 months' imprisonment was an appropriate term of imprisonment for these counts. (When he was initially sentenced, Williams had received a 168-month sentence on these counts.) Defense counsel agreed to the 60-month sentence and did not raise any challenges to it, and this sentence was both 75 months below the low end of the advisory guideline range and a full nine years lower than the term previously imposed. There is no non-frivolous challenge to this sentence on appeal. See United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a below-guidelines sentence will almost never be unreasonable); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (reviewing only for plain error contentions not raised to trial court).

We therefore GRANT defense counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

III. Plaintiffs' Investment Claim (Count I)

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Investment Claim set forth in Count I fails as a matter of law because:

(1) it seeks to impose fiduciary liability for investment decisions on Defendants that exercised no discretion in that regard; (2) it is barred by the terms of the Plan (which provide that the Employer Stock Fund was "established [by the Plan sponsor] as an integral ESOP feature of the Plan design" and make clear that the Plan Committee has "no authority to limit, expand, or remove the Employer Stock Fund" from the Plan); (3) it is precluded by ERISA (which specifically exempts plans like SunTrust's from the duty of prudence to the extent it would require diversifying investments in employer stock); and (4) it cannot be judged under the "presumption of prudence" framework sometimes used in the Third Circuit.

(Dkt. [78] at 11). Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint is alleged against all Defendants. As an initial matter the Court must determine whether all the Defendants were "acting as a fiduciary (that is, were performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint." Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226. As noted above, the fiduciary function is not an "all-or-nothing concept" and a defendant is only a fiduciary to the extent that he exercises discretionary authority "with respect to the particular activity at issue."Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005).

Regarding Plaintiffs' Investment Claim, the "particular activity at issue" is the investment of the Plan's assets in SunTrust Stock. Plaintiffs' Investment Claim against SunTrust must be dismissed because the Company did not make decisions related to the investment options available to Plan Participants or allocation of the Plan's assets. To the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to hold the Company liable under a doctrine of respondent superior, the Court will not impose liability under ERISA on that ground. See Woods v. Southern Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1370 n. 10 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (expressing reservation about imposing respondeat superior liability under ERISA, given absence of any express contemplation of such theory within text or legislative history of statute). Similarly, Plaintiffs' Investment Claim against the Director Defendants and the Compensation Committee Defendants must be dismissed because they had no responsibility or power to make decisions regarding the offerings of the Plan or allocation of its assets. Plaintiffs' Investment Claim is only proper as to the Plan Committee which was "responsible for the day-to day management and administration of the Plan," including "the responsibility to select and monitor investment funds to be made available to the Participants,

deciding whether and to what extent to allow Participant investment in the Employer Stock Fund," and as to the Investment Sub-Committee "which exercised responsibilities for reviewing and assessing performance of investment choices offered in the Plan. (Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 47, 62).

Defendants concede that the Benefits Plan Committee bears fiduciary responsibility for selecting the investment options made available to Plan Participants. (Dkt. [78] at 12).

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' Investment Claim must also be dismissed as to the Plan Committee and its Investment Sub-Committee because the claim is "`a rebadged argument for diversification' that is precluded by ERISA." (Dkt. [78] at 16 (citing Mellot v. ChoicePoint, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2007)). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Investment Claim, based upon a failure to diversify the Plan's investments away from SunTrust Stock, should be dismissed because ERISA precludes such diversification arguments for EIAPs, such as the Plan. (Id. at 16). Plaintiffs do not dispute that EIAPs are exempt from the duty of diversification under ERISA. (Dkt. [84] at 7). Rather, Plaintiffs' contend that the "crux of [their] claim is that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by permitting the Plan to invest in SunTrust stock when SunTrust stock was clearly imprudent due to the severe mismanagement of the Company as well as artificial inflation of the Company stock, not as a result of the failure to diversify." (Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original)).

The relevant portion of ERISA reads: "In the case of an [EIAP] . . ., the diversification requirement . . . and the prudence requirement (only to the extent that it requires diversification) . . . [are] not violated by the acquisition or holding of . . . qualifying employer securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). This Court has previously examined the question of whether a claim for failure to diversify an EIAP can constitute a breach of the duty of prudence and has concluded that such a claim does not constitute a breach of this duty. See In re Beazer Homes USA, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 1:07-CV-0952, 2010 WL 1416150 (N.D.Ga. April 2, 2010); In re Coca-Cola Enters. ERISA Litig., No. 1:06-CV-0953, 2007 WL 1810211, (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2007) ("CCE"); Mellot, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1305; Pedrazza v. Coca-Cola Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2006). After a careful examination of these decisions and Plaintiffs' arguments to try and distinguish their Investment Claim from the type of claims this Court has previously found to be premised upon diversification, the Court holds that Plaintiffs' Investment Claim fails to state a claim as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs assert that their Investment Claim is not based upon diversification and therefore is not excluded by 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). However, as noted above, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss states that "Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by permitting the Plan to invest in SunTrust stock when SunTrust Stock was clearly imprudent. . . ." (Dkt. [84] at 7). While Plaintiffs maintain that their Investment Claim is not a failure to diversify claim, it is similar to claims this Court has previously rejected as diversification claims. In Smith, the plaintiff alleged that defendants acted imprudently by "maintaining the Plan's pre existing heavy investment in Delta securities when the stock no longer was a prudent investment for the Plan." 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The Court described plaintiffs' pleading in that case as an attempt "to argue around ERISA's diversification exemption by alleging that the [Plan's] heavy investment in Delta securities was imprudent irrespective of the lack of diversification."Id. at 1327. The Court held that:

At its core, however, Count I just amounts to another form of diversification argument. Section 1104(a)(2) speaks to such an argument, exempting not only the duty to diversify but also the duty of prudence to the extent it requires diversification. Therefore, regardless of Plaintiff's phraseology, a strict application of § 1104(a)(2) mandates dismissal of Count I . . .
Id. The same is true for Plaintiffs' Investment Claim in this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Investment Claim, asserted as part of Count I of the Complaint, fails to state a claim as a matter of law and is DISMISSED.

See also CCE, 2007 WL 1810211, at *9 ("EIAP fiduciaries `do not have a duty to diversity and do not act imprudently by not diversifying the assets of an EIAP.'" (quoting Smith, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1325)); Pedrazza, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 ("While ERISA generally provides that a fiduciary must diversify the investment of a plan, it also excuses that duty in the case of a fiduciary of an EIAP. Further, the duty of prudence is excused to the extent that it depends on diversification." (citations omitted)); Mellot, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1312, 1313 ("Plaintiff's characterization of his claim as an `artificial inflation' claim rather than a diversification claim is simply another form of a diversification argument. . . . Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is a rebadged argument for diversification, a strict application of § 1104(a)(2) ends the inquiry and requires dismissal of the claim.").

Plaintiffs' argument that it was imprudent to continue to hold or further invest in SunTrust stock in light of the facts alleged in the Complaint is persuasive. However, the Court will not stray from the plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) which precludes Plaintiffs from prevailing on the type of prudence claim it seeks to assert. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2004) ("It is well-established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms." (internal quotes and citation omitted)).

Furthermore, as previous decisions of this Court have done, this Court once again rejects the rebuttable presumption framework set forth in Moench v. Robertson, because it runs counter to the plain language of ERISA. See Smith, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30; CCE, 2007 WL 1812011 at *9-10; Pedraza, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76; Mellot, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. Because Plaintiff's Investment Claim is barred by the plan language of ERISA, the Court need not decide whether it is also barred by the language of the Plan Document. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's Investment Claim is GRANTED.

62 F. 3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit stated "that in the first instance, a [plan] fiduciary who invests the assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that decision. However, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing in employer securities." Id. at 571.

Defendants argue that the Plan document requires the Employer Stock Fund and the Plan Committee has no discretion to eliminate it. The Plan document states that "[t]he investment funds selected by the [Plan] Committee are in addition to the Employer Stock Fund . . . which [is] an integral ESOP feature of the Plan design." (Plan Doc. at § 4.2(a)). The Plan document also states that while "[t]he [Plan] Committee will have primary responsibility for administering the Plan and all powers necessary to enable it to properly perform its duties . . . it will have no authority to limit, expand, or remove the Employer Stock Fund." (Id. at § 9.1(b)(4)).
Plaintiffs argue that ERISA fiduciaries are only limited by Plan documents to the extent that the documents are consistent with ERISA. In a case concerning a mirror voting provision, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "the trustee must disregard the provision, just like it would have to disregard any other plan provision controlling the disposition of plan assets which leads to an imprudent result." Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1369 n. 15 (11th Cir. 1997). In a recent amicus curiae brief, the Secretary of Labor noted:

[A]lthough plan fiduciaries are required to follow plan documents, they must do so only "insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions" of Title I and Title IV of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). See Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1457 (6th Cir. 1995) ("a fiduciary may only follow plan terms to the extent that the terms are consistent with ERISA"); Coleman v. Interco Inc. Divisons' Plans, 933 F.2d 550, 551 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that when ERISA and plan language diverge "ERISA is trumps"); cf. Imel v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal., 904 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[p]rivate parties may not agree to alter statutory duties") (citing Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946)).

Brief of Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor in Support of Appellant at 7 In re Citigroup ERISA Litig. (No. 09-3804-cv 2d Cir. (Dkt. [84-3])).


IV. Plaintiffs' Communication Claims

Plaintiffs' Communication Claims allege that all Defendants breached their duty of loyalty and prudence: (1) by not providing Plan Participants with complete and accurate information concerning the Company and its Stock (the "False Information Claim"); and (2) by not disclosing material negative information, thus preventing Plan Participants from properly assessing the prudence of investing in SunTrust Stock (the "Participant Disclosure Claim"). (Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 252-53, 269, 274).

A. False Information Claim

ERISA requires that plan fiduciaries publish a summary plan description ("SPD"), an annual report, and a financial statement for the plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021- 31; 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.101-2520.107.1. Plaintiffs assert that during the Class Period, Defendants "made direct and indirect communication with the Plan's [P]articipants including statements regarding investments in Company Stock," including "SEC filings, annual reports, press releases, and Plan documents." (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 110). During the Class Period, SunTrust's SEC filings were incorporated into and part of the Plan's SPDs. (Id.).

As an initial matter the Court must determine whether all the Defendants were "acting as a fiduciary (that is, were performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint." Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226. A defendant is only a fiduciary to the extent that he exercises discretionary authority "with respect to the particular activity at issue." Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs' Complaint acknowledges that "[t]he responsibility for communicating with Participants about Plan-related matters, including the providing of information concerning the investment option[s] offered to Participants, lay primarily with the Benefits Plan Committee Defendants." (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 79). However, Plaintiffs' Complaint also specifically identifies communications made by "SunTrust," as well as Defendants Wells and Chancy. (See e.g., Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 154, 162, 163, 185, 200, 201, 204). Yet there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that communications by Defendants other than the Plan Committee Defendants were made in regard to the Plan or directed toward Plan Participants. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1074, 134 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1996) (holding that corporation's statements were made in ERISA fiduciary capacity because statements were intentionally connected to plan). Plaintiffs contend that "Defendants were clearly speaking as both Plan fiduciaries and as corporate representatives when issuing the public statements. . . ." (Dkt. [84] at 25). However, simply asserting as much, without any factual underpinning for the assertion, does not make it so.

James M. Wells, III, is SunTrust's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). Wells became Chairman of the Board in 2008, and served as a director of the Company since 2006. (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 42).

As to the SEC filings incorporated into the SPDs provided to Plan Participants, Defendants argue that such SEC filings cannot serve as the basis for an ERISA claim. Even assuming that an ERISA claim may be based upon false or misleading SEC filings incorporated into Plan documents, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to identify any false or misleading statements contained within any of the incorporated SEC filings. Therefore, Plaintiffs' False Information Claim must fail.

Courts have reached disparate outcomes on this question. The court in Mellot, held that plaintiff's claim of failure to disclose information to plan beneficiaries failed because, "[t]he preparation of SEC filings, even if misleading and incorporated by reference in required ERISA disclosures, is not a fiduciary act under ERISA. Mellot, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; see also In re ING Groep, N.V. ERISA Litigation, 1:09-CV-0400-JEC, at 18 (N.D. Ga. March 31, 2010) (stating representations in SEC filings are not actionable under ERISA); but see Pedraza, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-81 (reasoning that because SEC filings were incorporated into documents required by ERISA, granting a motion to dismiss without examining the SEC filings would be inappropriate); In re Washington Mutual, Inc. Sec., Derivative ERISA Litig., No. 2:08-md-1919 MJP, 2009 WL 3246994, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2009) ("Courts have recognized that the act of incorporating SEC filings into Plan communications may give rise to ERISA liability.").

B. Participant Disclosure Claim

The second prong of Plaintiffs' Communication Claim is based upon Defendants' failure "to provide participants with material information that [D]efendants know or should know is needed to adequately protect the participants' interests." (Dkt. [84] at 26). Defendants argue that "ERISA imposes no roving duty on fiduciaries to disclose everything that might be of interest to participants. Rather, ERISA contains a carefully crafted set of statutorily prescribed disclosures. . . ." (Dkt. [78] at 25). Defendants' argument is not without support. The court in Mellot, held that plaintiff's claim of failure to disclose information to plan beneficiaries failed because

there is no general fiduciary duty of disclosure under ERISA. The Court agrees with the circuit courts that have addressed the issue of ERISA disclosure: ERISA's fiduciary duty standards should not be expanded to include disclosure of information that is not explicitly required under ERISA. See Sprague [v. General Motors Corp.], 133 F.3d [388, 405 (6th Cir. 1998)]; [ Bd. of Trs. v.] Weinstein, 107 F.3d [139, 147 (2d Cir. 1997)]; Faircloth [v. Lundy Packing Co.], 91 F.3d [648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996)]. To the extent an affirmative duty of disclosure exists, it is limited to the disclosure of information about the plan, plan benefits, or plan expenses.
561 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.

However, other decisions from this District have allowed such claims to proceed. In CCE, the foundation of two of the plaintiff's claims was that "Defendants violated their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose material, non-public information regarding CCE's . . . activities to the Plan's participants." 2007 WL 1810211 at * 11. The court found that the defendants that were fiduciaries in regard to those claims "had a duty to disclose any fraudulent [acts] about which they knew or should have known." Id. at 14; see also Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1368-69 (finding that in some circumstances an ERISA fiduciary will have an affirmative duty to disclose information to plan beneficiaries beyond the traditional duty to disclose). Also, this Court in Woods, joined several of its sister courts in holding that dismissal of a claim alleging a failure to fully inform plan participants at the motion to dismiss stage would be inappropriate. 396 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.

Citing cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, the Secretary of Labor recently noted: "ERISA fiduciaries are not only prohibited from misleading plan participants or allowing others to do so, but also have an affirmative duty to disclose material information that plan participants need to know to adequately protect their interests." Brief of Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor in Support of Appellant at 24 In re Citigroup ERISA Litig. (No. 09-3804-cv 2d Cir. (Dkt. [84-3])).

This Court cited In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 832 (S.D. Ohio 2004); In re Excel Enegery, Inc. Securities, Derivative, ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1182 (D. Minn. 2004); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 672-73 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Stein v. Smith; 270 F. Supp. 2d 157,174 (D. Mass. 2003). Woods, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew or should have known that SunTrust Stock was not a suitable and appropriate investment for the Plan as a result of the changing risk profile of SunTrust Stock investment and the Company's deteriorating financial position. (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 270). Despite this knowledge, Defendants failed to provide Plan Participants with information to allow them to accurately evaluate their investment in SunTrust Stock.

Defendants maintain that to the extent there was a duty to disclose the risk associated with SunTrust Stock, it was satisfied by the SPD which warns Participants that the Employer Stock Fund is "a high risk investment" that "carrie[s] more risk than the other investment options because it depends on the performance of only one company." (Dkt. [78] at 6). However, this warning contained in the SPD cannot satisfy Defendants' duty to disclose material negative information to Plan Participants, particularly when, as Plaintiffs allege, Defendants were aware of the deteriorating nature of the Company and its Stock. Based upon the allegations in the Complaint, the Court cannot say that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for failure to disclose material information to Plan Participants. (See e.g. Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 157, 162, 163, 185, 200, 204 (noting instances in which Defendants failed to disclose the true state of the Company's finances or level of risk associated with investment in SunTrust Stock)).

Even though Plaintiffs may have generally stated a claim as a matter of law for failure to disclose, the Court must still determine whether that claim is appropriate against all Defendants, as Plaintiffs allege. The responsibility for communicating with Participants about Plan-related matters rested primarily with the Plan Committee Defendants, and therefore Plaintiffs' Communication

Claim based upon a failure to disclose is appropriate as to those Defendants. However, the Court cannot say that these are the only Defendants who had a fiduciary duty to ensure that Plan Participants were aware of the true state of the Company's business practices. ERISA contemplates both named fiduciaries and de facto fiduciaries. An individual is a de facto fiduciary with respect to an EIAP to the extent

(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, . . . or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). The Court cannot say at this stage that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that the Director Defendants and the Compensation Committee Defendants are de facto fiduciaries with respect to the Plan who have an obligation to disclose material negative information to Plan Participants. (See Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 90-98 (describing basis for Director and Compensation Committee Defendants' fiduciary status)).

Therefore, Plaintiffs' Participant Disclosure Claim states a claim as a matter of law against the Plan Committee Defendants, the Director Defendants, and the Compensation Committee Defendants. Plaintiffs' Participant Disclosure Claim against Defendant SunTrust, based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, fails as a matter of law and is DISMISSED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [78] Plaintiffs' Communication Claims is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

V. Plaintiffs' Monitoring Claim and Plan Committee Disclosure Claim (Count II)

Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint is brought against SunTrust, the Director Defendants, the Compensation Committee Chairman and Defendant Chancy. (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 279). Count II is best viewed as having two prongs, as Plaintiffs appear to allege at least two distinct grounds for liability in Count II of their Complaint. One prong contends that the Monitoring Defendants failed to supervise the Plan Committee by failing to evaluate their performance and failing to remove individuals from the Plan Committee for their continued imprudent investment of Plan assets in SunTrust Stock (the "Monitoring Claim"). (Id. at ¶ 285(a), (d)). The other prong of Count II asserts that the Monitoring Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by "failing to ensure that the monitored fiduciaries appreciated the true extent of SunTrust's risky and inappropriate business practices, and the likely impact of such practices on the value of the Plan's investment in SunTrust Stock" (the "Plan Committee

Defendants note that:

Plaintiffs contradict themselves and contend that, despite having been informed of the "true extent" of SunTrust's allegedly "inappropriate business practices," the Plan Committee failed to remove SunTrust [S]tock as an investment option and the "Monitoring Defendants" breached their duty "by standing idly by as the Plan suffered enormous losses as a result of the appointees' imprudent actions and inaction with respect to Company stock." In others words, the "Monitoring Defendants" either did or did not meet their unbounded duty to inform the Plan Committee, and the Committee failed to act on information they either did or did not have."

(Dkt. [78] at 27-28 (internal citations omitted)).
Plaintiffs' allegations would be problematic if both state of facts had to exist in order for Plaintiffs to prevail upon their Count II claims. However, plaintiffs are allowed to, and often do, plead facts in the alternative, as the present Complaint does. Whether the Plan Committee was aware of the "true extent" of SunTrust's business practices is irrelevant to answering the question of whether the Monitoring Defendants had an obligation to remove the Benefits Plan Committee Defendants for imprudently investing the Plan's assets in Company Stock (the first prong of Count II). The second prong of Count II however rests upon the assumption that the Plan Committee Defendants did not appreciate the "true extent" of SunTrust's practices, and the Monitoring Defendants are liable for not ensuring that they were fully informed of the Company's business practices.
To the extent that the Plan Committee did not have access to non-public information concerning the Company or its Stock, Plaintiffs' Participant Disclosure Claim would fail as to the Plan Committee Defendants. The alternative scenarios created by the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint are: (1) the Plan Committee Defendants were not aware of the "true extent" of the Company's business practices, in which case Plaintiffs may be able to prevail on the Plan Committee Disclosure Claim, but would be unlikely to succeed on their Participant Disclosure Claim against the Plan Committee Defendants; and (2) the Plan Committee Defendants were aware of material non-public information concerning the Company and its Stock in which case Plaintiffs may prevail on their Participant Disclosure Claim, but may not prevail on the Plan Committee Disclosure Claim.



Disclosure Claim"). (Id. at ¶ 285(b)). This second prong, is best viewed as a disclosure claim, because it alleges that the Monitoring Defendants possessed material information about the Company that they failed to share with the Plan Committee, rather than a classic ERISA monitoring claim.

The Complaint also alleges that the Monitoring Defendants breached their fiduciary duties through "the Company's failure to properly account for and to disclose its exposure to losses tied to the illiquidity of mortgage-backed securities and its business operations in the declining real estate market. . . ." (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 285(c)). Presumably, this allegation refers to a failure to disclose necessary information to the Plan Committee Defendants. To the extent it refer to a failure to disclose information to Plan Participants, it is duplicative of the Participant Disclosure Claim.

A. Monitoring Claim

Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim of failure to monitor without demonstrating that those to be monitored were acting imprudently. The Court has held that the Plan Committee did not breach its fiduciary duty of prudence with regards to its investment of the Plan's assets in Company Stock. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Monitoring Claim, which depends on the investment of Plan assets in Company Stock being imprudent as a matter of law, fails along with Plaintiffs' Investment Claim. See Smith, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 ("Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim of failure to monitor when those to be monitored were acting prudently."); CCE, 2007 WL 1812011 at *11 ("Because the Court has determined that the Plan's investment in CCE stock was prudent as a matter of law . . . there can be no cause of action for failure to monitor a fiduciary's conduct with respect to that investment."). Therefore, the first prong of Count II contending that the Monitoring Defendants failed to supervise the Plan Committee by failing to evaluate their performance and failing to remove individuals from the Benefits Plan Committee for their continued imprudent investment of Plan assets in SunTrust Stock, fails as a matter of law and is DISMISSED.

B. Plan Committee Disclosure Claim

Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Count II also alleges a disclosure claim, based upon an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the Monitoring Defendants for their failure to disclose material negative information about the Company to the Plan Committee Defendants. The Court in Smith noted that if members of the board of directors "had failed to disclose material information relating to [the defendant's] financial health, it may be plausible to argue that they should be liable for failing to inform the Investment Committee." 422 F. Supp. at 1327. However, in that case the plaintiff's allegations of failure to disclose were too vague and conclusory to sustain a claim against the defendants. Id. The same cannot be said for Plaintiffs' claims

in this case. The allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint are sufficient at this stage to state a claim that the Monitoring Defendants possessed information that they had an obligation to share with the Plan Committee. (See e.g., Dkt. [58] at ¶¶ 157, 162, 163, 185).

Other courts have also recognized that a fiduciary has a duty to disclose to other fiduciaries material information that it knew, but others did not, if necessary to protect the plan. In setting forth conclusions of law as to "Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA," one district court noted:

15. Even if not asked, ERISA fiduciaries must make "full and complete" disclosure and "communicate material facts affecting the interests of beneficiaries." Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2000).
16. This duty to provide material information arises under ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Bowerman, 226 F.3d at 590. This duty requires disclosure to other fiduciaries acting on behalf of the plan's beneficiaries. Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund, 93 F.3d at 1182 (3rd Cir. 1996); Midwest Community Health Service, Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co., 255 F.3d 374, 379 375-6 (7th Cir. 2001).
Keach v. U.S. Trust Co. N.A., 313 F. Supp. 2d 818, 864 (C.D. Ill. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor in Support of Appellant at 25 In re Citigroup ERISA Litig. (No. 09-3804-cv 2d Cir. (Dkt. [84-3])) ("Fiduciaries likewise operate under an obligation to disclose their knowledge to other fiduciaries, particularly where necessary to correct misconceptions that at least some of the fiduciaries allegedly helped disseminate, as is alleged here." (citation omitted)); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 662-63 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that the complaint stated a claim for defendants' failure to inform co-fiduciaries about the company's actual financial status); In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("When a corporate insider puts on his ERISA hat, he is not assumed to have forgotten adverse information he may have acquired while acting in his corporate capacity. Plaintiffs' allegation that [defendant] failed to disclose to the Investment Fiduciary and the other investing fiduciaries material information he had regarding the prudence of investing in WorldCom stock is sufficient to state a claim.").

Defendants maintain that the claims in Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint are only proper as to SunTrust's CFO, as he was the only one responsible for appointing the members of the Plan Committee. (Dkt. [78] at 28-29). This argument is better suited for Plaintiffs' Monitoring Claim, which the Court has already determined fails to state a claim as a matter of law. As for the Plan Committee Disclosure Claim, the Court cannot say that Defendant Chancy, SunTrust's CFO, was the only Defendant that had a fiduciary duty to communicate to the Plan Committee negative material information about the company. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Director Defendants and the Compensation Committee Chairman, as named or de facto fiduciaries, also had an obligation to disclose material negative information to the Plan Committee. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Complaint sufficiently states a claim against the Director Defendants, the Compensation Committee Chairman, and Defendant Chancy, for failure to disclose material negative information about the company to the Plan Committee. Plaintiffs' claims in Count II against Defendant SunTrust, based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, fail as a matter of law and are DISMISSED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [78] Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

VI. Co-Fiduciary Liability

Both Counts I and II contain allegations of co-fiduciary liability against the Defendants named therein. Count I states that all the Defendants "breached their co-fiduciary obligations by, among their other failures: knowingly participating in, or knowingly undertaking to conceal, the other Defendants failure to disclose crucial information regarding the severe mismanagement of the Company and the imprudence of the Company Stock." (Dkt. [58] at ¶ 275). Count II states that the "Monitoring Defendants are also liable as co-fiduciaries because they knowingly participated in each other's fiduciary breaches as well as those by the monitored fiduciaries, they enabled the breaches by these Defendants, and they failed to make any effort to remedy these breaches, despite having knowledge of them." (Id. at ¶ 286).

ERISA imposes liability upon a fiduciary for another fiduciary's breach of duty with respect to the same plan in the following circumstances:

(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in the administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled some other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).

The Court has found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead primary claims of breach of fiduciary duty against the Director Defendants, the Compensation Committee Defendants, the Plan Committee and Investment Sub-Committee Defendants. Plaintiffs have not adequately plead any primary claims against SunTrust and therefore cannot adequately plead any co-fiduciary liability as to those that Defendant. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint adequately pleads that the remaining Defendants knew of the Company's problems and improper practices, but failed to take any effort to remedy existing breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Therefore, at a minimum Plaintiff has adequately alleged co-fiduciary liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [78] Plaintiffs' claims of co-fiduciary liability set forth in Counts I and II is GRANTED as to Defendant SunTrust and is otherwise DENIED.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Oral Argument [102] is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [78] is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The following claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim as a matter of law: Plaintiffs' Investment Claim, stated as part of Count I; Plaintiffs' False Information Claim, stated as part of Count I; and Plaintiffs' Monitoring Claim, stated as part of Count II. Plaintiffs' Participant Disclosure Claim, stated as part of Count I, is properly alleged against the Director Defendants, the Compensation Committee Defendants, and the Benefits Plan and Investment Sub-Committee Defendants. Plaintiffs' Benefits Plan

Committee Disclosure Claim, stated as part of Count II, is properly alleged against the Director Defendants, the Compensation Committee Chairman, and Defendant Chancy. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged co-fiduciary liability against all Defendants other than SunTrust.

The remaining parties shall submit a proposed scheduling order to the Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order.

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IN RE SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. ERISA LITIGATION (N.D.Ga. 10-25-2010)
(Oct 25, 2010)