Malicious prosecution — Termination of criminal prosecution — Assessment of part of costs upon defendant — Evidence — Malice — Probable cause — Verdict — Amount — Excessiveness.
1. The fact that the defendant in a criminal prosecution is directed to pay one-half of the costs, although he is acquitted, is not a bar to an action by him for malicious prosecution.
2. In an action for malicious prosecution, in which it appeared that plaintiff had been acquitted on a charge of larceny of certain fixtures from a house belonging to defendant which had been occupied by plaintiff, the evidence was on appeal held sufficient to sustain findings of malice and want of probable cause on the part of defendant and to support a verdict for plaintiff.
3. Verdict in the amount of $500 held not excessive, especially where there was evidence which warranted the submission of the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Argued May 6, 1936.
PER CURIAM, July 10, 1936:
The judgment is affirmed on the opinion of Judge GRAY of the court below. The facts as stated in that opinion distinguish this case from Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Co., 315 Pa. 465, 173 A. 411; Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa. 518, 178 A. 831; and Alianell v. Hoffman, 317 Pa. 148, 176 A. 207, recently decided by the Supreme Court, and relied on by appellant. MacDonald v. Schroeder, 214 Pa. 411, 63 A. 1024; Randall v. Fenton Storage Co., 117 Pa. Super. 212, 177 A. 575, and Farneth v. Commercial Credit Co., 313 Pa. 433, 169 A. 89, give support to the ruling of the court below.
Judgment affirmed.