PER CURIAM.
The evidence of the plaintiff, if believed, is sufficient to sustain the verdict in this case, and it is evident that the jury believed that evidence. The charge of the Court was free from harmful error, for it is not reversible error for the Court to refrain from charging the jury upon all the deductions which the jury could draw from all the facts and circumstances in a case. Counsel ordinarily have the right to argue to the jury their own conception of what reasonable deductions should be drawn from facts in evidence and it is not necessary to this end that the Court point out all the deductions that might reasonably be drawn from these facts.
The judgment below is affirmed.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I accept as the law of the case the opinion of the majority on the last appeal that the facts presented by that record made out a case for the submission of the issue whether Campbell acted in extremis. But the record now made is not the same, the facts do not raise the issue, and the charge as given was highly confusing and prejudicial. I think the judgment should be reversed, and I dissent from its affirmance.